Joseph H. Johnston v. Tennessee State Election Commission, et al.
This appeal requires us to consider whether the plaintiff can bring a declaratory judgment action against the Tennessee State Election Commission in chancery court. We have reviewed the relevant authorities and have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Daniel Mayo, II
A jury found the Defendant, Roy Daniel Mayo II, guilty of one count of attempted burglary, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of six years in prison. The Defendant does not challenge his misdemeanor convictions. On appeal, he asserts that his evading arrest conviction should be reversed because the trial court’s jury instructions did not require the jury to find that the Defendant’s flight took place while he was operating the motor vehicle. Given the facts surrounding the Defendant’s conviction, in particular the proof regarding whether his flight was by means of a vehicle or on foot, we conclude that the jury instructions failed to fairly submit the legal issues and misled the jury as to the applicable law and that the error was not harmless. We accordingly reverse the Defendant’s felony evading arrest conviction, and we remand for new trial on that charge. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly E. Lapinsky v. Janice E. Cook et al.
Kimberly E. Lapinsky (“Plaintiff”) appeals the order of the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Janice E. Cook, Kevin D. Cook (“the Cooks”) and Brenda Brewster (“Brewster”) in this lawsuit that arose from the sale of a house by the Cooks to Plaintiff. Plaintiff raises issues on appeal with regard to whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to allow Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery prior to ruling on the motions for summary judgment. The Cooks raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying their motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery, that the defendants made properly supported motions for summary judgment, and that Plaintiff failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. As the Cooks and Brewster made properly supported motions for summary judgment and are entitled to summary judgment, we affirm the grants of summary judgment. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for attorney’s fees. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Arvidson Richards v. Neil Kingsland Richards
In this divorce action, Penny Arvidson Richards (Wife) argues that the trial court’s judgment granting her a divorce and incorporating the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (MDA) should be set aside. Among other things, Wife alleges that she signed the MDA under duress and/or while she lacked the requisite mental capacity to do so. The trial court ruled that Wife failed to prove her defenses to the enforcement of the MDA. Wife appeals. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy B. Bernal
A Maury County jury found the Defendant, Guy B. Bernal, guilty of rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) his right against self-incrimination was violated when the trial court did not conduct a proper Momon hearing; (2) the convicting evidence is insufficient; and (3) his twelve-year sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Oscar C. Wells
The defendant, Oscar C. Wells, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2002 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Jones
The defendant, Jeremy Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed an effective term of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court failed to ensure an impartial jury venire; and (3) he is entitled to relief due to cumulative error at trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3 to check the box indicating that the defendant was found guilty in that count. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Elizabeth D.
The custodians of a child filed a petition in Greene County Circuit Court to terminate the parental rights of the Father to the child, who had resided with the Custodians since birth; at the time of the hearing on the petition, the Father was incarcerated in Florida. Following a three-day hearing extending over one month, the court entered an order holding that Father failed to visit or support the child within the four months preceding his incarceration and terminating Father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment. Father appeals, asserting that the conduct of the hearing denied him his due process right to meaningfully participate in the termination proceeding and that the record does not support the determination that he willfully failed to visit or support his child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Randall E. Pearson, M.D. et al. v. Paul Koczera et al.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s determination that it was without jurisdiction, following a prior appeal in the same matter, to act upon a motion seeking to alter or vacate an order entered after remand. The administrator ad litem for the third-party plaintiff has appealed from the trial court’s order determining that it lacked jurisdiction to act on her motion following remand. We determine that the trial court did possess jurisdiction to act on pending motions following the remand from the appellate courts. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for further proceedings. We also vacate the trial court’s order granting sanctions against the administrator ad litem for filing her motion to alter or vacate. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
James F. Logan, Jr. et al. v. The Estate of Mildred Cannon et al.
This case involves a one-quarter ownership interest in an unimproved 7.18-acre tract of real property located in Bradley County, Tennessee (“the Property”). The plaintiff, attorney James F. Logan, Jr., asserts that he purchased a one-quarter interest in the Property from Sam and Mildred Cannon in 1974. Sam and Mildred Cannon were divorced in 1979, and Mr. Cannon remarried. Upon Mr. Cannon’s death in 2002, he was survived by his second wife, Yvonne, and two adult children from his marriage to Mildred Cannon. Prior to commencement of this action, Yvonne Cannon conveyed any interest she had in the disputed property to Mr. Logan via quitclaim deed. Mr. Logan, together with co-plaintiffs, who are co-tenants of the Property not participating in this appeal, subsequently filed this action in February 2011, seeking declaration of ownership in Mr. Logan’s name and clear title concerning his claimed one-quarter interest in the Property. They named as defendants Mildred Cannon; her daughter, both individually and in her capacity as trustee for Sam and Mildred Cannon’s son; and a successor trustee. The plaintiffs acknowledged that no deed reflecting Sam and Mildred Cannon’s purported conveyance to Mr. Logan had been recorded or could be produced. In the alternative, the plaintiffs pled adverse possession. Mildred Cannon died in September 2011, and her estate was substituted as a party in this action. The parties subsequently filed competing motions for summary judgment, with the defendants alleging that Mr. Logan’s claim could not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and the plaintiffs amending their complaint to add alternative equitable theories of constructive trust and/or resulting trust. Following hearings, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Mr. Logan appeals. We affirm the trial court’s findings that the evidence cannot satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds or give rise to a constructive or resulting trust. We determine, however, that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Mr. Logan’s claim of adverse possession, and we remand for further proceedings concerning this claim. We also determine that the trial court improperly found statements in an affidavit presented by an employee of Mr. Logan’s law firm to be inadmissible. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Shettles
The Defendant, James Shettles, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for which he is serving a four-year workhouse sentence on probation. See T.C.A. § 30-13-102 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013). On appeal he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a recording of a 9-1-1 call, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to remove a juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Caney Fork Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization
The Tennessee Attorney General opined that a tax exemption in favor of electric cooperatives found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-25-122(a) violates Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Board of Equalization began proceedings to recalculate the taxes of the electric cooperatives. Several electric cooperatives objected and maintained that the exemption under Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-25-122(a) was valid. The Board recalculated their taxes anyway. The electric cooperatives appealed. Although the Board of Equalization cannot rule on the constitutionality of the statute, we can. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-25-122(a) violates Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In re: Beckwith Church Of Christ
In this case, two former members of a dissolved church filed a petition seeking permission to sell the improved real property formerly occupied by the church and donate the money to a nonprofit Bible school or, in the alternative, to convey the property directly to the school. The petitioners filed suit against unknown former members of the church and obtained permission to serve the unknown respondents by publication in a local newspaper. After publication of the action, no responsive pleadings were filed, and the petitioners obtained a default judgment. Before the default judgment became final, a descendant of the original owners of the real property filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and dismiss the petition based on insufficient service of process. The court granted the motion, set aside the default judgment, and dismissed the petition with regard to the descendant. On appeal, the petitioners argue: (1) the chancery court erred in finding constructive service insufficient; (2) that the descendant waived his objections to service of process by filing a notice of appearance; and (3) that the descendant should be estopped from setting aside the judgment because he delayed asserting his rights. Upon review of the record, we conclude that service of process on the descendant was insufficient and that the descendant’s conduct did not preclude him from setting aside the void judgment. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Jason S., et al.
This case involves termination of the parental rights of a mother and father to their three children. Following a report of drug exposure and environmental neglect, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) obtained emergency temporary custody of the children. Approximately nine months after the children were removed from the parents’ home, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. The petition also sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the additional ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit, and it sought to terminate the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent. The juvenile court found all grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Although we conclude that DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the children by willful failure to visit, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Dewight Washington v. State of Tennessee
Anthony Dewight Washington (“the Petitioner”) appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to file a motion asking for the recusal of the trial judge, failing to file a motion to suppress evidence from a search of the Petitioner’s home, and failing to communicate with the Petitioner, investigate witnesses, and develop a trial strategy or defense. The Petitioner argues that counsel’s deficiency prejudiced him because, but for the deficiencies, he would have accepted the State’s plea offer instead of proceeding to trial. Upon thorough review of the appellate record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re C.C. et al.
The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking, on the basis of four grounds, to terminate the parental rights of H.C. (Mother) to her four children, C.C., D.C., A.D., and S.D. (collectively the Children). In the same petition, DCS also sought to terminate, on three grounds, the parental rights of B.D., Mother’s long-time boyfriend and father of two of the Children, i.e., A.D. and S.D. (collectively the twins).The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, three grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights and three grounds to terminate B.D.’s parental rights. By the same quantum of proof, the court found that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Mother and B.D. (collectively the parties) appeal. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary David Strickland
Defendant, Zachary David Strickland, was convicted of initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and sentenced to ten years of incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal. In the interests of justice, we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. However, upon review of the evidence presented at trial, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tina Garrett v. State of Tennessee
In June 2013, the Petitioner, Tina Garrett, entered a “best interests” guilty plea to first degree murder in exchange for a life sentence. She subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Lewayne Morton
The trial court found that the Defendant, Timothy Lewayne Morton, violated the conditions of his two-year probation when he was arrested for disorderly conduct and public intoxication. The Defendant pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge prior to the revocation hearing. The Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of a violation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Envy J., et al.
Mother appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights. The trial court terminated her parental rights on the grounds that the children were victims of severe abuse and that mother had failed to financially support the children. The trial court also concluded that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was not clear and convincing evidence of abandonment by willful failure to support. But, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse and that termination was in the best interest of the children. Consequently, we affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jasmine B., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two minor children on the statutory grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann §§36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(2); and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal from Appellant’s home, Tenn. Code Ann.§36-1-113(g)(3). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zakkawanda Zawumba Moss a/k/a Face
A Lincoln County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Zakkawanda Zawumba Moss, of six counts of first degree premeditated murder, and he received consecutive sentences of life in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court’s refusing to allow the jury to view a child witness’s video-recorded interview denied him of his right to due process, that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of four witnesses into evidence, that the trial court should have granted his requests for a mistrial, that the trial court improperly admitted photographs into evidence that were overly prejudicial and cumulative, and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shiema Moniqueke Reid
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Shiema Moniqueke Reid, of perjury, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Connie Khonsabanh Vongphakdy
The Appellant, Connie Kohnsabanh Vongphakdy, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of theft $60,000 or more but less than $250,000; four counts of theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; and two counts of theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Appellant received a total effective sentence of eight years. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $178,300. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. The State concedes that the trial court did not consider the specific factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103 but contends that the trial court implicitly found that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and to serve as a deterrent. Upon review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and and remand for resentencing. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lavonta Laver Churchwell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lavonta Laver Churchwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide and resulting effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |