Roberta Piper, For Herself As Spouse And Widow Of Merle Piper, Deceased v. Cumberland Medical Center et al.
The plaintiff filed this health care liability action on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, alleging that his death was caused by the negligent care he received from the defendant hospital and physicians. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims because she failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(D) and (E). The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment of dismissal |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Moore & Associates Memphis LLC v. Greystone Homeowners Association Inc.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a declaration of covenants for a homeowners’ association. Appellant, the homeowners’ association, filed liens on lots owned by Appellee for nonpayment of association fees. Appellee brought suit to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. The trial court dismissed the slander of title claim and interpreted the declaration of covenants to exempt Appellee from the payment of association fees. The trial court removed the liens filed against Appellee’s lots, but assessed no monetary damages against Appellant. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Montrell Thompson
The Defendant, Kevin Montrell Thompson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Taliaferro
The Defendant, Brandon Taliaferro, was convicted of first degree murder in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101; -13-202(a)(2); -13-403(a). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to enter into evidence the entire tape-recorded conversation between the Defendant and a State‘s witness, the mother of his child, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, arguing that there was no proof that he intended to rob the victim or that he was criminally responsible for the actions of the person(s) who killed the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee Dewane Watts
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Lee Dewane Watts, of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the Defendant’s first degree murder convictions and ordered him to serve a life sentence for first degree murder and a consecutive twenty-five year sentence for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly sentenced him by ordering consecutive sentences and ordering the maximum sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it ruled that the Defendant’s prior convictions would be admissible should he testify. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fredonia Mountain Nature Homeowners Associations, Inc. v. David Anderson, et al
This is an appeal from the denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from judgment. On August 17, 2015, the trial court entered an order allowing Appellants’ counsel to withdraw. The order also provided Appellants thirty days to retain new counsel. Approximately one week after the order was entered, the case came up on a regularly scheduled docket call and was set for trial in November 2015. Although notice of the trial setting was sent to Appellants, they allege they never received it. The trial was held in the absence of Appellants, and a judgment was entered against them. Two months after the judgment was entered, Appellants filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion finding that there was no inadvertence, surprise or mistake that would justify the relief sought. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Wall
The Appellant, Jerome Wall, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the Shelby County Criminal Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appeals the ruling. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Lackland
Defendant, Brian Lackland, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in two separate indictments for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The indictments were consolidated for trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of simple assault, aggravated burglary, attempted first degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The charge for aggravated assault was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty-three years. Between the trial and the hearing on the motion for new trial, the victim signed an affidavit recanting his trial testimony. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, finding that the victim's recantation was not credible. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rochelle Bush v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rochelle Bush, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief in which she challenged her concurrent sentences of ten years at thirty percent for her aggravated robbery conviction and twenty years at one hundred percent for her especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she was denied her right to the effective assistance of counsel, which resulted in the trial court improperly enhancing her sentences. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelly D. Bush, et al v. Commerce Union Bank D/B/A Reliant Bank
Kelly D. Bush and Byron V. Bush, DDS (“the Bushes”) appeal the December 7, 2015 order of the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing their suit against Commerce Union Bank d/b/a Reliant Bank (“Reliant”). We find and hold that the doctrine of prior suit pending applies to this case, and therefore, the Trial Court correctly dismissed this suit. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Noel Nelson, et al v. Charles W. Myres, et al.
A woman died in a multi-vehicle accident. Two wrongful death actions were filed, one by the woman’s daughter, the other by the woman’s husband. The daughter’s suit named the husband and others as defendants. The husband’s suit named one of the other drivers as the only defendant. The trial court dismissed the daughter’s complaint, holding that Tennessee’s wrongful death statute creates only one cause of action and that the husband, as the surviving spouse, was granted priority to prosecute the action under the statute. The daughter appeals the dismissal of her complaint. Because the husband is unable to name himself as a defendant in the suit he has filed, he is not able to prosecute the wrongful death action in a manner consistent with the right of the decedent to sue all wrongdoers whose actions are alleged to have led to her death; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the daughter’s complaint, reinstate the complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry L. Faulkner
Defendant, Jerry L. Faulkner, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that relief was not available because his illegal sentence had expired and thus was not subject to correction under Rule 36.1. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Barnes v. U.S. Bank National Association
A musician/composer borrowed money from a bank and assigned performance royalties as collateral. He later filed for bankruptcy, and his debt to the bank was discharged. The bank, however, continued to collect royalties during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. The musician/composer filed suit against the bank seeking recovery of the royalties collected by the bank after the filing of the bankruptcy petition based on theories of unjust enrichment and conversion. The musician/composer also sought damages from the bank for violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bank moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion. Because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, we vacate the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric R. Wright v. Grady Perry, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Eric R. Wright, appeals the habeas court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging eleven reasons why the habeas court erred. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Rico Durant
A jury in the Montgomery County Circuit Court found the Appellant, Nicholas Rico Durant, guilty of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with premeditation and that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding premeditation was not sufficient to “satisfy state and federal constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Lamont Price
The Petitioner, Barry Lamont Price, appeals the Circuit Court of Madison County's summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jones
The defendant, Christopher Jones, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Heather Palumbo-Jones, and the abuse of her corpse, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to life imprisonment and two years to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing statements made by his wife as an exception to the hearsay rule, by allowing evidence of his prior abuse of the victim, and by admitting into evidence photographs of his wife’s charred body. Additionally, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Centerstone
Appellant, Centerstone, seeks review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to quash a judicial subpoena issued to Centerstone for the mental health records of the victim in an underlying criminal case. Centerstone argues that the judicial subpoena issued pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-17-123 is an invalid mechanism for discovery of mental health records made confidential by Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-3-103. After careful consideration, we conclude that access to the confidential mental health records must come by way of the procedure set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-3-105 rather than through a judicial subpoena issued pursuant to section 40-17-123. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Phillip Lester
Defendant, Jackie Phillip Lester, pled guilty to aggravated assault and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He was sentenced to six years, suspended to probation. Defendant violated probation, and the trial court ordered a partial revocation of the probationary sentence and service of eighteen months in incarceration. Defendant was released from incarceration and violated probation for the second time shortly thereafter. This time the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation, ordering him to serve the original six-year sentence. The trial court awarded Defendant credit for time served during the partial revocation and prior to sentencing on the full revocation. On appeal, Defendant complains that the trial court did not award him all his due jail credit. Because the proper method to address post-judgment jail credit is through the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act rather than an appeal to this Court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the case for the correction of a clerical error in the revocation order. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Phillip Lester-Dissenting
I agree with the majority that, generally, once an inmate is in the custody of the TDOC, the proper avenue to address sentence reduction credits is through the APA. State v. Henry, 946 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). However, our court has recognized unique circumstances which authorize the trial court to entertain requests for declaration of proper sentence credits. Id. (citing Matthew P. Finlaw v. Anderson County Jail, No. 03C01-9212-CR-0048, 1993 WL 310312, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 1993); State v. Christopher Oliver, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00447, 1993 WL 152408, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 1993)). I believe that the instant case calls for similar relief. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David W. Anderson v. Edward Poltorak, et al
This appeal arises from a civil action in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Defendants appeal contending the trial court committed reversible error by limiting their impeachment of Plaintiff regarding three felony convictions. After applying the balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 to determine if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court allowed Defendants “to question the plaintiff about whether he has been convicted of three felonies” but barred any questions about “the details regarding the nature of the convictions, types of convictions or the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions.” The dispositive issue is whether a party to a civil action has an absolute right under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 to impeach a witness with evidence of prior felony convictions including the details regarding the nature of his convictions, the types of convictions, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions. Defendants contend the evidence was admissible as a matter of right under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609; therefore, the trial court did not have the discretion to conduct a balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Having determined that the trial judge had the discretion to conduct a balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of Defendants’ impeachment of Plaintiff, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Byron J. Walker
The Defendant, Byron J. Walker, entered guilty pleas in 1998 in case numbers 98-01078, 98-01079, and 98-01252 to two counts of possession with the intent to sell cocaine and to one count of possession of marijuana. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent sentences of three years for each possession with the intent to sell cocaine conviction and sixty days’ confinement for the possession of marijuana conviction, for an effective three-year sentence. On January 26, 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct illegal sentences. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying relief, (2) the trial court erred in its application of the habeas corpus statute, (3) the trial court’s application of State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), as the basis for denying relief violated procedural due process, and (4) this court should overturn our supreme court’s holding in Brown. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Maddox P.
This appeal arises from a dispute over a residential parenting schedule. Joshua Parker (“Father”) filed a petition against Anna Marsh (“Mother”) in the Juvenile Court for Sumner County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to modify the parenting plan regarding their minor child, Maddox (“the Child”). Mother filed a counter-petition. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court made certain modifications to the existing parenting plan but otherwise left it in place. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing in part that the Juvenile Court should have established specific days each month that Father may exercise visitation with the Child. Father, an airline pilot, has a shifting work schedule. We hold that Mother’s requested schedule would have the practical effect of unduly limiting the Child’s time with Father and that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s requested modification. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Wayne Eskridge
The Appellant, William Wayne Eskridge, was convicted in the Washington County Criminal Court of driving under the influence with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or greater (DUI per se), and the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court violated his due process rights by summarily denying his motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing because he was not present for the hearing. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient but that the trial court committed reversible error by summarily denying the motion to suppress. Therefore, the Appellant‟s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan Cannady
Bryan Cannady (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, three counts of burglary, and one count of vandalism in the amount of $60,000 or more in Case 13-02653 and vandalism in the amount of $1,000 or more in Case 14-06122 and received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Corrections. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying probation or an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |