State of Tennessee v. Cedric Jones
Defendant, Cedric Jones, appeals his convictions for three counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated kidnapping and his total effective sentence of thirty-seven years. Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it revoked his bond for failure to appear; (3) that the trial court erred when it denied his motions for recusal; (4) that the trial court erred when it did not allow Defendant to represent himself at trial; (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (6) that the trial court erred during sentencing. Upon our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Dwayne Staggs v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Curtis Dwayne Staggs, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise the statute of limitations as a defense against his aggravated robbery charge and because counsel failed to request a jury instruction cautioning the jury to evaluate the weight and credibility of a witness’s testimony in light of the witness’s agreement with the State. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Dwayne Staggs v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion affirming the trial court’s denial of relief on the petitioner’s aggravated robbery conviction, which extends his life sentence an additional twelve years. With regard to this conviction, I agree with the petitioner’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the statute of limitations as a defense. Here, the petitioner’s indictment for aggravated robbery stated that the offense occurred on June 19, 1992. However, the indictment itself was not issued until July 29, 2010, eighteen years after the commission of the offense and ten years after the eight-year statute of limitations had expired. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402(b), 40-1-101(b)(2). The indictment was untimely on its face because the prosecution commenced well after the expiration of the limitations period. Even though counsel explained that he did not raise the statute of limitation as a defense because it is “on hold” when “the defendant either lives out of state or conceals the crime[,]” our law requires the State to plead specific facts in the indictment to toll the statute of limitations. State v. Davidson, 816 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tenn. 1991) (stating that the burden is on the State to “plead[] and prove[] that certain specific facts toll the statute of limitations”) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (“When an indictment or presentment is brought after the expiration of the statute of limitations, it must be pleaded and proved that certain specific facts tolled the statute of limitations.”); State v. Thorpe, 614 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (stating that in situations where a statute of limitations may be tolled, “the specific facts which toll the limitation period must be pleaded and proved”); State v. Comstock, 326 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. 1959) (“[W]here the indictment is brought after the period of limitations has expired, it must be pleaded and proved that certain specific facts toll the statute of limitations[.]”). The record shows that this was not done in this case. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dariun Bailey
Following a jury trial in Shelby County, Defendant, Dariun Bailey, was convicted of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He received concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for second degree murder, three years for aggravated assault, and two years for reckless endangerment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to notify him of the gunpowder residue kit and having the kit tested. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Jamar Norris v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Terry Jamar Norris, appeals the denial and dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, specifically asserting that the post-conviction court incorrectly dismissed his premature petition with prejudice and that his underlying McLaughlin/Huddleston issue is meritorious. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying and dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Milta Blanchard
Defendant, Milta Blanchard, filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that the judgments against him were illegal because he was out on bond in one of his cases when he was arrested on the three other cases. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and vacated three of the judgments against him. The trial court determined that the judgment for the offense for which Defendant was on bond was not illegal as it occurred first in time. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in correcting his illegal sentences on the concession of the State without first appointing counsel, holding a hearing, or providing him the opportunity to withdraw his plea. After review of the record and the briefs, we conclude that the trial court lacked authority to grant Defendant’s motion and that the judgments against Defendant should be reinstated. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Hayes
The Defendant, Lisa Hayes, was arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence and simple possession of marijuana. More than one year later, the Sullivan County General Sessions Court held a preliminary hearing, and the Defendant's case was bound over to the grand jury. Following her indictment for the offenses, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in the Criminal Court for Sullivan County, alleging that the prosecution was not commenced within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss. In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the trial court's ruling dismissing the case. Because no document in the record qualifies as a valid arrest warrant and the State failed to establish that the Defendant's first appearance in general sessions court was within the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Felicia Jones
The Defendant, Felicia Jones, was arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI) and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant consented to a bench trial in Sullivan County General Sessions Court and was found guilty of both offenses. The Defendant then appealed to the Sullivan County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against her, arguing that the affidavit of complaint filed after her arrest was void, that prosecution had never commenced in this matter, and that the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and the State now appeals. The State contends that the fact that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than a qualified judicial officer was a mere technical defect that had “no impact on validity.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael E. Stewart v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael E. Stewart, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence and his effective sentence of life plus eight years. The Petitioner contends that (1) the post-conviction court failed to make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to each ineffective assistance of counsel claim and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlin C. Goff
The defendant, Marlin C. Goff, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2005 convictions of rape of a child and failure to appear. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Craig Brueckheimer v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this pain management case, the employee received pain management treatment for more than ten years for a work-related injury pursuant to a judgment entered in November 2003. In April 2015, the employee’s treating physician advised him that he was retiring and moving to Florida, prompting the employee to contact his employer’s insurance carrier, who provided him with a panel of pain specialists two days later. The treating physician then made a referral to a different clinic to continue the employee’s treatment, so the employee declined to select a doctor from the panel while the insurance carrier declined to authorize the referred clinic. The employee filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Giles County, seeking to compel the insurance carrier to authorize treatment by the clinic. The trial court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees and travel expenses for a trip to Florida by the employee to see his previous physician. The insurance carrier has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by granting the employee’s motion. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Laquinton Brown
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, LaQuinton Brown, of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; two counts of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective twenty-two-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play a video showing him with a handgun because the video violated Rules 404(b) and 608(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentences in the range, by ordering consecutive sentencing, and by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Shell
In this appeal as of right by the State, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court dismissing the case as barred by the misdemeanor statute of limitations. Because no document in the record qualifies as a valid arrest warrant and no other event occurred to timely commence the prosecution in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tonya Halleen Blackwell v. Christopher S. Blackwell
In this post-divorce action, the mother sought modification of the father’s child support obligation due to a material change of circumstances. The trial court increased the father’s child support obligation but declined to order such modification effective as of the date the mother filed her petition to modify. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in failing to modify the father’s child support obligation effective as of the date of the petition’s filing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in that regard and remand for entry of a modified judgment retroactive to the date the mother filed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Rebecca Creswell Henegar v. Jason Adam Henegar
This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the grounds for the divorce, the division of marital property, the parenting plan, the calculation of child support and educational expenses, and attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Commerce Union Bank Brentwood, Tennessee D/B/A Reliant Bank v. Kelly D. Bush, et al.
This is a post-foreclosure action in which the lender seeks to recover a deficiency judgment, interest, and the costs of collection. In their answer, the borrowers asserted that the loan was a nonrecourse debt; thus, they were not liable for the deficiency. Alternatively, they asserted that the property sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than its fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the loan was a full recourse debt as to both borrowers. This determination was based on the finding, inter alia, that all parties intended the borrowers to be personally liable. The trial court also concluded that the lender was entitled to a deficiency judgment, finding that the borrowers failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the foreclosure sale price was equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118. The trial court awarded the lender a judgment of $640,783.41, plus interest and attorney’s fees, against the borrowers jointly and severally. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandan Dane Windrow
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brandan Dane Windrow, was convicted of aggravated assault involving the use or display of a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102; -14-408; -11-105. He received a total effective sentence of fourteen years to be served at thirty-five percent. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted intentionally or knowingly. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin O'Donnell Stone
In 2015, the Defendant, Kevin O’Donnell Stone, pleaded guilty to violating his probation in case numbers 2011-CR-486 and 2011-CR-103 and to possession of cocaine in case number 2013-CR-528. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his three-year sentence in confinement. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to a concurrent sentence of five years of incarceration for the possession of cocaine conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement instead of ordering an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharod Winford Moore
The Defendant, Sharod Winford Moore, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his request to present evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence; (4) that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge the jury with Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 42.09(a), designating Jason McCollum as an accomplice as a matter of law; (5) that the trial court erred in allowing an “incompetent” witness, Clifford Watkins, to testify; (6) that the trial court erred in denying a request to cross-examine Mr. Watkins regarding a previous arrest and subsequent determination by the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute that he was incompetent to stand trial; (7) that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to keep the State from eliciting testimony that the Defendant was a member of the Vice Lords gang; (8) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument “by misstating [the] law concerning the definition of reasonable doubt”; and (9) that the District Attorney General’s Office committed a Brady violation by providing defense counsel with “redacted ‘exculpatory’ witness statements,” foreclosing counsel’s ability to determine whether those “witness[es] could provide exculpatory testimony.” Following our review, we determine that the Defendant’s failure to timely file a motion for new trial results in waiver of all issues except for sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton
In this probate action, the executrix proposed to distribute the decedent’s real and personal property in a manner that she claimed was in accordance with the decedent’s Last Will and Testament (“Will”). One beneficiary, one of the decedent’s three adult children, objected, claiming that the decedent had granted her an option to purchase one parcel of real property owned by the decedent. The trial court determined that the real property in question was an asset of the probate estate and that the executrix could administer it in accordance with the decedent’s Will. The trial court also determined that a settlement agreement executed by the decedent’s three children precluded the claim of an option to purchase. The beneficiary appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-301, we vacate the trial court’s denial of the beneficiary’s requests for an inventory and accountings and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Young Colley v. John S. Colley, III
In this post-divorce action, Vanessa Young Colley (“Mother”) filed a petition for modification of the Permanent Parenting Plan (“Parenting Plan”) entered in connection with the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) seeking to change the decision-making authority with regard to educational decisions for the parties’ minor children. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Davisdon County (“the Trial Court”), inter alia, modified the Parenting Plan to change joint decision-making with regard to education to Mother having sole decision-making authority with regard to education. John S. Colley, III (“Father”) appeals the decision of the Trial Court raising issues with regard to the change in decision-making authority, the denial of Father’s petition for recusal, and the award to Mother of attorney’s fees, among other things. We find and hold that some of Father’s issues seek an advisory opinion, and we refuse to address those issues. With regard to the issue of recusal, we find no error in the Trial Court’s resolution of this issue. We further find and hold that Mother proved a material change in circumstances justifying a change in decision-making authority with regard to education and further proved that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother to have sole decision-making authority with regard to education. We, therefore, affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry K. King, et al v. Stephen S. Kelly
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to enforce two offers of judgment offered serially by the defendant. Because the trial court improperly certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul M. Martin v. Perma-Chink Systems, Inc.
This appeal arises from an age discrimination lawsuit brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). Paul M. Martin ("Martin") sued his former employer Perma-Chink Systems, Inc. ("Perma-Chink") in the Circuit Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court"). Martin alleged that he had been fired as a sales representative for Perma-Chink because of his age, then 60. The matter was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Martin. Perma-Chink filed an appeal to this Court, and Martin raises his own issues on appeal. Perma-Chink argues, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in admitting a chart ("the Chart") containing raw data of employee ages at their date of termination, and that Martin failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. We, inter alia, affirm the age discrimination judgment for Martin. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Wayne Ferguson
Defendant, Richard Wayne Ferguson, pled guilty to twenty-seven felonies and three misdemeanors for property-related crimes committed in November and December of 2014. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charlotte Pickel Wilson v. Jeremiah Pickel
This case involves a purportedly forged deed. Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a quit claim deed that was allegedly executed in favor of Appellant by his now deceased grandfather. The trial court found the signature on the deed was forged and not that of the grandfather. In so ruling, the trial court applied the preponderance of evidence standard. Because the correct standard is clear and convincing evidence, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |