In re Malaya B. et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Mother’s two children were removed from Mother on an emergency basis. A court later adjudicated the children dependent and neglected based on the stipulation of Mother. After the children had been in State custody for nearly eight months, the Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s rights—substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistent conditions. The court also concluded that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing that the evidence was not clear and convincing that there were statutory grounds for termination or that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Wayne Moore
The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Wayne Moore, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI) in exchange for a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation after the service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of his plea, Moore reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, which was based upon an alleged unconstitutional seizure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Reyes
The defendant, Jose Reyes, was convicted of one count of rape of a child and sentenced to thirty-two years at 100%. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict and that the trial court erred in several of its rulings. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred in: denying his motion in limine to prevent the Child Advocacy Center facility dog from being present with the victim as he was testifying; denying his motion to suppress his written statement and his motion in limine that the statement be excluded at trial; denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment; denying his motion for a continuance to locate a witness; denying his motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding his having sexual relations or watching pornography in the presence of the victim; denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; imposing an excessive sentence; and considering the victim impact statement, which included references to HIV, herpes, and gonorrhea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raines Brothers, Inc. v. H. Michael Chitwood, et al.
This is the second appeal in this contract action, which stems from the failure of the defendant, H. Michael Chitwood, to pay for construction work performed by the plaintiff, Raines Brothers, Inc. (“Raines”). The work was performed on a home occupied by Mr. Chitwood but owned by a trustee, James Dreaden, who was also named as a defendant in the original action. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Raines a judgment against Mr. Chitwood and Mr. Dreaden (collectively, “Defendants”) in the amount of $66,762.71. The trial court also awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum, beginning August 14, 2007. The trial court denied Raines's claim for attorney's fees. Following a timely appeal by Defendants, this Court determined that Raines adequately proved its entitlement to the trial court's judgment of $66,762.71 against Mr. Chitwood but reversed the trial court's judgment against Mr. Dreaden. This Court modified the trial court's award of the rate of interest from eighteen percent per annum to ten percent in accordance with relevant statutory and case law. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Lee Wheeler v. Alethia Danielle Wheeler
This appeal involves a mother’s post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan. The court below determined that while a material change of circumstances had occurred, modification of the plan was not in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Megan E. Smith v. Justin L. Smith
This is an appeal of an order modifying a party’s child support obligation. The trial court granted Appellee’s petition to downwardly modify her child support obligation based on a decrease in Appellee’s income. Appellant objected, arguing that Appellee was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court found that Appellee was not underemployed and determined Appellee’s income for the purpose of child support obligation by averaging the income she earned in each of her previous five positions. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brody., et al
This appeal concerns the propriety of a writ of certiorari granted by the Williamson County Chancery Court to review a protective custody order entered by the Williamson County Juvenile Court. The chancery court held that the protective custody order from the juvenile court was void and enjoined the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) from interfering with the paternal grandmother’s physical and legal custody of the minor children at issue. Because we are of the opinion that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s order, we vacate the judgment of the Chancery Court and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Frederick Hegel
The appellant, James Frederick Hegel, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to suspend the costs the court ordered he pay for his 2009 convictions of rape of a child and incest. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Scott Deadrick
The appellant, William Scott Deadrick, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to multiple counts of selling and delivering less than one-half gram of a Schedule II controlled substance within a school zone. The trial court merged some of the convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective eight-year sentence to be served at 100%. Subsequently, the appellant filed a motion for reduction of sentence, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Drew Gentry
Mary Drew Gentry (“the Defendant”) appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and imposing her three-year sentence for burglary. On appeal, the Defendant acknowledges that she violated probation but argues that the trial court should have imposed split confinement and community corrections rather than ordering her to serve her sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Micah England
The Defendant, Micah England, pleaded guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to carrying a weapon on school property, a Class E felony, with the length and the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1309 (2014) (amended 2015). The court sentenced the Defendant to two years' probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Walton v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant, an inmate at a state prison operated by a private contractor, filed the underlying pro se petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge the result of a disciplinary proceeding against him. The trial court dismissed the petition against the private contractor's employees on the ground that these employees could not impose punishment on the inmate under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-24-110(5) and were, thus, not proper parties to the petition. As to the Appellee Tennessee Department of Correction, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently and that the inmate had not stated a claim for violation of due process. We affirm and remand. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
In re Sophia P.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights filed by the minor child’s maternal grandmother and step-grandfather. During the trial court proceedings, the minor child’s natural father sought to have his paternity and parenting rights established. When the trial court denied the termination petition, it ordered the natural parents to attempt to agree upon a parenting plan. The trial court noted that it would enter a permanent parenting plan on its own if the parents could not reach an agreement. Because the record transmitted to us does not indicate that the trial court ever entered a permanent parenting plan, there is an absence of a final judgment in this case. We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Calvert Hugh Fletcher
This appeal stems from probate proceedings in the Putnam County Probate Court. During the course of the trial proceedings, an issue arose as to the ownership of a certificate of deposit titled in the decedent’s name. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that the certificate of deposit was, in fact, the property of the decedent’s estate. On appeal, the decedent’s surviving wife argues that because the funds within the certificate of deposit were derived from a joint marital account, they should have been impressed as entireties property. We agree and conclude that the funds in the certificate of deposit passed to the surviving wife upon the decedent’s death. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly reversed. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Navada N., et al.
Both Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s decision to terminate their parental rights to two children. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting several grounds against each parent and also found that termination was in the children’s best interest. With respect to the grounds for termination, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and affirm in part. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s determination that termination is in the children’s best interest, and therefore, affirm the termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children at issue. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Addison P.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and wanton disregard. Because the trial court entered an order during the proceedings that excluded wanton disregard as a ground and this ground was not tried by implied consent, we reverse the trial court's finding of wanton disregard. In addition, the trial court failed to make any finding that Mother's failure to visit the child was willful. Accordingly, we vacate this ground and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Helkie Nathan Carter
Helkie Nathan Carter (“the Defendant”) was indicted for the following counts: (1) driving under the influence (“DUI”)—third offense; (2) driving with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .08 or more (“DUI per se”)—third offense; (3) violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender statute; and (4) driving on a revoked license. The Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a mandatory blood draw was granted by the trial court. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal, arguing that the Defendant gave both actual and implied consent to the blood draw and that, if the good-faith exception is adopted in Tennessee, it should apply to this case. Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant’s actual consent was not freely and voluntarily given; Tennessee’s implied consent law does not, by itself, operate as an exception to the warrant requirement; and no exception to the warrant requirement justified the blood draw. We decline to adopt a good-faith exception. The judgment of the trial court suppressing the results of the warrantless blood draw is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Connie Arnold v. Doug Cook, Warden
The Petitioner, Connie Arnold, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged the legality of his judgments of conviction for rape of a child and aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The Petitioner asserts that his indictment and judgments of conviction are illegal and void on their face because the offense date listed in the documents is incorrect. Further, the Petitioner asserts that his judgment for rape of a child contains an illegal sentence, entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Faye Shipley Ex Rel. Frank Shipley v. Robin Williams
Health care liability action filed in November 2002 in which patient alleges that physician was negligent in failing to assess her condition, failing to provide proper medical care, failing to admit her to the hospital or refer her to another doctor, and failing to properly follow-up with her. The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims and, following an appeal to this court in which we reversed the grant of summary judgment on all claims, the Supreme Court reinstated summary judgment on the failure to admit claim and remanded the case for trial on the remaining claims. On remand, on the patient’s motion, the trial court set aside the summary judgment on the failure to admit claim, applying the “substantially different evidence” exception to the law of the case doctrine; following further discovery, the court reinstated summary judgment on that claim. After a trial, the jury found that the physician did not breach the standard of care and judgment was entered in her favor. Patient appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment on the failure to admit claim in 2006 and in reinstating the claim on remand; in restricting and excluding certain evidence at trial; in allowing evidence designed to shift blame from the physician to the patient and others; and in awarding sanctions against counsel for the patient. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Charles K. Jr., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent’s rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit, abandonment based upon each parent’s conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified in this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Joseph Wilkerson, III v. Charlene Monique Wilkerson
This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. Mother filed a petition in which she requested a modification to the permanent parenting plan. Father filed a counter-petition in which he requested to be named the primary residential parent of their children. The trial court found that Father failed to prove a material change in circumstance as necessary to change the primary residential parent designation and that Mother failed to prove a material change in circumstance as necessary to modify the permanent parenting plan. After reviewing the record, we find the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that there was no material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jon R. Ross v. Anna L. Rosswoods
This appeal involves a post-divorce parental relocation. The mother notified the father that she intended to relocate outside of Tennessee with the parties’ minor son. The father filed a petition opposing the relocation on the grounds that it would not be in the child’s best interest; the petition was filed outside the 30-day filing period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108. The trial court excused the untimely filing of the father’s petition, reasoning that the mother waived the defense by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense. After a hearing, the court found that the mother’s proposed move would not be in the child’s best interest. The mother now appeals. We conclude that the mother was not required to raise the untimely filing as an affirmative defense. Because the father failed to file a written petition opposing the mother’s relocation within 30 days of receiving notice of her proposed relocation, the trial court erred in conducting any further analysis under Section 36-6-108. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this Opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Epperson
The Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth Epperson, was charged by affidavit of complaint on November 28, 2012, for driving under the influence (DUI) second offense, violation of the open container law, violation of the implied consent law, driving on a revoked license, and improper display of a license plate. See T.C.A. §§ 55-4-110, 55-10-401, -406, -416, 55-50-504. Epperson entered guilty pleas to improper display of a license plate and violating the open container law and was convicted by a jury as to the remaining charges. On appeal, Epperson contends that the affidavit of complaint made against him was void and that the State therefore failed to initiate a prosecution against him within the statutory period. He contends that this error requires vacating his convictions. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his DUI conviction. Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Epperson's conviction for DUI. However, we agree with Epperson that the State failed to initiate a prosecution against him within the statutory period. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and vacate Epperson's convictions. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Clayton
The defendant, Jasper Clayton, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Blocker
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Maurice Blocker, as charged of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1); 39-14-103, -105(3) (Supp. 2011). Blocker was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and eight years, respectively. His sole argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |