Austin Davis v. Covenant Presbyterian Church of Nashville, et al.
Following the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60.02”). The trial court found no basis for setting aside the judgment under Rule 60.02 and denied the motion. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Bruce Chapman Bower
This appeal arises over a dispute regarding the terms of a trust. Bruce Chapman Bower (“Decedent”) died having executed a trust (“the Trust”), the primary asset of which was a lake house. Decedent's son, Christopher R. Bower (“Successor Trustee”), served as Successor Trustee. Decedent's widow, Denise Bower (“Widow”), objected to the appointment of Successor Trustee, and the parties engaged in litigation over various terms of the Trust. The Probate Court for Sevier County (“Trial Court”) found that, under the Trust, Widow was entitled to exclusive use of the lake house as well as payments of $2,000 per month. Successor Trustee appealed to this Court. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court in its interpretation of the terms of the Trust. We also modify the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Widow. The judgment of the Trial Court is modified, in part, and reversed, in part. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sergei A. Novikov
The defendant, Sergei A. Novikov, appeals his Wilson County Criminal Court bench conviction of criminal trespass, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ross Pruitt
Ross Pruitt (“the Defendant”) appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and imposing the balance of his two-year sentence for aggravated statutory rape. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement as opposed to split confinement with the added condition that his internet access be monitored and restricted while on probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Christopher Butler
The Defendant, Adam Christopher Butler, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of vandalism of property valued at $1000 or more. See T.C.A. § 39-14-408 (2014) (amended 2015). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective four years on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in excluding testimony relative to the victim's accusations against another person. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie Gordon v. Tractor Supply Company
Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently indicted for two criminal offenses based on statements given to police by two of Defendant’s employees at the Tractor Supply Company store in Lenoir City, Tennessee. When the criminal case went to trial, one of the charges was dismissed on the day of trial, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of the other charge. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action asserting several claims. Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion to summarily dismiss all claims. The trial court granted the motion as to three of the claims: malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the false imprisonment claim. As for the claims for malicious prosecution and negligent supervision, we have determined that material facts are disputed. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the claims for malicious prosecution and negligent supervision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Bradley Watts v. Colin Wade Watts
At issue is whether a trial court may award attorney’s fees that relate to a petition for criminal contempt when the contempt arises in the context of a child support proceeding. Mother filed a post-divorce petition asserting that Father was in criminal contempt for failing to satisfy his support obligations along with a petition seeking a judgment for child support arrearages and attorney’s fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Father guilty of one count of criminal contempt and found that Mother was entitled to a judgment for the unpaid child support. When Mother submitted her application for attorney’s fees, Father objected arguing that an award of attorney’s fees for the prosecution of the criminal contempt petition would violate his rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103(b) and Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following a hearing, the court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees related to the child support judgment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), which award is not at issue in this appeal. The court also awarded Mother the attorney’s fees she incurred in pursuit of the criminal contempt petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) because “the criminal contempt [petition] served a dual purpose of preserving the power and vindicating the dignity and authority of the law and the Court as well as collecting substantial amounts of child support for the benefit of the minor children.” While we recognize that a criminal contempt petition may serve as the catalyst for a delinquent parent to satisfy his or her child support obligations, the purpose of criminal contempt is to uphold the court’s authority, not to enforce the private rights of a party. Moreover, the criminal contempt statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103(b), expressly limits the punishment that a court may award, and it makes no provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees. Because attorney’s fees incurred in a petition for criminal contempt are not provided for by statute or other rule and the purpose of criminal contempt is to uphold the court’s authority, not to enforce the private rights of a party, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees related to the petition for criminal contempt. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Milli L. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, asserting that the evidence does not sustain the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and persistence of conditions as found by the court and does not support the finding that termination of Mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding that the record clearly and convincingly supports the grounds found by the court, as well as the finding that termination of Mother’s rights is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jayvien O.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned her four-year-old son by willfully failing to visit him and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larsheika Hill
The Defendant-Appellant, Larsheika Hill, entered a “best-interest” guilty plea on October 10, 2014, to the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. Prior to sentencing, Hill filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging that her attorney coerced her into pleading guilty. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Hill contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lajeanra E. Polk v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, LaJeanra E. Polk, filed a petition in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, seeking post-conviction relief because her counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carolyn Tillilie
This is a Rule 3 appeal of an order requiring the Appellant to post security for the care of three horses. Appellant was charged with cruelty to horses and ordered to post security for the care of the horses pending the resolution of her criminal charges. Appellant appealed. We determine that this is a criminal matter and therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Craig L. Beene v. Dan M. Alsobrooks
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district attorney general to furnish him with copies of records pertaining to his criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the district attorney general named in the petition had retired, that the statute did not require delivery of records to an incarcerated petitioner, and that the records had been provided in discovery and were no longer available to produce for inspection. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Christian P. et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to five minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory ground of the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. June Anne Wascher
The Defendant-Appellant, June Ann Wascher, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI) in exchange for an eleven-month and twenty-nine day probationary sentence, after service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of her plea, Wascher reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of her motion to suppress, which was based upon an alleged unconstitutional seizure. Following our review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delarris Jones a/k/a Cedrick Jones
The Defendant, Delarris Jones, also known as Cedrick Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; possessing a firearm as a person convicted of a felony involving the use of violence, a Class C felony; and possessing a firearm as a person convicted of a felony drug offense, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2014) (second degree murder); 39-13-102(a)(1)(iii) (Supp. 2011) (amended 2013, 2015) (aggravated assault); 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony); 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (felon in possession of a firearm); 39-12-101(a) (2014) (criminal attempt). The Defendant received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Butler
The Defendant, Terry Butler, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, three counts of official misconduct, a Class E felony, and two counts of official oppression, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (evidence tampering), 39-16-402 (2014) (official misconduct), 39-16-403 (2014) (official oppression). The trial court merged the three counts of official misconduct and sentenced the Defendant to an effective four years to be served on five years' probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the indictment for Count 3, official misconduct, was defective, and (3) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sammie Lee Taylor
The Defendant, Sammie Lee Taylor, was convicted in 1994 of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus sixty-two years. In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of illegal sentences. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Childress, et al. v. United Parcel Service Inc., et al.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal results from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellants’ did not provide the mandatory affidavit in support of their motion for recusal as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Caldwell, as power of attorney f/u/b of Leathy M. Johnson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, et al.
In this health care liability action, this Court granted the defendants' application pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to address two issues. We have determined that: (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) does not preempt Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f); and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendants' petition for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f) because it is undisputed that the defendants complied with the procedural requirements of subsection (f), and the plaintiff did not file an objection as permitted under the statute. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's decision and remand for the entry of a qualified protective order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John A. Jones, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John A. Jones, III, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief for the petition's being filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
An Anderson County jury found the Petitioner, Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr., guilty of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a violent offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by this Court and our Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr., 321 S.W.3d 501, 507-08 (Tenn. 2010). On remand, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a career offender to sixty years of incarceration, and this Court affirmed his sentence on appeal. State v. Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr., No. E2012-01023-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3833412, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Knoxville, July 22, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. He asserts that the post-conviction court erred: (1) when it denied his request for a continuance to allow him to locate material witnesses and to allow him to obtain new post-conviction counsel; and (2) when it determined that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Guy Michael Kapustka v. Courtney Rose Kapustka
In this post-divorce co-parenting action, the father filed a petition requesting modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan and a finding of contempt against the mother in the Montgomery County Chancery Court which had entered the parties’ divorce decree. In response to the father’s petition, the mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court find Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and that the court either dismiss the case or transfer it to Florida. Since entry of the divorce judgment, the mother and the parties’ minor child had resided in Florida. The father moved to Alaska at some point after entry of the divorce decree. The father filed a response objecting to the mother’s motion and asserting that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201, et seq., the trial court ultimately dismissed the father’s petition, determining that Tennessee was an inconvenient forum because no party resided in Tennessee, the mother’s alleged actions occurred in Florida, and the evidence necessary to resolve the issues would be unavailable in Tennessee. The father appeals, stating that the trial court erred in determining Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and thereby dismissing his action. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Tennessee is an inconvenient forum. However, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-222(c), we reverse the dismissal of the father’s petition and remand to the trial court for issuance of a stay and imposition of conditions the court may consider just and proper. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re American Bonding Company
The appellant, American Bonding Company, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order granting partial exoneration from the final forfeiture of a $200,000 bond and ordering the company to forfeit $75,000 of the bond. On appeal, the appellant argues that it is entitled to full exoneration of the forfeited bond because law enforcement requested that the company not attempt to apprehend the subject of the bond. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Omni Insurance Company A/S/O Lisa J. Earl v. Dennis R. Nickoloff
This appeal arises from an accident involving an automobile and a pedestrian that occurred in Anderson County. The pedestrian's insurer, as subrogee of the pedestrian, filed the instant action, alleging that the defendant driver should be held liable for negligence and negligence per se. Following a bench trial, the trial court assessed liability against the driver and awarded the pedestrian's insurer $50,000.00 in damages. The driver timely appealed. On appeal, the driver filed a statement of the evidence, approved by the trial court, that contains insufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals |