State of Tennessee v. Donald Biggs, Alias - Dissenting
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case, and therefore I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I want to make it clear that I do not dissent for the reason the sentence imposed by the trial court is the most appropriate sentence for the Defendant. In fact, had I been the trial judge, I would have been persuaded by the logic set forth in Judge Thomas' opinion to sentence the Defendant to an effective sentence of 22 years. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Wilson
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-one years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it required that he be represented by counsel at trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Norris
In this procedurally complex case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Norris, of second degree murder in 1999, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years of incarceration. After several proceedings and filings, discussed in detail below, the U.S. Sixth Circuit granted the Defendant habeas corpus relief unless the State allowed the Defendant to reopen his original direct appeal and raise an issue regarding whether his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The State allowed the Defendant to reopen his appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession to police because he gave his confession after being held for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause hearing. This Court addressed the issue pursuant to plain error review. State v. Terry Norris, No. W2000-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 6482823 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 18, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2015). The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for plenary review. The State filed a petition to rehear, which the Tennessee Supreme Court denied on May 15, 2015. After our plenary review, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Herrera v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard Herrera, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery and his effective one-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Wilks
The Petitioner, Terrance Wilks, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition requesting deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing pursuant to the 2001 Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-301 to -309. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he had not proven the statutory prerequisites for DNA analysis set forth in the Act. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Austin Davis v. Covenant Presbyterian Church of Nashville, et al.
A former church member brought suit against the pastor and other defendants not involved in this appeal. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the pastor with the exception of the causes of action for defamation and outrageous conduct. We have concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint does not make out claims for defamation or outrageous conduct. The decision of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint in in its entirety. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Americus C., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of parental rights to an adopted child. The boyfriend of the adoptive mother physically and sexually abused the child. Upon a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the adoptive mother had committed severe child abuse. The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The adoptive mother appeals claiming that she was not the perpetrator of the abuse and that she had not been given an opportunity to adjust her circumstances. We affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Clay | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Cohen v. Richard A. Demonbreun
This appeal arises from the dismissal of suit for unpaid fees. An expert and an attorney entered into a services agreement in March 2005. The expert first invoiced for his services in January 2006. Additional services were rendered after that date, and the expert sent additional invoices. Despite repeated requests from the expert and promises from the attorney, invoices went unpaid except for a small partial payment. On September 19, 2013, the expert filed suit against the attorney in general sessions court and obtained a default judgment. Attorney then appealed to circuit court. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Lisa Holt v. Jeremy B. Holt
The matters in dispute pertain to a retroactive child support judgment for a period of time prior to the filing of the child support petition. The trial court assessed a retroactive judgment that included a period of time prior to the filing of the petition, holding that the petition filed by the State on behalf of Mother was to “set” child support not to “modify” support. Father contends a prior support order was in effect when the petition was filed; thus, the trial court violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) by awarding a judgment based on an increase in child support for several months prior to the filing of the petition. In the trial court the State insisted that the petition was to set support; however, on appeal, it concedes that a child support order was in effect when this petition was filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) directs that a judgment for child support shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or amounts prior to the date a petition for modification is filed. Therefore, we vacate the retroactive child support judgment and remand for the trial court to calculate the judgment from the date the petition to modify support was filed. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Eileen F. Carman Ex Rel. Rodney Carman v. Tracy L. Carman-Thacker
The defendant appealed from a judgment entered on May 12, 2014, and a post-judgment order entered on October 2, 2014. Because the defendant did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lionel R. Lindsey
The Petitioner, Lionel R. Lindsey, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Libertad Claborn v. Bobby L. Claborn
In 2013, Libertad Claborn (Wife) obtained a “default judgment for dissolution of marriage” from a trial court in Illinois. Wife had resided in Illinois since 2011. The Illinois court ordered the sale of the marital residence in Chattanooga and directed Bobby L. Claborn (Husband) to “cooperate fully” in the sale. The Illinois judgment also ordered Husband to pay child support and educational expenses for the parties’ children. Wife properly enrolled the judgment in Tennessee and sought its enforcement. The trial court in Tennessee accorded full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment. Husband appeals, arguing that (1) the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale of the marital residence; (2) the foreign judgment contains provisions at odds with Tennessee public policy; (3) the trial court improperly declined to transfer the matter to chancery court; and (4) the trial court entered a “default” judgment without allowing him to present defenses. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Winters v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Winters, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashley Marie Pretzer
The trial court granted judicial diversion for the Defendant, Ashley Marie Pretzer, on several drug-related charges in an eighteen-count indictment. The Defendant agreed to be on supervised probation for a period of eight years. Two years later, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit with the trial court alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of her probation by failing a drug screen. The trial court issued a probation violation warrant, and, thereafter, the police arrested the Defendant for driving under the influence, failing to prove financial responsibility, and possessing drug paraphernalia. The Defendant’s probation officer amended his affidavit to include these new charges. The trial court held a hearing on the Defendant’s alleged probation violations during which she admitted to the violations. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion and sentenced her to serve a sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, she contends that the trial court improperly required her to serve the balance of her sentence rather than reinstate her sentence of probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ewin B. Jenkins et al v. Big City Remodeling et al.
The plaintiffs filed this action to recover damages they incurred when, during construction, their home was completely destroyed by fire. The plaintiffs sued the project's general contractor as well as various subcontractors employed by the general contractor. The complaint included allegations of negligence, based in part on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the general contractor regarding claims based upon the general contractor's own negligence and res ipsa loquitur, but we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment regarding the negligence of the flooring subcontractors. We also reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor regarding the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. Finally, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Ewin B. Jenkins et al v. Big City Remodeling et al. - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. What was the proximate cause of the fire and explosion that led to this lawsuit? That was the central question before the trial court. The plaintiffs' theory on this subject is correctly set forth in the majority's opinion: . . . [the plaintiffs] asserted that Flooring Subcontractors [(the subcontractors)] allowed flammable rags to remain on or near the exterior deck and also smoked cigarettes in the area. As claimed by [the plaintiffs], the improper disposal of cigarette butts resulted in the stain-soaked rags igniting, thereby causing the fire. The subcontractors were on the construction site to “stain[ ] . . . the hardwood floors.” In my judgment, the problem in this case is an absence of evidence showing a nexus between the subcontractors' conduct – negligent as it certainly was – and the fire. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Perry L. McCrobey
Defendant, Perry L. McCrobey, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State concedes that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing Defendant’s motion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the motion and remand for appointment of counsel if Defendant is indigent and for other proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jordan Leanne (Parker) Roland v. Ryan Lee Roland
Mother and Father are the parents of two minor children. Mother and Father each filed a complaint for divorce and sought to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court designated Father the primary residential parent and created a permanent parenting plan that was materially different from the plan proposed by either party. The court also entered a child support order. Mother appealed the trial court’s judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) designating Father the primary residential parent; (2) setting up the residential schedule and parenting plan based entirely on Father’s work schedule, with the result that Mother has the children only one day at a time; and (3) imputing a higher income to her for child support purposes than is warranted by the evidence. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent, but we vacate the trial court’s residential plan and child support order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Historic Sylvan Park, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, et al
Residents of the Sylvan Park neighborhood of Nashville filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of a decision by the Metropolitan Planning Commission to recommend that the Metropolitan Council disapprove an ordinance which would expand the historic conservation overlay district in the neighborhood. The Planning Commission moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the Planning Commission’s decision “was only a recommendation and not a ‘final order’ from which an appeal may be taken with a writ of certiorari.” The court granted the motion, holding that the decision by the Planning Commission was not a final order, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Residents appeal. Because the Metropolitan Council must take further action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation before the zoning ordinance is enacted, the decision of the Planning Commission is not a final order or judgment for purposes of judicial review; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Malina W., et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, the father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his two daughters on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support the children in the four consecutive months preceding his incarceration and conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The father also asserts the court erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We fail to find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the father abandoned the children by failing to visit or support them in the four months preceding his incarceration; however, we affirm the trial court’s finding that father engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. Likewise, we affirm the court’s best interest determination. The trial court’s finding that father’s parental rights should be terminated is affirmed. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Frances E. Miller Ex Rel. Arnold Edward Miller, Sr. v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center, et al.
Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice action on September 8, 2011, pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“the TMMA”) against Cookeville Regional Medical Center, which is a governmental entity subject to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The Medical Center filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), to support its assertion that Plaintiff’s suit was untimely filed because it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the GTLA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). Plaintiff responded contending that the Cunningham decision should be applied prospectively only, so as to preserve Plaintiff’s claim as timely. The trial court found the decision in Cunningham controlling and dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Dewayne Echols v. Elke Monika Echols
This appeal arises from a divorce involving a challenge to the validity of the marriage. Marvin Dewayne Echols (“Husband”) filed suit for divorce against his wife Elke Monika Echols (“Wife”) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). Husband later alleged that his marriage to Wife was void. Husband and Wife had married shortly after a German court had pronounced Wife divorced, and Husband’s position is that Wife’s divorce was not yet legally binding under German law when they married in Kentucky. The Trial Court, among other things, found the marriage valid and granted the parties a divorce. Husband raises several issues on appeal, chief among them the issue of the validity of the marriage in the first place. We hold that Husband failed to prove that his marriage to Wife was invalid. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Holtsclaw et al v. Darrell Johnson et al.
This is a dispute over a narrow strip of real property adjacent to the boundary line of tracts of land owned by plaintiffs Wayne Holtsclaw and Willie Holtsclaw and defendants Darrell Johnson and Brenda Johnson. The Holtsclaws brought this action seeking ejectment and a declaration that they owned the disputed property. The Johnsons asserted, among other things, that they were entitled to the property because of their many years of adverse possession. The Holtsclaws responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 (2000 & Supp. 2015) bars the Johnsons' adverse possession claim because, for more than twenty years, the Johnsons had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. The Johnsons responded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tenn. 2007), which held that § 28-2-110 is not applicable “when the tracts are contiguous, a relatively small area is at issue, and the adjacent owners making claims of ownership have paid their respective real estate taxes,” applied in this case. The trial court ruled that the Johnsons established ownership by adverse possession and that the “Cumulus exception” applies. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Cody Cofer v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cody Cofer, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Cumberland County. He was convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received consecutive life sentences and a concurrent twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Guy Ratledge v. Langley Enterprises, LLC, et al.
The employee fell from a roof in the course of his employment and sustained fractures of his left leg. The injury required three surgical procedures, including a fusion of his injured ankle, which resulted in the shortening of one leg. He asserted that his altered gait from the leg injury has caused disability to his lower back and that the permanency of his injuries has resulted in severe clinical depression. When the employee and the employer were unable to resolve the issue of workers' compensation benefits, the employee filed suit. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court found that the leg injury extended to the body as a whole and, further, that the employee, who had been unable to return to work, was entitled to an award of benefits in excess of six times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 (2008 & Supp. 2013). The employer appealed, contending that the trial court erred by assigning disability to the body as a whole and by awarding a 90% vocational disability, which is in excess of six times the anatomical disability of 12%. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel |