State of Tennessee v. Tasha Briggs
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Tasha Briggs, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class E felony, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions for possession of a controlled substance and sentenced the appellant to an effective four-year sentence to be served as three years in confinement followed by one year on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea for the offense of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error regarding the instruction and that the case must be remanded for a new trial on the charge of possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. Moreover, upon remand, the trial court is to enter a single judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eliot Russell
The defendant, Eliot Russell, was convicted of one count of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed twelve-year sentences for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted rape of a child and that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-four year sentence. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Avenue Bank v. Guarantee Insurance Company
Appellee Avenue Bank (“the Bank”) filed suit against the Appellant Guarantee Insurance Company (“GIC”), alleging breach of contract with respect to a “Funds Held Agreement” entered into between the parties. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Bank agreed to disburse proceeds of a letter of credit to GIC. In turn, GIC agreed to hold the funds in a separate “Funds Held Account” and disburse the funds to pay unpaid premiums and certain claims that might become payable pursuant to policies of workers' compensation insurance. The agreement further provided that upon the resolution of all workers' compensation claims filed within the applicable statute of limitations period, GIC would, upon request of the Bank, return to the Bank any funds remaining in the Funds Held Account. Following the resolution of all claims filed within the limitations period, the Bank demanded the repayment of the remaining balance. GIC failed to comply with this demand. In its answer, GIC alleged that it was unable to perform in light of a Delaware court order concerning the liquidation of a third-party, Ullico Casualty Company (“Ullico”). It contended that the terms of the Delaware order barred disbursement of the funds at issue. The Bank ultimately moved for judgment on the pleadings by asserting that the undisputed facts showed that it was entitled to relief. The trial court granted the motion and concluded that the facts admitted by GIC's answer established the Bank's right to recover on its breach of contract claim. In doing so, the trial court rejected GIC's arguments that Ullico's liquidation and/or the Delaware court order had any effect on its performance. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristy L. Poland
Kristy L. Poland (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at over $500 and was sentenced to one year suspended to supervised probation with restitution to be set by the trial court. After a hearing on the issue of restitution, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $8,100 in monthly installments of $75. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider her current financial resources and future ability to pay restitution. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we modify the trial court‟s restitution order and remand the case for entry of a new restitution order. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristy L. Poland - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. When establishing the proper amount in restitution owed, the trial court should base the figure on the victim’s pecuniary loss as well as the defendant’s financial resources and future ability to pay or perform. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(b), (d)-(e) (2010); State v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore, the payment schedule is not to exceed the term of the sentence imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(c), (g)(2); see also State v. Daniel Lee Cook, No. M2004-02099-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1931401, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2005) (concluding that there was no way the appellant could pay $9,000 in restitution at a rate of $150 per month during a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days). Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously stated that the trial court “simply should [] set the restitution at an amount it believe[s] [the defendant] can pay” rather than attempting to “facilitate payment of its order of restitution.” See State v. Mathes, 115 S.W.3d 915, 919 (2003). |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Loyd Davis
Defendant, Christopher Loyd Davis, was indicted for theft of property valued over $10,000. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft. The jury verdict form reflects a conviction for theft of property valued over $1000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The judgment form reflects a Class C felony theft conviction with a sentence of twelve years in incarceration as a Career Offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, that the State failed to prove the value of the property, that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, that the trial court erred in denying a jury instruction on ignorance or mistake of fact, and that the trial court erred by having extrajudicial communication with the jury. After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the judgments do not properly reflect the jury's verdict. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlon Yarbro
Appellant, Marlon Yarbro, appeals from his convictions for drug offenses, arguing that the State introduced improper evidence of previous misconduct and violated his right to compulsory process and also argues that the trial court improperly applied the drug free school zone enhancement to his conviction for simple possession. After a thorough review, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on the judgments for selling a controlled substance within a school zone and possession of drug paraphernalia. However, because the school zone enhancement was improperly applied to the simple possession conviction, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Leon Forbes
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brandon Leon Forbes, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -403, -408. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire; (3) that juror misconduct occurred during the course of his trial; (4) that the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentences; and (5) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy A. Baxter v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his petition stated cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief because it alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights, ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel, “pervasive governmental misconduct,” and insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case for treatment of the petition as one for post-conviction relief and further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Bernard Easley
The defendant, Andre Bernard Easley, appeals his Benton County Circuit Court jury conviction of introduction into or possession of drugs in a penal institution, claiming that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Mitchell Smith v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Mitchell Smith, is seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving on a suspended or canceled license, reckless endangerment, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bertin Dejesus Jimenez
The Appellant, Bertin DeJesus Jimenez, pled guilty to stalking and received a sentence of ninety days in the workhouse. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, contending that the arrest warrant was void ab initio because it failed to allege all of the elements of the offense. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deshaun Fly Smith v. State of Tennessee
In 1998, the Petitioner, Deshaun Fly Smith, was convicted along with three co-defendants of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed upon the Petitioner an effective life sentence plus twenty-five years. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Smith, No. M1997-00087-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at *14-20 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 1999), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 denied (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2000). In 2001, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed. This court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Deshaun Fly Smith v. State, No. M2004-00719-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 468308, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 15, 2004), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 denied (Tenn. Nov. 7, 2005). In 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that the prosecutor intentionally withheld evidence in the form of the State’s primary witness’s criminal history. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely and held that the Petitioner had not established that his grounds for relief arose after the limitations period. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Lee Fisher v. State of Tennessee
Jason Lee Fisher (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of four counts of burglary, four counts of theft of property, and three counts of vandalism. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel and co-counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory search of the Petitioner’s vehicle. Following a hearing where only the Petitioner, trial counsel, and co-counsel testified, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsels’ alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove that impounding the Petitioner’s car was necessary and, therefore, the inventory search was invalid. Accordingly, he contends that, had trial counsel and co-counsel filed a motion to suppress, it would have been successful, and all the evidence against the Petitioner would have been excluded. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chartis Casualty Company, et al v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
Ace American Insurance Company, et al v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
Old Republic Insurance Company, et al v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
Valley Forge Insurance Company v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Wendy A. McCulley v. Robert McCulley
This is a breach of contract case. In 2012, the parties entered into a contract to resolve an issue of past-due child support owed by Appellant to Appellee. The contract provided that Appellant would grant a remainder interest in his home to Appellee, reserving a life estate interest for himself. In exchange, Appellee agreed to forgive the past-due child support owed to her by Appellant. The contract provided, among other things, that Appellant would pay the taxes on the property during his lifetime and would make monthly payments to Appellee's attorney to repay Appellee's attorney's fees. In 2014, Appellee filed a petition alleging that Appellant breached the contract by, among other things, failing to pay the taxes on the property. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant breached the contract and that forfeiture of his life estate in his home was the appropriate remedy. On appeal, Appellant admits that he breached the contract but argues that the trial court erred in holding that forfeiture was an appropriate remedy. Because the trial court failed to provide any reasoning for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review of this issue on appeal. We affirm in part but vacate the trial court's revocation of Appellant's life estate and remand for further findings and conclusions on that issue. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Terry Lynn Priest
The Appellant, Terry Lynn Priest, pled guilty to theft in an amount more than $1,000 and less than $10,000. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Santarone
Defendant, Danny Santarone, was convicted of possession of dihydrocodeinone, oxycodone, cocaine, and heroin within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that application of the school zone enhancement violates public policy. Based upon a thorough review of the record, authorities, and arguments, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions and that his argument regarding the public policy behind the school zone enhancement is without merit. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Jatavious M.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her severely disabled son. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the child's best interest. On appeal, the mother challenges only the best interest finding. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Biggs, Alias
The Defendant, Donald Biggs, alias, appeals as of right from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft by shoplifting, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-402, -14-103, -14-105, -14-146. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years each on two aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve these two sentences consecutively. The Defendant’s remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of forty-four years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it imposed partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed partial consecutive sentences, and the judgments of the trial court are, therefore, reversed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |