Heather Anne Gulish Gladwell v. Tony Neil Gladwell, Jr. PARTIAL DISSENT
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, Dissenting in Part. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery G. Douglas v. Jackson Police Department
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Appeal dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric James Miller
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Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Eugene Wallace v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Eugene Wallace, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because Petitioner knew of the statute of limitations when he entered his plea and made a strategic decision not to rely on its protection, he did not receive ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl L. Bryant
The Defendant, Darryl L. Bryant, was indicted for one count of possession of oxycodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; and one count of simple possession of marijuana. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -418. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of oxycodone with intent to sell, a Class D felony; and acquitted of the simple possession charge. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -17-417. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence against him; (2) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for facilitation of possession of oxycodone with intent to sell; (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kathy L. Bartlett
A Williamson County grand jury indicted appellee, Kathy L. Bartlett, for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The charge was dismissed pretrial after the trial court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss. The State appeals the trial court’s granting of the motion and argues that the trial court misapplied the law relating to lost or destroyed evidence. Following a thorough review of the record, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Damascus Willingham
The appellant, Damascus Willingham, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to review and modify his sentences. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Iris Teresa Bowling Chambers v. Faye Bowling Devore, et al.
This is an appeal from the denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion. Appellee, Appellant’s law firm, filed an attorney’s lien against real property that was awarded to Appellant by partition in the underlying case. The trial court set the amount of the lien based on the commissioners’ valuation of the real property. Appellant disputed the amount of attorney’s fees by filing a motion to compel arbitration, in which she specifically argued that, under their contract, the parties were required to arbitrate any dispute concerning the amount of attorney’s fees. The trial court did not specifically rule on Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration, but inferentially denied the motion when it granted Appellee’s motion to sell the property to satisfy the previously granted attorney’s lien. Appellant then filed a Rule 60.02 motion for relief from the order enforcing the attorney’s lien. Her motion was denied, and she appeals. Although the attorney’s lien is valid, we conclude that the trial court erred in enforcing the lien as a judgment when there was a dispute concerning the enforceability of the parties’ contract, the amount of attorney’s fees, and the proper means of calculating those fees. Accordingly, we vacate the order enforcing the attorney’s lien in the amount awarded and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the questions concerning the parties’ contract and to determine the proper amount of attorney’s fees, which may then be enforced against the lien. Vacated and remanded. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Stackhouse v. State of Tennessee
A Hamblen County jury convicted the Petitioner, Paul Stackhouse, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Paul M. Stackhouse, No. E2010-01972-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5620925, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 18, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 7, 2012). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court‘s judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Mason M.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights; Father surrendered his parental rights prior to trial. The trial court found that four grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights had been established. Mother does not challenge any of the grounds for her termination; instead, she contends that the termination was not in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryne B.F. v. Michael David B.
This appeal arises from post-divorce proceedings. When the parties divorced in 2008, Mother was designated primary residential parent of the parties' one-year-old son. Mother later remarried and sought permission to relocate to Australia with the child. Following a hearing in 2011, the trial court denied Mother's request to relocate and changed the designation of primary residential parent to Father. Mother moved to Australia with her new husband. Mother instituted this proceeding in 2013, alleging that a material change in circumstance has occurred and that it is in the child's best interest to live with her in Australia. The trial court considered testimony over the course of four days and eventually dismissed Mother's petition. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded the matter for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court subsequently entered a lengthy written order explaining its decision. Mother filed a second notice of appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas M. Mathis v. Wayne Carpenter, Warden
The petitioner, Douglas M. Mathis, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. In it, he repeats the claim of his first such petition, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to conduct his trial. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy R. Moss, Jr. v. Dan P. Evans et al.
This appeal arises from an election contest. Randy R. Moss, Jr. (“Moss”) ran against Dan P. Evans (“Evans”) for the office of Chief Administrative Officer of the McMinn County Highway Department (“Highway Commissioner”). Evans won. Moss filed an election contest in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”) challenging Evans' statutorily required qualifications to hold the office. Moss also sued the McMinn County Election Commission and its officials (“the Election Commission,” collectively) in the same action. Evans and the Election Commission filed motions to dismiss. The Trial Court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that Moss was required to have challenged Evans' certification as a qualified candidate before the Tennessee Highway Officials Certification Board (“the THOCB”) and that Moss could not now challenge Evans' qualifications by an election contest. Moss filed this appeal. We affirm the Trial Court in its dismissing the complaint against the Election Commission, which acted only in a ministerial capacity. We hold, however, that the Trial Court erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear Moss's challenge to Evans' qualifications. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand this case to proceed against defendant Evans. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Todd Hoover v. Morgan Siera Hoover
This post-divorce appeal presents the issue of whether the trial court erred in its modification of the parties' permanent parenting plan. The parties were married on March 28, 2009, with one child subsequently born of the marriage. The parties were divorced by final judgment dated August 25, 2011. The trial court concomitantly entered a permanent parenting plan, naming the mother primary residential parent and granting the father co-parenting time of 105 days per year with the child. Approximately eight months later, the father filed a motion seeking modification of the parties' permanent parenting plan, alleging that he had been exercising and should have been awarded at least fifty-percent co-parenting time with the child. Following a hearing conducted on July 31, 2013, the trial court temporarily modified the co-parenting schedule to award each parent equal time with the child. The court reserved the issue of a permanent residential schedule for further hearing. At a subsequent hearing conducted on June 24, 2014, the trial court considered a modification to the permanent parenting plan due to the child's having reached kindergarten age. Upon hearing proof regarding the child's best interest, the trial court entered an order maintaining the mother's status as primary residential parent and awarding the father 105 days of co-parenting time per year. Father timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In re Marcell W.
This appeal results from a dependency and neglect action initiated in the Shelby County Juvenile Court. The juvenile court found that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court also found that the child's severe injuries constituted severe child abuse perpetrated by the child's mother. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed. Discerning no error, we also affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Marcell W. Concur
I concur in the majority's conclusion that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court's finding that Mother committed severe abuse. I write separately, however, to respond to the relevance of my good friend and colleague's discussion of Mother's waiver of her challenge to the Special Judge's appointment in the juvenile court. The opinion states that because Mother did not raise her objection to the appointment of the Special Judge in the juvenile court, the issue is deemed waived. In support of this position, the opinion relies, in part, on this Court's decision in State Department of Children’s Services v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). In the A.M.H. decision, this Court held that the failure to object to the appointment of a special judge results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Id. at 764. I believe, to avoid confusion, the relevance of A.M.H. to the facts of this case requires clarification. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael J. Karel, et al. v. William Steven Cummings, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Deeric McAfee v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Deeric McAfee, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angela Ayers
The Defendant, Angela Ayers, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, false report, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211 (2014), 39-16-502 (2014), 39-17-1324 (2010) (amended 2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for the manslaughter conviction, which was to be suspended to probation after two years’ confinement, to four years for the false report conviction, which was to be suspended to probation after two years’ confinement, and to six years’ confinement at 100% service for the firearm conviction. The court ordered the six-year sentence for the firearm conviction to be served consecutively to the other sentences, for an effective twelveyear sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for voluntary manslaughter and false report, (2) the indictment relative to the firearm conviction is insufficient, (3) the trial court erred by excluding proof of the victim’s abusing the Defendant and her son, (4) the trial court erred relative to expert medical testimony, and (5) the trial court erred by refusing to provide the jury with a selfdefense instruction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relative to the voluntary manslaughter and false report convictions, but we reverse the judgment, vacate the conviction, and dismiss the charge for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Keith
The appellant, Frederick Keith, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by vouching for the credibility of State witnesses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erica Harris v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Erica Harris, filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from her conviction for the sale and delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. Petitioner alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she alleges that trial counsel failed to communicate to her a plea offer that had been formally made to prior counsel and that he dissuaded her from testifying on her own behalf at trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed her petition. Upon thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy John McCormick v. Stephanie Renee Crouch McCormick
Husband in divorce action appeals trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony in futuro to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s division of marital property; we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand to the trial court for reconsideration. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In re Sonya M.
The issue in this case is whether former foster parents have standing to bring an action for termination of parental rights and adoption of children formerly in their care. We hold, as did the trial court, that former foster parents do not have standing to do so. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Dale Blevins
The Defendant-Appellant, Terry Dale Blevins, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He previously entered guilty pleas to two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery and was ordered to serve his sentences on enhanced probation. On appeal, Blevins argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that he lacked amenability to rehabilitation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Martha B. Schubert
This case involves the construction of the Last Will and Testament of Martha B. Schubert (“the Will”). The Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found and held that Martha B. Schubert (“Deceased”) intended the real property described in the second paragraph of Article IV of the Will to be the two parcels of real property owned by Deceased located on Cherokee Boulevard and that these properties vested immediately in John Schubert upon Deceased's death. John Schubert appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the second paragraph of Article IV of the Will referred to the two properties on Cherokee Boulevard and that these properties vested in John Schubert immediately upon Deceased's death. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding and holding that it was Deceased's intent that the second paragraph of Article IV of the Will describe the two Cherokee Boulevard properties. We find and hold, however, that these properties did not vest in John Schubert immediately upon Deceased's death because the Will also contains specific language which, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |