Shane Michael Grogger v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Shane Michael Grogger, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate Petitioner’s mental health issues and by failing to raise the rejection of a requested jury instruction as an issue on direct appeal. After a careful review of the record, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dyanna Wilson v. City of Memphis
This appeal results from the trial court's order reversing the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission's decision to terminate the employment of one of its employees. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steven D. Hill v. State of Tennessee
A Maury County jury convicted petitioner, Steven D. Hill, of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, and theft over $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty years. He unsuccessfully appealed his convictions to this court and subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery D. Aaron
Defendant, Jeffery D. Aaron, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Prior to trial, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the state trooper’s stop of Defendant. The State appeals. After a thorough review of the record, relying upon our supreme court’s decision in State v. Brotherton, 323 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2010), we conclude that the trooper had reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that Defendant had committed or was about to commit the Class C misdemeanor offense set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123(1). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charlie McRae v. State of Tennessee
A corrections officer for the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”) was assaulted in the course and scope of his work by an inmate. His workers’ compensation claim for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) was settled and approved. The next month, the employee resigned from TDOC and began working at a local county jail. Thereafter, he filed a petition for reconsideration of his settlement based on his resignation. The State contended that his resignation was voluntary and not related to his work injury. The Claims Commission ruled that his resignation was reasonably related to his work injury and awarded additional disability benefits. The State has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Twanna Blair
In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s dismissal of two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony. Through a series of indictments, the State charged the defendant, Twanna Blair, with one count of conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder, three counts of felony murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court consolidated the indictments and required the State to elect which offenses it wished to prosecute. The State chose not to prosecute the defendant on the charge of conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder and proceeded to trial on Count 2 of the indictment, especially aggravated robbery, and Counts 3, 4, and 5 of the indictment, felony murder. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was deadlocked. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal as to Count 2. The trial court also granted the motion of acquittal for felony murder and the lesser included offense of second degree murder in Counts 3, 4, and 5. The trial court declared a mistrial in Counts 3, 4, and 5 for the remaining lesser included offense of facilitation of felony murder. After the mistrial, the State re-indicted the defendant for a host of offenses, including two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court granted. The State now appeals, challenging only the dismissal of the two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder. The State argues that: (1) the indictments are not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the re-indictment of the defendant; and (3) Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 does not prevent an indictment for additional charges after the declaration of a mistrial. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that the indictments are not prohibited by the statute of limitations or the Double Jeopardy Clause but that the indictments constitute the “saving back” of charges that Rule 8 is intended to prevent. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
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Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frank Shackelton v. David B. Westbrook, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Frank Shackleton, appeals the Davidson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction and sentence are illegal and void because he pled guilty to an offense with a different date from the offense date in the indictment. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre D. Rucker
The defendant, Deandre D. Rucker, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, and the court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial or a cautionary instruction because of prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s closing argument. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant’s first two assignments of error are without merit. However, we agree that the State’s closing argument was improper to such a degree that we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie Brummett Zarecor v. Glenn Payne Zarecor, Sr.
This appeal involves a trial court's award of alimony in a divorce action. Wife filed for divorce in November 2012. Following a two-day trial, the trial court entered an order awarding Wife $10,000 as alimony in solido and transitional alimony of $1,000 per month for three years and, thereafter, $650 per month for an additional four years. Husband appealed the alimony awards. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Allen Cummins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Allen Cummins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Calvin Whitehead
The Defendant, Alfred Calvin Whitehead, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver in a Drug-Free School Zone, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession of cocaine with intent to sell), 39-17-417(c)(1) (classifying the offense as a Class B felony), 39-17-432(b)(1) (2014) (requiring that offenses committed in a Drug Free School Zone be sentenced one classification higher and affecting the minimum required service and release eligibility of the sentence). The Defendant, a Range II offender, was sentenced to serve twenty-eight years with a minimum required service of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial because a juror slept during a portion of the proof, (3) the trial court erred in permitting a police officer to testify as an expert witness, and (4) the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
MLG Enterprises, LLC v. Richard Johnson
The lessor of commercial property brought this action for breach of a lease agreement against the tenant, a limited liability company, and the tenant’s president/owner, Richard Johnson, whom Plaintiff contends agreed to be personally liable for “all of tenant’s obligations” under the lease. Mr. Johnson signed the lease in two places. It is undisputed that his first signature was in a representative capacity on behalf of the tenant; the disputed issue is whether his second signature expresses a clear intent to be personally liable for the tenant’s obligations. After a default judgment was entered against the tenant, Mr. Johnson’s alleged personal liability was tried without a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Mr. Johnson made an oral motion for involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Mr. Johnson did not personally agree to be liable for the tenant’s obligations. This determination was based on the findings that Mr. Johnson was entitled to the presumption that he signed the lease in a representative capacity because he handwrote the words “for Mobile Master Mfg. L.L.C.” after his second signature, and that the sole provision in the lease, which states that he agreed to be personally liable, was not in capital or bold letters, nor was the one-sentence paragraph indented or otherwise emphasized. The court also noted that the signature provision at issue did not bear the title Guarantor. Plaintiff appealed. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
MLG Enterprises, LLC v. Richard Johnson - Dissenting
Because I conclude that the clear intent of the Lease Agreement was to bind Mr. Johnson individually, I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, “[a] cardinal rule of contractual interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.” Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn. 2009). The parties’ intent is determined through examination of the plain language of the contract as a whole. 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Tenn. 2011). In conducting this analysis, the hidden, subjective intent of the parties is of no value because the unexpressed intent of one party is not binding on another party without notice. Cone Oil Co. v. Green, 669 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). Interpretation of the parties’ intent is a matter of law subject to de novo review. 84 Lumber, 356 S.W.3d at 383. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley K. Lowe et al v. The Greene County Partnership et al.
This is an appeal from an order certified by the Trial Court as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the judgment. The appellee, The Greene County Partnership, has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Shaun Alexander Hodge v. State of Tennessee
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial based upon the recantation of a State witness. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Based upon our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Anthony Lajeniss v. State of Tennessee
David Anthony Lajeniss (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
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Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Gail Stephens
In this interlocutory appeal, Susan Gail Stephens (“the Defendant”) challenges the prosecutor‟s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. She asks this court to remand the case to the prosecutor with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion. She also asks us to instruct the prosecutor to grant pretrial diversion nunc pro tunc to the Defendant‟s 2012 update to her application for pretrial diversion. Upon review, we find that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion upon the terms and conditions of the diversion to be established by the trial court. However, we decline to instruct that pretrial diversion be granted nunc pro tunc to 2012. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vickie Lynn Perry
Defendant, Vickie1 Lynn Perry, appeals her convictions for first degree murder and robbery, arguing: 1) that there is insufficient evidence to establish that she killed the victim while committing felony robbery; 2) that the State introduced improper evidence; 3) that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a specific instance of conduct to impeach Defendant‟s character for truthfulness; and 4) that the State made improper remarks during its closing argument. After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Seigler
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Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Seigler
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Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Seigler
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Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Anthony Smith
In a plea agreement encompassing several cases, the Defendant, Michael Anthony Smith, pleaded no contest to one count of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of sale of a Schedule II drug, one count of sale of a Schedule IV drug, and one count of theft of property valued less than $500. In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed several charges against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of nine years to be served on supervised probation. It also ordered that he successfully complete the 23rd Judicial Drug Court Program and pay restitution. Subsequently, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a warrant, alleging that he had ceased to participate in the 23rd Judicial Drug Court Program. At a hearing, the Defendant admitted the violation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Margaret Smith v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance E. Kindall
The appellant, Terrance E. Kindall, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revoking his community corrections sentence for carjacking and ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant was statutorily ineligible for community corrections. Therefore, the appellant’s community correction sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained-for element of the appellant’s plea agreement. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael G. Kohlmeyer
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Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals |