Loretta M. Gaither v. Michael Deleon Gaither - separate concurring opinion
I concur completely in the majority’s treatment of the piano issue. Under the proof before the trial court, I also concur in the majority’s decision to modify the trial court’s judgment as to the marital residence and the overall division of the marital estate. I write separately to express my view that it is sometimes appropriate to take into account the cost of selling an asset even though there is no present intent to sell. Since the proof in this case does not support the trial court’s “20%” decision, I agree that this particular part of the trial court’s judgment is not correct. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Loretta M. Gaither v. Michael Deleon Gaither
This is a divorce action involving the proper classification and division of the parties’ assets. The trial court found one asset, a baby grand piano, to be the wife’s separate property as it had been a gift to her from the husband. All other assets were determined to be marital. The most valuable asset was the parties’ marital residence, which was appraised at a value of $475,000. Although the trial court awarded the marital residence to the wife rather than ordering it to be sold, the trial court deducted twenty percent from the home’s equity value for the associated costs had it been sold. The trial court subsequently fashioned a nearly equal percentage distribution of the marital assets and debts, which included an allocation of a portion of the equity in the home to the husband. The husband has appealed. We determine that the trial court correctly classified the piano as the wife’s separate property. We also determine that the trial court improperly deducted the costs associated with a hypothetical sale of the marital residence from its equity value. We therefore modify the trial court’s award of equity in the home to the husband to effectuate the trial court’s ostensible overall percentage distribution. We affirm that equitable distribution in all other respects. We decline to award the wife attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Reguli, et al. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is a declaratory judgment action in which Petitioners, who were respondents in an ongoing disciplinary proceeding, requested the trial court answer 15 questions concerning the applicable rules of procedure and evidence and the process and organization of the Board. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that Petitioners merely sought an advisory opinion and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to afford the relief desired. Petitioners appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville & Davidson County, TN, et al. v. The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville & Davidson County, TN, et al.
Advertising company applied to the Metropolitan Government Department of Codes and Building Safety for a permit to convert its standard billboard to a digital billboard. The zoning administrator denied the request; the company appealed to the Metropolitan Board of ZoningAppeals,which reversed the administrator’sdecision and granted the permit. Days later, the permit was revoked on the ground that the proposed digital billboard violated a provision in the zoning code. The company again appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which held that the permit had been revoked in error and reinstated the permit. The Metropolitan Government then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; the trial court reversed the decision granting the permit. The advertising company appeals; finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Craft and Cedric Mims
Defendants Allen Craft and Cedric Mims were convicted of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced each defendant to life for the felony murder conviction, with concurrent sentences of twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and two years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. The trial court also dismissed the charges of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Edward Martin, Jr.
The defendant, Paul Edward Martin, Jr., was convicted by a Chester County Circuit Court jury of carjacking and aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and sentenced to terms of twenty years on each conviction, to be served consecutively as a Range II offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Felton McNeal v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Felton McNeal, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered without the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sam E. Stevenson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Sam E. Stevenson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip M. Nall, et al v. The City of Oak Ridge. et al
Four sergeants with a municipal police department filed a grievance complaining that there was an unlawful disparity in pay among the sergeants on the force. The personnel board for the municipality denied the grievance. The sergeants appealed. The trial court determined that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act was applicable under the facts of the case and the personnel board’s decision that it lacked authority to grant the relief sought was supported by material and substantial evidence. We affirm as modified. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Grover Richardson
Defendant, Travis Grover Richardson, was convicted by a Carter County jury of aggravated robbery, two counts of felony evading arrest, two counts of felony aggravated assault, criminal simulation, and felony reckless endangerment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends: (1) that he was improperly convicted of felony reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder; (2) that his two convictions for felony evading arrest violated his right to be free from double jeopardy; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and both of his convictions for aggravated assault; and (4) that he was improperly sentenced as a career offender based, in part, on offenses he committed as a juvenile. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant’s conviction of felony reckless endangerment and merge Defendant’s two convictions for felony evading arrest into a single conviction. We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of the judgment forms. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demario Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demario Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered without the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Craig U. Quevedo v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Craig U. Quevedo, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2002, the petitioner pled guilty and nolo contendere to seventy-nine counts of various sex crimes involving his minor stepdaughter for which he received an effective sentence of ninety-two years in the Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea and sentencing phases. This court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment with respect to counsel’s performance at the guilty plea phase but remanded to the post-conviction court with directions to enter an order stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the sentencing phase issues. On remand, the post-conviction court again denied relief. In this appeal from our limited remand, the petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, he contends that counsel was deficient in failing to introduce additional positive evidence about the petitioner, namely the details of his military service, his employment history, and his involvement in various community activities. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul T. Coleman v. Billie A. Brown, et al.
In the present consolidated action, the plaintiff sought a determination from the trial court that he was the sole owner of a corporation and two limited partnerships based on the deaths of the other shareholders/partners. The trial court found that the plaintiff had failed, pursuant to the terms of the respective partnership agreements and the corporate buy-sell agreement, to assert his right to purchase the decedents’ interests within a reasonable time after their deaths. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had waived his right to purchase those interests and was barred from now asserting such claim. The plaintiff has appealed that ruling. We affirm the trial court’s ruling regarding ownership of the corporate shares and partnership interests, although on different grounds. Determining that the corporate shares and partnerships interests are held by the personal representatives as assets of the decedents’ estates, we modify the trial court’s judgment to remove the designation of the personal representatives as assignees. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Newsom
The Defendant, Charles Newsom, was convicted of aggravated burglary upon his best interest guilty plea. See T.C.A. § 39-14-403 (2014). As part of the plea agreement, he accepted a three-year, Range I sentence, with the question of judicial diversion and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied judicial diversion and imposed a split-confinement sentence of one year of confinement followed by two years of probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Brown
Appellant, Kenneth Brown, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder, twelve counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, twelve counts of aggravated assault, one count of employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions. He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 308 years. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder and attempted murder convictions and argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession. Following our careful review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Maurice Deal
The defendant, Quincy Maurice Deal, pled guilty, in three different cases, to two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; possession of cocaine in a school zone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; and felon in possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective term of fourteen years, to be served consecutively to his sentences in previous convictions for which he was on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Young v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Johnny Young, contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial – citing multiple bases supporting his contention – and on appeal – citing counsel’s failure to file a motion for new trial – and asks this court to either grant him a new trial or a delayed appeal. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for new trial and, therefore, grant the Petitioner a delayed appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Scott Hutchinson
The Defendant, Jeffery Scott Hutchinson, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of one count of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and two counts of simple possession of methamphetamine. He was thereafter convicted by a separate Bedford County jury of failure to appear. At a consolidated sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence for all of these convictions. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury’s finding that he knowingly failed to appear and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher J.B.,Jr., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her three children. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and provide support and failure to comply with the requirements contained in the permanency plans. The court further found that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Brian King
Defendant, Robert Brian King, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of assault. As a result, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in incarceration, to be served on supervised probation after the service of ten days in incarceration. Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution to the victim. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony on the basis that it constituted hearsay. After our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the assault conviction where the jury weighed the credibility of the State’s witnesses and accredited their testimony. Further, we determine that the trial court erred in excluding testimony as hearsay when the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to prove their effect on the hearer. However, we determine the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
G and N Restaurant Group, Inc. d/b/a City Cafe Diner v. City of Chattanooga
This action involves the constitutionality of a city ordinance regulating beer sales by establishments operating twenty-four hours a day. In June 2006, the defendant city amended its beer ordinance, which previously had required restaurants serving beer and other alcoholic beverages to serve no alcohol between the hours of 3:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on weekdays and 3:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on Sundays. Pursuant to the amended code section, no establishment remaining open for business of any type between the hours of 3:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. is permitted to simultaneously maintain a beer permit. The plaintiff restaurant is located within a hotel in Chattanooga and serves a wide variety of food items twenty-four hours a day. Upon its opening in 2004 and subsequent reopening in April 2006, pursuant to the unamended version of the city code, the restaurant served beer during the hours allowed. The restaurant continued to serve beer until it received a letter alleging a code violation from the Chattanooga Police Department in June 2011. Following a mandatory appearance before the Chattanooga Beer Board, the restaurant surrendered its beer permit. The restaurant brought this action in the trial court, alleging that the city code subsection at issue violated the restaurant’s substantive due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the city, finding, inter alia, that the code subsection was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The restaurant appeals. Because we determine that the code subsection is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant the restaurant’s request for a judgment declaring the subsection to be constitutionally invalid. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby W. McEarl, et al. v. Talmo Johnson, et al.
This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. The parties contest the location of the common boundary line between their respective properties. Appellees argue that the boundary line lies at the center of the creek that runs between the parties’ properties. Appellants contend that the boundary lies on the creek’s east bank. Both sides proffered expert testimony to prove the boundary location. The trial court found Appellees’ expert credible. Based on the testimonies of Appellees’ expert and their predecessor in title, and the deeds submitted into evidence, the court determined that the boundary line was located along the centerline of the creek. The trial court also awarded damages to Appellees based on Appellants’ removal of timber from the disputed area. Appellants appeal. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm and remand. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phalanda D. Falls
Appellant, Phalanda D. Falls, entered a guilty plea to evading arrest, a Class D felony, and driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of four years. Following a hearing to determine her request for alternative sentencing, the trial court denied the motion and ordered appellant to serve her sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This appeal follows. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roger Jamal Myrick v. State of Tennessee, et al.
This appeal arises from a decision by the Davidson County Chancery Court dismissing inmate’s petition for declaratory judgment. Inmate was convicted of second degree murder and sought a declaratory order from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) claiming he was eligible for parole and requesting a parole hearing date. The request was denied, so inmate filed a petition for declaratory judgment with the Davidson County Chancery Court, arguing that he was entitled to a parole hearing and mandatory parole pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-115(b)(1) and -117(b). The State filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501. The trial court granted the State’s motion, and this appeal followed. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Potter's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Joseph Szekely, et al.
Appellants appeal from the trial court’s decision to grant partial summary judgment to the Appellee. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court failed to state the legal grounds on which it was granting summary judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. Consequently, this Court cannot proceed with our review and must vacate the order at issue. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals |