Petros Goumas v. Jimmy Mayse et al.
The issue in this slip-and-fall premises liability case is whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Petros Goumas (“plaintiff”), the fiancé of the daughter of defendants Jimmy Mayse and wife, Barri Mayse, was staying at the defendants’ house for an extended visit. Plaintiff was working outside in the yard, helping to clear away dead brush and trees from the property, when he stepped on a rock, slipped, fell, and broke his arm. The trial court held that plaintiff presented no proof that the rock (1) was in any way unusual or posed any particular danger, (2) was hidden or concealed, or (3) created any kind of defective or dangerous condition. The court concluded that there was no proof of a known or foreseeable unreasonable risk of injury created by the condition of defendants’ property. Consequently, the court held, as a matter of law, that defendants owed no duty to plaintiff. He appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.H. et al
V.H. (“Mother”) appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children, S.H., R.L.R. III., M.B and K.C.B. (“Children”). The Children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) based on allegations of lack of supervision, physical abuse, and Mother’s drug use. The Children were subsequently adjudicated as being dependent and neglected. After a trial, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence of multiple grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. She challenges the court’s denial of her motion to continue the trial and its best interest determination. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Felisha Brown et al. v. Karen L. Samples et al.
This is a medical malpractice action brought against the State of Tennessee and others. The issue as to the appealing State is whether the plaintiffs complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012 & Supp. 2013). The State argues that the plaintiffs were required to send the pre-suit notice applicable to their claim against the State to either (1) the Attorney General of Tennessee or an Assistant Attorney General, or (2) the Division of Claims Administration of the State. The Tennessee Claims commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding (1) no statutory authority requiring that pre-suit notice as to the State be served upon one of the parties alluded to by the State, and (2) that the State received adequate pre-suit notice in this case. We affirm and hold that the plaintiffs complied with Section 121’s pre-suit notice requirements by providing notice to the University of Tennessee Graduate School of Medicine, a health care provider, which entity is a division of an agency of the State of Tennessee and also a named defendant in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
April Miller, et al. v. Northland Insurance Company
A commercial truck driver was injured while sitting in the passenger seat with another person driving. The question presented is whether the passenger qualified as an employee and was, therefore, excluded from benefits under the trucking company’s liability insurance policy. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the passenger was an employee when the accident occurred. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Lester G. Murphy, Sr. v. State of Tennessee Child Support Services
A mother and father divorced and the trial court ordered the father to pay the mother $50 a week as support for their two children. The children subsequently came into the legal custody of their maternal grandfather, but the court did not order support. Ten years later, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to set child support against the father. After a hearing which the father did not attend, the trial court increased his child support obligation to $333 a month and declared that he owed back support of $31,635, which he was ordered to pay in monthly installments. Four years later, the father, acting pro se, filed a petition to modify the support order. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, declaring only that its previous order was a valid one. Because there was an existing support order for the two children, the appropriate proceeding would have been one to modify that order. The requirements for modification were not met, and the trial court exceeded its authority by assessing an arrearage based upon an amount different from the amount set in the existing order. We accordingly hold that the father was entitled to Relief from a Final Order under Tenn. R. App. P. 60.02(5), and reverse the trial court’s denial of that relief. We also vacate the trial court’s earlier order imposing on the father a duty to pay a modified amount of support and retroactive child support. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Rodney Butler v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Christopher Rodney Butler, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to “solicit” the testimony of Albert Sweat; (2) trial counsel failed to depose the State’s witnesses prior to trial; and (3) trial counsel failed to obtain video surveillance footage from the cameras at the “Mix Factory in Jackson, Tennessee showing that he had been approached by a young black man, who drove him to the purported crime scene.” After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzo Spencer
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Lorenzo Spencer, was convicted of aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 34-14-403. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cameron Winselle v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cameron Winselle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. However, this court is without jurisdiction in this case because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Aiden W.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi), failure to establish/exercise paternity; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), abandonment for willful failure to visit; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-113(g)(2), substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), persistent conditions. We reverse in part and we affirm in part; we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to Aiden W. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Rebekah Shay Trembley v. Guy Dale Dunn, II
This is a post-divorce action involving a modification of the defendant’s child support obligation. Because the order from which the plaintiff appealed adjudicated fewer than all of the claims of the parties, it was not a final appealable order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). We must therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Churchman
The defendant was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, first degree (felony) murder and two counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder. These convictions all sprang from an incident in which shots were fired at three men in a car during an attempted robbery. To establish the defendant’s identity as the murderer the State introduced evidence at trial of a separate carjacking and shooting committed by the defendant and an accomplice several hours prior to the homicide. The defendant, who had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder of the carjacking victim prior to trial on the instant charges, asserts on appeal that the two incidents were subject to mandatory joinder and that he could not be tried for the charges in the present indictment after he had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder. He also appeals the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of the carjacking, the trial court’s limits on cross-examination of a witnesses, the trial court’s evidentiary decisions regarding hearsay, and the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no error and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Ware v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Walter Ware, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Annie Harris v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency
Former tenant of an apartment complex whose lease was terminated for an alleged breach sued alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. Specifically, the former tenant contends the defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-601(b)(2)(B); she also contends it intentionally discriminated against her due to her disabilities in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(e). The defendant denied all claims and moved for summary judgment contending the plaintiff could not establish essential elements of her claims;it also contended it terminated the lease on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the landlord violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Lance Allen v. Robbie Marie Allen
Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to modify child support. We reverse and remand for entry of a judgment setting child support in accordance with this opinion and for an award of attorney fees to Mother. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Houghland Hooper, III v. Amanda Marie Bures Hooper
In this divorce action, Father appeals the denial of his motion to suspend Mother’s parenting time and the decision to lower Mother’s child support; he also requests that this court modify the residential parenting schedule. Mother appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days she exercises parenting time in determining the amount of child support she was ordered to pay. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of Mother’s residential time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for recalculation; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julie Fuller aka Julie Cole
The defendant, Julie Fuller a.k.a. Julie Cole, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for correction of an illegal sentence and/or reduction of sentence. On August 9, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to serve ten years at thirty percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence was illegal and that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to modify it. Following a review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand to correct the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Newt Carter v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted Petitioner, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. He received an effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent incarceration for the aggravated rape to be served consecutively to five years to be served at thirty percent incarceration for the aggravated burglary. State v. Newt Carter, No. W2009-00600-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2349207, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 11, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After holding evidentiary hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the denial of the petition and argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied the petition. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald W. Damon
The Defendant, Ronald W. Damon, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2010) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-403 (aggravated burglary), 39-12-103 (2010) (criminal conspiracy). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-three years as a violent offender for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eleven years as a Range I, standard offender for aggravated robbery, nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for aggravated burglary, and seven years as a Range II, multiple offender for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in allowing an eight-day break in the trial between the proof and the closing arguments, (4) the court erred in excluding the testimony of a 9-1-1 operator regarding one of the victim’s statements, (5) the court erred in admitting testimony about a letter he wrote, (6) the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, (7) the court erred in allowing the State to play portions of a video recording of his pretrial statement, (8) the court erred in allowing a jail inmate to testify without being subject to cross-examination about the truthfulness or falsity of his prior testimony in another matter, (9) the court erred in admitting testimony about his financial problems despite the witness’s lack of personal knowledge, (10) the court erroneously admitted evidence in his first trial that resulted in a hung jury but would have resulted in an acquittal if the evidence had not been admitted, and (11) the court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Crystle D. Rutherford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Crystle D. Rutherford, appeals the summary dismissal of her pro se petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In June 2010, she pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. She is currently serving a total effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction. In March 2013, the petitioner filed a pro se petition alleging multiple grounds for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner addresses only her asserted grounds for relief, and she fails to address the finding of untimeliness. Following our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Junior P. Samuel v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Junior P. Samuel, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for relief as time-barred. The petitioner is currently serving an effective thirty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for five counts of rape and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure in 2008. In April 2013, the petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition after concluding that it was filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the dismissal was improper because due process required tolling the statute of limitations. Specifically, he contends that he was mislead by appellate counsel into believing that appellate counsel was continuing the appellate process following the denial of the direct appeal. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Nathaniel Scott
The defendant, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse. Prior to a sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion because he provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate a “fair and just reason” that would justify the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Matthew Black
The Defendant, William Matthew Black, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of nineteen years’ confinement as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his police statement, (3) the trial court erred by permitting the State to strike potential jurors on the basis of race, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to include aggravated assault in the jury instructions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Shelton
Appellant, Justin Shelton, was indicted by the Lincoln County Grand Jury on two counts of reckless endangerment and two counts of vandalism. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to two years on each count for a total effective sentence of eight years. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered Appellant to probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed which alleged that Appellant had not reported to his probation officer; failed to pay fines; and failed to provide proof of employment. Petitioner also pled guilty to another offense. At a hearing, Petitioner pled guilty to the probation violation. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC et al.
Sixty days prior to filing his complaint, the plaintiff in this health care liability action sent written notice of his potential claim to each of the health care providers that would be named as defendants. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2013). The plaintiff served the pre-suit notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by statute. Id. § 29-26-121(a)(3)(B). In his subsequent complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had complied with the statutory requirement of pre-suit notice, id. § 29-26-121(b), but the plaintiff failed to file with the complaint “an affidavit of the party mailing the [pre-suit] notice establishing that the specified notice was timely mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested,” id. § 29-26-121(a)(4). The defendants moved for dismissal of the lawsuit, citing the plaintiff’s failure to file with the complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The defendants did not allege that the lack of the affidavit resulted in prejudice. Instead, the defendants contended that the pre-suit notice statute demands strict compliance with all its requirements and that dismissal is the mandatory remedy for noncompliance. The trial court “reluctantly” agreed with the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed but noted the “harsh results” strict compliance produces in cases, such as this one, where no prejudice is alleged. We granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the statutory requirement of an affidavit of the person who sent pre-suit notice by certified mail may be satisfied by substantial compliance. We also hold that the plaintiff substantially complied with the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’sdismissal of the complaint is reversed; the complaint is reinstated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Kory W. A.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon his incarceration. The court likewise found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |