Potter's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Joseph Szekely, et al.
Appellants appeal from the trial court’s decision to grant partial summary judgment to the Appellee. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court failed to state the legal grounds on which it was granting summary judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. Consequently, this Court cannot proceed with our review and must vacate the order at issue. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Scott Lower v. Melanie Ewing Lower
This post-divorce appeal concerns Mother’s request to relocate to Alabama with the Parties’ minor child. Father objected to the move and responded by filing a petition to modify the parenting plan in which he opposed Mother’s requested relocation and requested designation as the Child’s primary residential parent. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s request to relocate and revised the parenting plan to reflect the change in visitation as a result of the relocation. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Narceus Cox
The Defendant, Narceus Cox, pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Oxycodone, with intent to sell. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to a three-year sentence involving split confinement. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his application for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Williams, et al. v. Adrain Armitage, et al.
This is an appeal from an order resolving the claim for damages made by the appellee, Tommy Williams, in the Original Complaint. However, the order did not resolve the counterclaim filed by the appellant, Adrian A. Armitage, and Albert L. Armitrage. Because the order appealed from does not resolve all claims raised in the proceedings below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Scott Morrell
The defendant, Joseph Scott Morrell, appeals his Washington County Criminal Court jury conviction of third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the verdict of the jury was not unanimous, and that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment or declared a mistrial following the State’s improper commentary during closing argument. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John C. Wells, III v. Tennessee Board of Probation And Parole
This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”) to deny inmate parole at his initial parole review hearing. Inmate was convicted of nine counts of aggravated sexual battery and was denied parole due to the seriousness of his crimes and the likelihood thathe would commit similar crimes again if released. Inmate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction, was illegally comprised, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The trial court dismissed the petition with prejudice, and this appeal followed. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven B. Stubblefield v. Tennessee Department of Health, et al.
A physician was charged with failing to report a reckless driving conviction on his medical license renewal application. Following a contested case hearing before an administrative agency, the physician’s medical license was placed on probation for five years. The physician sought judicial review, arguing the agency’s sanction was disproportionate to what he represented was merely a mistake. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision, and the physician appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Dean Wells
The defendant was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), DUI per se, simple possession, leaving the scene of an accident, and DUI (second offense) after his vehicle struck a utility pole and small building. The defendant refused law enforcement’s request to test his blood in order to determine his blood alcohol content. The defendant’s blood was taken pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) (2012) and without a warrant, despite his refusal to submit to testing. The defendant moved to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) was unconstitutional. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the statute was unconstitutional. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal, arguing that the blood was taken under exigent circumstances and that the implied consent law functioned to satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the blood draw violated the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures because it was not conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement, and we affirm the suppression of the evidence. We determine that, although the blood draw was taken pursuant to the statute, the statute did not dispense with the warrant requirement and is therefore not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vernon Motley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Vernon Motley, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the State’s Brady violation rendered counsels’ assistance ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III
This case involves the modification of a parenting plan. The trial court reduced Father’s time with the parties’ children to four hours of supervised time every other weekend. The trial court so limited the Father’s parenting time as a result of his intentional interference with the children’s relationship with Mother. Father appeals the trial court’s modification of the parenting schedule. In addition, he claims the trial court erred by: (1) limiting Father’s communication with the children; (2) refusing Father’s request to retain an expert to rebut testimony by an expert Mother and Father initially agreed would provide a recommendation about parenting time; (3) excluding certain portions of his treating physician’s testimony; (4) requiring the children to continue counseling sessions with a psychologist; (5) terminating Father’s participation in educational decisions for the children; (6) instituting a permanent injunction against Father; (7) finding Father guilty of six counts of criminal contempt; (8) finding Father in civil contempt; (9) denying Father’s requests to reopen the proof to present newly discovered evidence; and (10) awarding Mother $678,933.05 in attorneys’ fees and discretionary costs. We reverse the judgment of the trial court finding Father in civil contempt. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles A. Kennedy
In this interlocutory appeal by the State, the State challenges the trial court’s suppression of the results of blood alcohol testing conducted on the defendant’s blood pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) (Supp. 2012), claiming that the trial court erred by declaring Code section 55-10-406(f)(2) unconstitutional and by ruling that no exception to the warrant requirement existed to justify the warrantless taking of the defendant’s blood. Because Code section 55-10-406(f)(2) does not mandate the warrantless taking of a blood sample, the trial court erred by declaring the statute unconstitutional, and that portion of the judgment is reversed. Because no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless taking of the defendant’s blood in this case, however, we affirm the trial court’s order suppressing the results of blood alcohol testing conducted on the sample. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Freeman Clay v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, David Freeman Clay, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of sexual battery and three counts of assault, based upon his assertions that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. In his appeal Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barry Lamont Price v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, Barry Lamont Price, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1991 guilty plea to three counts of the sale of cocaine, one count of driving on a revoked license, and one count of obtaining money by false pretenses and his effective ten-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Casey Bryant
The Defendant, Jonathan Casey Bryant, pled guilty to promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop. However, the Defendant failed to file any document specifying the certified question presented. Because the Defendant failed to properly reserve the certified question, the appeal is dismissed. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Concetta Long aka Concetta Walton
The defendant appeals the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. In this appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrea Kelly Jones
The defendant, Andrea Kelly Jones, appeals her Class D felony, guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of vehicular assault entered by the Dekalb County Criminal Court. The trial court ordered that the agreed four-year sentence be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of a sentencing alternative to incarceration. We affirm the manner of service of the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lonnie Lanorris Holland, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lonnie Lanorris Holland, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. In the petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner claimed that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary and stemmed from the ineffective assistance of his counsel. Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, we affirm its order. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lamont Hall
The Defendant, Gregory Lamont Hall, was indicted for one count of manufacturing .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class B felony; one count of possession with intent to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class B felony; one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, -17-417, -17-1324(a). The Defendant filed a suppression motion which the trial court denied. The Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State and reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and received a ten-year sentence to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. The remaining charges were dismissed. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that there was not sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant to search the residence in question. Following our review, we reverse, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and dismiss the charge. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James David Shell v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James David Shell, pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance and one count of driving under the influence. During plea negotiations, Petitioner was offered two alternate sentences by the State: either one year to serve with ten years of probation or seven years to serve with no probation. After consulting with his attorney, Petitioner chose the seven-year sentence. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was under the influence of several prescribed medications at the time he pled. He also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner appealed. Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Jermaine McAlpin
Defendant, Roderick Jermaine McAlpin, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public school; possession with intent to deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public school; possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care agency; possession with intent to deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care agency; criminal trespass, and public intoxication. Due to an error in the indictment, the trial court dismissed the public intoxication charge at the State’s request. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the remaining offenses. The four felony drug convictions were merged into one Class A felony conviction of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public school. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 16 years’ incarceration for this conviction and 30 days, concurrently, for the conviction of criminal trespass. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the crack cocaine, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Dale Spicer
The defendant, Allen Dale Spicer, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A) (2010). The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years’ confinement and ordered the sentence be served consecutively to the sentence in another case. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ben J. Mosby v. McDowell Center for Children
The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable workers’ compensation injury to his left shoulder and knee from a fall at work. The employer denied the claim. The trial court found that the employee did not comply with the notice statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-201(a)(2008) and dismissed the claim. The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court’s notice ruling was erroneous. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding and affirm the judgment. |
Lauderdale | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Kristen Ball v. Regions Financial Corporation, et al.
An employee fell in the bathroom at her place of employment and reported pain in her right shoulder and hip. She was treated and released by her authorized physician. Approximately five months after the fall, she developed left knee pain. Five more months later, she developed pain her left hip and lower back. The employee’s knee and back conditions ultimately required surgery, but her employer denied that the fall at work caused her conditions. The trial court disagreed and awarded benefits for the knee and back injuries. The employer appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a permanent, work-related injury to her back. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Russell Kyle v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company
An insurance adjuster was injured when he fell from a ladder after inspecting a roof for his employer. Consistent with a voluntary agreement with his employer, the employee received sick leave payments in lieu of temporary total disability payments. After returning to work for two months, the employee retired. In addition to the employee’s medical records, the parties introduced into evidence the deposition of a physician selected through the Medical Impairment Registry. The physician assigned an impairment of nine percent to the body as a whole. The trial court, however, awarded permanent disability benefits based on an impairment of fourteen percent and awarded additional temporary total disability benefits. The trial court also granted the employer a setoff for payments made to the employee pursuant to his accrued sick leave. The employer appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred by awarding a set-off of the payments made under the employer’s sick leave policy and by adopting an impairment rating other than that assigned by the MIR physician. We remand the case for additional proceedings and findings by the trial court. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Dana Automotive Systems Group, LLC, et al. v. Larry Evans
An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome while working as a welder and supervisor for his employer. Prior to receiving medical treatment and unrelated to the injury, the employer gave the employee a choice to retire or potentially lose his substantial pension. The trial court held that the Medical Impairment Registry physician’s rating was incorrect and that the statutory one and one-half cap on permanent partial disability benefits did not apply. The employer appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel |