State of Tennessee v. Xavier Crawford
Appellant, Xavier Crawford, stands convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant submits that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Montez Dewayne Birt
The Defendant, Montez Dewayne Birt, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and received a six-year, suspended sentence. Thereafter, a violation warrant was filed, and following a hearing, the trial court revoked the sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement based upon his failure to report to his probation officer. The Defendant appeals the revocation and order of total incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carey Faught
Carey Faught (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two convictions for especially aggravated robbery and the two convictions for attempted aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also argues that his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates principles of double jeopardy. Finally, the Defendant contends that his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield
This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield - Concurring
I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc. et al.
The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The trial court, applying the principles promulgated in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 1996), held that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration virtually all of his claims, while allowing the defendants access to a judicial forum for some of their potential claims. We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor is controlling and that Taylor mandates a holding that theagreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re T.F.H. et al
A.F.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor children, T.F.H. and P.F.H. (“the Children”). After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. He challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but not the best-interest determination. We affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Lataynia Jones v. Sharp Electronics Corporation
Plaintiff filed an action alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the Tennessee Disabilities Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Employer on the basis that the Act does not require employers to make “reasonable accommodations,” as were required by Plaintiff at the time she was discharged. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Riannah M.F.
The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kaliyah S. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Kaliyah S. and Jaya P. (“the Children”), the minor children of Kayla S. (“Mother”). In November 2010, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Jaya’s father, Josh P., on November 30, 2010. The petition alleged severe child abuse as the sole ground for termination. DCS filed an amended petition in May 2011, which also named Kaliyah’s father, Rontez L. (“Father”), and alleged that his parental rights should be terminated on the statutory ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. Father was incarcerated at the time the amended petition was filed. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother and Josh P. upon finding that DCS had proven the ground of severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned Kaliyah by engaging in conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for her welfare prior to his incarceration. When making its ruling, the trial court concluded that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to assist Father in reunification because DCS sufficiently proved the statutory ground of abandonment alleged against him. The court also found that termination of the parental rights of all three respondents was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that DCS was relieved of the requirement of making reasonable efforts of reunification with regard to Father and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kaliyah S. et al - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I believe the Trial Court committed no reversible error, and I would affirm the decision of the Trial Court. The majority acknowledges that there are two distinct lines of cases from this Court on this issue. The majority discusses these cases in detail and there is nothing to be gained by my discussing them once again in this dissent. I, however, believe that those decisions holding that in a case involving “aggravated circumstances,” DCS is relieved of making an attempt to reunify the parent and the child best give effect to the intent of our General Assembly. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Victor Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Victor Gonzalez, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court should have found that due process considerations tolled the statute of limitations for filing his petition. Following our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition on the basis that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and the petitioner failed to show any reason for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Troy Lynn Fox
The Defendant, Troy Lynn Fox, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting certain photographs into evidence—one, a photograph of the murder victim that was taken while she was alive and, two, multiple photographs of the crime scene and of the victim’s injuries, taken both at the scene and during the autopsy; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to conduct a jury-out hearing prior to the admission of several photographs of the victim taken at the crime scene and by describing those photographs as “gross” in front of the jury; (4) whether the trial court erred by requiring the Defendant to cross-examine the victim’s mother during the State’s case-in-chief rather than allowing the Defendant to recall her as a defense witness; (5) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from further development of the couple’s social, family, and marital history; (6) whether the trial court committed reversible error in its instruction to the jury on the impeachment of a witness; and (7) whether the trial court demonstrated judicial bias against the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Christopher Sales
The Defendant, Shawn Christopher Sales, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 163 days in confinement followed by fifteen years to be served in Community Corrections. In March 2013, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed a second affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State presented insufficient evidence to support the revocation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Downey
Jonathan Downey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder and then merged the latter two convictions with the felony murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of first degree felony murder. The State asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s merger of the aggravated burglary conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder. We order the trial court to reinstate the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated burglary and remand this matter for sentencing on that conviction. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Wayne Miller
The Defendant, Jackie Wayne Miller, pled guilty to initiation of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentences. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years and three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Bates
Appellant, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1,000 or more. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that both issues are without merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Denise L. Heilig v. Roy Heilig
Years after the parties divorced, they agreed to entry of a consent order requiring the mother to cooperate with the father in obtaining passports for the parties’ two minor children. Months later, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had refused to cooperate in executing the necessary documents. The trial court found the mother in contempt for willfully refusing to execute the documents. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order finding her in contempt, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the parties no longer live in Tennessee. She also argues that the trial court erred in holding her in contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Denise L. Heilig v. Roy Heilig - Partial Separate Concurrence and Partial Dissent
I concur in most of the majority opinion, with the exception of its decision to deem waived Mother’s stated issue of whether the trial court erred in holding her in contempt when the order she was accused of violating had no deadline. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Daniel Rudd v. Debra Ann Gonzalez
This appeal involves post-divorce parental relocation. The mother notified the father that she intended to relocate outside Tennessee with the parties’ minor daughter. The mother asserted that the relocation was for purposes related to her career as a surgeon. The father filed a petition opposing the relocation on the grounds that the mother’s motive for the relocation was vindictive and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose under Tennessee’s parental relocation statute. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the father had not carried his burden of proving the mother’s motive was vindictive or that the relocation was not for a reasonable purpose, and so permitted the mother to relocate with the parties’ child. The father now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Traylor, by and through his parent, David Traylor, and David Traylor, Individually v. Shelby County Board of Education
This is a slip and fall case under the GTLA. The plaintiff high school student slipped on a patch of ice on the sidewalk at his public high school and sustained injuries. The student filed this action against the county board of education alleging negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the defendant school board had constructive notice of the ice on the sidewalk and thus was liable under the GTLA. The school board now appeals. After carefully reviewing the record, we find insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of constructive notice and so reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Auqeith Lashawn Byner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Auqeith Lashawn Byner, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of reckless driving. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. As a result, he was sentenced to a sixteen-year sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell conviction and six months for reckless driving, to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence in another case 2007-D-3157. Petitioner initiated a direct appeal of his convictions but dismissed the appeal voluntarily. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re J.B. Jr. et al
J.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor children, J.B. Jr. and J.B. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) was involved with the family going back to 2006. In 2009, the Children were taken into emergency, protective custody predicated on allegations of illegal drug use, failure to protect from sexual abuse, and domestic violence. The Children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and placed in foster care. A year later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. It alleged that Mother abandoned the Children and that she failed to resolve the issues that led to their removal. Following a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. On this appeal, Mother challenges only the best interest determination. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Lamont Johnson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joseph Lamont Johnson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of felony evading arrest. The trial court then reduced one of the aggravated robbery convictions to aggravated assault pursuant to State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) and sentenced the petitioner to an aggregate sentence of fifty-four years. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, No. M2007-01644-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2567729, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2009). The petitioner brings this post-conviction action alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that: (1) trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer or inform the petitioner regarding his potential exposure; (2) trial counsel did not adequately investigate the case; (3) trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to dismiss one of the aggravated robbery counts; (4) trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to suppress a witness’s identification of the petitioner; (5) appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge the petitioner’s sentencing range; and (6) that the cumulative errors above resulted in the deprivation of the right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to prove one or both prongs of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to each claim, and we accordingly affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick Braxton
Defendant, Derrick Braxton, was convicted as charged for one count of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years’ confinement to be served at 100 percent release eligibility. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts the following: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; 2) his sentence is excessive; 3) the trial court failed to act as thirteenth juror; and 4) the prosecutor’s comments about Defendant’s credibility during closing argument were improper. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |