State of Tennessee v. Dexter Deshaun Coleman
The Defendant, Dexter Deshun Coleman, pled guilty to three counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count each of especially aggravated burglary and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would receive an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for alternative sentencing. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Shane Powell
A Madison County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Joseph Shane Powell, charging him with promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Lee Reburn
Appellee, Donald Lee Reburn, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. At his guilty plea submission hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to ten years, suspended to probation. The State has appealed and argues that the trial court erred by sentencing appellee without a sentencing hearing and without a presentence report. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, Administrator of the Estate of Jessica E. Givens, Deceased, et al v. The Vanderbilt University D/B/A Vanderbilt University Hospital, et al
This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to this court, and we vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that section 29-26-121 did not mandate dismissal for noncompliance with its terms. Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2013-00266-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5773431, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013). Defendants filed an application for permission to appeal our decision. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application for purposes of remanding the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care, Inc., – S.W.3d –, 2013 WL 6158000 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2013). Upon our reconsideration, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lyndle Curtis, et al. v. Kathy Parchman et al.
Plaintiffs appeal a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Tennessee Right to Farm Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 43-26-101 et seq. (“the TRFA”). Plaintiffs own an express ingress/egress easement, a gravel road, that passes through Defendants’ farm. In what Plaintiffs titled a “COMPLAINT FOR ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE AND DAMAGES”, they alleged, inter alia, that Defendants substantially destroyed the utility of their ingress/egress easement by driving heavy farming equipment across and allowing cattle to walk upon the easement. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss contending that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted because the nuisance claim was barred by the TRFA. More specifically, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants violated any “generally accepted agricultural practices” or a “statute or regulation” in the use or operation of the farm upon which the easement lies. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the TRFA pertains to nuisances alleged to arise from a farm or farm operations but not to claims of unreasonable interference with the use of an ingress and egress easement. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim, for the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted for a nuisance arising from a farm or farm operation. However, we have determined the complaint states a separate claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress easement, a claim that is not subject to the TRFA. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint for it states a separate and viable claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress/egress easement. Further, this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
James H. Wilkins, et al. v. GGNSC Springfield, LLC DBA Golden Living Center-Springfield, et al.
This appeal stems from a case of alleged nursing home abuse and neglect and involves a dispute as to whether a health care power of attorney executed by decedent was effective to authorize the agent to execute an optional arbitration agreement on the decedent’s behalf. The trial court denied the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the attorney-in-fact did not have authority to sign the optional arbitration agreement on the principal’s behalf. The nursing home appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Kendra Kuebler Vachon v. Claude Vachon
This is a divorce appeal. Husband appeals the classification, valuation, and division of certain items in the marital estate, the award of alimony in futuro, and the requirement that he pay a portion an expert witness fee. We vacate the classification and valuation of the furniture which is at issue, vacate the valuation of the stock and the 401(k), and remand those matters for further consideration. We affirm the court’s decision to award alimony, but vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the type, amount and duration of the award. We affirm the court’s ruling in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Davis H. Elliot Construction Company, Inc. v. Commisioner Of Labor and Workforce Development, et al
This appeal involves review of an administrative decision. Chattanooga‟s local utility company hired the Appellant construction company to perform preliminary work on the utility company‟s fiber-optic internet infrastructure. One of the Appellant‟s employees was injured while performing this work. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development‟s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“TOSHA”) conducted an investigation of the incident. Thereafter, on recommendation of the inspector, TOSHA cited the Appellant for violations of the telecommunications safety regulations. Appellant contested the citations before the Division of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“the Commission”), which upheld the citations. Appellant then appealed the Commission‟s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which also affirmed the citations. Appellant now appeals the Chancery Court‟s decision to this Court. We conclude that TOSHA erred in applying the telecommunications regulation instead of the construction regulations. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and vacate the citations issued to Appellant construction company. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristine Blankenship v. Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C.
Kristine Blankenship (“Plaintiff”) sued Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C. (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that as a result of Defendant’s failure to properly treat a surgical patient Plaintiff suffered injuries including “a severe and disabling injury to her back.” Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment after finding that Plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 by filing her complaint less than 60 days after sending the notice letter. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether Defendant waived the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 and whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 conflicts with Rule 18.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to this case. We hold, as did the Trial Court, that Defendant did not waive the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, and that Plaintiff waived her second issue by not raising it in the Trial Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman v. Bobby Spencer Hickman
In this post-divorce case, Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman (“wife”) appeals the trial court’s reduction of her transitional alimony and its refusal to grant her attorney’s fees, expenses and discretionary costs. The trial court granted the petition of Bobby Spencer Hickman (“husband”) to reduce alimony based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) (2010), which allows a suspension of transitional alimony when the recipient lives with a third person and the recipient fails to rebut the statutory presumption that the third person is either contributing to, or receiving contribution from, the alimony recipient, and, therefore, the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded. The third person was the parties’ son, Ethan, who had turned eighteen shortly before husband filed his petition. Wife continued to allow Ethan to live with her, and provided food and other necessities to him, after he turned eighteen. We hold that wife rebutted the statutory presumption by showing that her financial situation had not significantly changed, and actually had deteriorated, since the award of transitional alimony. Wife demonstrated a continuing need for alimony notwithstanding her willingness to allow her son to continue living with her and to support him after his eighteenth birthday. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for the court to determine wife’s fees and expenses at the trial court level and her discretionary costs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jack E. Miller v. Boyd Wyatt
Jack E. Miller, a former City Manager of Crossville, filed this defamation action against Councilman Boyd Wyatt, based on Wyatt’s statement during a City Council meeting that Miller had been “discharged from City Manager up here because of misappropriating funds and not following procedures.” Wyatt moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was protected by legislative privilege under the common law and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(b)(2) (2012), which statute provides that “[a]ll members of boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, and other governing bodies of any governmental entity . . . shall be immune from suit arising from the conduct of the affairs of such board, commission, agency, authority, or other governing body.” The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that Wyatt had immunity under § 29-20-201(b) because the alleged defamatory statement arose “from the conduct of the affairs of” the Crossville City Council. We agree with the trial court that Wyatt’s statement was made in the course of conducting the affairs of the City Council and, therefore, was protected by legislative privilege. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yogonda Abdula Corley
Defendant, Yogonda Corley, was charged with five counts of aggravated sexual battery, with three counts being against the victim T.S. and two counts against the victim M.M., and seven counts of rape of a child, with three counts being against T.S. and four counts being against M.M. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of rape of a child, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was ordered to serve a total effective sentence of 75 years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that it was plain error for the trial court: 1) to admit into evidence a recording and transcript of statements by Defendant obtained by the use of a body wire worn by the mother of one of the victims; 2) to admit into evidence Defendant’s statements to the police following his arrest; 3) to admit into evidence the opinion testimony by a nurse practitioner that the victims’ statements were consistent with their medical examinations; and 4) not to sever the offenses against the two victims. Defendant asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a reversal of his convictions. Lastly, Defendant categorizes another section of his brief as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but then acknowledges that he chooses not to argue the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. With regard to the evidentiary issues, we conclude that the Defendant has waived consideration of the issues by his failure to contemporaneously object at trial. Also, Defendant failed to request severance of the charges as to each victim pre-trial. Because the alleged evidentiary issues and severance issue do not rise to the level of plain error, we decline review. We further conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yogonda Abdula Corley - Concurring
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority pertaining to the Defendant’s failure to demonstrate plain error relief on the evidentiary issues in this case. Notwithstanding the Defendant’s waiver of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, I write separately because the record provides ample evidence supporting each of the convictions in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Norfolk v. Tennessee Civil Service Commission
State trooper challenges his termination for the good of the service. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the Civil Service Commission and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Director, TVHS, Murfreesboro Campus v. Lawrence Hartman
The trial court ordered a sixty-eight year old army veteran to be involuntarily hospitalized because it found that he suffered from a mental illness that rendered him “unable to avoid severe impairment or injury from specific risks.” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 33-6-501. The only evidence of actual risk, however, was that others might easily be able to take financial advantage of his confusion or his trusting nature. We reverse the trial court and order the defendant’s release, because it is not constitutionally or statutorily permissible to deprive an individual of liberty when he poses no danger to others, and when the only danger he poses to himself is danger to his own property or potential for financial loss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Keenan, Sr. and Debra B. Keenan v. Barry C. Fodor and Deborah A. Fodor
The Keenans and the Fodors are neighbors who share access to their respective properties through an elaborate stone and metal gate that had been constructed on an easement of way over the Keenans’ property by the prior owner of the Fodors’ property. After a period of relative harmony, a dispute over the ownership of the gate led to a lawsuit. The trial court and this court ruled that the gate was personalty, not a fixture, and belonged to the Fodors, who were given authority to move it. The trial court’s order also set out some ground rules for the shared use of the gate pending its removal. Disagreements over the gate continued, resulting in two additional legal actions. The first was a motion for civil contempt filed by the Fodors alleging that the Keenans had violated the judicially-ordered ground rules for the use of the gate. For their part, the Keenans filed a motion to compel the Fodors to remove the gate from the easement and place it on their own property. In one proceeding, the court found that the Keenans were in contempt of its orders. In the other, it declined to order that the gate be removed. We reverse the finding of contempt, but we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Fodors are not obligated to remove the gate. We also hold, however, that the Fodors are not entitled to exclude the Keenans from the free use of their own property by keeping the gate locked. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Keenan, Sr. and Debra B. Keenan v. Barry C. Fodor and Deborah A. Fodor
The Keenans and the Fodors are neighbors who share access to their respective properties through an elaborate stone and metal gate that had been constructed on an easement of way over the Keenans’ property by the prior owner of the Fodors’ property. After a period of relative harmony, a dispute over the ownership of the gate led to a lawsuit. The trial court and this court ruled that the gate was personalty, not a fixture, and belonged to the Fodors, who were given authority to move it. The trial court’s order also set out some ground rules for the shared use of the gate pending its removal. Disagreements over the gate continued, resulting in two additional legal actions. The first was a motion for civil contempt filed by the Fodors alleging that the Keenans had violated the judicially-ordered ground rules for the use of the gate. For their part, the Keenans filed a motion to compel the Fodors to remove the gate from the easement and place it on their own property. In one proceeding, the court found that the Keenans were in contempt of its orders. In the other, it declined to order that the gate be removed. We reverse the finding of contempt, but we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Fodors are not obligated to remove the gate. We also hold, however, that the Fodors are not entitled to exclude the Keenans from the free use of their own property by keeping the gate locked. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Wall Farthing, Dickson County Register of Deeds v. Dickson County, Tennessee by and Through Bob Rial, Mayor for Dickson County, Tennessee
Register of Deeds filed petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. seeking an increase in compensation for her three deputy clerks and seeking an award of her costs, including attorney’s fees. The trial court denied Register the relief she sought, and she appealed. Based on the evidence presented and the language of the statute, we hold the trial court was required to determine the appropriate salary for Register’s assistants. Register is entitled under the applicable statute to have her costs, including her attorney’s fees, paid out of the fees collected by her office. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ramon E.A.V., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case. Following a hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment due to failure to visit and (2) failure to comply substantially with the permanency plan. The trial court further concluded that clear and convincing evidence revealed that termination was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vernon Lavone Roberts
Defendant, Vernon Lavone Roberts, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone and two counts of the sale of more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea to four counts of the sale of cocaine outside of a school zone. He received a sentence of twenty-years for each conviction, with three sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the fourth conviction for an effective forty-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas based on his assertion that the pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dejuan Koshief Roberts
A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Dejuan Koshief Roberts, guilty of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court imposed an effective Range II thirteen-year sentence. The Defendant appeals claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the State violated the rules of discovery. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we conclude that no error exists. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James M. Smith
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, James M. Smith, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving on a suspended, cancelled or revoked license, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and reckless endangerment. The trial court Defendant stipulated that he had been convicted of DUI on at least three previous occasions, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender, to six years in confinement followed by four years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to continue his case; (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during opening and closing arguments; (3) a distraction during the jury deliberation likely caused a hurried and potentially incorrect verdict; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the judgment of the trial court. The trial court’s judgments are, therefore, affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Brandon J. G. et al.
The mother of six children and the father of one of the children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights on three grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by incarceration,and upon the determination that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court terminated the father’s parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, willful abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit, and the determination that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother and father appeal. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville
Plaintiff filed a timely claim with the Division of Claims Administration, which did not resolve the claim within the statutory period. The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission, and Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Claims Commission Rules. Much later, the State amended its answer to allege fault by the City of Clarksville. Plaintiff filed suit against the City. The suit was dismissed because the trial court found that the “original complaint” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was not filed within a year of the alleged injury. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Rheatta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
A defendant appeals the award of punitive damages arising from the death of a patient at an assisted living facility, which the defendant managed. We affirm the trial court’s review of the Hodges factors and the due process analysis relating to the punitive damage award. We also affirm the trial court’s directed verdict making the defendant liable for the actions of the assisted living facility’s employees. We must modify the amount of the punitive damage award by reducing it to comply with the amount the plaintiff requested in the ad damnum clause of their complaint. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals |