Lisa M. Paterson Potter v. Scott D. Paterson
This post-divorce case involves the application of Supreme Court Rule 40A, which governs the appointment, role and duties of a guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem in this case, Janice Russell, was appointed on November 7, 2008. She filed a motion requesting the court to hold her ward’s father, appellant Scott D. Paterson (“father”), in contempt. After father filed a response pointing out that Rule 40A, § 9(a)(4) did not authorize a guardian ad litem to file a contempt motion, the trial court, in response, entered an order on March 17, 2010, appointing Ms. Russell “attorney ad litem.” Subsequently, Rule 40A, § 9 was amended to allow a guardian ad litem to “take any action that may be taken by an attorney representing a party pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.” After the amendment took effect, Russell referred to herself in her filings as “guardian ad litem.” The trial court followed suit in its final order. On January 20, 2011, the trial court entered an order that disposed of all matters relating to custody of the child. More than a year later, father filed a petition to modify his child support. On May 16, 2013, the guardian ad litem filed a “motion for emergency hearing and motion for contempt.” On May 20, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing, after which it entered an order holding father in contempt on four counts, sentencing him to 40 days in jail, suspending all of his parenting time, and reducing contact with his daughter to one telephone call per week. Father appeals. We hold that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 40A, § 5, the guardian ad litem’s appointment terminated when, with the passage of time, the court’s order disposing of the custody matters became final. Hence, the guardian ad litem had no authority to file her motion for “emergency hearing” and for contempt. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re K.P., et al.
This is a dependency and neglect case. R.P. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s finding that he severely abused her minor daughter, K.P. The Department of Children’s Services petitioned the juvenile court to declare K.P. and her sister, K.J. (collectively, “the Children”) dependent and neglected. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found 1 that the Children were dependent and neglected in the care of Mother and her then-boyfriend, B.J.2 The juvenile court further found that B.J. committed severe abuse against K.P.,3 but that Mother did not. DCS appealed to the trial court. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the Children were dependent and neglected and (2) that Mother committed severe child abuse against K.P. in that she failed to protect K.P. from abuse at the hands of B.J. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Kirby Miranda Gentry v. Michael Anthony Gentry
In this post-divorce case, the trial court entered an order on March 12, 2012, incorporating a permanent parenting plan. The order states that “[t]his matter shall be reviewed in one year.” On April 18, 2013, the court entered an order stating that “the Court, sua sponte, finds that the Permanent Parenting Plan attached to the Order of [March 12, 2012], should in fact be a Temporary Parenting Plan and by this Order [the court] corrects such.” We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(a) (2010), which provides that “[a]ny final decree or decree of modification in an action for absolute divorce . . . involving a minor child shall incorporate a permanent parenting plan,” the parenting plan incorporated by the trial court’s March 12, 2012 order was a permanent plan. Because of the mandatory statutory language, the trial court was without authority to subsequently “convert” it to a temporary parenting plan. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re C.L., et al.
A.L. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights with respect to her five minor children (collectively, when referring to all five, “the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) placed the Children in temporary state custody based on the youngest child’s exposure to methamphetamine in utero. The court found that Mother’s conduct constituted severe abuse against that child; consequently, the court relieved DCS of its obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification of the Children with Mother. Some 17 months after the Children were placed in foster care, DCS initiated these termination proceedings. After a bench trial, the court terminated Mother’s rights based on its finding of multiple grounds for termination and its further finding that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Both findings were said by the trial 1 court to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jamazin H. M.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights on numerous grounds. We affirm the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination exist, due to incarceration under a ten year sentence, severe child abuse, persistent conditions, and abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and we affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. We vacate the trial court’s finding of willful failure to pay child support but otherwise affirm the order as modified. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
James G. Akers v. McLemore Auction Company, LLC, Et Al.
Plaintiff in action to recover for negligence, professional negligence, breach of duty, constructive fraud, constructive breach of contract, and inducement of failure to perform a lawful contract, appeals dismissal of various parties and claims; plaintiff also appeals a portion of the jury instructions, the jury’s verdict awarding him $474.00, and the denial of his motion for a new trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Michael Blevins
Appellant, David Michael Blevins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery as lesser-included offenses of the indicted charges, rape of a child. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed three consecutive sentences of ten years each. Appellant raises three issues in this appeal: (1) whether aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; (2) sufficiency of the convicting evidence; and (3) challenges to the length and alignment of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re A Transfer Of Structured Settlement Payment Rights By Laurel J. Shanks
The respondent financial services company appeals the trial court’s entry of an order approving a transfer of the payee’s structured settlement payment rights to the petitioner financial services company and its assignee, pursuant to Tennessee’s Structured Settlement Protection Act (“SPPA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-2601 to 2607 (2013). The trial court found that the transfer at issue met all statutory requirements. On appeal, the respondent company raises the issue of whether the transfer order contravened two prior court orders partially transferring the payee’s structured settlement payment rights to the respondent and if so, whether this contravened applicable law under the SSPA. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Lester Benedict v. Gretchen Michelle Benedict
This appeal concerns numerous post-divorce issues. Donald Lester Benedict (“Husband”) filed a petition to modify his child support obligation against his former wife Gretchen Michelle Benedict (“Wife”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The parties eventually raised a host of issues about money, which were referred to a Special Master. Wife objected to certain of the Master’s findings. Ultimately, the Trial Court sustained certain of Wife’s objections to the Master’s report and denied others. The Trial Court found, inter alia, that Husband was willfully or voluntarily underemployed. Husband appeals, and both parties raise several issues. We reverse the Trial Court as to its finding that Husband is willfully or voluntarily underemployed and those issues related to this finding. We remand for the Trial Court to make new determinations on these issues in light of our holdings that Husband was not willfully or voluntarily underemployed, and that Husband’s income for purposes of child support is $75,000 per year as found by the Master. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Griffith Services Drilling, LLC, et al. v. Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc.
Griffith Services Drilling, LLC (“Griffith”) and Lexington Insurance Company, Griffith’s insurance company, sued Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc. (“Arrow”) for property damage caused by a fire that occurred while Arrow was refueling a drilling rig operated by Griffith in Anderson County, Tennessee (“the Drilling Site”). Arrow answered the complaint and counterclaimed for breach of contract based upon Griffith’s refusal to pay for the fuel delivered by Arrow on the day of the fire. Arrow also filed a motion to dismiss for spoliation, which the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) granted dismissing Griffith’s claims against Arrow. Arrow then filed a motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim, which the Trial Court granted in part. Griffith appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the dismissal of their claims and the grant of summary judgment to Arrow. We find and hold that both Griffith and Arrow were guilty of spoliation, and, therefore, that dismissal of Griffith’s claims was not an appropriate sanction. We vacate the dismissal of Griffith’s claims against Arrow and reinstate them. Because the Trial Court granted Arrow summary judgment based upon its decision on the issue of spoliation, and we have vacated the Trial Court’s decision on the issue of spoliation, we also vacate the grant of summary judgment to Arrow. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Winfred Errol Ankton v. Chandranita Michelle Ankton
The parties to this action were divorced in Shelby County, Tennessee in 2002. The parties had one child together during the marriage. Pursuant to the original parenting plan, Mother had primary custody of the child. Father remarried and moved to Arkansas in 2003. In 2003, Father brought an action in the trial court charging Mother with contempt and petitioning the court to award him custody of the child. The trial court granted Father’s petition, and the child moved to Arkansas to live with Father. In 2012, Father was granted permission by the court to relocate to Texas with the child. In 2013, Mother brought this action in the trial court charging Father with contempt and petitioning the court to award her custody of the child once again. The trial court dismissed Mother’s petitions, ruling that Tennessee no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody issues related to the child. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Frank W. Wilson, et al. v. TMBC, LLC
The plaintiff took his bass fishing boat to defendant’s business for it to repair a “rodbox lid” that did not fit properly. While the boat was there, defendant replaced the lid. Subsequently, plaintiff went to the defendant’s store and got in the boat, which was on a trailer in the parking lot, in order to examine the new lid. While attempting to exit the boat, plaintiff caught his foot on something, tripped, and fell out of the boat. Plaintiff’s theory was that an employee of the defendant had negligently left the old rodbox lid inside the boat and that plaintiff tripped over the old lid. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that plaintiff failed to prove breach of duty because, according to defendant, he offered no evidence of the object that caused his fall; and defendant could not, as a matter of law, be liable because plaintiff was at least 50% at fault for his injuries. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant. We hold that plaintiff presented sufficient proof that the old lid caused him to trip and fall, and that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employee had negligently caused plaintiff’s injury. We further hold that the question of comparative fault is properly for the jury to decide under the proof presented at this trial. We therefore vacate the directed verdict and remand for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
City of Townsend v. Anthony Damico
This appeal presents the issue of whether the City of Townsend (“the City”) properly issued a citation for trespass to the defendant, Anthony Damico, when he exited the Little River onto private property in order to avoid crossing a dam on his inner tube. The Townsend Municipal Court upheld the citation and issued Mr. Damico a fine. Mr. Damico appealed to the Blount County Circuit Court for a trial de novo. The circuit court held that Mr. Damico had a right to portage around the dam and that he was denied this right when he was confronted by an agent of the private property owner. The circuit court further held that Mr. Damico did not engage in trespass when he traversed private property because he was seeking to avoid further confrontation, which the court found constituted justifiable cause. Therefore, the circuit court dismissed the citation. The City of Townsend appeals. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the trespassing citation and fine. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
City of Gatlinburg v. Stuart H. Kaplow, et al.
This case presents issues regarding the interpretation and enforceability of an agreed order entered into between the parties before the Gatlinburg Board of Appeals and Adjustments (the “Board”). Defendant, Stuart H. Kaplow, leases certain real property improved with rental units from defendant, Maury R. Greenstein, which property is located within the City of Gatlinburg. The City of Gatlinburg (the “City”), through its building official, issued notices of condemnation to the defendants regarding certain units on this property and informed the defendants that the units would be demolished if repairs were not made. The defendants appealed to the Board. During those proceedings, the parties entered into an agreement with respect to the property and memorialized this agreement in the form of a written order, which was signed by the defendants and their counsel. A few months later, the City filed the instant action, seeking a declaration that (1) the defendants’ further attempts to appeal to the Board were void and ineffectual pursuant to the terms of the agreed order and (2) the defendants had materially breached the agreed order such that the City had no obligation to issue building permits. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendants had materially breached the terms of the agreed order. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited their right to further appeal to the Board. The court therefore ruled that the City could demolish the condemned units and impose a lien against the real property for the demolition and cleaning costs. Defendants have appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Scott McCoy
Randall Scott McCoy (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law concerning the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley Purdy v. Matthew C. Smith
This case involves the difficult issue of disestablishment of paternity and its effect on child support arrears. Over a year after the trial court entered an order requiring the respondent to pay child support, he requested Rule 60 relief on the grounds that he was not the biological father of the child. Based upon the statutory prohibition against the retroactive modification of child support and the related caselaw, we must affirm the trial court’s decision denying the respondent Rule 60 relief for any time period prior to the filing of his petition. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Summer Ann-Michelle MIller v. Richard Anthony McFarland
In this post-divorce modification of alimony case,Husband contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his alimony obligation was not subject to modification. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and conclude that Husband’s alimony obligation constitutes transitional alimony that is subject to modification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-121(g)(2). Reversed and remanded. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodricko O. Thomas v. Jerry Lester, Warden
The petitioner, Rodricko O. Thomas, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a basis on which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the dismissal, contending that the habeas corpus court should have appointed counsel and held a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Wilder
The defendant, Michael Wilder, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors and erroneously classifying him as a persistent offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Justin Feaster - concurring in part; dissenting in part
I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant. Likewise, I agree with the conclusion that State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012), provides the current double jeopardy analysis and that the analysis announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), applies retroactively. I respectfully disagree, though, with the majority opinion’s conclusion that a separate due process analysis is unnecessary in the present case, and I believe the separate convictions should be merged. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Justin Feaster
Appellant, Terrence Justin Feaster, stands convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, for which he received consecutive sentences of twelve years as a career offender, fourteen years as a persistent offender, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Allan Fogle, Sr. v. Mardonna Shawn Fogle
In this divorce action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded Wife alimony of $700 per month for 48 months. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect an award of periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Bernard Anderson, III
Following a jury trial Defendant, Ronald Bernard Anderson, II, was found guilty as charged of four counts of the Class C felony offense of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of thee years for each conviction. A combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing resulted in an effective sentence of six years. As to the manner of service of the sentences, the trial court ordered split confinement: three months incarceration and the balance of the six-year sentence suspended, with supervised probation for twelve years. In this appeal Defendant presents two issues for review. He claims the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend each of the four counts of the indictment over Defendant’s objection because the indictment was defective, and he asserts the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions. After review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Guadalupe Arroyo v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
In January of 2002, Guadalupe Arroyo (the “Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court imposed two twelve-year sentences to be served consecutively—an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Petitioner successfully appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the basis that the trial court had imposed consecutive sentencing based upon the “dangerous offender” classification in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4) (2010) without first addressing the requisite factors set forth in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). A second appeal on the same issue also resulted in a second remand to the trial court. In a third sentencing order, the trial court held that the sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and were necessary to protect the public, grounds essential for the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon the “dangerous offender” classification. Id. at 938; see also State v. Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *9-10 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). The reasons cited were as follows: [One,] during the prior sentencing hearing the [Petitioner] admitted to underage drinking on a daily basis, confirmed in the pre-sentence report; Two, the [Petitioner] admitted to driving without a license daily; and Three, the [Petitioner] has been illegally within this country since his arrival. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Guadalupe Arroyo v. State of Tennessee
The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive twelve-year terms for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant twice appealed the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Each time, the trial court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence. The defendant did not appeal the third sentencing order. Later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal the third sentencing order. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he and the defendant discussed the futility of a third appeal and the defendant agreed that no appeal would be filed. The defendant denied that he and his trial counsel discussed a third appeal. Trial counsel did not file a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(d)(2) waiver of appeal. The post-conviction court found trial counsel to be more credible than the defendant. Based on that finding, the trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the defendant knew of his right to appeal and waived that right. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know of his right to appeal or that he otherwise did not waive that right. His trial counsel’s failure to file a written waiver of appeal was not per se deficient performance, but was a fact properly considered by the trial court on the issue of whether trial counsel rendered effective representation. Based on the credibility determinations made by the post-conviction court, we hold that the defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his allegations of ineffective |
Knox | Supreme Court |