State of Tennessee v. Glenn Lydell McCray - Dissent
I respectfully dissent. Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment for two counts of aggravated assault against the victim. One of the convictions for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a rifle, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.] The other conviction for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.] |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Justin B. Conrad v. State of Tennessee
Justin B. Conrad (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property of $1,000 or more. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Justin Brian Conrad, No. M2008-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103776, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Eidson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: David L. R. et al
The parents of six children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on two grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions, and the determination that termination of both parents rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Smith, Julian Kneeland and Barron Smith
The Defendants, Barry Smith, Barron Smith, and Julian Kneeland, were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of eight counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; one count of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; eight counts of reckless endangerment, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-103, 39-14-406 (2010). The trial court merged the eight counts of reckless endangerment with the eight counts of aggravated assault. Defendant Barry Smith was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each aggravated assault conviction, one year for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective ten-year sentence. Defendant Barron Smith was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years for each aggravated assault conviction, three years for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective fourteen-year sentence. Defendant Julian Kneeland was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for each aggravated assault conviction, one year for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendants contend that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a 9-1-1 recording, and (3) the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the Defendants’ convictions except the aggravated assault convictions in Count 21, which we reverse and dismiss. We vacate the judgments for the remaining aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions and remand the case for entry of a single judgment for each aggravated assault conviction, noting merger of the reckless endangerment convictions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Haley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jerry Haley, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brandon Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. Gossett Kia-Hyundai South d/b/a Gossett Kia South and Gossett Hyundai South
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Thomas Harmon
A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Darryl Thomas Harmon, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darren Brown v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Darren Brown, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition without an evidentiary hearing, based upon a finding that the petition was filed in violation of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny L. McGowan Jr. v. Jerry Lester, Warden
The Petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, Jr., appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the habeas corpus court committed a “misdemeanor in office” by denying his petition for relief, that he was illegally sentenced as a repeat violent offender, and that he did not have the requisite prior convictions to be sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction (DOC). After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jacobe M.J.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1102(1)(A)(i). We conclude that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support is met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights is in the child's best interest. Affirmed and remanded. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Trinity M. H.
Grandparents were awarded custody of Child after a dependency and neglect finding. Grandparents later filed petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to adopt Child. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights after concluding Mother abandoned Child and that it was in Child’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned Child by failing to visit her in the four months leading up to Grandparents’ petition, but the evidence is not clear and convincing that it is in Child’s best interest that Mother’s rights be terminated. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Haynes v. Formac Stables, Inc.
Plaintiff filed retaliatory discharge suit against his former employer, Defendant. According to his complaint, Defendant’s owner engaged in illegal activity. Plaintiff complained to Defendant’s owner of the illegal activity and was subsequently terminated. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff did not report the illegal activity to any person or entity other than the Defendant’s owner, who was a participant in the illegal activity. Plaintiff contends that where a company’s owner is a participant in illegal activity, reporting the illegal activity solely to the owner should not preclude a retaliatory discharge claim premised on refusal to remain silent. We do not agree and therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teresa Ann Kingsmill
The Defendant, Teresa Ann Kingsmill, pled guilty to eight charges, all of which stemmed from her possessing or manufacturing methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of twenty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced her because it failed to adequately state its reasoning for the Defendant’s sentence in the record. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced the Defendant. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Deshawn Mitchell
The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Deshawn Mitchell, entered guilty pleas in Case No. 12-CR-136 to sale of a counterfeit substance, which he represented to be cocaine (count 1) and delivery of a counterfeit substance (count 2); in Case No. 12-CR-137 to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 1) and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 2); in Case No. 12-CR-138 to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 1) and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 2); and in Case No. 12-CR-139 to possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base (count 1), possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine base (count 2), resisting arrest (count 3), and evading arrest (count 4). The plea agreement stated that the length and manner of sentencing in these cases would be determined by the trial court, and the trial court sentenced Mitchell as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years in confinement. On appeal, Mitchell argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Adam Barnes
The defendant, Daniel Adam Barnes, appeals from his Cheatham County Circuit Court bench conviction of Class A misdemeanor assault. On appeal, the defendant claims that his 11-month, 29-day sentence, all but 10 days of which was suspended, was erroneously imposed because he was not given the opportunity to be heard before the sentence was imposed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Richard Sanford White Living Trust
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrell B. Johnson
The Defendant, Terrell B. Johnson, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone and possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1) (possession with the intent to sell Schedule II narcotics) (2010). The convictions were merged, and the Defendant, a Range I, standard offender, was sentenced to twelve years, with a minimum of eight years to be served. See id. § 39-17-432 (2010) (enhanced penalties for offenses committed in drug-free zones). The sentence was imposed consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in other cases. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to lost and destroyed evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Joseph Raudenbush, III
The Defendant, George Joseph Raudenbush, III, was found guilty by a Monroe County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest with risk of death, a Class D felony; evading arrest, a Class A misdmeanor; two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor; and speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2010) (evading arrest), 39-13-101 (2010) (assault), 39-13-103 (2010) (amended 2012, 2013) (reckless endangerment), 55-50-504 (2012) (driving on a suspended license), 55-12-139 (2012) (amended 2013) (violation of the financial responsibility law), 55-8-152 (2012) (speeding). The trial court merged the evading arrest convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years as a Range I, standard offender for evading arrest. For the misdemeanor convictions, he was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment and the two assault convictions, six months for the driving on a suspended license conviction, and thirty days for the speeding conviction. Pursuant to statute, he was not sentenced for violating the financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences. On appeal, he contends that the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by determining he waived the right and by requiring him to proceed pro se at the trial, during sentencing, and on appeal. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rokisha Alderson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rokisha Alderson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2008 convictions for two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted first degree murder and her effective sentence of life plus fifteen years. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding her petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing her petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl P.E. Munsey v. John Howerton, Warden
The petitioner, Carl P.E. Munsey, challenges his sentences for three 1978 convictions for armed robbery. The petitioner’s claim is primarily based on an assertion that the sentencing provisions of the statute he was sentenced under had been repealed by the legislature and his sentences are therefore illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without a hearing. We conclude that the sentences are not illegal, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Michael Flinn
The Defendant, James Michael Flinn, was convicted by an Anderson County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of his backyard and car, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from his warrantless detention, (4) he was denied the right to counsel at a pretrial hearing, (5) he was denied preliminary hearings after his arrests on two dates, (6) the trial court erred in revoking his bond, (7) he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him by the trial court’s admission of the victim’s death certificate, (8) he was denied his right to testify by the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony regarding the reason he made statements to a witness, (9) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his purchase of a shotgun, (10) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of vandalism of the victim’s house and truck, (11) the trial court erred in receiving as exhibits the no true bills returned by the grand jury regarding a prior incident in which the victim hit the Defendant, (12) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on the Defendant’s silence when he was detained by the police, (13) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by misstating the evidence, (14) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding admissions against interest, and (15) the trial court violated the Defendant’s right to due process by entering judgment and sentencing him on the same day. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Torriano Floyd
Appellant, Torriano Floyd, was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery. The trial court imposed two six-year sentences for robbery, to be served consecutively to each other, and one four-year sentence for attempted robbery, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, he challenges the credibility of one of the witnesses as it pertains to sufficiency of the evidence and the imposition of partial consecutive sentence alignment. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Jimi L. Greene
Jimi L. Greene (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked licence, and violating the financial responsibility law. He was sentenced as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement, with the remainder of his sentence to be suspended to community corrections with several specific conditions. Subsequently, a community corrections violation warrant was filed. The Defendant admitted to the violations alleged in the warrant, and a hearing was held as to disposition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals |