Berlinda Lane, and Edward L. Montedonico, as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of Berlinda Lane v. Jacob L. Daniel and Daniel J. Lund
This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to an intervening personal injury complaint filed by a bankruptcy trustee after the defendants asserted that the original plaintiff, the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding, lacked standing to bring the claim. Once the bankruptcy trustee became aware of the claim, he filed a motion for intervention, or in the alternative, for substitution pursuant to Rule 17.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the trustee’s motion and the trustee later filed an intervening complaint. The trial court, however, later dismissed the case, reasoning that because the first complaint was filed by a party without standing, the original complaint was a nullity. Under this theory, the trial court concluded that the action was commenced upon the filing of the trustee’s intervening complaint, which was undisputedly outside the applicable statute of limitations. Having determined that the plaintiff’s original complaint was not a nullity, we conclude that the trustee’s intervening complaint relates back to the original complaint and, thus, was filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone Bohanna
Appellant, Tyrone Bohanna, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a multi-count indictment with co-defendant Brandon Harris in March of 2010. Appellant was indicted for especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during a felony, aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. Following a lengthy jury trial, Appellant was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment as a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. Appellant was acquitted of one of the firearms charges. At a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant was a career offender. As a result, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for each offense and ordered consecutive sentencing after finding that Appellant had an extensive criminal history and was a dangerous offender. Appellant received a total effective sentence of 120 years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant seeks resolution of the following issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of evidence pursuant to the forfeiture by wrongdoing provision of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6); (3) the admission of recordings of telephone calls made by Appellant from jail; (4) the determination by the trial court to hold court on Sunday; (5) the denial of Appellant’s motions for mistrial; (6) the admission of the testimony of Donovan Hensley; and (7) the imposition of consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence including Appellant’s telephone calls, hearsay statements of Antonio Hawkins, and testimony from Donovan Hensley; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffrey Booth v. State of Tennessee
Jeffrey Booth (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. Pursuant to a sentencing agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, this Court merged the two especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Petitioner subsequently filed for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court should have applied State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), retroactively. He also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Victoria G. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children, Victoria G. and Ethan G. (“the Children”). The Children were born during the marriage of David G. (“Father”) and Rachel M. (“Mother”). When Father and Mother divorced in 2004, Mother was awarded primary custody of the Children. In 2005, Mother suffered a recurrence of cancer. She and the Children subsequently moved in with her sister, Amanda M., and her sister’s husband, Paul M. When Mother died on October 6, 2005, Amanda M. obtained custody of the Children the following day. Father did not seek custody of the Children until April 2006. The parties engaged in protracted litigation, during which Father was allowed varying types of visitation. In September 2010, Father was granted progressively expanding visitation with the Children, designed toward increasing co-parenting in frequency and consistency over time. The visits did not go well, however, and the Children eventually refused to go with Father. The last attempted exchange, occurring on September 9, 2011, resulted in an incident wherein Father was arrested for assault. Father did not seek visitation with the Children after that date. Paul M. filed a petition seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights on January 26, 2012, based upon the statutory ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and support. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition after finding clear and convincing evidence that Father had willfully failed to visit the Children for at least four months preceding the filing of the petition, and upon determining that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Otis Simerly v. State of Tennessee
In 2004, a Johnson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert Otis Simerly, of first degree felony murder, and the jury sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Robert Simerly, No. E2002-02626-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 443294, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar 11, 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2004). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for recusal, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied the Petitioner’s motion for recusal because, during the trial, the judge improperly reminded the prosecutor to establish venue. The State counters first that the appeal was untimely filed. The State further avers that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief based upon the trial court’s failure to recuse itself. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that, pursuant to the circumstances of this case, the Petitioner’s petition should not be dismissed based on his failure to timely file a notice of appeal. We further conclude that he is not entitled to post-conviction relief based upon the merits of his claim. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Reginald Mackinnon
In 2007, a Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Andrew Reginald Mackinnon, of violating the implied consent law. The Defendant appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment, remanding the case for the trial court to determine whether the Defendant violated the implied consent law. State v. Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, No. E2009-00093-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1460167 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 30, 2011), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On remand, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to suppress, both of which the trial court denied after a hearing. After a non-jury trial, the trial court determined that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law. The trial court ordered the Defendant’s license be revoked for a period of one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it:(1) denied his motion to dismiss; and (2) denied his motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel., Wendy Harrison v. Danny Scott
This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition to modify the father’s child support obligation as set in 2000 under a previous version of the child support guidelines. The dispositive issue is whether there is a “Significant Variance” in the father’s income as required by Department of Human Services Rule 1240-2-4-.05(2)(b)(1) to allow a modification. The trial court found no significant variance in the father’s income; nevertheless, it modified his child support obligation, setting it at the presumptive amount as calculated under the current child support guidelines and using the parties’ current income. We have determined the trial court’s finding of no significant variance was based upon a mathematical error, and we find there is a significant variance entitling the father to a modification of his child support obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the modification of the father’s support but on different grounds than those relied upon by the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Carroll v. Robert Corcoran
Unmarried Father and Mother of infant child filed petitions to establish initial custody, calculate parenting time, set child support, and determine residential sharing schedule. Father sought to have the child bear his surname. The trial court entered a parenting plan and denied Father’s request to change the child’s surname. Father appeals and assigns as error certain parenting plan provisions, the trial court’s award to Mother of her attorney fees, and the trial court’s decision not to change the child’s surname. Mother appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days of parenting time for purposes of determining child support. Finding that the court miscalculated the number of days of parenting time, we remand for a redetermination of child support. We also remand the attorney fee award for reconsideration. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Fisher et al. v. Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission et al.
The main issue in this case is whether Rutherford County provided adequate notice, under the Open Meetings Act, concerning a planning commission meeting to vote on the site plan for a mosque. We have concluded that the trial court erred in finding the notice provided to be inadequate under the Open Meetings Act. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Nitra Lynn Haggard v. Dylan Haggard
After the trial court entered a final decree of divorce, the wife filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking a modification of the division of marital property. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, stating that the court was operating under a misconception concerning the wife’s position at trial, which rendered the division of marital property inequitable. The court awarded an asset previously awarded to the husband to the wife instead. Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ruby W. Graham
The defendant, Ruby W. Graham, appeals her White County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempt to possess with the intent to sell morphine, oxycodone, and marijuana, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the total fine imposed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin T. Saulter v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Kevin T. Saulter, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis and a motion to reconsider the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the lower court was correct that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: A Way Out Bonding
The appellant, A Way Out Bonding, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of its Petition to Operate a Bail Bonding Company. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by summarily denying the petition without conducting a hearing. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Glen Crocker v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner challenges the Carroll County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing the petition as time-barred because his mental incompetence tolled the one-year statute of limitations for filing the petition. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Glen Crocker v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion save one point. My colleagues infer that the post-conviction court discredited the Petitioner’s testimony, although the court made no such finding. I believe the record reflects that the court’s findings accepted all the testimony as true but that the court concluded the Petitioner did not provide clear and convincing evidence of his claim. The record supports such a conclusion. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathanael Little
A Chester County jury convicted appellant, Nathanael Little, on count 1 for selling more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; on count 2 for delivering more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; on count 3 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; on count 4 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony; and on count 5 for possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, a Class A misdemeanor. After appropriately merging some of the counts, the trial court sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days for two Class E felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his motion to suppress and by improperly sentencing him. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathanael Little - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to hear the Defendant’s suppression motion. I respectfully dissent, though, because I believe the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to support the conclusions regarding both full confinement and consecutive sentencing. I also believe the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act were not best served by the sentence imposed. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Tonya Dotson v. Donald Howard
The father of one child appeals the trial court’s finding of ten counts of criminal contempt for failing to pay ten weekly child support payments and the imposition of consecutive sentences of ten days for each count for a total sentence of 100 days in jail. Petitioner introduced little evidence other than proof that the father had not paid child support; the father defended the petition insisting he did not have the ability to pay support. Medical records introduced into evidence, along with the testimony of the father and his optometrist, established that the father suffered from an autoimmune medical condition that substantially impairs his vision and prevents him from working in bright light, including sunlight, and from working in a hot environment. Additionally, the father has a tenth grade education and is a convicted felon, facts which further impair his employability. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are unable to conclude that a trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the father had the ability to pay and that his failure to pay support was willful. Accordingly, his conviction of ten counts of contempt for willfully failing to pay child support is reversed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bringle Farms Partnership v. State of Tennessee
The claimant has filed a notice of appeal from an Order Denying Claimant’s Motion for En Banc Review entered by the Tennessee Claims Commission on February 26, 2013. Because the claimant did not file its notice of appeal with the clerk of the Claims Commission within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Estate of Joe Boyd Martin
This case involves a claim first asserted against a decedent’s estate by the decedent’s longtime companion, and then pursued after her death by her heirs The claim was transferred from the probate court to the chancery court and then, by agreed order, to the circuit court for a jury trial. The jury upheld the validity of the claim, and the court entered a judgment on the verdict. The decedent’s heirs then filed post-trial motions contending that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the claim. After extensive briefing, the circuit court agreed with those arguments and vacated its own judgment. We reverse the trial court and reinstate its original judgment. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Ponce DeLeon
The Defendant, Carlos Ponce DeLeon, entered best interest guilty pleas to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, two counts of automobile burglary, Class E felonies, theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402, 39-14-103, 39-14-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years for the theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 conviction, four years for each automobile burglary conviction, three years for the theft of property value at more than $500 but less than $1000 conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each theft of property valued at $500 or less conviction. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing for an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Board of Professional Responsibility
An attorney suspended from the practice of law for eleven months and twenty-nine days,with all but forty-five days of the suspension probated, was assessed costs associated with the proceedings that resulted in his suspension pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 24.3. The attorney timely filed a petition seeking relief from costs, and a panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility convened and conducted a hearing on the petition. The panel denied the petition, and the attorney has appealed to this Court, as permitted by Rule 9, section 24.3. Having carefully and thoroughly considered the record and each of the nine issues raised, we affirm the panel’s decision denying the petition for relief from costs. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Gaines
Appellant, Kenneth Gaines, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in September of 2009 with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment. Appellant pled guilty to all three charges. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Appellant was placed on judicial diversion for three years under the supervision of the department of probation. The State filed a petition for revocation of Appellant’s probation in March of 2011 after Appellant was charged with rape, failed to report the arrest, failed to pay court costs, and failed to pay probation fees. After a jury trial on the rape charge, Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault. The trial court approved the jury verdict, terminated Appellant’s judicial diversion, and set both matters for a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years for each aggravated assault conviction and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the six-month sentence Appellant received for the assault conviction, for a total effective sentence of six years and six months. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he challenges the termination of judicial diversion without a formal hearing and insists that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s rights to due process were not violated when the trial court made the determination that Appellant violated the terms of his judicial diversion contemporaneously with his trial on subsequent charges. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to an effective sentence of six years and six months. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delmonta Hill
The Defendant, Delmonta Hill, entered a best interest plea to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by failing to classify him as an especially mitigated offender and (2) by denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tarence Nelson
Defendant, Tarence Nelson, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the State failed to prove that Defendant did not act in self-defense; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a revolver found during the search of Defendant’s residence that was not the murder weapon; 3) the prosecutor misquoted Defendant during closing argument in an inflammatory manner; and 4) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |