Opinions
Carole Hoke Johns v. Sam N. Johns, Jr.
This appeal involves the latest in a series of attempts by Mother to recover child support arrearages owed by Father. In this particular case, Mother sought to register and enforce in Tennessee a 2007 Arkansas judgment for approximately $47,000 in child support arrearages. The trial court entered an order registering the Arkansas judgment in Tennessee. However, it granted a declaratory judgment motion filed by Father, declaring that the Arkansas judgment was unenforceable in Tennessee due to the ten-year statute of limitations for enforcing judgments found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cheryl Rebecca Norwood
The defendant (along with several co-defendants) was indicted on eight counts of a ten-count indictment: one count of first degree murder; one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder; one count of arson; two counts of tampering with evidence; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; one count of abuse of a corpse; and one count of credit card fraud. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress three statements given to police after the defendant was “voluntarily” detained. The State sought and received permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Upon review, we conclude that the defendant was, in fact, arrested when she was detained but that her arrest was supported by probable cause. We further conclude that the defendant was given sufficiently prompt judicial review of the officer’s probable cause determination. For these reasons, the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wesley Chad Bouterie
The Defendant, Wesley Chad Bouterie, appeals the Hardin County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for convictions for selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine and selling four oxycodone tablets and ordering his effective eight-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darnell White v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Darnell White, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the offense as stated in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to ten-years as a Range I, standard offender. Petitioner did not seek a direct appeal of his conviction. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Johnson
Appellant, Mario Johnson, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to five counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III persistent offender to fifteen years for each count and ordered two of the five sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of thirty years at forty-five percent release eligibility. Appellant now challenges the trial court’s determination with regard to sentence alignment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Eugene Kelly, Jr.
The Defendant, Timothy Eugene Kelly, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402; 39-13-101 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years for the aggravated robbery convictions in Counts 1 and 4, twenty years for the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault conviction. The court ordered the Defendant to serve Counts 1 and 3 consecutively, for an effective thirty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jawaras Beauregard
The Defendant-Appellant, Jawaras Beauregard, was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree premeditated murder. He was convicted by a jury of the charged offense of attempted especially aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to a concurrent sentence of five years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him in a photographic lineup; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tenneseee v. Gary D. Jones
The appellant, Gary D. Jones, pled guilty in the Henderson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000; felony evading arrest; driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linda Carten ex rel. Daniel John Carten v. MBI and/or Mr. Bult's, Inc., et al.
An employee died from “traumatic asphyxiation” after a front-end loader accidentally pushed him into a trailer loaded with garbage. The employee’s widow sought workers’ compensation death benefits. The employer denied that the employee was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits and raised the affirmative defenses of willful misconduct and willful failure to use a safety device. Following a trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the employer, and the employee’s widow appealed. We affirm. |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Alvin Harding
The defendant, Michael Alvin Harding, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the 15-year sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sterling Jerome Davis
The defendant, Sterling Jerome Davis, was convicted by a Monroe County jury of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class A felony; possession of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of forty years at 35% for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, four years at 35% for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) whether the trial court improperly limited defense counsel’s questioning of venire members; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the defendant’s petition for a hearing on a forfeiture warrant; (5) whether the prosecutor engaged in improper closing argument; and (6) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Dale Netheron v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ricky D. Netherton, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first-degree and second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Martindill v. Dwight Barbee, Warden
The Petitioner, Jason Martindill, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of summary dismissal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael L. McKillip v. State of Tennessee
Proceeding pro se, the Petitioner, Michael L. McKillip, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner did not comply with the requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 10(B), this court is without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Jason Vance
Defendant, Michael Vance, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, making a false report to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court severed counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 from counts 4, 6, 7, and 8, and upon the State’s motion, the trial court subsequently dismissed with prejudice counts 6, 7, and 8 of the indictment. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder, making a false statement to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, three years for making a false report, three years for evading arrest, and one year for unlawful possession of a weapon. Defendant’s sentences in counts 2, 3, and 5 were ordered to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to his life sentence. In this direct appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of the victim’s divorce attorney; 3) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 404(b); 4) the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Lynn Zager; 5) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Murray Smith; 6) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of the State’s mental health expert, Dr. Rokeya Farooque; 7) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a photo of the victim taken while the victim was living; 8) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; 9) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a durable power of attorney executed by the victim; 10) the trial court erred by not severing count 1 from the remaining counts; 11) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and 12) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Jason Vance - Concurring
I respectfully write separately to express somewhat different views from the majority on two issues. First, relative to the 911 dispatcher’s testimony that the 911 system maintained a “flag” on the defendant’s address that indicated issues of officer safety, the majority relies upon the failure of the “flag” to identify the defendant as the source of the issue as a basis for denying the defendant relief. I believe that, given other evidence in the case, the officer-safety flag substantially implicated the defendant. Consequently, the trial court should have excluded the evidence. On the other hand, the totality of the evidence in the case renders the admission of this evidence harmless, and I would have affirmed the denial of relief on that basis. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Aaron Pounds v. Roland Colson, Warden
The petitioner, Michael Aaron Pounds, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1988 conviction of felony murder. In this appeal, the petitioner lists some 65 issues for appellate review. His chief complaint, however, appears to be that an inconsistency between the wording of the indictment and the plea agreement documents renders his conviction void. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Compton v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Brandon Compton, of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the judgments of conviction and entered convictions for second degree murder, remanding to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2005-01419-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2924992, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 13, 2006) perm. to app. denied (Feb. 26, 2007). After the trial court resentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each of his second degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, this Court affirmed the twenty-five year consecutive sentences. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2007-01790-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4071825 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2008) perm. app. denied (Feb. 17, 2009). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney failed to: (1) adequately investigate witnesses, (2) present the theory of self-defense, (3) refute the State’s characterization of the Petitioner as a drug dealer, and (4) present expert testimony on gunshot residue. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. William L. Gibbons, et al. v. Clayton R. Smart, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of penalties and interest on ad valorum taxes owed by a funeral home business after the business was placed in receivership. The Appellant/Shelby County Trustee filed a claim with the Appellee/Receiver to recover delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. The trial court denied the penalties and interest, but allowed the Receiver to pay the base taxes. The Trustee appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Nelson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joseph Nelson, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Because the Petitioner has failed to prove any grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Markum Douglas v. Peggy J. Lowe, et al.
Plaintiff purchased landlocked property and filed suit against adjoining landowners to establish an easement for a private road and for utilities pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-101, et seq. After the jury of view returned its verdict form selecting a certain route for the easement, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which the trial court granted. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which the trial court denied. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hayden C. G-J
Former unmarried partner of the child’s adoptive mother seeks visitation with the child. Because the former partner has no biological or legal relationship with the child, we affirm the trial court’s finding that she does not have standing to seek visitation. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Sharyn Bovat v. Nissan North America
This civil action is the progeny of a criminal proceeding in which Plaintiff was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for criminal trespass and stalking following an incident that occurred at the headquarters of Nissan North America. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal trespass; however, the stalking charge was dismissed because a corporation is not defined as a “person” under the stalking statute. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan North America asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process pertaining to the stalking charge. Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed facts that was supported by the affidavit of the Williamson County Deputy District Attorney General who investigated and prosecuted the criminal proceedings. Plaintiff filed a response opposing Nissan’s motion for summary judgment; however, she failed to file a statement of disputed facts or any affidavit or deposition testimony to dispute the facts relied upon by Nissan as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires. After setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 56.04, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon the findings that Nissan presented competent evidence to negate essential elements of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of disputed material fact regarding any of the grounds relied upon by Nissan. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Discover Bank Issuer of Discover Card v. Layton Howell, III
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on Sworn Account, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 245-107, for unpaid credit card charges against the credit card holder. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a statement of the material facts as to which Plaintiff contended there was no genuine issue for trial, and each fact was set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph as the rule required, with a specific citation to the record. Defendant filed a response objecting to the motion; however, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the facts Plaintiff relied upon in making the motion for summary judgment were, in fact, disputed as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. As a consequence, the facts relied upon by Plaintiff were undisputed and the trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the amount owed. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Winkfield v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Samuel Winkfield, was indicted for first degree (premeditated) murder, first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to tamper with evidence. During his July 2007 trial, the petitioner was acquitted of the felony murder and conspiracy to tamper with evidence charges. Because the jury was unable to reach a decision regarding the remaining charges, he was retried in January 2008 and convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The jury was again unable to reach a decision on the kidnapping charge, and this charge was eventually dismissed. On the direct appeal of his convictions, the petitioner challenged the admission into evidence of his testimony from the first trial, the exclusion from evidence of the MySpace page of the State’s chief witness, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. The petitioner then filed a timely post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner asserted his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to investigate and produce witnesses; in failing to obtain expert testimony; in failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses; and in failing to explore alternative defense strategies. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |