Phillip Douglas Seals v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Phillip Douglas Seals, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the postconviction court erred in denying his request for transcripts of the opening and closing statements so he could determine whether the original prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Dodson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of having a witness testify at the post-conviction hearing, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call the aforementioned witness to testify at trial for the purpose of impeaching the victim’s testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jodie Williams Henson
The Defendant-Appellant, Jodie Williams Henson, was indicted by a Lake County Grand Jury for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Henson entered an open guilty plea to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(2). The charge for leaving the scene of an accident was dismissed upon entry of Henson’s guilty plea. The trial court subsequently ordered Henson to serve her sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Henson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a probationary sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, et al.
This lawsuit concerns the extent to which a bookstore/café area and fitness center/gymnasium contained in a church family life center facility are exempt from property taxation under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-212. The trial court upheld the determination of the State Board of Equalization and the Assessment Appeals Commission that the bookstore/café area was not exempt from taxation, and that the fitness center qualified for a 50 percent exemption under the statute. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Faye Morrow
Appellant, Mary Faye Morrow, entered a guilty plea without a complete agreement as to a recommended sentence to one count of theft of property valued at more than $60,000. Prior to sentencing, the parties reached an agreement as to the length of the eight-year sentence but requested a sentencing hearing on the issue of whether appellant should receive an alternative sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve her eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from this judgment that she now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Margaret Lynn McCoy
A Union County grand jury indicted appellant, Margaret Lynn McCoy, for driving under the influence, first offense; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia, all Class A misdemeanors. The State dismissed 1 the possession of a controlled substance charge and a jury convicted her of driving under the influence, first offense, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each offense, with the first sixty days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe Clyde Tubwell v. City of Memphis, et al.
This is an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from the Memphis City Court. Appellant filed a pauper’s oath in the circuit court, but did not file a proper bond or oath in the city court as required to perfect his appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court did not gain jurisdiction over the matter and, thus, properly dismissed the appeal. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Dobbins, As Conservator of the Estate of Frank Bailey, Jr., v. Gerald S. Green, et al.
This is a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 case. Following plaintiff’s death and the filing of a suggestion of death in the trial court, no motion to substitute party was made within the ninety day time period set out in Rule 25.01. The trial court determined that the failure to file a motion for substitution of party was not the result of excusable neglect and granted the Rule 25.01 motion to dismiss the lawsuit. The court subsequently also granted the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. We conclude that, in the absence of excusable neglect, failure to comply with Rule 25.01 requires mandatory dismissal of the case with prejudice and the lawsuit may not thereafter be revived by the filing of a motion for voluntary dismissal. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Robinson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gregory Robinson, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Petitioner was sentenced to death for first degree murder and twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping to be served consecutively. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004). In this appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief, petitioner contends that (1) the State failed to disclose a statement of a witness in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the State elicited and failed to correct false testimony of a witness at trial; (3) counsel were ineffective in both phases of the trial and on appeal; and (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional. We conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied post-conviction relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Robinson v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I join Judge Page’s opinion in full. I write separately solely to express my conclusion that trial counsel cannot be found to render ineffective assistance of counsel when the record of the post-conviction proceedings reflects that trial counsel would not have had the time and/or the resources to provide the investigation performed by post-conviction counsel after the trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Carter King
The appellant, William Carter King, appeals the Fentress County Criminal Court’s revoking the alternative sentences he received for guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, a Class C felony; burglary, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued more than five hundred dollars but less than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Danny Keith Ellis
This case involves a dispute between the administrators of the estate of a man who died intestate and the decedent’s’s former wife over the legal ownership of funds that were held in jointly titled accounts at two banking institutions. After the man’s death, his former wife withdrew almost all the funds from the accounts. The administrators asked for a declaratory judgment that the funds belonged to the estate on the basis that the husband and wife had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) before their divorce which designated those funds as belonging solely to the husband. However, the husband never changed the titles on those accounts, and the ex-wife insisted that the unaltered designation of joint ownership conclusively established her right to the funds after her ex-husband’s death. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the bank accounts were the sole property of the estate, and the former wife was obligated to return the funds. The trial court reasoned that because the MDA was approved by the court and was binding on the parties, it amounted to an amendment to the contract that the parties had created when the accounts were established. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Russell, et al. v. Hendersonville Utility District
Property owners sued utility district for damages and an injunction as a result of the excessive use of an easement across the property owners’ land by the district’s assignees. The utility district denied any wrongdoing and moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted. The property owners appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the property owners’ complaint because the property owners have stated a cause of action for which relief can be granted. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v Jonathan Kyle Hulse
The Defendant, Jonathan Kyle Hulse, w as found guilty by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13- 502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-14-106 (2010) (unauthorized use of a vehicle). He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-nine years for each of the Class A felonies and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor. The trial court ordered that the felony convictions be served consecutively, for an effective fifty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) his dual convictions for aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process principles, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the deceased victim’s statements about the crimes as excited utterances. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Lamont Moss, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
On October 5, 2005, a Davidson County jury convicted petitioner of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $500 but less than $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Robert Lamont Moss, Jr., No. M2006-00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245082, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 7, 2008). Subsequently, petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition on the merits and the coram nobis petition as time-barred. On appeal, petitioner argues that (1) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) his right to due process was denied by the trial court’s denial of funds for the defense to hire experts in eyewitness reliability and shoe print identification; and (3) he is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David D. Lawrence v. Midwestern Insurance Alliance
The employee alleged that his pre-existing heart failure was permanently worsened by an accidental inhalation of cement dust on the job. The workers’ compensation insurer for the employer asserted that the worsening of the heart failure was a natural progression of the condition and that the inhalation event had no permanent effect on the employee. Cardiologists testified in support of each side’s theory. The trial court found for the employee and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The insurer has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Gene B. Cochran, et al. v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
The South Cordova Area was annexed in November 2001. In December 2001, Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint challenging the South Cordova Area annexation. In 2011, however, the complaint was dismissed “without prejudice” for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint challenging annexation, but the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hill Boren, P.C. v. Paty, Rymer and Ulin, P.C. and James Eric Hamm
This appeal involves a dispute over an attorney’s fee involving two law firms and their client. The parties originally entered into a contract whereby both law firms would jointly represent the client as a plaintiff in a personal injury suit. Two years later, the client discharged one of the law firms. The other firm continued to represent the client, and when the case settled over a year later, the remaining firm retained the entire contingency fee. The discharged firm sued the client and the other firm, alleging that it was entitled to a share of the contingency fee and asserting numerous causes of action. The defendants claimed that the discharged firm was limited to quantum meruit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The plaintiff law firm appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe v. Mark Gwyn, Director of TBI, et al
The petitioner, John Doe, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to challenge his guilty-pleaded, 1995 attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction arising in that same court. Specifically, the petitioner, whose three-year sentence was suspended, challenged his conviction based upon sanctions imposed upon him by 2004 and 2007 changes to the sexual offender registration law. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm the order of the habeas corpus court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Lee Robertson
Appellant, Larry Lee Robertson, pled guilty to selling oxycodone in Sumner County in October of 2010. He received a sentence of six years on probation. In May of 2012, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation by using intoxicants to excess and pleading guilty to a public intoxication charge. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristin M. Myers
The Defendant, Kristin M. Myers, was convicted by a Loudon County jury of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements made to authorities because she did not execute a knowing, voluntary wavier of her Miranda rights. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statements and that the evidence produced at trial is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David D. Clark, Jr. v. Ashlyn Cooper
This appeal arises from a dispute involving custody of a child. David D. Clark, Jr. (“Father”) and Ashlyn Cooper (“Mother”) voluntarily gave custody of their minor child (“the Child”) to the Child’s paternal grandparents. Mother later sought to alter custody of the Child through the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court denied Mother’s motions. Mother filed a motion for a new hearing, which also was denied. The Juvenile Court, when denying Mother’s motion for a new hearing, described the matter as a dependency case despite earlier classifying it as a custody case. Mother appealed to the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”), which denied Mother’s appeal. The Trial Court held that the action was, in fact, a custody matter, and therefore, Mother’s appeal from Juvenile Court, if any, should have been to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Mother appeals. We hold that, while the Trial Court correctly held that this was a custody matter and that it therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal, it should have transferred her appeal to this Court rather than simply deny the appeal. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Burress
The Defendant, Christopher Burress, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his two convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery and ordering him to serve his effective six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person, (2) finding that he violated his probation by resisting arrest, (3) revoking his probation, and (4) ordering him to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Ray Irick v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, filed a motion to reopen his error coram nobis proceedings or, in the alternative, a second petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his pleading, he reasserted the grounds underlying his first petition for the writ and added claims of judicial misconduct pertaining to the judge in his first coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court in the instant case denied relief, and this appeal follows. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Angel S. F. et al.
The Juvenile Court of Putnam County terminated the parental rights of both parents to their |
Putnam | Court of Appeals |