State of Tennessee v. John Robert Q. Jackson
Appellant, John Robert Q. Jackson, challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court after he was revoked from community corrections. He argues that the trial court erred by considering his pending criminal allegations when ordering that he serve some of his sentences consecutively with each other. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his record of criminal activity was extensive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Thomas D. Thomas, et al.
Plaintiff Bank accelerated a loan secured by an aircraft after Borrower failed to maintain insurance on the aircraft as required by the loan documents. Bank filed an action to collect amounts due; took possession of and disposed of the aircraft; and sought a judgment for the deficiency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Bank. Defendant Loan Guarantors appeal. We affirm in part; reverse in part, finding that Bank did not provide sufficient notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-611; and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brys Andrew Hensley
Brys Andrew Hensley (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of two years. The State subsequently alleged that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced the Defendant. After a second hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to reconsider its previous ruling, and this appeal followed. We hold that, in revoking the Defendant’s diversion and probation, the trial court failed to exercise its statutory discretion and thereby committed reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kiara Tashawn King
The defendant, Kiara Tashawn King, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property with a value of $500 or more, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective five-year sentence, to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court failed to follow the correct sentencing procedure, imposed an excessive sentence, and erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an effective sentence of five years of probation and that its decision to deny judicial diversion did not wholly depart from the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court accordingly. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deeric McAfee
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Deeric McAfee, of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal history, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce on cross-examination a letter written by the appellant, the trial court erred by giving an instruction regarding flight, and the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ahmad R. Manning, Alias
On appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment due to pre-indictment delay. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment because it misapplied the law in reaching its determination that the delay caused the Defendant actual prejudice. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wendy Leverett, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
A woman who was severely injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an unlicensed minor filed suit against the minor. The minor’s parents’ insurance company denied coverage and refused to defend the suit on the basis of an exclusion in the insurance policy for damages caused by a party driving without permission of the owner or a person “in lawful possession” of the vehicle. No defense was offered, and the injured party obtained a $1 million default judgment against the minor driver. The injured party and the minor’s parents then jointly filed suit against the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company was liable for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act based upon its denial of coverage. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the minor was entitled to insurance coverage under her parents’ policy at the time of the accident. The remainder of the case was tried, and the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The jury also found the insurance company had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the trial court trebled the compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees under the Act. The insurance company has raised a number of issues in this appeal, inter alia, the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of coverage; the finding of liability for bad faith, the liability and enhanced penalty under the TCPA, and the requirement that plaintiffs should make an election between the punitive damages and the enhanced damages. We affirm the breach of contract holding, including the conclusion that the policy terms provided coverage. We reverse and vacate the holding of liability for bad faith, including the award of punitive damages thereunder, since the statutory cause of action was not plead. We also reverse the award of treble damages under the TCPA, but affirm the finding of a violation of the Act. We affirm as modified the award of attorneys’ fees. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy Leverette, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company - Concur and Dissent
I agree with the majority’s analysis of the coverage issue in Section V and its conclusion that TFM breached the contract by denying coverage. As a result of this breach, the judgment against TFM in the amount of $67,000 was appropriate. I concur as well with the analysis of the bad faith claims in Section VI. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamey Ray Christy
The Defendant-Appellant, Jamey Ray Christy, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and aggravated assault, all class C felonies; and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon involved, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide convictions and imposed concurrent terms of eight years’ confinement for the vehicular homicide and aggravated assault and three years’ confinement for the reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a consecutive term of ten years’ confinement for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated child neglect. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Baleke Kromah
The Defendant-Appellant, Baleke Kromah, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. He was subsequently convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of count three and was acquitted of the remaining counts. Kromah was sentenced to ninety days of imprisonment followed by four years of probation. On appeal, Kromah argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election of offenses at the close of the State’s proof. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael L. Snodgrass
The Defendant, Michael L. Snodgrass, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his judicial diversion for a charge of theft of property valued at less than $500 and imposing a split confinement sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in sentencing him to split confinement and imposing a requirement that he serve 75% of his sentence before eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and related rehabilitative programs. We affirm the denial of full probation but reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment that deletes the special condition that the Defendant to serve ten days “flat” and specifies the percentage of his sentence he must serve before eligibility for rehabilitation programs. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton
The appellant, Linda Gass (“Heir”), an heir to the Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton, appeals from an order of the trial court entered on October 30, 2012, which determined that certain specifically described real property upon which Heir lives is an asset of the estate and may be sold by the appellee, Barbara D. Carmichael, the Executrix of the decedent’s estate (“Executrix”), pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s will. Because it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked properly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Barnes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Barnes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The plea agreement provided for an effective eight year sentence and, further, that the petitioner could apply for a suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the State complied with an agreement to recommend probation to the trial court. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jameel Childress v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jameel Childress, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In January, 1999, the petitioner pled guilty, in seven separate cases, to two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and one count of theft of property over $1000. Because all sentences imposed in the case were ordered to be served concurrently, the petitioner received an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because the sentences imposed are illegal, as they were statutorily required to be served consecutively because the petitioner was on bond when the offenses were committed. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Ray Ward
The defendant, Thomas Ray Ward, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class E felonies, and was given consecutive two-year sentences for each offense. However, the defendant was placed on probation for a period of eight years. A violation warrant was subsequently issued, and, at the hearing, the defendant acknowledged that he had committed the technical violations of his agreement. The trial court found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that the balance of the reinstated six-year sentence be served in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision to revoke was error because it was based upon the fact that the defendant had prior violations of his probation rather than on the technical violations which were established at the hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the revocation of probation. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Ray Boatwright
The defendant, William Ray Boatwright, was convicted by a Knox County jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault counts into the especially aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-five years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated robbery conviction, and twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated burglary conviction. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of forty-nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his identity as a perpetrator and argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony and by enhancing his sentences within his range and ordering consecutive sentencing. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity, that the defendant has waived the issue regarding the jury instruction, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentences within his range and ordering that they be served consecutively. However, we note under plain error review that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-404 d) prohibits the defendant’s dual convictions for both especially aggravated burglary and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we modify the defendant’s Class B especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and his sentence to ten years as a Range II, multiple offender for this offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Krissa E.M.L.
The guardian ad litem for the minor child Krissa E. M. L. (“the Child”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lanesha L. (“Mother”) to the Child. The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), which already had been involved with the Child’s case through dependency and neglect proceedings, was named in the petition and supported the prosecution of the petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie D. Seymore
The defendant, Jackie D. Seymore, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Pavwoski v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Edward Pavwoski, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2009 Maury County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of rape and six counts of incest. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tirrone Akilla Simpkins v. State of Tennessee
Tirrone Akillia Simpkins ("the Petitioner") pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Andrews, Jr. v. Deborah L. Clemmer
This case involves the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiff did not file any further bond at that time. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the appeal from General Sessions Court in light of our recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Andrews, Jr., v. Deborah L. Clemmer - Dissenting
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff’s payment of $211.50 satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 for appealing a case from general sessions court to circuit court, the majority relies upon the recent case of Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013). Because I believe Bernatsky is based upon a flawed premise, I respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Kruger, et al. v. The State of Tennessee, et al.
Diane Benson and the Northwest Tennessee Shooting Sports Association filed requests for variances to devote property to a Use Permitted on Appeal within a Forestry-Agricultural- |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Kruger, et al. v. The State of Tennessee, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. In the majority opinion, the majority states the issue raised by the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) as: “Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Dyer County Zoning Resolution does not require an applicant seeking a variance to have a written lease.” In a footnote, the majority observes that the appellate record contained “no such finding by the circuit court.” Instead of leaving it at that, the majority goes on to “construe the BZA’s argument as ‘Whether the Resolution requires an applicant seeking a variance to possess a valid lease.’ ” |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Marisa R. Rowland et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County et al.
In this case involving serious injuries sustained in a collision between a school bus and a pickup truck, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |