State of Tennessee v. Eddie Leroy Rowlett
The Defendant, Eddie Leroy Rowlett, was convicted by a Stewart County jury of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the entry into his home and his subsequent detention and arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; (3) several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of certain photographs and limitations on establishing a "criminal trespass" defense; and (4) the jury instructions, arguing that a special instruction should have been given for the State’s failure to disclose the deputy’s telephone records, and that instructions on self-defense and defense of others should have been included in the final charge to the jury. Because the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient, the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is reversed and modified to a conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault. The judgment for resisting arrest is affirmed. The case is remanded for resentencing. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie Leroy Rowlett-concurring in part and dissenting in part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. The majority concludes that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury to Deputy Saltkill. Nowhere in the Defendant’s brief does he even mention the issue of the sufficiency of the proof as to serious bodily injury. As the majority points out, the "crux of the Defendant’s sufficiency argument is that the State failed to prove that he did not act in self-defense." Indeed, I submit that, not only is it the "crux" of his argument, it is his only argument. The Defendant’s entire argument on the sufficiency issue is comprised of only one paragraph that consumes less than one-half of a page of the Defendant’s brief. The only citation in the paragraph is to the seminal case Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), regarding the general standard of appellate review on sufficiency issues. Moreover, the only reference to the proof was with regard to the issue of self defense. Under these circumstances, the Defendant clearly has failed to support any argument on the sufficiency of the evidence as to the issue of serious bodily injury "with argument, citation to relevant authorities, or any references to the appellate record." See Tenn. R. App. P. 27. Accordingly, I would find that the Defendant has waived any sufficiency argument with regard to the issue of serious bodily injury. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa Barnett v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding her convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying her relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wade P. Tucker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Wade P. Tucker, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred in failing to consider his motion for appointment of counsel and that the indictment was defective so as to deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Pernell Taylor
Appellant, Eric Pernell Taylor, was on probation after entering guilty plea in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on January 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Appellant had failed to report his arrest, failed to report to his probation officer, failed to pay litigation taxes, and tested positive for cocaine. He also admitted to the cocaine usage in writing. After holding a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the probation or ordering the service of the sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott McLain
The appellant, Scott McLain, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with seven days to be served in confinement. As a condition of his plea, he reserved certified questions of law concerning the suppression of the results of his blood alcohol test. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; however, our supreme court subsequently remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. 2008). Upon reconsideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for dismissal of the indictment. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Dacia S., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Donald R.S., Jr. (“Father”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W. , and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Markina Westmoreland, et al. v. William L. Bacon, M.D., et al.
The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case to us for consideration in light of its opinion in Shipley v. Williams. In the original appeal of this medical malpractice case, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. On remand we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert was not competent to testify and consequently, the plaintiffs created genuine issues of material fact, making summary judgment for defendants inappropriate. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marina Castro v. TX Direct, LLC
Employer terminated employee shortly after discovering she was pregnant. Thereafter, employee filed a complaint against her former employer asserting claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and misrepresentation. Following a period of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on each of the employee’s claims. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Derek Alton Badger v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Derek Alton Badger, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery after a jury trial in Bedford County. Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was unsuccessful on appeal. See State v. Derek Alton Badger, No. M2009-01295-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3489173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 25, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court failed to advise him regarding sex offender registration and community supervision. After a hearing on the post-conviction petition, at which Petitioner presented several witnesses, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal and seeks our review of the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Donnell Davis
The Defendant, Alvin Donell Davis, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Hamilton County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his probation because his sentences had expired. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s probation on Count 2 of his convictions and affirm the trial court’s order of probation revocation and incarceration on that count. However, because the sentences in Counts 1 and 3 expired prior to the filing of the revocation warrant, the trial court lacked the authority to revoke the Defendant’s sentence on those counts; therefore, the orders of revocation and incarceration on Counts 1 and 3 are reversed and vacated. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc. et al.
The issue presented is whether the jury verdict against the management company of an assisted living facility for negligence based on understaffing is supported by material evidence. Mable Farrar’s physician prescribed Ms.Farrara daily dose of an over-the-counter medicine for constipation. The nursing staff at the assisted living facility where Ms. Farrar lived did not give the medicine to her as often as prescribed. As a result, Ms. Farrar became constipated and returned to see her doctor. Ms. Farrar’s doctor notified the nursing staff at the assisted living facility to give Ms. Farrar three to four enemas each day beginning on May 27, 2004. A facility nurse gave Ms. Farrar one enema on the evening of May 27, none on May 28, and one enema on the evening of May 29. Very soon after receiving the last enema on May 29, Ms. Farrar died from a perforated colon. Her daughters filed a wrongful death action against the nurse who gave the enema, the director of nursing at the assisted living facility, the owner of the facility, and its management company. The suit alleged that the negligence of the staff, the owner, and its management company caused Ms. Farrar’s death. The jury returned a verdict finding the nurse thirty percent at fault, the director of nursing twenty percent at fault, and the management company fifty percent at fault based on its failure to provide sufficient personnel at the facility. The management company appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict against the management company, finding that there was no material evidence that staffing deficiencies proximately caused Ms. Farrar’s death. We hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the award of punitive damages. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
Joseph E. Smith v. Electric Research & Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc., and Ace American Insurance Co.
Joseph E. Smith (“Employee”) alleged that he injured his back in the course and scope of his employment with Electric Research & Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc. (“Employer”). Employee’s evaluation physician assigned a 12% permanent impairment rating to the body as a whole as a result of the injury. A physician selected through the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process assigned a 3% permanent impairment rating to the body as a whole. The trial court found that Employee rebutted the statutory presumption of accuracy afforded the MIR physician’s rating by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) (2008) and awarded 40% permanent partial disability to the body. Employer has appealed. After reviewing the record as we are required to do, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Soumya Pandey v. Manish Shrivastava
Following a four-day trial in this divorce case, the trial court entered an order naming the Mother primary residential parent and permitting her to relocate to Arkansas with the parties’ minor child. The Father appeals. Because the trial court failed to provide any reason for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review on appeal. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order that contains the findings and conclusions mandated by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Denzel Wallace v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Denzel Wallace, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Otis Maclin v. State of Tennessee
Otis Maclin ("the Petitioner") filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions based upon guilty pleas to the offenses of kidnapping, sexual battery, and aggravated assault. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective ten-year sentence. In his petition, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy W. Keith v. Michael J. Jackson, Sr., and Nata M. Jackson
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract for employment. Roy W. Keith (“Keith”) sued Michael J. Jackson, Sr. and Nata M. Jackson (“the Jacksons”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that he was not paid separation payments due to him under an employment agreement. The Jacksons answered the complaint, arguing essentially that Keith waived these payments when he accepted a job in the new corporation. Keith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Jacksons appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment as there remained a material controversy regarding whether Keith waived his right to payment under the employment agreement. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tiashaun C., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to two minor children (collectively “the Children”) of the defendant, Valtrella C. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the custody of the petitioners, Jason C. and Edana B., in November 2009. The Children had been removed from Mother by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because of Mother’s substance abuse problems. Jason C. and Edana B. filed a petition in June 2011 seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother. They alleged that grounds for termination existed due to abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit or pay more than token support. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had willfully failed to visit the Children. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald K. Nelson v. Gerald E. Nelson, et al.
This interlocutory appeal involves the question of whether the arbitration provisions contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7-1206(f)-(k)(2008), a part of the Tennessee uninsured motorist (“UM”) statutory scheme, apply to policies with UM coverage that were issued and delivered in Texas. The trial court held that the arbitration provisions do apply. The UM carriers, brought into this action pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7- 1206(a), appealed that decision. We reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Ann Cradic v. Kenneth Wayne Cradic
This case focuses, in the context of the parties’ divorce, on the distribution of their marital assets and debts. Gwendolyn Ann Cradic (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Kenneth Wayne Cradic (“Husband”) on October 24, 2008. The parties went to trial in October 2011 on the issues of fault and division of property. The court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. It then divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of one asset and its division of marital property. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Chanda Langston v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Chanda Langston, pleaded guilty without a recommended sentence to six counts of forgery and one count of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner now claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Furlough v. Spherion Atlantic Workforce, LLC
We accepted review of this appeal to determine whether, when a workers’ compensation settlement involving an employee represented by counsel is approved by the Department of Labor and the SD-1 form is submitted contemporaneously with the settlement agreement, a court may set the settlement aside as non-final based on the court’s determination that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We hold that when the Department of Labor approves a settlement, it implicitly approves the accompanying SD-1 form, and a court has no authority to set the settlement aside based on its independent finding that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We therefore reverse the judgments of the Panel and of the trial court and dismiss the employee’s petition. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lamont Simpson
The defendant, David Lamont Simpson, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Thereafter, he was sentenced to a term of fifteen years, to be served at 100%, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Because the defendant failed to file a transcript of the evidence on appeal, he is entitled to no relief, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thais M. Lay v. Millard C. Wallace and Iris Carrington
This case involves the status of a road as public or private, as well as Plaintiff’s right to access such. We find that the roadway was a public road prior to 1960, but that it has since been abandoned. Finding no necessity, we further conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to a private easement over the road to access her property. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. James W. Frierson et al
This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |