Suzanne Renee Williams-Ali as personal representative of the Estate of Ruby Lee Cofer Williams v. Mountain States Health Alliance
This is a case alleging negligence by defendant, Mountain States Health Alliance, which resulted in injury to a patient, Ruby Williams. Ms. Williams fell off a table while she was undergoing myocardial perfusion imaging, also known as a nuclear stress test. Mountain States Health Alliance asserted that Ms. Williams’s complaint sounded in medical malpractice instead of ordinary negligence, and asked for summary judgment because Ms. Williams had not complied with the filing requirements of the medical malpractice statute. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the case involved a medical malpractice claim rather than an ordinary negligence claim. Ms. Williams’s Estate appeals. We affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Austin D. et al
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Nicole D. (“Mother”) and Terry D. (“Father”) to their minor children, Austin D. and Trinity D. (collectively “the Children”). Mother and Father separated after an incident of domestic violence; the Children remained with Mother. A drug raid at Mother’s house led the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) to remove the Children and take them into temporary protective custody. DCS filed a petition seeking temporary legal custody. Later, the Children’s maternal grandmother, Lisa D. V. (“Grandmother”), filed an intervening petition and was granted temporary custody. A year later, Grandmother filed a petition seeking to terminate both parents’ parental rights; she seeks to adopt the Children. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition based upon its findings, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. We vacate in part and affirm in part. As to the trial court’s decision that termination is appropriate, we affirm that ultimate conclusion. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce D. Mendenhall
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was convicted of three counts and acquitted of two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-102, -12-107, -13-202. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for each conviction and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever two of the counts; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to a fellow inmate turned police informant; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress numerous letters the Defendant had sent from jail; (5) that the trial court erred by admitting redacted portions from numerous letters the Defendant had sent from jail and from several telephone conversations the Defendant had while in jail; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of another crime as "contextual background evidence;" (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; and (8) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences.Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tellico Village Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Health Solutions, LLC, et al.
Tellico Village Property Owners Association, Inc. (“TVPOA”) sued Health Solutions, LLC; Tellico Senior Living, LLC; Citizens National Bancorp, Inc. d/b/a Citizens National Bank of Tennessee; Home Federal Bank Corporation d/b/a Home Federal Bank; and NBN Corporation d/b/a National Bank of Tennessee (“National Bank”) with regard to a failed development project. TVPOA asked the Trial Court to declare that TVPOA’s option agreement concerning real estate in the development project had priority over certain recorded deeds of trust. National Bank appeals the Trial Court’s grant of partial summary judgment to TVPOA raising issues about whether the Memorandum of Agreement and Development Agreement between TVPOA and the Developer and the Developer Company violated the statute of frauds, and the Trial Court’s grant of TVPOA’s motion in limine to exclude evidence on National Bank’s claim of unjust enrichment. We find and hold that National Bank was not a party to the Memorandum of Agreement or the Development Agreement and, therefore, may not raise a statute of frauds defense. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in excluding evidence on National Bank’s claim of unjust enrichment. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Fred V. Wilson, et al v. Monroe County, Tennessee, et al
Fred V. Wilson and his wife, Anna R. Wilson, were the initial plaintiffs. They filed suit against Monroe County and the City of Sweetwater alleging that the amputation of Mrs. Wilson’s left leg was proximately caused by the negligence of those responding to an emergency call to her home. Mrs. Wilson died before trial and the case proceeded with her husband as the sole plaintiff, individually and in a representative capacity. At a bench trial, the court found that the injury to Mrs. Wilson’s left foot occurred during the ambulance ride from the Wilsons’ home to the hospital emergency room. It further found that the injury, which did not heal, necessitated the amputation of her leg. The court entered judgment against Monroe County. The claims against Sweetwater were dismissed. Monroe County appeals. The plaintiff, by way of a separate issue, challenges the sufficiency of the court’s award of damages. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Dean McDaniel v. Kimberly Ruth McDaniel
This appeal arises from a divorce. Harold Dean McDaniel (“Husband”) sued Kimberly Ruth McDaniel (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After a long and contentious legal battle, including an earlier appeal to this Court and subsequent remand for a new trial, the Trial Court entered its supplemental final decree of divorce. Wife appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not adequately compute child support, and, therefore remand for its proper computation. We also modify the allocation of guardian ad litem fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, in part, and vacated, in part. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Keenan W. Carroll v. Chandra P. Carroll
This case involves the issue of retroactive child support and whether the trial court appropriately denied Wife’s request. Husband’s divorce petition was pending for more than three years before Wife answered. During that time the parties were separated, and Husband made monthly car payments on Wife’s vehicle in an amount that exceeded what would have been his child support obligation. We conclude that Husband satisfied his child support obligations based on the unique facts of this case and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Coffee County Bank v. Robert Eugene Hulan and Sherry Renee Hulan
A bank filed a complaint against husband and wife to recoup money owed on a credit agreement after a foreclosure sale failed to produce sufficient funds to repay the loan in full. The trial court entered a judgment against the couple, and the couple appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the bank relied on two different versions of a credit agreement, thereby failing to prove the existence of an enforceable contract with definite terms. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Columbia National Insurance Company et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein one insurance company, which provided general liability insurance coverage to the insured, asserts that another insurance company, which provided the same insured with automobile insurance coverage, had the primary duty to pay the cost of defending and to indemnify the insured in a third-party tort action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112. The plaintiff insurer asserts that the defendant insurer had the primary duty to provide and pay the cost of the defense in that action and to indemnify the insured pursuant to its automobile insurance policy because an additional insured was operating a “boom truck” owned by the insured that was listed under the defendant’s auto policy when the injury to the third-party plaintiff occurred.Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer holding that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for providing and paying the cost of the defense and for indemnifying the insured in the third-party tort action. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
The Preserve at Forrest Crossing Townhome Association, Inc. v. Marsha DeVaughn and Keene Patterson
A townhome owner and her tenant challenge an amendment adopted by the owner’s townhome association prohibiting the owner from leasing her unit to a third party. The owner purchased her unit before there were any restrictions on leasing individual units. The amendment was adopted in accordance with the Horizontal Property Act and in accordance with the documents governing the units where she lives. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment enjoining the owner from renting her townhome to a third party and requiring the tenant to vacate the unit. On appeal we conclude the amendment is enforceable and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Fredrick Milan v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Fredrick Milan, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to convey a twenty-five year offer by the State; and (2) trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Starks
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Antonio Starks, of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify about his previous abuse of the victim; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the victim’s mother about a prior conviction; (4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a police officer testified that the victim had been sexually abused; (5) the trial court should have given a curative instruction when the State made an improper comment during closing arguments; and (6) the trial court should have granted a new trial because the State failed to disclose that the victim’s mother received favorable treatment in return for her testimony. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elder Mark Anthony Thornton
Appellant, Elder Mark Anthony Thornton,was convicted in Davidson County General Sessions Court of eighty counts of criminal contempt after violating an order of protection. He appealed those convictions to the Davidson County Criminal Court and, following a bench trial, was found guilty of criminal contempt for 180 separate violations of the order of protection. Appellant was pro se at trial. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten calendar days per incident consecutively, for a total of 1800 days of incarceration. Appellant, still proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the original and the supplemented record, we determine that ten of the convictions and sentences are proper and, thus, are affirmed. However, the balance of the convictions, 170 in total, which were not listed in the charging notice can not stand, as proper notice was not given to Appellant. As such, those convictions are reversed, and the resulting sentences are vacated. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sterling Lamar Cooper v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Sterling Lamar Cooper, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance less than 0.5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance more than 0.5 grams, a Class B felony, and his concurrent sentences of ten years and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the convictions should be vacated and the charges dismissed because (1) his sentences were illegal, (2) the trial court committed judicial misconduct, (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgement of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ruth M. Maxwell v. Motorcycle Safety Foundation, Inc. et al.
Plaintiff filed this action against the instructor of a motorcycle safety course and his employer for injuries she sustained when she drove off of the designated course site and collided with a parked pickup truck.The trial court found that the plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred because she signed a valid written waiver/release from liability document prior to starting the course. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s gross negligence claims, finding there was nothing in the record which would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant exercised a conscious neglect of duty or a callous indifference to consequences. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jordan T. J.
The father in this termination of parental rights case, who was incarcerated at all times material to this case at Riverbend Maximum Security Prison and is indigent, appeals the termination of his rights contending he was denied due process because he was not informed of his rights as required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f), he did not sign a waiver of his rights, and he was not provided a court-appointed attorney. The father, who did not file a responsive pleading to the petition, contends, inter alia, that the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f), which mandates that he be informed that he has the right to participate and contest the allegations and, if he wished to contest the petition, that a court-appointed attorney would be provided to assist in contesting the petition. The record does not contain a signed waiver by the father nor does it reflect that the juvenile court made the requisite determination that he was informed of his rights and, after being informed, voluntarily waived his right to a court-appointed attorney to assist in contesting the petition, or that, if he did not participate after being informed of his rights, the court may proceed with such action without the parent’s participation as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f)(5). We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the juvenile court as it pertains to the father’s parental rights and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f) and, if the father wishes to contest the petition, that a court-appointed attorney be provided and the case set for a new trial once his attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to prepare. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Lynn Averitte v. William Ronny Averitte
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute over whether the parties’ MDA required the payment of alimony in futuro or alimony in solido. The Wife remarried shortly after the parties’ divorce, and the Husband filed a motion to terminate his alimony obligation, claiming that the obligation was for alimony in futuro, which automatically terminates upon remarriage. The trial court concluded that the obligation was for alimony in futuro, and therefore, the court granted the Husband’s motion to terminate his alimony obligation. Wife appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight Miller
Dwight Miller (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Defendant sought post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We now address two issues in the delayed appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a bomb threat; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prior testimony of an unavailable witness to be read into the record. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on either of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight Miller - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that in Miller I this court reversed the conviction solely “because of the manner in which the trial court admonished Blackwell [the unavailable witness] in front of the jury, [Blackwell’s] explanation that her improved memory resulted from the threat of jail, and her testimony that she had been assaulted after she spoke with the TBI together with her attribution of the assault to her involvement in the case.” |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ann M. Taylor, Deceased
Former administrator of decedent’s estate appeals order denying his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, which sought relief from an order requiring him to reimburse the estate for fees incurred by the successor administrator. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael A. Virga v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael A. Virga, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder and aggravated arson convictions. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was denied the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Leo Rochelle
The defendant, Jeffrey Leo Rochelle, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder and was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a witness testified regarding the defendant’s anger management issues. After a careful review of the record, we conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie A. Cole v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Willie A. Cole, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and tampering with evidence conviction. He was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to a term of life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and to six years for the tampering with evidence. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because the evidence established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony S. Harding
The Defendant, Anthony S. Harding, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of six counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of attempted aggravated statutory rape. The trial court later dismissed the attempt conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve four years on each count of aggravated statutory rape, with all of these counts to run consecutively, resulting in an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the indictment was insufficient for failing to provide specific dates for the offenses; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony from an alibi witness; and (4) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, the Defendant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated statutory rape are affirmed. We remand solely for the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect dismissal of Count Seven, the attempt conviction. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lance Osteen
The defendant, Christopher Lance Osteen, was convicted of burglary, reckless aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, and resisting arrest and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of sixteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s enhancement of his sentences by the use of prior convictions that were listed in his presentence report but not included in the State’s notice of enhanced punishment. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |