Robert W. Porter v. Brandi Porter (Kimbrell)
Upon the parties’ divorce, Mother was named the children’s primary residential parent. Years later, Mother petitioned to increase Father’s child support, and Father filed a countercomplaint seeking to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the entryof the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court further found that certain best interest factors weighed in favor of,and against, both parties; however, it determined that the children’s best interests would be served by Mother remaining the primary residential parent. Father appeals and, discerning no error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Robert W. Porter v. Brandi Porter (Kimbrell) - Concur
While I agree with the majority opinion in this case, I write separately to say that I view the question of whether to affirm the trial court’s decision to be a much closer question than is indicated by the majority opinion. I concur only because of the high standard of appellate review of the trial court’s decision. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Beck Ramsey v. Michelle Min Ramsey
This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court named Mother the primary residential parent and entered a permanent parenting plan limiting Father’s parenting time to one hundred and eight (108) days a year. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Shavonn Sayers
The Defendant, Eric Shavonn Sayers, submitted a best interest guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to criminal conspiracy to commit theft of property valued over $1000, a Class E felony, eleven counts of criminal simulation, Class E felonies, two counts of theft of property valued over $1000, Class D felonies, and driving without a license in his possession, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-103, 39-14-115, 39-14-103, 55-50-351 (2010). The parties agreed to an effective six-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court failed to make the required factual findings to support the Defendant’s guilty pleas, (2) his convictions for criminal simulation and theft violate double jeopardy principles, and (3) the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. ex rel. Linda Martiniano v. State of Tennessee
This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Anthony Bond v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Anthony Bond, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Following a second jury trial after his first conviction was reversed and he was granted a new trial, Petitioner was again convicted for first degree murder. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to challenge the State’s medical expert’s testimony regarding the victim’s cause of death. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Lyon, II
The appellant, a juvenile, appealed the juvenile court’s revocation of his probation and commitment to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. The trial court, upon the juvenile’s timely appeal, affirmed the ruling of the juvenile court. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetree Ptomey
The Defendant, Demetree Ptomey, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for possession of oxycodone for sale or delivery, a Class C felony, and ordering his five-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jesse L. Rogers, III v. David Sexton, Warden
The petitioner, Jesse L. Rogers, III, pro se, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1994 convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He claims the judgment is void due to an invalid waiver of his constitutional rights during the entry of his guilty plea. The trial court denied relief without appointing counsel, concluding that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Marie Wilburn
The Defendant, Tammy Marie Wilburn, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated arson, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s statements regarding his personal beliefs of witness credibility is reversible error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sidney S. Stanton III v. State of Tennessee
The defendant was indicted on sixteen counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide necessary food and care to horses on his farm in Warren County. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion, but the assistant district attorney general, acting for the district attorney general, determined that the defendant was not an appropriate candidate for pretrial diversion. The defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking a review by the trial court. The trial court found no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Scott Parton
The Defendant, Gregory Scott Parton, alias, Gregory Scott Partin, alias, appeals from the trial court’s order declaring him to be an Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO). On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the State’s petition to have him declared an habitual offender on the grounds that the State did not move “forthwith” in filing the petition as required by statute and that the court erred in using his most recent driving under the influence (DUI) conviction as a basis for its decision. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cynthia Denise Marshall
The Defendant, Cynthia Denise Marshall, pleaded guilty to introducing contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony, possession with the intent to deliver morphine, a Class C felony, and possession with the intent to deliver more than one-half gram of marijuana, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-201 (2010) (amended 2012), 39-17-417 (2010) (amended 2012). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective six years on probation. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We reverse the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darren Price v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darren Price, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a 911 call in support of his alibi defense. The petitioner also appeals the denial of his petition for DNA analysis of the knife, the victim’s vehicle, the crime scene, and the skin of the victim, arguing that “DNA testing of these items might yield DNA for analysis that could contain evidence that would assist [him] [to] establish his innocence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petitions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Stewart v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Stewart, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction for destruction or interference with utility lines and his three-year, three-month sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that counsel provided him the ineffective assistance of counsel (1) by failing to object to hearsay statements and (2) by failing to obtain a Memphis Light, Gas and Water incident report. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael John Stitts
The defendant, Michael John Stitts, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and sentenced to six years as a Range II offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timmy Dale Britt v. Dyer's Employment Agency, Inc. et al.
The employer, a temporary staffing agency, assigned the employee to work temporarily at a manufacturing facility. The employee sustained a compensable work-related injury three weeks into the assignment and reported the injury to the employer. At about the same time, the manufacturing facility notified the employer that employee’s assignment had ended. Consistent with its business practice, the employer terminated the employee’s employment and did not return the employee to work after the injury. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court awarded benefits; however, citing the temporary nature of the employment, the trial court applied the statute capping the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008 & Supp. 2012). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a determination of whether the employee had a meaningful return to work. We hold that because the employer neither returned the employee to work after his injury, nor offered him an opportunity to return to work, nor terminated his employment for misconduct, the award of benefits is governed by the statute authorizing benefits up to six times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6241(d)(2)(A), not by the statute capping benefits at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The judgments of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel and trial court are vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision |
Decatur | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of James Edgar Miller
Many years prior to the decedent’s death, he was ordered to pay child support. Upon his death, the decedent’s ex-wife filed a claim against his estate seeking recovery of child support arrearages. The personal representative filed an exception, and the trial court denied the claim. The ex-wife appeals. We reverse. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Lee Moats, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew James Chakales
The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Draine v. S & ME, Inc, et al
In this workers’ compensation case, a Hawkins County employee sustained a compensable injury in September 2000. His claim was settled in July 2003. The settlement, which was approved by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, provided that the employer would continue to provide medical care for the injury in accordance with the workers’ compensation law. In 2009, the employee and his employer’s insurer entered into an agreement closing future medical benefits in exchange for a lump sum payment, subject to approval by Medicare. This settlement closing future medical benefits was approved by the Circuit Court for Knox County by agreement of the parties. Medicare declined to approve the proposed agreement and suggested an alternate, much larger, lump sum payment. The employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County to enforce the settlement agreement as amended by Medicare. The employer and insurer moved to dismiss, based on improper venue. That motion was denied. After a series of non-evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the employer’s insurer to make a lump sum payment in excess of $500,000. The employer and insurer have appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss, and by ordering the $500,000 payment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss, and therefore reverse. |
Sullivan | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Randy B. Braswell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Randy B. Braswell, Jr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse and his effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding counsel provided the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Lee Harris
The defendant, James Lee Harris, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders revoking his probationary sentences and ordering the sentences to be served in confinement. The defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the motion well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22 F), affirm the trial court’s orders pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |