Opinions
Sharon Clayman Sitz v. William Grant Sitz
After some 16 years of marriage, Sharon Clayman Sitz (“Wife”) sued William Grant Sitz (“Husband”) for divorce. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, which made Wife the primary residential parent of their minor child and divided the marital property. The court further determined that Husband was voluntarily underemployed and imputed additional income to him in order to calculate his child support obligation. Husband appeals. We affirm with one modification. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jeremiah I. R.
Spenser R.S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor son, Jeremiah I.R. (“the Child”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his mother’s custody after a babysitter took the Child and two siblings to the emergency room for injuries to the siblings. Father’s whereabouts were then unknown and his paternity of the Child had not yet been established. The Child’s mother entered into an agreed order with DCS stipulating that the Child was dependent and neglected in her care. Thereafter, the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. Some 18 months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights. The trial court granted the petition based on its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Clendenon
This case involves a claim filed against the Estate of Todd Clendenon. Elite Oncology Medical Group filed the claim seeking payment for medical treatment and services rendered to the decedent. Barbara Jean Clendenon, the decedent’s wife and his Personal Representative, moved the probate court to designate as “exempt funds” the monies paid to the decedent under his health insurance policy. The payments included those pertaining to the treatment and services the decedent received from Elite. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court determined that payments made by the health insurance carrier that were deposited into the Estate’s bank account after the death of the decedent were exempt from the claims of creditors pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-1-110 (2010). Elite appeals. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Lewis Young v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lewis Young, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
4215 Harding Road Homeowners' Association v. Stacy Harris
In suit brought by condominium Homeowner’s Association, former owner of condominium unit which was ordered sold after being determined to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order granting the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Andrews, As Admin. for the Estate of James Christopher Sprinkle & Jacob Colton Sprinkle a minor by next friend and Guardian Tonya Andrews v. Amy Sprinkle and Frank Wray
The basic issues in this appeal involve the valuation of a decedent’s business at the time of his death. After the decedent died, the decedent’s mother was appointed administratrix of his estate. She filed this lawsuit against the decedent’s wife and the decedent’s wife’s brother, alleging that they had wrongfully disposed of virtually all of the decedent’s property after his death, including his business assets, therebyrendering a proper administration of the estate extremely difficult if not impossible. Following a four-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that the defendants had wrongfully taken possession of the decedent’s business assets and converted them to their own personal use. Relevant to this appeal, the court valued the decedent’s business at $75,000, and it held that the defendants were jointly and severally liable to the estate for that amount. The defendants appeal, challenging only the amount of damages awarded by the trial court for the value of the business. After a careful review of the record, we affirm |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Lillian F. W.
This is an appeal from orders entered by the Circuit Court in an appeal from a juvenile court’s judgment finding a child dependent and neglected and establishing custody and visitation. These proceedings are part of a custody struggle between the biological father of the child, who lives in California, and her maternal grandparents, who live in Tennessee. Both parties have participated in proceedings in the courts of Tennessee and California. Although the substantive orders of the two courts were very similar, each of the parties decided at some point not to follow the orders of the court in the state of the other party’s residence, resulting in conflicting orders of custody and a jurisdictional battle in which both parties have invoked the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. We have determined that the only type of subject matter jurisdiction at issue here is the temporary, emergency jurisdiction that the juvenile court exercised to determine Grandparents’ petition for dependency and neglect. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Michael Hooten
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Michael Hooten, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the merged murder convictions and concurrent sentences of eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years for the tampering with evidence conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded a videotaped confession from a co-defendant; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freeman Ray Harrison, Jr.
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Freeman Ray Harrison, Jr., of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment and one of the counts of aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the victim’s grandmother’s testimony about the victim’s initial “complaint”; (3) Rutherford County was not the appropriate venue; (4) the State’s loss of a GPS device about which there was testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair; and (5) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. As such, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Pack
The defendant, Phillip Pack, appeals from his Campbell County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that newly discovered evidence established his innocence, that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, and that the prosecutor made inappropriate remarks during closing argument. Because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder, the conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Wendell Thorpe
The defendant, Jeremy Wendell Thorpe, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, claiming that the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction on attempted sexual battery by an authority figure as a lesser included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Lamont Graham
The defendant, Reginald Lamont Graham, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of the attempted sale of cocaine, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Wyatt Barish
After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of first degree (felony) murder as well as one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. Prior to trial, the defendant also pled guilty to one count of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony. The defendant was automatically sentenced to life in prison for the felony murder, and he received concurrent sentences as a Range I, standard offender of eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery and one year for the burglary of the automobile. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could not consider lesser-included offenses until after they reached a unanimous decision with respect to the first degree murder charge. We find these claims to lack merit. In addition, the defendant claims that the trial judge’s ex parte contact with the jury during its deliberations exerted an improper influence on jury’s verdict. Upon review, we conclude that on the unique facts of this case public confidence in jury’s verdict has been so undermined as to necessitate reversal of the defendant’s first degree (felony) murder conviction. We affirm the defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Lance Walker
The Defendant, William Lance Walker, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, two counts of possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, 39-17-425 (2010). The trial court merged each possession with the intent to deliver conviction with the corresponding possession with the intent to sell conviction. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of nineteen years for each possession with the intent to sell conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and (3) the trial judge erred by failing to recuse himself. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Eric Pickett, Jr.
A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Tony Eric Pickett, Jr., guilty of evading arrest, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a career offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on misdemeanor evading arrest. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bradley Mitchell West, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bradley Mitchell West, Jr., appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to locate and interview a potential witness. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher S. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Christopher S., Jr. (“C.J.”) and Lilly S., the minor children (“Children”) of Tawana S. (“Mother”) and Christopher S., Sr. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on October 14, 2010. On September 22, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Following a bench trial held on April 27, 2012, and July 11, 2012, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents had committed severe child abuse and were mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. Father and Mother have appealed. We reverse the finding that Father and Mother were mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edgar Ray Bettis
The appellant, Edgar Ray Bettis, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder; second degree murder; and unauthorized use of an automobile, also known as joyriding. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and sentenced the appellant to life. For the joyriding conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served concurrently with the murder conviction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he murdered the victim, that the trial court erred by allowing the forensic pathologist to testify outside the contents of the autopsy report, and that the trial court’s error resulted in the jury’s improperly seeing a photograph of the victim’s larynx. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Joseph Harr
A Carroll County jury convicted appellant, Robert Joseph Harr, of attempted sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail and ordered him to serve forty-five days in confinement with the balance of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, the trial court’s denial of full probation, the trial court’s discovery rulings under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, and the State’s denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew W. Wambles v. State of Tennessee
Matthew W. Wambles ("the Petitioner") pleaded nolo contendere to one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent terms of eight years’ incarceration. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas are constitutionally infirm. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Ann Hernandez v. Jose Emmanuel Hernandez
The issues in this divorce case are whether the trial court correctly ordered husband to pay wife $600 per month in transitional alimony for 36 months, child support in the amount of $253 per month, and $4,000 of the wife's attorneys fees, the latter as alimony in solido. At the time of trial, husband had been unemployed and actively seeking work for about one year. The trial court found that his income was zero. Wife did not argue that husband was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, and the trial court made no such findings. The proof at trial establishes that many of the statutory factors supporting an award of alimony in futuro - including the need of the wife, duration of the marriage, i.e., 20 years, the parties' relative earning capacities, wife's contributions to the marriage as homemaker and parent, and wife's health - were demonstrated. Husband's current ability to pay, however, is quite limited because of his involuntary unemployment and zero income. Consequently, we modify the transitional alimony award to $50 per month, but designate it as alimony in futuro. The difference in husband's income, i.e., $1,191.66 per month, at the time his child support obligation was set and his income, i.e., zero, at time of trial likely supports a finding that there is a significant variance between the current support order of $253 and the amount of the proposed presumptive modified support order. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order refusing to modify his child support obligation and remand for a recalculation of child support. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Trehern v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Richard Trehern, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to adequately communicate and meet with him to prepare for the case; (2) by failing to attack the credibility of Petitioner’s wife on cross-examination; (3) by failing to advise him that the crime for which he was charged had no release eligibility date; (4) by failing to adequately advise him of the consequences of Momon; and (5) by failing to obtain an expert witness to rebut the State’s theory of shaken baby syndrome. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clyde Turner
The defendant, Clyde Turner, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve his original four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven A. Pugh, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to waive all fines and costs related to the nolle prosequi of all charges in Hamblen County Criminal Court case number 03CR212. Because it is clear from the record that no court costs or fines were assessed against the appellant as a result of the nolle prosequi entered in the proceedings below, there appears to be no judgment of the trial court adverse to the appellant’s interests and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessica M. Myers
The defendant, Jessica M. Myers, was indicted on one count of first degree (premeditated) murder of Jimmy Cutshall, three alternative counts of first degree (felony) murder of Jimmy Cutshall, and one count of attempt to commit first degree murder of Rhonda Cutshall. A jury found her guilty of the first four counts as charged and of the lesser-included offense of reckless endangerment on the fifth count. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for counts one and two, and she was sentenced to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days on count five, with all sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an alleged defect in the indictment in count one, and the admission of certain post-mortem photographs as cumulative evidence at trial. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals |