State of Tennessee v. Lavon Douglas Robertson
The Defendant, Lavon Douglas Robertson, was convicted by a jury of one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years of supervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of a one-room "dwelling" used by the Defendant and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lavon Douglas Robertson-separate concurring opinion
Respectfully, I would not engage in an analysis of standing relative to the dirt road leading from the public road to the defendant’s building. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jose Rodriguez A.K.A. Alex Lopez v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jose Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his guilty plea, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner claims that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), his counsel was deficient in failing to advise him regarding the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The petition was filed more than one year after the guilty plea, and the post-conviction court denied relief based on the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). We conclude that a post-conviction action does not lie when the petitioner’s record has been expunged and no conviction exists. In addition, the trial court was correct in concluding the petition was time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jose Rodriguez A.K.A. Alex Lopez vs. State of Tennessee-concurring and dissenting opinion
I concur with affirming the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority opinion’s reasoning. I believe the Petitioner’s expunction of his legal proceedings is not a legal impediment to his bringing a post-conviction action. On the other hand, the petition was filed late, and the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), as to being advised of potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea has been held not to apply retroactively. See, e.g., Francisco Miquel Jose v. State, No. M2011-00295-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2012). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Gene Pullon
Defendant was convicted after a trial by jury of two counts of sexual battery, Class E felonies. He was sentenced to eighteen months probation on each count, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by ruling that the defendant could not cross-examine the victim concerning her history of mental illness and use of prescription medications. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err by limiting the scope of the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dexter L. McMillan v. Aubrey L. Davis
This is an action for legal malpractice against a court-appointed attorney in a criminal case. The Circuit Court of Knox County entered a judgment for the defendant. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Lee Swett, Jr.
The defendant, Raymond Lee Swett, Jr., appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, and felony murder, claiming that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, and felony murder; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial; (3) the trial court erred by effectively amending the indictment via the instructions to the jury; and (4) the sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Perry Kirkman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Perry Kirkman, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received concurrent sentences of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Lee Whitmire v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jimmy Lee Whitmire, was convicted of one count each of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary. He received an effective sentence of eighteen years. State v. Jimmy Lee Whitmire, No. M2007-01389-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486178, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 13, 2009). He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly advise him regarding testifying at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective or that if trial counsel was ineffective that he suffered prejudice from such. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ray Neil Thompson
Appellant, Ray Neil Thompson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to twenty-seven years in incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated an appeal. On appeal, he argues: (1) that the trial judge improperly refused to recuse himself; (2) that the trial court improperly denied a motion to suppress Appellant’s statement; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the evidence and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for recusal or the motion to suppress and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Edward Phelps vs. Jacqueline Ann Newman, et al
After he lost his job at the University of Tennessee, the plaintiff filed this action against UT and several of his coworkers. The complaint can be summarized thusly: the plaintiff had an intimate relationship with a female coworker and, after it ended, she and three of her friends, who were also coworkers of the plaintiff, set out to get him fired. He seeks to impose liability on the four individuals and UT under various theories. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend which the trial court denied. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Austin L.A.
This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. Custodial Parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support several statutory grounds of termination and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. The Parents appeal the court’s best interest finding. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Laurence v. Tower Insurance Company
The employee, a satellite dish installer, injured his head while installing equipment at the residence of a customer of the employer. When the employer denied workers’ compensation benefits for permanent partial disability, the employee filed suit. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits and a 70% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to a special workers’ compensation appeals panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because an employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits only until he is able to return to work or reaches his maximum recovery, the trial court erred by awarding an additional fifty weeks of temporary total disability benefits. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed. |
Monroe | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Eila L.G., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on four minor children (“the Children”) of the defendant, Tabitha W. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Children into custody in July 2010 because of Mother’s continuing drug use and the Children’s truancy problems. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother in July 2011, alleging that numerous grounds for termination exist. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan, and that the conditions originally leading to removal still persisted. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
James Bostic v. State of Tennessee
James Bostic (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee and others seeking money damages. The claim against the State was transferred from the Division of Claims Administration to the Claims Commission pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c) 2012). The State filed (1) a motion to dismiss raising several defenses and (2) the affidavit of Brenda Boatman. Based upon the affidavit, the Claims Commission granted the State summary judgment and dismissed the Claimant’s claim. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bradley Hawks
The appellant, Bradley Hawks, pled guilty in the Crockett County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to sell and received an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law, namely whether exigent circumstances justified law enforcement’s searching his residence without a warrant. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that evidence of exigent circumstances does not exist in this case. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewone Alexander v. Tennessee Department of Correction
A prison inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking review of a prison disciplinary action. Numerous respondents were listed in the complaint, and one respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss because, among other things, the petition was not verified or sworn, and it did not state that it was the first application for the writ. The petitioner appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
J-Star Holdings, LLC v. The Pantry, Inc.
This appeal turns on whether a commercial lease agreement requires the tenant to pay the landlord’s Tennessee excise tax. We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the lease does require the tenant to pay the excise tax. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Eugene Breezee
The Defendant, David Eugene Breezee, was found guilty by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-503(b); 39-15-302(b). At the sentencing hearing, the incest conviction was merged with the rape conviction, and the Defendant was sentenced to ten years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that he erroneously received more than the minimum sentence of eight years because the trial court applied the multiple victims enhancement factor. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for rape, but we reverse the trial court’s merger of the incest conviction into the rape conviction, reinstate the incest conviction, and remand for sentencing as to that conviction. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leston Parker
Following the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police, the Defendant-Appellant, Leston Parker, entered open guilty pleas to his charged offenses of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, driving while one’s driver’s license is canceled, suspended, or revoked because of a conviction for driving under the influence, a Class B misdemeanor, and violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court subsequently sentenced Parker to an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Parker argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress, and (2) imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we conclude that only the sentencing issue is properly before this court because Parker failed to reserve a certified question of law regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of the appeal regarding the denial of Parker’s motion to suppress, and we affirm his effective sentence of ten years. However, we remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of merging the conviction for driving while one’s driver’s license is canceled, suspended, or revoked because of a conviction for driving under the influence with the conviction for driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Misty Lynn Nanney
The Defendant, Misty Lynn Nanney, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; one count of forgery, a Class E felony; one count of possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-105(a)(2), -14-114, -16-503, -17-417(c)(2)(A), -17-425(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mershaun William Scott
The Defendant, Mershaun William Scott, was convicted in a bench trial by the Davidson County Criminal Court of simple possession of marijuana and received a thirty-day sentence, suspended to unsupervised probation, and a $250 suspended fine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010). The Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brittany Scott Pye v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brittany Scott Pye, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and sentenced as a multiple offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to communicate his acceptance of the State’s offer of settlement prior to trial. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept his guilty plea after a trial date had been scheduled. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brittany Scott Pye v. State of Tennessee-concurring in part and dissenting in part
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that trial counsel’s actions regarding the Petitioner’s acceptance of the plea agreement did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the Petitioner’s remaining issue, I concur with the majority’s decision. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Cross
Defendant, Andrew Cross, pled guilty in the Polk County Criminal Court, to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of Class E felony theft. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the minimum allowable sentences of three years for aggravated burglary and one year for theft, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court also ordered the effective sentence of three years suspended, to be served on probation, but the trial court denied Defendant’s request to be granted judicial diversion. In this appeal, Defendant argues that he should have been granted judicial diversion. We disagree, and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals |