In re: The Application of Kimyata Izevbizuaiyamu (seeking to qualify as owner of Number One Bonding) v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kimyata Izevbizuaiyamu, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order denying her application to write bail bonds as the owner of Number One Bonding Company. On appeal, petitioner argues that the evidence did not support the court’s denial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noura Jackson
The defendant, Noura Jackson, was convicted of second degree murder for the death of her mother, Jennifer Jackson, and sentenced to twenty years and nine months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in the following rulings: (1) concluding that her conversation at the scene with a family friend, who is an attorney, was not subject to the attorney-client privilege; (2) concluding that the searches of the residence she shared with the victim and of a vehicle parked in the driveway were lawful; (3) allowing testimony of lay witnesses as to her use of “drugs”; (4) allowing testimony of her having sexual relations at a time after the murder, as to her eviction from an apartment after the murder, and as to her hospitalization at Lakeside Hospital after the murder; (5) allowing the victim’s brother and sisters to testify as to arguments between the defendant and the victim prior to the murder; and (6) allowing certain photographs of the crime scene and the victim’s body. Additionally, the defendant argues that she is entitled to a new trial because of (7) prosecutorial conduct consisting of references to the post-arrest silence of the defendant; suppression of the third statement of a State’s witness; loudly beginning its opening statement by saying, “Give me the f*cking money”; using a misleading PowerPoint presentation during its closing argument; commenting on her right to remain silent; references to the Deity during closing arguments; commenting in closing argument on the length of the trial; treating as established facts which were not proven at trial; making personal attacks during closing statements upon her; and making additional improper statements during closing argument. Further, the defendant argues on appeal that (8) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder and that (9) the court erred in imposing more than a minimum sentence. We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the arguments of the defendant are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noura Jackson-Concurring
I concur in the results reached in the lead opinion by Judge Glenn. Indeed, I join in the lead opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. As the lead opinion points out, the opening sentence of the State’s rebuttal argument was as follows: “Just tell us where you were. That’s all we’re asking, Noura.” The defense contends that the remark constitutes an improper comment on the defendant’s choice not to testify at trial. The State claims that the remark was merely a reference to the testimony during trial given by Cindy Eidson, the defendant’s aunt. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrianne Kiser
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Andrianne Kiser, of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of sixteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by allowing a State witness to testify about telephone calls she received before trial, and (3) his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s reckless endangerment conviction. Therefore, that conviction is reversed. The appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Shedd, Individually and as Mother and Next of Kin of Jodie Woods v. Larry Dwayne Woods, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
C. H. Guenther & Son, Inc. v. Sue Ann Head et al.
An employee appeals the trial court’s decision to void a final administrative order by the Department of Labor awarding the employee attorney fees with respect to the employee’s actions to enforce a workers’ compensation settlement. We have determined that the applicable request for assistance process does not constitute a contested case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Murray v. Jamie Hollin, et al.
This is a libelous defamation case. Appellant, a public figure, filed suit against Appellees for publication and distribution of allegedly defamatory comments. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees upon its finding that Appellees had negated the essential element of actual malice, and that Appellant had not met her burden to provide sufficient countervailing evidence so as to survive summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Timothy W. H. et al.
The father of two minor children appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment for failure to pay child support; failure to comply with the permanency plan; and failure to remedy persistent conditions. The court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Greenbank v. Sterling Ventures, L.L.C., et al.
After the property at issue was sold at a foreclosure sale, Appellee Bank filed the instant action seeking a deficiency judgment against Appellants. The Bank subsequently moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statutory presumption that the foreclosure sale price was the fair market value of the property at the time of purchase. Tenn. Code Ann. §35-5118(b). Appellants objected, asserting that, because the foreclosure sale price was less than the appraised value of the property, the sale was commercially unreasonable. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion, finding that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the foreclosure sale price was “materially less” than the fair market value of the property at the time of foreclosure. Tenn. Code Ann. §35-5118(c). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Donna Thorn v. Clay Gentry
This is a proceeding to establish the arrearage for child support owed by the father to the mother of their minor child. The genesis of this matter was in 1993, when Mother filed a petition to establish paternity and set support. The Department of Human Services, Child Support Services intervened on behalf of Mother, paternity was established and child support was set. Over the next two decades Father was habitually delinquent in paying child support and Mother obtained judgements from time to time for arrearages. The most recent petition to establish the arrearage was assigned to a Child Support Magistrate in Dickson County. Following a hearing in March 2012, the magistrate ruled that Father’s child support arrearage principal was $17,894.26, and that the interest on the principal, some of which had been accruing since the entry of a 1994 judgment, totaled $54,726.64. Judgment in favor of Mother was awarded by the magistrate in the gross amount of $72,620.90. Although Mother had independent counsel representing her before the magistrate, the Department appealed the magistrate’s order, purportedly on behalf of Mother but over Mother’s objection and despite the fact none of the proceeds were owed to the Department. The juvenile court reduced the total award to $26,937.36. Mother filed this appeal. We have determined that Mother was not aggrieved by the magistrate’s decision; thus, the Department could not appeal, on behalf of Mother, a wholly favorable decision. Because the case was never properly before the juvenile court, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to reinstate the $72,620.90 judgment awarded by the magistrate. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah V. S.
The mother of a sixteen month-old girl left the child in the care of the child’s grandparents. The grandparents subsequently filed a dependency and neglect petition, and the court found that the child was dependent and neglected and granted temporary custody to the grandparents. They continued to raise the little girl without any assistance from the mother. Almost eight years later, the mother petitioned the court to restore custody of the child to her. Proceedings in the Juvenile Court followed, with an appeal to the Circuit Court, which determined that the child was dependent and neglected because changing custody to the mother would expose her to a risk of substantial harm. It also found that it was in Hannah’s best interest that custody remain with the grandparents. The appropriate standard for the mother’s request for modification of the order giving temporary custody to non-parents is whether the non-parents demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a substantial risk of harm to the child if custody were granted to the parent. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Dakota C.R., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, in which the trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights to three of their children on the grounds of severe abuse and persistence of conditions. We reverse the ground of severe abuse as to Father, affirm as to Mother, and affirm the ground of persistence of conditions as to both parents. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of the children. On that basis, we affirm the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Reed's Track Hoe & Dozier Service v. Terry Patrick Dwyer
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff to demolish a dilapidated building. After the building was demolished, the defendant disputed the amount charged by the plaintiff and so refused to pay the plaintiff for his work. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant alleging breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the parties had entered into an oral agreement under which the plaintiff would be paid hourly for the demolition services, and that the defendant owed the plaintiff for the time spent on the job at the rates claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant now appeals. The appellate record does not contain a transcript; it contains only a statement of the evidence submitted by the defendant and not acted on by the trial court. We decline to consider the appellant’s proposed statement of the evidence, on the basis that, on its face, it does not convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court as required under Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Left only with the technical record, we must assume that the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s decision. On this basis, the trial court’s decision is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lee Leggs
The defendant, David Lee Leggs, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction, with one of the sentences ordered to be served consecutively to the other two concurrent sentences. Because the defendant had prior convictions for aggravated robbery, the sentences were also ordered to be served at 100 percent, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(k)(2), for a total effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Taylor
The defendant, Calvin Taylor, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacob Stephen Love v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jacob Stephen Love, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery and effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily made because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Ochoa
Following a traffic stop and search of his vehicle that uncovered over five kilograms of cocaine, the defendant, Mario Ochoa, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury with possession of over 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony. He subsequently pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, in exchange for a Range I sentence of twelve years in the Department of Correction, reserving the following certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A): (1) whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) whether the officer exceeded the scope of the stop once he discovered that the defendant’s temporary license tag was valid; (3) whether the evidence should be suppressed because the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from the prior seizure; and (4) whether the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of what a reasonable person would have understood to have been meant by the defendant’s consent. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of Christopher P., Kobey P., Blake H. and Myles H.
Father’s parental rights to two children were terminated as a result of his confinement in a correctional facility for more than ten years; he appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the holding that termination of his parental rights would serve the best interest of the children. We disagree and affirm the decision terminating his rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Himes v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a state prisoner. The prisoner was found guilty of a disciplinary offense while in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the prisoner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court granted the petition. After reviewing the record, the trial court found that the prisoner was not entitled to relief and dismissed the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Rudd Halliday v. Todd Eric Halliday
This is a divorce appeal. Husband appeals the court’s award of alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, upward deviations in the calculation of child support to provide for education trust funds and private school expenses for the parties’ two children, and the award of discretionary costs; Wife appeals the court’s award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and attorneys’ fees and remand the case for additional findings with respect to the upward deviations for educational expenses and discretionary costs. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Conservatorship of Alfonso B. Patton
In this conservatorship case, Gloria and John Walker filed a petition in which they sought to be appointed as the conservator of Alfonso B. Patton. Patricia Richmond protested, alleging that she would be an appropriate conservator. Prior to a full hearing on the petition, the trial court appointed the Walkers as temporary conservators of the estate and Patricia Richmond as a temporary conservator of the person. Following approximately one year of protracted litigation, the court confirmed that Alfonso B. Patton was in need of a conservator of his estate and of his person. The court subsequently appointed a neutral, third-party as permanent conservator of the estate and of the person. Patricia Richmond appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Trumaine Salters, Sr.
Appellant, Ricky Trumaine Salters, Sr., entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to drug offenses stemming from four separate indictments, for which the trial court imposed an effective thirteen-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering partially consecutive sentences and by refusing alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Fusco, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, which were merged, and one count of each of the following offenses: conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -12-103, -13-202, -13-304, -13-305, -13-402, -13-403, & -14-403. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender for sentencing purposes and imposed an effective 65-year sentence. We first decided this appeal several months ago in February 2012. See State v. Robert Fusco, No. M2010-01724-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 368224 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2012). Our decision was vacated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties addressing any White issues. When this case was previously before this court, the Defendant raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offense of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (3) whether the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping; (4) whether his dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process concerns because the restraint of the victim was not beyond that necessary to complete the robbery; (5) whether the trial court erred by not merging his two conspiracy convictions because the offenses were the object of the same agreement; (6) whether the trial court erred by using certain out-of-state convictions to enhance his sentencing range; and (7) whether his sentence was excessive. We reissue our previous opinion as follows with a new section dealing with the White issues. Upon further consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case with those in White, we again affirm the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery. The case is remanded to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect merger of the Defendant’s conspiracy convictions. In all other respects, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Albert James Saavedra v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Albert James Saavedra, was ultimately convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted second degree murder and, thereafter, received an effective fourteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) allegedly providing the prosecution with information about the location of the Petitioner’s vehicle and (2) failing to adequately address issues surrounding the video recording of the Petitioner’s statement to authorities. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals |