Timmy Herndon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timmy Herndon, appeals from the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In 1999, the Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a fifteen-year sentence. Two months before his parole was set to expire, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a twenty-two page petition for habeas corpus relief alleging a variety of issues all related to the constitutionality of the aggravated robbery statute upon which he was convicted. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition as moot because, at the time of the hearing, the Petitioner’s sentence and parole had expired. In this appeal, the Petitioner presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether he is entitled to a hearing because he filed his petition for habeas corpus relief prior to the expiration of his sentence and parole; (2) whether his claim presents “a present and live, controversy”; (3) whether “‘potential’ merits” to his claim exist which entitle him to appointed counsel; and (4) whether the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his petition is void because the court “acted without subject matter jurisdiction.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc.
A contract required payment of “fee residuals” from customers referred by BSG, LLC to Check Velocity, a company providing check re-presentment services. The contract provided that payment of fee residuals survived the termination of the agreement between the parties and continued until the “expiration of the Customer agreements as they may be renewed.” Two agreements were executed between a referred customer and Check Velocity. The first agreement, which expired by its own terms, provided for check re-presentment services. The second agreement continued the re-presentment services required by the first agreement and added additional services. In addition, other terms of the first agreement were changed, including a choice of law provision. We hold that the second agreement with additional services and changed terms was not a renewal of the first agreement. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Check Velocity. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sherman Lane Pierce, et al. v. James H. Delashmitt, et al.
Sherman Lane Pierce and Cathryn Pierce (“the Pierces”) own real property in Meigs County, Tennessee. James H. Delashmitt and Minnie C. Delashmitt (“the Delashmitts”) own real property that adjoins the Pierces’ property. The Pierces sued the Delashmitts alleging, among other things, that the Delashmitts had trespassed upon the Pierces’ property and attempted to fence off a portion of the Pierces’ driveway. The Delashmitts answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Pierces had trespassed on the Delashmitt’s property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Pierces had adversely possessed a portion of the disputed property. The Pierces appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces failed to prove adverse possession as to the entire disputed area. The Delashmitts raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces adversely possessed any portion of the disputed property. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
R. Douglas Hughes et al. v. New Life Development Corporation et al.
This appeal involves the validity and effect of amendments to restrictive covenants for a residential development and amendments to the charter and bylaws for the homeowners’ association serving the development. After the death of the president of the original corporate developer, a successor developer purchased the original developer’s remaining property with the intent to continue to develop the property. Several homeowners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Franklin County, alleging that the successor developer’s new development plan violated restrictive covenants. The trial court granted the successor developer a judgment on the pleadings, and the homeowners appealed. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings, principally on the question of whether a general plan of development, or the plat for the subdivision, gave rise to certain implied restrictive covenants. Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., No. M2008-00290-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 400635, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2009). While the successor developer’s application for permission to appeal was pending, the homeowners’ association amended its charter and the restrictive covenants to address certain issues identified by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the homeowners filed a second suit, principally contesting the validity of the amendments. The trial court consolidated the two suits and granted the successor developer a summary judgment on all claims in both suits. However, the trial court also enjoined the successor developer from acting contrary to its corporate charter. The homeowners appealed a second time. On this occasion, the Court of Appeals concluded that the procedure used to amend the charter and restrictive covenants was valid but remanded the case with directions to determine whether these amendments were reasonable and to determine whether the plat supported the existence of implied restrictive covenants. Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., No. M2010-00579-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1661605, at *9-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2011). The successor developer filed an application for permission to appeal, asserting that Tennessee law did not support the Court of Appeals’ reasonableness inquiry and that the plat provided no basis for the existence of implied restrictive covenants. We have determined that the amendments were properly adopted and that there is no basis for implied restrictive covenants arising from a general plan of development or from the plat. |
Franklin | Supreme Court | |
Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) v. The Estate of Harvey L. Collins
This is an action to collect child support ordered in the parties’ 1965 divorce decree. The Trial Court held that the ten year statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 110(2) acted as a bar to this action and dismissed the case. Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Thomas Ewing Cowan
This appeal involves a determination of the proper final discipline for an attorney who pleaded guilty to willful tax evasion. We hold that because ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 5.11(b)applies to criminal acts such as those admitted by the attorney here, the trial court’s order of disbarment is affirmed. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Dewayne Terry
Defendant, Reginald Dewayne Terry, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a two-count indictment for aggravated burglary with intent to commit theft and with intent to commit assault. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the count of aggravated burglary with intent to commit theft and sentenced by the trial court to 15 years confinement. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of Defendant in a photographic lineup; 2) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Gerald McShepard to testify that the photo of Defendant used in the photo lineup was a booking photo because such testimony was more prejudicial than probative; 3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow Defendant to crossexamine the victim about her failure to appear at a prior court date; 4) the trial court erred by allowing Detective McShepard to give a lay opinion regarding fingerprint evidence; and 5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated burglary. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by ruling that the victim’s refusal to appear at the originally scheduled trial date was not relevant to her credibility as a witness. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetrius M. Clark
The Defendant-Appellant, Demetrius M. Clark, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and/or deliver, two counts of possession of hydrocodone with the intent to sell and/or deliver, one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court merged the two convictions for cocaine possession and merged the two convictions for hydrocodone possession and sentenced Clark as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of ten years for the cocaine possession conviction, three years for the hydrocodone possession conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction and to a consecutive sentence of three years at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction, for an effective sentence of thirteen years. On appeal, Clark argues: (1) he was deprived of his due process right to present a defense; (2) the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Wayne Lee
The appellant, Christopher Wayne Lee, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation for robbery and burglary and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fred Smith v. Henry Steward, Warden
The Petitioner, Fred Smith, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his fifty-year sentence for second degree murder is illegal. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua Hilliard v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
Inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari. The chancery court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and because inmate failed to show that the prison disciplinary board acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. We affirm, finding the inmate failed to show that the disciplinary board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rick Earl, et al. v. Dr. Raquel Hatter, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Human Services, et al.
Married couple sought judicial review of decision of Department of Human Services holding that they were not eligible for medicaid under an amendment to the Social Security Act known as the “Pickle Amendment.” Upon consideration of the record we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bridget Michelle Agee v. Jason Forest Agee
In this post-divorce dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan to designate Mother as primary residential parent and the trial court’s calculation of his income and monthly child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
M. Josiah Hoover, III v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is an appeal from a judgment affirming the disbarment of an attorney. After considering evidence presented incident to five complaints against the attorney, a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that disbarment was warranted. On appeal, the trial court affirmed. In this appeal, the attorney has raised the following issues for review: (1) whether the panel erred by denying his motion to continue the hearing; (2) whether the panel erred by considering the attorney’s conduct in a case based upon a complaint by another attorney who had no involvement in the case; (3) whether the evidence supports the panel’s findings; (4) whether disbarment is an appropriate punishment; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the attorney’s post-judgment motion to supplement the record. We affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Thomas Grady Chastain
The issue in this appeal is whether the statutory requirements for execution of an attested will prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104(1) (2007) were satisfied when the decedent failed to sign the two-page will but signed a one-page affidavit of attesting witnesses. We conclude that the decedent’s signature on the separate affidavit of attesting witnesses does not satisfy the statute requiring the testator’s signature on the will. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court that the will was not properly executed is reinstated. |
Polk | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Harry Pearson
Appellant, Harry Pearson, was indicted, tried, and convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, for which he received sentences of thirty years and twenty years, respectively. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeanette Rea Jackson v. Bradley Smith
This appeal involves the efforts of a grandmother to obtain court-ordered visitation with her granddaughter in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2010). Shortly after the death of her daughter, the grandmother filed a petition in the Chancery Court for McNairy County seeking visitation with her granddaughter. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court denied the grandmother’s request for visitation because she had failed to prove the statutory grounds necessary to permit a court to order grandparental visitation over a parent’s objection. The grandmother did not appeal this decision. After the decision became final, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the burden of persuasion in the grandparental visitation statute by creating a new rebuttable presumption that a child whose parent dies will be substantially harmed by the cessation of an existing relationship with a grandparent who is the parent of the deceased parent. Without alleging new facts and relying solely on the change in the statutory burden of persuasion, the grandmother filed a second petition in the trial court seeking visitation with her granddaughter. The trial court granted the child’s father’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. Jackson v. Smith, No. W2011-00194-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3963589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2011). We granted the grandmother’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the intervening change in the burden of persuasion in the grandparental visitation statute provided an exception to the operation of the res judicata doctrine. We have determined that it does not and that, without some material change in the facts, the doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of the grandmother’s petition for grandparental visitation. |
McNairy | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Demond McCathern
The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to ten years, twenty-five years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The ten-year and twenty-five-year sentences were ordered to be served consecutivelyfor a total effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction, with fifteen years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his possession of cocaine conviction and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Demond McCathern - Concurring
I concur in the result in this case. My only departure from the majority opinion stems from the majority’s use of abuse-of-discretion review of the sentence alignment issue. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald W. Davis
The defendant, Reginald W. Davis, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated burglary, theft under $500, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery,and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he argues that his due process rights were violated by his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, which were incidental to his aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review, we affirm the convictions for aggravated burglary, theft under $500, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, but we reverse the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts of the indictment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marlon O. Walls v. State of Tennessee
Pro se Petitioner, Marlon O. Walls, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to re-open his petition for post-conviction relief.Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court is without jurisdiction to review the appeal, and it is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Edward Williams, III
The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Edward Williams, III, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s imposition of an effective twenty-year sentence for his guilty pleas to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a class C felony; criminal simulation of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and failure to appear, a Class E felony. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to: (1) impose the minimum sentence in the applicable range for each of his sentences, and (2) grant a community corrections sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Labor Standards Division
This is an administrative appeal in which an employer challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development finding the employer in violation of the Tennessee Child Labor Act for failing to furnish, within one hour of demand, personnel files of each of its minor employees. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Department and this appeal followed. Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111(1) & (4) require employers to “make, keep and preserve a separate and independent file record for each minor employed, which shall be kept at the location of the minor’s employment” and to “furnish” the records relative to the minor employees. On appeal, the employer contends it maintained the records on site as required, thus it did not violate Subsection (1) of the statute. The employer also asserts that it has a Fourth Amendment right to object to a warrantless search by the Department and it may not be penalized for asserting its constitutional right. We have determined the Department’s decision to assess penalties for violating Subsection (1) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111 is not supported by substantial and material evidence and the inference drawn by the Department that the records were not maintained on site based upon a mere inference drawn from the fact they were not produced within one hour of demand is insufficient. Therefore, the assessments for allegedly failing to maintain personnel records of minor employees on site is reversed. As for the requirement under Subsection (4) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111 that employers of minor employees furnish and allow inspection of the separate and independent file records for each minor employed upon request by the Department, the Act expressly provides that if the Department is denied permission to make an inspection, Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-4-101 provides that the Department employee or official may obtain an administrative inspection warrant in accordance with the procedures outlined in the statute; the Department did not seek to obtain a warrant in this case. As for refusing the Department’s request to inspect the records without an administrative warrant, in order for a warrantless search or inspection to be constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the Department must establish that the employer was part of a pervasively regulated industry or that the employer had weakened or reduced privacy expectations that are significantly overshadowed by the Department’s interests in regulating the employer’s industry. We have determined the Department failed to establish either; accordingly, the Department cannot assess a penalty against an employer for asserting its constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.Thus, the penalty assessed for allegedly violating Subsection (4) of the statute is reversed. Pursuant to the foregoing, we remand with instructions for the trial court to order the Department to vacate the citations and penalties against the employer. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Labor Standards Division - CONCUR
I fully concur in parts A and B of the opinion’s analysis section; however, I have some reservations regarding part C. I have chosen to write separately to highlight my concerns about the implications of this opinion for administrative inspections generally. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirleen Nevels v. Joseph Contarino, M.D. et al.
The trial court dismissed this medical malpractice claim on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, after excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness. Because the trial court erred in its application of the locality rule and Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence, we reverse. |
Giles | Court of Appeals |