State of Tennessee v. Willie Calvin Taylor Jr.
The defendant, who had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after a jury trial and sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict and that the jury was improperly influenced by information outside the evidence presented at trial. The trial court found that the evidence supported the conviction and the defendant was not prejudiced by any extraneous information. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vincent Love Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Vincent Love Williams, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without reviewing it or answering the allegations, that his judgment was void because of a defective indictment, and that his right against double jeopardy had been violated. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hong Samouth (Sam) Rajvongs v. Dr. Anthony Wright
A patient who alleged that he had been negligently injured by his podiatrist filed a complaint against him for malpractice, and then voluntary dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Less than a year later, he furnished the defendant podiatrist with the sixty day notice of potential claim required by a recently enacted statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(a). He subsequently refiled his complaint in reliance on his rights under the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was time-barred under the saving statute because it was filed more than one year after the dismissal of the original complaint. The plaintiff contended, however, that he was entitled to the benefit of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the statute of limitations on medical malpractice claims by 120 days if the plaintiff has complied with the sixty day notice requirement. The defendant responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) does not apply to complaints filed under the saving statute. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but allowed him to file an application for interlocutory appeal because of the novelty of the legal question involved. After careful consideration of the relevant statutes, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(c) does apply to the saving statute, and we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Beach Community Bank v. Edward A. Labry, III, et al.
This case involves personal guaranties on a loan to purchase real estate. The Appellants entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The partnership obtained a loan in the amount of $2,611,000.00 to purchase real property located in Florida. The Appellants each signed a personal guaranty on the loan in favor of the Appellee bank. By the express terms of the guaranties, the Appellants guaranteed “up to a principle amount of $795,600.00.” The partnership defaulted on the loan and the bank sued to enforce the guaranties. The Appellants answered that the guaranties were joint and several and that, because they were only 30% owners of the partnership, they could only be liable for 30% of the amount of the defaulted loan. In addition, the Appellants argued that the bank breached the covenant of good faith in failing to foreclose on the subject property. The trial court found that, under Florida law, the guaranties were not ambiguous, but were separate guaranties holding each Appellant separately liable for $795,600.00. The trial court also awarded interest on the entire debt. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the guaranties unambiguously require each Appellant to be separately liable for $795,600.00, but hold that the term regarding interest is ambiguous. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remand to the trial court for the consideration of parole evidence regarding the amount of interest and fees chargeable to the Appellants. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lee Kailar Cooper v. Christopher Aaron Brown
Upon the Court's inquiry as to whether the order appealed was a final judgment, Appellant filed an application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although we must dismiss Appellant's Rule 3 appeal, we grant Appellant's Rule 10 application and vacate in part the trial court's order of October 26, 2011, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryant Carter
Defendant, Bryant Carter, entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and properly reserved the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether further prosecution of this case is barred by double jeopardy under the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions when the Defendant was detained under a pro forma policy of the General Sessions Criminal Court while properly out on a misdemeanor citation in lieu of arrest.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hubbard
Christopher Hubbard (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Faye Allison
The Defendant, Lisa Faye Allison, pled guilty, pro se, to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and one count of possessing less than 0.5 ounces of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request to apply for the community corrections program, improperly basing the denial on her decision to exercise her right to a hearing on the issue of whether she violated her probation. She further contends that the trial court erred because it denied her community corrections request without holding a hearing on her eligibility. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Brandon Bush v. State of Tennessee
Derrick Brandon Bush (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of attempt to commit rape in December 2000. On April 25, 2011,the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief,alleging that his guilty plea was unconstitutional in light of Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), and that the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. The State appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we hold that the rule announced in Ward does not apply retroactively. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b)(1). We also hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling on due process grounds. Thus, the Petitioner’s claim for relief is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darry Lee Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
Darry Lee Mitchell (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty in 1991 to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated robbery, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-fiveyears in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in 1996 and again in 2004; both petitions were denied. Acting pro se, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in July 2011, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Jai'Shaundria D.L.R.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. The trial court found two grounds for termination, abandonment and persistence of conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home. The finding of abandonment was based on the mother’s incarceration at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate and because the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest due to the fact that the mother lacked a meaningful relationship with the child, that the mother failed to make adjustments to her home and lifestyle to make it safe for a child, and that the child was happy and healthy in her foster home of over two years such that removal would have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional and psychological condition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Middle Tennessee State University v. Tracy Sorrell Simmons a/k/a Tray Simmons
A former student who obtained a student loan from Middle Tennessee State University appeals the judgment of the trial court holding him liable on the student loan, including interest that accrued thereon, costs of collection, attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. Mitchell B. Lanphere
In a previous appeal, this court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for an order of protection based upon the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. On remand, the trial court issued an order making the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof and thereby abused its discretion. We find no merit in this argument. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of Lyle L. Lawton - Stephen Lawton v. Lyle L. Lawton
This appeal involves a conservatorship. After the parties announced in open court that they had reached an agreement on a partial conservatorship, the appellant ward stood up in court and asked to speak. The hearing was adjourned and subsequently the partial conservatorship was ordered in accordance with the agreement. The ward now appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, failing to make the requisite findings, and failing to hear from the ward. We find no error and affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Knox County Election Commission v. Shelley Breeding
This case addresses the issue of whether an announced, and otherwise qualified, candidate for the District 89 (Knox County) seat in the State House of Representatives satisfies the residency requirement to run in the Democratic primary on August 2, 2012. The trial court held that she was not eligible to run because the court found that she was a resident of Anderson County. She appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Song & Song Corporation, and Jin Y. "Jim" Song, Individually v. Fine Art Construction Company, LLC, et al.
Property owner hired a general contractor to perform construction work on a commercial building. The parties subsequently discovered that when the building was originally constructed, there were no fire dampers installed in the ductwork. The contractor performed the additional work necessary to install the missing fire dampers, but when the work was completed, the property owner refused to pay the amount invoiced by the contractor for the additional work. Both parties asserted that the other had breached the contract. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and awarded her a judgment for the unpaid balance and other damages. The property owner appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr.
The Defendant, Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr., was found guilty by the Sevier County Circuit Court of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2010), 39-14-404 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-12-101 (2010). The trial court merged one count of aggravated assault into an attempted first degree murder conviction. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for each attempted first degree murder conviction, twelve years for especially aggravated burglary, and six years each for the aggravated assault and attempted aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered the attempted first degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder convictions, (2) his conviction for especially aggravated burglary is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d), and (3) the trial court erred by applying improper sentencing enhancement factors and ordering partially consecutive sentences. We ffirm the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Christopher Lyons, aggravated assault, and attempted aggravated robbery. We reverse the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin and especially aggravated burglary and remand the case for sentencing and entry of judgments of conviction for attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr. - concurring in part and dissenting in part
After careful review of the record and relevant law, I am unable to agree with my colleagues’ determination that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent on this issue. I concur with the majority’s conclusions otherwise. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Todd
The Petitioner, John Todd, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twenty years’ confinement for second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding him competent to stand trial; (2) denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial trial on the ground that an outburst during the trial prejudiced the jury against him and prevented a fair trial; (4) admitting gruesome photographs of the victims at the trial; (5) allowing a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsies to testify at the trial; and (6) denying his request for a mistrial on the ground that the State failed to provide his oral statement reduced to writing before the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hubert Morrison, et al. v. The City of Bolivar, et al.
We granted this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal to answer the question of whether the Tennessee Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., permits a private right of action on behalf of Appellees, utility rate payers, against Appellants, the City of Bolivar and its utility. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that Appellees could maintain a private cause of action because Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-115(f) did not provide the sole remedy for violation of the statutory scheme. We hold that the Revenue Bond Law does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and that Appellees have not carried their burden to establish that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. Reversed and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ramone Gholston
A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ramone Gholston, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Henry Wiggins
The appellant, William Henry Wiggins, was convicted in the Davidson CountyCircuit Court of felony possession of a controlled substance, namely oxycodone, and a violation of the sex offender registry. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Case Handyman Service of Tennessee, LLC v. Helen Marie Harben Lee
Homeowner retained Contractor to remodel her residence and paid Contractor two out of three installments as provided in the contract. Homeowner was not satisfied with Contractor’s work and refused to pay the final installment. Contractor sued for breach of contract and Homeowner filed a counterclaim asserting Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the job in a workmanlike and reasonable manner. Homeowner also claimed Contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair and deceptive practices. The trial court dismissed Contractor’s complaint and held Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the work in a reasonable and workmanlike manner. The court found Contractor was not liable for double or treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act because Homeowner did not prove its deficiencies were intentional or willful. Homeowner appealed, claiming the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend her counterclaim to assert a claim for rescission and erred in holding Contractor did not violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dan C. Ray et al. v. Sadler Homes, Inc.
Plaintiff-homeowners filed this action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the builder and seller of their home alleging that the home was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant breached the contract and the express and implied warranties, and violated the TCPA. The court awarded damages of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home. The court also held Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to the TCPA. Defendant appealed arguing that Plaintiffs failed to prove causation, that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home, and erred in finding it violated the TCPA for which the trial courtawarded attorney’s fees.We affirm the trial court’s findings as to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty and affirm the trial court’s determinations as to damages; however, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding of a violation of the TCPA and therefore the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Tom R. Smith v. Thomas Harding Potter
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney fees and court costs and executed an order to that effect. The plaintiff filed a motion for relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights by awarding the defendant attorney fees without providing proper notice and the opportunity to be heard. We reverse the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |