State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of 20 years for each conviction. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and 2) the trial court erred by limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of a State’s witness and by denying Defendant the opportunity to make an offer of proof of his excluded cross-examination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Rashad Farrell
The Defendant, Courtney Rashad Farrell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. As part of the Defendant’s guilty plea, he agreed to a sentence of between ten and twelve years as a Range I standard offender. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine the length of sentence within the agreed upon range as well as whether the sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with the Defendant’s prior twelve-year sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven years consecutively to his prior sentence. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Le'mon Goode v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Derrick Le’mon Goode, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court committed error in finding that neither his general sessions court counsel nor his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law. He cites six factual grounds supporting his claim and alleges that the cumulative effect of counsels’ errors deprived him of his right to counsel and a fair trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that either counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to prove venue; (2) law enforcement officers’ seizure of him violated his constitutional protections; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joby Lee Teal v. The Criminal Court Of Shelby County, Tennessee, et al
Pro se petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of his five 1988 convictions for drug offenses and the resulting concurrent five-year sentences he received as a result of a negotiated plea agreement. As grounds, petitioner argues that the sentences are void because he committed the offenses while on bail and should have received consecutive sentences. The Criminal Court for Shelby County found that declaratory judgment relief is not available to petitioner because his five concurrent sentences had expired. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denise Dianne Brannigan
The Defendant, Denise Dianne Brannigan, was convicted by a Carter County jury of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 and three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value equal to or less than $500. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed terms of 5 years for the theft conviction and 11 months and 29 days for each fraudulent use of a credit card conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the 5-year sentence and two of the 11-month and 29-day sentences. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior uncharged conduct under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (2) that her sentence was excessive. After our review, we affirm. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Foreign Court Subpoena Jane Doe v. USA Swimming et al.
A non-party deponent appeals the imposition of $6,635 in monetary sanctions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(4). The non-party deponent, a Tennessee resident, was subpoenaed to give a deposition concerning a civil action pending in a California state court pursuant to a foreign court subpoena, which was issued and served in accordance with the Uniform Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 24-9-201 through -207. During the deposition, the deponent’s attorney objected to almost every question in an argumentative and suggestive manner, often without providing a proper basis for the objection, consulted with the deponent at length several times during questioning, and unilaterally terminated the deposition without seeking a protective order. The California defendants who attempted to take the deposition filed a motion to compel discovery and to recover their expenses pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court granted the motion and held the non-party deponent liable for the defendants’ expenses. The deponent appeals contending that he did not obstruct the deposition, that the sanctions are the result of his attorney’s misconduct, and that his attorney should be solely responsible for the sanctions. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(4) affords the trial court the discretion to require a deponent whose conduct necessitated a motion to compel, or the attorney advising such conduct, or both of them to pay to the moving party’s reasonable expenses. The manner in which the deponent’s attorney conducted the deposition amounted to clear violations of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 30.03 and 30.04. Except for certain circumstances not at issue here, a lawyer’s misconduct is attributable to and binding on the client; therefore, the deponent should not be excused from liability for his attorney’s misconduct, especially considering the deponent is experienced in giving depositions and knew or should have known his attorney’s conduct was outrageous and in violation of the rules of discovery. Moreover,because trialcourts have broad discretion in determining when to impose sanctions and against whom, such decisions are reviewed on appeal pursuant to the very deferential abuse of discretion standard. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Williamson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
The Town of Pegram v. Cornerstone Development, LLC et al.
Town of Pegram appeals from the trial court’s decision awarding it no damages in its claims against Cornerstone Development, LLC, the company which constructed theTown’scity hall and surrounding parking lot. Pegram also appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, which provided the performance bond assuring Cornerstone’s performance. We affirm the trial court’s findings in all respects. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Butcher v. Ronald Butcher
Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property in this divorce action. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Kennedy
The Defendant, Christopher Kennedy, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery in exchange for a sentence of nine years to be served at 100%, followed by community supervision for life. After his release for that conviction, the Defendant was indicted for violating a condition of his community supervision. The Defendant filed a motion to declare Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional “and/or” seek habeas corpus relief. After hearing the motion, the trial court granted relief, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 violate double jeopardy protections. The State filed a timely notice of appealed. The Defendant cross appeals, asserting: (1) the community supervision for life statute is unconstitutional; and (2) the conditions for lifetime supervision established by the Board of Probation and Parole are void as the conditions are not enacted pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court improperly declared Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional and that the trial court properly dismissed the remaining issues. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court in part and affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Troy Fuller v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, Troy Fuller, was convicted by a Madison County jury of rape, aggravated criminal trespass, and violation of an order of protection. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Appellant complains that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the length of his sentence was excessive, that the jury was not instructed on the offense of assault and that his wife’s car was illegally searched. On appeal, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; he has waived any issue regrading his sentence because he failed to include a copy of the presentence report in the record; Appellant has waived any issue regarding an assault instruction because he failed to request one; and his constitutional rights were not violated by the search of the car because the knife, which was recovered from the search, was not |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stoney R. Anderson, II
The Defendant-Appellant, Stoney R.Anderson,II,pled guilty in the Hickman County Circuit Court to possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Anderson reserved the following certified question of law: “[w]hether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s bag is supported by exigent circumstances.” Upon review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Thomas
Raymond Thomas (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years of incarceration. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the consecutive service of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Carlton Pickard, Jr.
Richard Carlton Pickard, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pled nolo contendere to one count of DUI, second offense, and one count of simple possession of Schedule IV contraband. He reserved five certified questions regarding the legality of his stop. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the Defendant is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Easton Jones v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because due process considerations may toll the statute of limitations in this case and the post-conviction court did not make such determination, we reverse the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Easton Jones v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process considerations could toll the statute of limitations in this case. While there are instances when due process could toll the statute of limitations, this is not one of them. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael McGhee v. Shelby County Government
This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a former employee of Appellee Shelby County, filed suit against Shelby County for alleged breach of a settlement agreement. specifically, Appellant alleges that Shelby County breached the contract by failing to change Appellant’s employment record to reflect that he resigned, rather than that he was fired, and/or by informing Appellant’s potential employer that Appellant was fired. Shelby County filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions had expired. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We conclude that: (1) the contract is severable; (2) Appellant’s cause of action for Shelby County’s breach of its obligation to change his employment records was correctly dismissed on the statute of limitations ground; (3) Appellee’s contractual obligation to answer employment inquiries pursuant to the terms of the contract was not implicated until the condition precedent occurred (i.e., until inquiry was made by a third-party); and (4) the breach of this obligation accrued when Shelby County disseminated information counter to that contemplated in the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Appellant’s claim that Shelby County violated the express terms of the settlement agreement in 2010 by informing the Appellant’s potential employer that he was fired is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harriet Robertson Forrest
The Defendant, Harriet Robertson Forrest, was indicted on nine counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. The Defendant pleaded guilty to all nine counts. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence for each conviction as a Range II multiple offender with the sentences to run concurrently. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her effective four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Channon Lee Williams
Defendant-Appellant, Channon Lee Williams, appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. He was originally convicted for the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony. He received a sentence of eight years, which was to be served on community corrections after one year’s imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re The Decedant Estate of Edward Lavoy Glasscock
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition filed by the niece of a decedent’s surviving spouse to have the decedent’s estate administered and to have a personal representative appointed. The probate court dismissed the niece’s petition for lack of standing holding that she could not proceed as next friend of her aunt because her aunt had previously appointed the decedent’s brother as her attorney-in-fact. The niece contends on appeal that she has standing to pursue the administration of the decedent’s estate in accordance Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 17.03 because the attorney-in-fact for her aunt failed to initiate administration of the decedent’s estate. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Ron Fausnaught, Jr., M.D. v. DMX Works, Inc.
Defendant corporation, which failed to appear for trial, appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against it. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying its Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 motion for relief from judgment and in awarding the plaintiff damages that exceeded the ad damnum clause of the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Sammy T. Robertson v. Roadway Express, Inc.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee injured his lower back on August 22, 2005. The trial court approved a settlement of his workers’ compensation claim in 2008. The order approving the workers’ compensation settlement provided for future authorized medical treatment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204. In January 2011, the employee’s treating physician recommended a surgical procedure. The employer’s medical utilization review provider determined that the medical necessity of the procedure was not documented, and the employer denied approval for the procedure. The employee appealed the decision to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”), and the Department’s medical director did not overturn the utilization review decision. The employee then filed a petition in the trial court, seeking an order requiring the employer to authorize the surgery. The trial court granted the petition but denied the employee’s application for attorney’s fees. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by granting the petition, that the employee failed to exhaust his administrative remedy, and that the petition is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The employee has appealed from the denial of an award of attorney’s fees. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case without reaching the merits of the appeal. |
Bradley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Troy Lee McDonald
After a bench trial, the Hickman County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Troy Lee McDonald, of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to two years to be served as thirty days in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his request for full probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robbie E. Pickett
The defendant, Robbie E. Pickett, pleaded nolo contendere to one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, see T.C.A. § 55-10-101. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days’ confinement to be served at 75 percent before reaching release eligibility. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered as enhancement its opinion that the facts of the case supported a greater charge and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Windows of Tennessee, Inc. v. James Gardner
The employee was injured in 2007 and returned to work for his pre-injury employer. The employee’s claim was settled in November 2007 and was subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). In July 2009, the employee was diagnosed with cancer, and he took a medical leave of absence. The employee remained on leave for over one year. The employer’s policy permitted one year of medical leave. When the employee was unable to return to work in July 2010, he was terminated pursuant to that policy. The employee then sought reconsideration of the November 2007 settlement. The trial court found that the employee was not eligible for reconsideration. The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Workers Compensation Panel |