Estate of Thomas R. Ralston v. Estate of Fred R. Hobbs
The defendant appeals from an Order of Sale of real property, which was sold pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.07 to satisfy a money judgment against the defendant. We have concluded that the defendant waived many of the issues raised and, as for its issue challenging the sufficiency of the notice of the sale, the sale may not be set aside on this ground because Rule 69.07(4) expressly provides that bona fide purchasers for value at the sale shall take free of any defects concerning notice. The purchaser here is a bona fide purchaser for value; thus, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of one count of aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated rape with bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to a cumulative sentence of thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape with bodily injury, (2) the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the length of his sentences but remand the case to the Criminal Court of Davidson County for additional findings regarding consecutive sentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Ralph, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Between the years of 1988 and 1996, the Petitioner, Lawrence David Ralph, Jr., pled guilty to the offenses of public drunkenness, resisting arrest, interfering with the duties of a police officer, disturbing the peace, two counts of assault, driving under the influence, and harassment. On May 17, 2011, the Petitioner filed five separate pro se petitions for post-conviction relief. In five separate orders, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief, concluding that the petitions were not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it summarily dismissed his petitions. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis a/k/a Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the Anesthesia Defendants, among others. Prior to trial, one of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. McLaughlin, was excluded for failure to meet the requirements of the locality rule. Plaintiff proceeded to trial, and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. Plaintiff now appeals the expert’s exclusion and the subsequent jury verdict. In light of our previous vacation of the order excluding Dr. McLaughlin in Kennard 2, we remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of Dr. McLaughlin’s qualifications in light of Shipley. If the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin meets the requirements of the locality rule, as set forth in Shipley, it shall then consider whether he, as an OB-GYN, may testify against the Anesthesia Defendants. Finally, if the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin is competent to testify, it shall then determine whether his erroneous exclusion warrants a setting aside of the jury verdict rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tiffany Davis
The Defendant, Tiffany Davis, was indicted on eighteen felony drug counts following a series of controlled drug purchases conducted by law enforcement officers. The jury convicted the Defendant of one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; three counts of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, all Class B felonies; three counts of the delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, all Class C felonies; three counts of the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, all Class B felonies; two counts of conspiracy to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, both Class C felonies; and one count of the lesser included offense of facilitation of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony. She was found not guilty on the remaining five counts. At her sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a career offender based upon her seven prior Class B felony convictions, for which she previously had received a sixteen-year sentence. After merging alternative counts in this action, the trial court sentenced her to the mandatory sentence of fifteen years for each Class C felony and thirty years for each Class B felony. The trial court then ordered each of these sentences to run concurrently. After finding that the Defendant had an extensive prior record of criminal activity and that the present offenses were committed while she was on probation, the trial court ordered its effective thirty-year sentence in this case to run consecutively to the Defendant’s prior sixteen-year sentence. On appeal,the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each conviction. She also challenges her effective sentence, arguing that it is excessive. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kendrick Miles
Appellant, Kendrick Miles, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to four years. The trial court held a sentencing hearing specifically for the purpose of addressing Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. The trial court denied Appellant’s request and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence in incarceration. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court considered the pertinent sentencing guidelines and principles and properly denied Appellant’s requestfor alternative sentencing. Therefore, we affirm the judgmentof the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Wayne Lankford
Appellant, Travis Wayne Lankford, pled guilty in Marshall County to three counts of especially aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of assault and one count of criminal responsibility for aggravated assault. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged two of the especially aggravated burglary convictions into the third especiallyaggravated burglary conviction and merged the criminal responsibility for aggravated assault into the aggravated robbery conviction. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in setting the sentence length at twelve years each for the especially aggravated burglary conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction by placing too much weight on the enhancement factors used. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the weighing of enhancement factors is in the discretion of the trial court under the law and that Appellant’s record of extensive criminal activity supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Eugene Scales, Jr. vs. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Larry Eugene Scales, Jr., was convicted by a jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and sentenced to twelve years at 100%. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but subsequently waived his right to appeal. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, in part on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief on the basis that Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitionerappealsfrom the denial of post-conviction relief,arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to: (1) get an independent measurement to determine whether the drug sale took place within 1,000 feet of a school zone; (2) request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of casual exchange; (3) raise, preserve, or present any issues on direct appeal. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Specifically, Petitioner failed to introduce proof at the post-conviction hearing that the sale of cocaine occurred outside the school zone. Petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(d)(2) and therefore cannot show prejudice from a lack of an objection by counsel to a denial of a jury instruction on casual exchange. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. d/b/a Centennial Medical Center et al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a medical malpractice action due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide a certificate of good faith. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the medical malpractice action based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which provides: “If the certificate is not filed with the complaint, the complaint shall be dismissed, as provided in subsection (c), absent a showing that the failure was due to the failure of the provider to timely provide copies of the claimant’s records requested as provided in § 29-26-121 or demonstrated extraordinary cause.” Because the plaintiff failed to make a showing that the omission was due to the failure of any healthcare provider to provide records or demonstrate extraordinary cause, the trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The plaintiff asserts on appeal that the statutory requirement violates the separation of powers clause and that it violates the due process and equalprotection guaranteesofthe constitution of Tennessee bytreating plaintiffs in suits for medical negligence differently from plaintiffs in other civil litigation and by allegedly restricting access to the courts. Finding no constitutional infirmities, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ayden K.M.
This appeal concerns a dispute over parentage. Kelly Marie MacCord (“Petitioner”) filed suit against Jon Kyle McMillan (“Respondent”) in the Juvenile Court for Blount County (“the Juvenile Court”), seeking to overturn Respondent’s designation as the father of the minor child Ayden K.M. (“the Child”) and also seeking custody of the Child. The Juvenile Court held that Petitioner did not have standing to deny that Respondent was the Child’s father, noting that Petitioner had signed a sworn Acknowledgment of Paternity (“AOP”) in Texas that recognized Respondent as the father of the Child. Subsequently, Petitioner went to Texas and successfully challenged the AOP in a Texas trial court (“the Texas Court”). Respondent filed a writ of mandamus with the Court of Appeals of Texas, which held that the Texas Court did have subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner returned to Tennessee seeking to enforce the Texas judgment. The Juvenile Court declined to give full faith and credit to the Texas judgment, holding that the Texas Court lacked jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals. We hold that the Texas Court did have the appropriate jurisdiction and, therefore, the Texas judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. We reverse the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Francisco R. Liriano
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Francisco R. Liriano, of conspiring to deliver more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony. He received a community corrections placement of fifteen years following one year of confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence sufficiently established that Liriano was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew C. Welker
Defendant-Appellant, Matthew C. Welker, appeals from the Stewart County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Welker pled guilty to residing with a minor as a sex offender, and he received a suspended sentence of two years following 90 days of confinement. On appeal, Welker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and in ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Kelly King
The Defendant, Andrew Kelly King, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for robbery, vandalism, and attempted escape and ordering his fouryear sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence. We reverse the judgment of the trial court because the court improperly relied upon potential parole in making its determination. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new hearing. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Clark
The defendant, Michael Clark, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced to fifteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to another sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the trial court erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence, and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Phillips
The defendant, Cornelius Phillips, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County in two separate cases to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft of property over $1000, and one count of attempted aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider applicable mitigating factors and the principles of sentencing in setting the lengths of the sentences and by inappropriately ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Robinson
The defendant, William Robinson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced by the trial court to five years, suspended to nine months in the county workhouse with the remainder of the time on supervised probation. His sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
G. Perry Guess, Executor of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard v. Elizabeth G. Finlay
This case involves a dispute between G. Perry Guess (“the Executor”),Executor of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard (“the Deceased”), and the Executor’s sister, Elizabeth G. Finlay (“the Survivor”), regarding the ownership of funds, following the death of the Deceased, in several bank accounts and certificates of deposit. The trial court awarded the bank accounts to the Executor and the CDs to the Survivor. The Executor claims he is also entitled to the CDs while the Survivor argues that she should have received all of the funds. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding the bank accounts to the Executor. We modify the judgment in favor of the Survivor so as to award to her all of the bank accounts as well as the CDs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Nathaniel Johnson
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his requests for pretrial diversion in both Maury County and Rhea County, the denial of his motions for writ of certiorari by the Maury County and Rhea County trial courts, and the denial of his motion for interlocutory appeal by the Rhea County trial court. He also argues that the pretrial diversion statute does not prohibit diversion for more than one offense. After review, we affirm the denials of pretrial diversion and motions for writ of certiorari. We also conclude that the Rhea County trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion for interlocutory appeal but such error is of no effect in light of this court’s grant of an extraordinary appeal. We further conclude that the pretrial diversion statute does not prohibit diversion for more than one offense charged in the same indictment. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kirk Alan Estes v. Kathy Jo Estes
Father and Mother were divorced in 2001 and Father was ordered to pay child support. The parties reconciled in 2002 and began living together but did not remarry. They had another child in 2004. They shared a bank account during their period of reconciliation into which Father deposited his paychecks and from which Mother paid the family’s living expenses, including the children’s expenses. The parties separated again in 2006. Father did not give Mother child support payments during their four years of living together, but resumed paying child support once they separated again in 2006. Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, and Mother filed a counter-petition seeking child support payments for the period from 2002 through part of 2006 when she and Father resumed cohabitation. The trial court gave Father credit for the necessaries he paid for the children’s support during the reconciliation period but ordered Father to pay Mother $32,886 for child support payments that accrued during that time as well as health insurance premiums and medical expenses that Mother paid over that period. Mother appealed the trial court’s refusal to award her child support for the child born during the parties’ reconciliation, and Father appealed the trial court’s refusal to give him more credit for his contribution to the children’s necessaries during the reconciliation period. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Mother’s request for support for the child born during the parties’ reconciliation, but reverse the judgment ordering Father to pay child support during the time the parties were living together as a family unit. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie S. Jernigan v. Leonidas J. Jernigan
The trial court granted a divorce to the mother of two children, named her as their primary residential parent, and awarded the father temporary visitation with the children. The father subsequently entered into an agreed order that suspended his visitation, with a provision that visitation was to resume only upon the recommendation of the children’s counselor. The mother eventually filed a motion to terminate the father’s visitation, while the father filed a petition for contempt against the mother and also sought to have his visitation restored. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who recommended against resuming visitation between the father and his children. By that time, the father had not seen his children for over four years. The court dismissed the father’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for a prompt evidentiary hearing on the father’s petition. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
BancorpSouth Bank v. 51 Concrete, LLC & Thompson Machinery Commerce Corporation
This is a conversion case. The appellant bank perfected its security interest in collateral for a loan by filing a UCC-1 statement. The debtor subsequently sold the collateral to appellee third parties, representing that there were no liens on the collateral. The appellee third parties later sold the collateral. The debtor defaulted on the loan to the appellant bank, and the bank obtained a default judgment against the debtor. The debtor then filed bankruptcy. The appellant bank filed this lawsuit against the appellee third parties for conversion, seeking the proceeds from the sale of the collateral. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court also adjudicated the bank’s claims for punitive damages and attorney fees. The bank now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s holding on its subject matter jurisdiction, vacate its rulings on the claims for attorney fees and punitive damages, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Deshon Ewan and Patrick Ewan v. The Hardison Law Firm and Jonathan Martin
This is an action for rescission of a release and settlement agreement based on fraud. The plaintiff was involved in a vehicular accident with a commercial driver. She and her husband filed a personal injury lawsuit against the driver and his employer. The parties settled the case for the limits of the defendants’ automobile liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs signed a release that included not only the defendants, but also the defendants’ attorneys and the insurance company. The plaintiffs later discovered that the defendants had a substantial general liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit against the defendants’ attorneys, seeking to rescind the release based on the attorneys’ fraud, and a declaratory judgment that the general liability policy covered the plaintiffs’ injuries. In addition, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages from the attorneys for all damages resulting from the fraud and for punitive damages. The attorney defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Based on the language in the release, the trial court refused to consider extrinsic evidence of fraud and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We hold that the trial court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of fraud and reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aundrey Meals, as Natural Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of William Meals v. Ford Motor Company - Partial Dissent
I concur with most of the majority’s thorough opinion. I must dissent from the majority’s decision to suggest a remittitur of the jury verdict, from a total $43.8 million to $12.9 million. Respectfully, nothing in the majority opinion states a basis under the law for such a remittitur. In the absence of a basis under the law for remittitur, I believe that the majority’s decision amounts to a policy determination, limiting the size verdict a jury may award. It may be that our Legislature can appropriately make such a policy decision, but the courts are not authorized to do so. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Wayne Brown v. Lisa Denise Brown (Church)
This post-divorce appeal arises from an action to modify the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, permanent parenting plan, and to award child support. The permanent parenting plan provided that the father’s child support obligation would not become effective until certain real property was sold; however, because the property had not been sold, the father never started making child support payments. Several hearings were conducted; at the final one, the mother also sought permission to move out-of-state with the minor children. The trial court denied the relief sought by the mother. The father was named the primary residential parent, and the mother was ordered to pay child support. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Outdoor Resorts at Gatlinburg, Inc. v. Utility Management Review Board et al.
Webb Creek Utility District (“WCUD”) is a public utility district that, for the most part, furnishes potable water to its customers and processes their sewage. One of its customers is the plaintiff, Outdoor Resorts at Gatlinburg, Inc., the operator of a large campground for ampers and recreational vehicles (“RVs”). Outdoor is somewhat unique in that it has its own water supply. It is a “sewer only” customer. From 1985 until 2008, the rate WCUD charged Outdoor was set by contract, which either party could terminate with sufficient notice. In 2008, WCUD terminated the contract and notified Outdoor that it would be charged based upon the number of campsites multiplied by a standard minimum rate per campsite. Outdoor objected to the rate. WCUD held a hearing and adopted the proposed rate over Outdoor’s objection. Outdoor asked for a hearing before the Utility Management Review Board (“the UMRB”). While the matter was pending before the UMRB, WCUD conducted a rate study, following which it proposed still another rate for Outdoor that was less than the objected-to rate, but more than the rate Outdoor had been paying under the terminated contract. The UMRB approved the new rate. Outdoor demanded a refund of overpayments made by it under the higher rate; the UMRB denied Outdoor’s request, stating that it lacked authority to order a refund. Outdoor also asked the UMRB to compel the individual who prepared the rate study to appear for a deposition. The UMRB denied the discovery request upon concluding that it did not have the authority to order such a deposition. Outdoor sought review in the trial court by way of a common law writ of certiorari on several grounds, including lack of material evidence to support the new rate, denial of due process in not compelling a deposition, and its characterization of UMRB’s action as illegal and arbitrary. The trial court allowed Outdoor to take the deposition of the author of the rate study; the court later admitted the deposition testimony into evidence. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the UMRB’s decision was supported by material evidence and dismissed Outdoor’s complaint. Outdoor appeals. We hold that Outdoor was not denied due process, but we vacate the trial court’s judgment because we hold that neither the first post-contract rate established by WCUD nor the newly adopted rate approved by the UMRB is supported by material evidence. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |