U.S. Waste Atlanta, LLC and Clarence Emmer v. Mark Englund and William Englund
This appeal arises from an alleged agreement concerning a waste collection business. In 2007, U.S. Waste Atlanta, LLC (“U.S. Waste Atlanta”), filed suit against Mark Englund and William Englund Sr. (“the Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that the Defendants improperly took possession of certain trucks. U.S. Waste Atlanta argued, among other things, that written documents demonstrated that William Englund Sr. had an agreement with Clarence Emmer, owner of U.S. Waste, LLC (“U.S. Waste”), to transfer trucks to U.S. Waste Atlanta in exchange for an interest in the company. Clarence Emmer, on behalf of U.S. Waste Atlanta, made finance payments on the trucks but the transfer never happened. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court partially granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, awarding Clarence Emmer a judgment against William Englund Sr. for $36,073.90. The Trial Court also made this a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. William Englund Sr. appeals, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an agreement existed bars summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Delta Development Corporation, et al. v. F. Fani Gulf International, et al. v. Fariborz Ferdowsi, et al.
Defendants made a series of loans to Plaintiffs and a dispute arose as to the interest and principal owed. A judgment was entered in favor of Defendants. However, Defendants appealed the award, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting evidence, which allegedly reduced the judgment amount, and in refusing to hold all shareholders of the Plaintiff companies liable for the judgment. Plaintiffs also claim, on appeal, that the Special Master and the trial court set an incorrect “starting point” for determining the judgment owed. We affirm the Special Master and the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority et al.
The plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against the defendant housing authority. The plaintiffs alleged the housing authority was negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. The housing authority filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations preempted the plaintiffs’ negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The trial court denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. We granted review to determine whether the plaintiffs’ negligence claim is preempted by federal law or, in the alternative, whether the housing authority is immune from suit under the discretionary function exception of the GTLA. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ negligence suit is not preempted by federal law. We further conclude that the housing authority’s failure to evict is an operational decision and that the housing authority is not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Nero Oswald Jones
Nero Oswald Jones (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and voluntary manslaughter, claiming that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing statements made by the Defendant to law enforcement officials; (2) excluding the Defendant’s line of questioning on cross-examination of a witness regarding potential bias based upon alleged romantic interest; (3) excluding testimony of one witness purporting to impeach the testimony of another witness; and (4) allowing the testimony of a lay witness based on her experience with firearms. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Sims
The Defendant, Eric Sims, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to eight years on each conviction to be served concurrently. The Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, raising three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to question the Defendant about his arrest involving an explosive device at school when he was fourteen years old; and (3) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to all three subsections of the criminal responsibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402 (2006). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to all three subdivisions of the criminal responsibility statute. We, however, conclude that the Defendant failed to prove that this error probably changed the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandy Green v. Virginia Evans
This is a grandparent visitation case. The child at issue was adjudicated dependent and neglected; the appellant paternal great-grandmother was awarded legal custody. Months later, the child’s mother died. The appellee maternal grandmother then filed a petition in juvenile court seeking both custody and alternatively grandparent visitation. The order denying the grandmother’s petition was appealed to the circuit court for a de novo hearing. The circuit court denied the grandmother’s petition for custody, but awarded grandparent visitation. The custodian great-grandmother now appeals. We reverse and dismiss the grandmother’s petition. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Renee Reed v. Michael Eugene Reed
Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce determination that a substantial and material change of circumstances occurred that warranted a modification of the parenting plan and the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of their children. Mother also appeals the termination of her alimony payments and an award of attorney’s fees to Father. We affirm the finding that a substantialand material change of circumstance occurred and that it is in the best interests of the children that Father be the primary residential parent. We affirm the termination of alimony to Mother and the award of attorney’s fees to Father. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Cardiac Anesthesia Services, PLLC v. Jon Jones
This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to a legal malpractice action. Appellee attorney drafted a contract for Appellant medical provider; the contract contained a fee-split clause in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225. When the other party to the contract, a hospital, allegedly breached the contract and sued the medical provider, the medical provider counterclaimed for breach of contract. The hospital answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the contract was illegal and unenforceable.The trial court ruled that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6225 did not apply to the contract at issue. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the medical provider for more than one million dollars. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225 invalidated the contract, and remanded the case for dismissal. Within one year of the Court of Appeals opinion, the medical provider filed this legal malpractice case against the drafting attorney. The trial court dismissed the case as beyond the one-year legal malpractice statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Cristy Irene Fair v. Stephen Lynn Cochran
The Trial Court dismissed this case based upon its finding that although plaintiff’s Summons was issued the day she filed her Complaint, proof of service was not made to the clerk until 412 days later, and, because plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4, plaintiff was not entitled to rely on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Irene Fair v. Stephen Lynn Cochran - Dissenting
I agree completely with the majority that return of “proof of service to the court” 412 days after process was issued by the trial court clerk is hardly a “prompt[]” return of proof of service. I also agree – as I must – that such a delay in the return of proof of service violates the clear mandate of the first sentence of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1): “The person serving the summons shall promptly make proof of service to the court . . .” (Emphasis added.) |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Princeton Moody
The defendant, Princeton Moody, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years at 100 percent for the second degree murder conviction, eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction, with the murder and aggravated assault sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his second degree murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a hearsay statement as an excited utterance, in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior convictions for reckless endangerment, in admitting the victim’s medical records, and in allowing the medical examiner to testify with respect to an autopsy report that she did not create. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elgene Kentea Porter
A Rutherford County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Elgene Kentea Porter, for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and misdemeanor evading arrest. Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, robbery, and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at 100% for aggravated rape, six years at 30% for robbery, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest, to be served as an effective thirty-one-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the rape kit into evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his robbery conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carol Ann Tully
Defendant, Carol Ann Tully, pled nolo contendere to DUI, first offense, and properly reserved a certified question of law to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), after her motion to suppress evidence was denied. Defendant asserts that there was not a valid basis for the traffic stop which directly led to her arrest and that she was therefore subjected to an unconstitutional stop and seizure. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John P. Konvalinka, Trustee v. American International Group, Inc.
This is an appeal of an order setting aside a default judgment. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was granted. The order setting aside the default judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff now appeals. We find that Rule 54.02 certification was improvidently granted, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jacob L. Peachy v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jacob L. Peachy, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him that his sentence was to be served on probation. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ray Turner v. State of Tennessee
In 2008, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ray Turner, of one count of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivering 300 grams or more of cocaine. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. See State v. Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, No. M2008-02267-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1644969 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 22, 2010). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he alleged that his indictment was void because the State improperly amended the indictment to include that he committed the offenses in a school zone and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. On appeal, he contends the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mohinder N. Sud v. Man Keng Ho, aka Simon Ho, et al
The Trial Court held Man Keng Ho liable for unpaid rents on commercial property that Ho had leased from his landlord. Ho claimed against Soon Lee Pang, appellant, on the grounds that Pang was the guarantor on the lease. At the subsequent trial between Ho and Pang, Ho acting as an interpreter for Pang, the Trial Court entered Judgment against Pang for the full amount of the Judgment against Ho as guarantor under the terms of the lease. Pang then filed a Rule 60 Motion seeking relief from the Judgment, principally on the grounds that he was entitled to an interpreter and the Trial Court erred in utilizing his co-defendant, who had an interest in the case, as Pang's interpreter. The Trial Court overruled the Rule 60 Motion and Pang appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not complying with Rules 41 and 42 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and remand for a retrial on the merits. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy L. Morton
Appellant, Timothy L. Morton, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original effective sentence of three years. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon L. Smith
The defendant, Brandon L. Smith, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and agreed to be sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to thirteen years and six months to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) relied upon hearsay statements contained in the presentence report at sentencing; and (2) denied him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we conclude that the defendant’s first claim has been waived and his second claim is moot. We affirm accordingly. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Asata D. Lowe v. James Fortner, Warden
The Petitioner, Asata D. Lowe, was convicted by a Blount County jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a theft, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. Lowe subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Blount County Circuit Court, which was dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, Lowe argues that the judgments are void because numerous constitutional errors deprived the trial court of authority to try and sentence him. He asserts that his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to disclose evidence and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly, that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure and admission at trial of evidence, that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by his counsel’s performance at trial, and that his right against double jeopardy and due process rights were violated by multiplicitous indictments. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Brown
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Brown, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The conviction for simple possession of cocaine was merged with the Class B felony, and Brown received an effective twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Brown argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession with intent to deliver, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tray Turner
The Defendant, Tray Turner, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Criminal Court for Knox County. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of 14 years incarceration at 100 percent service. The Defendant contends (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve 100 percent of his sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joel Scott Stephens
A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Joel Scott Stephens, guilty of driving on a revoked license and violating the financial responsibility law. He was found not guilty of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total sentence of six months in the Hamblen County Jail, with ninety days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of ninety days of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph L. Lands
Defendant, Joseph L. Lands, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, and he intended, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), to reserve the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether proof of actual attempts by law enforcement officers to obtain a lawful warrant must be placed on the record before the court may find that exigent circumstances exist, such that the warrant requirement can be excused?” After review of the entire record, we conclude this appeal must be dismissed. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vernon Motley
The defendant, Vernon Motley, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court gave an improper jury instruction on premeditation; (2) the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a Brady violation; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony of the victim’s dying declaration to include information concerning the motive for the killing; and (4) the State’s argument during closing was improper and amounted to plain error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |