State of Tennessee v. Harrison Alexander Mason
W2021-01390-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The Defendant, Harrison Alexander Mason, was convicted in the Fayette County Circuit
Court of three counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one
count of solicitation of a minor and received an effective sentence of fifty-seven years in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error
by failing to exclude statements made by the victim during her forensic interviews pursuant
to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); that the trial court committed plain error by giving
a “vague” curative instruction and waiting until the final jury charge to give the instruction;
and that the trial court’s errors require reversal of the convictions under the cumulative
error doctrine. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court.

Ruben Estrada v. DJ Exteriors, LLC et al. - Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
M2022-01052-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley

I concur in the majority’s opinion regarding piercing the corporate veil and fraudulent conveyance. I disagree with the majority’s opinion regarding punitive damages. The plaintiff’s argument on this issue is certainly not robust, but I think the intention was simply to rely primarily on the argument regarding fraudulent conveyance to also support the claim for punitive damages. In other words, I read the plaintiff’s brief as arguing that the evidence of an intentional transfer of money to the individual defendants supports both the claim of fraudulent conveyance and punitive damages. Regarding questions of waiver, we should not “exalt form over substance.” Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 312 S.W.3d 496, 511 (Tenn. 2010). Moreover, “the doctrine of waiver generally exists to prevent litigants from raising issues to which their opponents have no opportunity to respond.” Jackson v. Burrell, No. W2018-00057-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 237347, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2019) (Stafford, J., dissenting). Here, the defendants have been on notice for the entirety of this case that plaintiff seeks punitive damages. For these reasons, I would not consider the issue waived.

Teresa Arlene Simmons Perkins v. Dennis Andrew Perkins
W2021-01246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tony Childress

In this divorce case, the wife appeals the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital estate,
while also challenging the amount of the trial court’s award to her of alimony in futuro.
Although the husband contends that the trial court’s division of the marital estate was
equitable, he also raises a challenge to the alimony award, albeit one that submits that the
decision to award any alimony to the wife was in error. For the reasons discussed herein,
we affirm the trial court’s division of the marital estate, modify the alimony award, and
award the wife appellate attorney’s fees for defending against the husband’s raised issue.

Ruben Estrada v. DJ Exteriors, LLC et al
M2022-01052-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley

This is an appeal from the granting of a directed verdict on limited issues in a jury trial. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proof, the defendant moved for and was granted a directed verdict as to the issues of piercing the corporate veil, fraudulent conveyance, and punitive damages. The trial then continued as to a breach of contract claim asserted by the plaintiff, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the trial court’s ruling on the motion for directed verdict was in error. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we reverse the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict as to the issues of piercing the corporate veil and fraudulent conveyance, but we affirm as to the issue of punitive damages.

In Re Disnie P.
E2022-00662-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

This is an appeal involving the termination of parental rights. The trial court entered an
order terminating the parental rights of both the parents on the ground of abandonment by
failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-
1-102(1)(A)(i). However, the court found that the petitioners failed to establish the
following grounds for termination: (1) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to
parent; (2) abandonment by incarcerated parent for wanton disregard pursuant to section
36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (4)
persistent conditions. Additionally, the court found that termination was in the best
interests of the child. Both parents appeal, and the petitioners also challenge the trial
court’s findings that two of the grounds were not established. We conclude as follows: (1)
we reverse the court’s finding that the ground of abandonment by failure to support was
established as to both of the parents; (2) we reverse the court’s finding that the ground of
persistent conditions was not established as to the mother but affirm as modified as to the
father; (3) we vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness as to both
of the parents but remand only as to the father; and (4) we reverse the court’s finding that
termination of both of the parents’ parental rights was in the best interests of the child and
remand to the trial court for findings on the new best interest factors. Accordingly, we
vacate in part, reverse in part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Raymond A. Conn v. William M. Donlon Et Al.
E2022-00419-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri Bryant

The developer of a subdivision filed suit seeking to enforce restrictive covenants against
the owners of property within the first phase of a multi-phase subdivision. In response, the
homeowners filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the developer had
breached his fiduciary duty to timely turn over control of the homeowners’ association to
the homeowners for the first phase of the subdivision. The developer also filed a motion
for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the homeowners upon its determination that the developer
could no longer enforce the restrictive covenants against the homeowners in the first phase
of the subdivision because he was required to turn over control of the homeowners’
association for the first phase of the subdivision to the property owners. We affirm the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

State of Tennessee v. Quincy M. Gordon
W2021-01190-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The defendant, Quincy M. Gordon, entered an open plea to one count of forgery, and based
on his prior Michigan convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range III,
career offender to six years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On
appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III, career
offender based on his out-of-state convictions. Following our review, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

In Re Bentley J. Et Al.
E2022-00622-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenneth N. Bailey, Jr.

The two minor children of the appellant, Ashlyn C. (“Mother”), came into the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in December of 2020. The children remained there until DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in October of 2021. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that DCS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, six grounds for termination: 1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent; 2) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; 3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; 4) severe abuse; 5) persistence of conditions; and 6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and financial responsibility for the children. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to five of the six statutory grounds, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling as to best interests. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s overall ruling that Mother’s parental rights must be terminated.

In Re Serenity M.
E2022-00682-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey D. Rader

A mother appeals a trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the
grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of
conditions, (3) severe child abuse, and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to
personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. She further challenges
the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental
rights was in the best interest of the child. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s
termination of the mother’s parental rights.

David Seely et al. v. Geico Advantage Insurance Company
M2021-01263-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This is a dispute between two insureds, David Seely and Subhadra Guanawardana (“Plaintiffs”), who co-own the insured vehicle, and their automobile insurance carrier, GEICO Advantage Insurance Company. The dispute arises from a vehicular accident in a McDonald’s restaurant parking lot. Following its investigation into the cause of the accident, GEICO determined that Mr. Seely was at fault when his vehicle collided with another. As a consequence, GEICO paid the claim asserted by the other motorist, placed an “at fault designation” on Plaintiffs’ Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange (“CLUE”) reports,1 and raised Plaintiffs’ premium. Thereafter, Plaintiffs commenced this action against GEICO asserting claims for (1) bad faith, (2) unconscionable contract, (3) violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, (4) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and (5) defamation. The trial court dismissed all claims, some pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim, and the remaining claims were dismissed on summary judgment. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Chad V. Hughes v. State of Tennessee
M2021-01526-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Bateman

The Petitioner-Appellant, Chad V. Hughes, entered a guilty plea to exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a class C felony, and theft of property less than $1000, a class A misdemeanor.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Petitioner received a suspended sentence of five years’ probation for the conviction of exploitation of a minor by electronic means and time served for the theft conviction. As part of the special conditions of probation, the Petitioner was subject to the requirements of the sex offender registry and required to have no contact with his ex-wife, his step-daughter-victim, or his biological daughter without a juvenile/divorce court order. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to pursue a bond reduction, in failing to conduct a pre-trial investigation, in failing to retain a digital forensic examiner, and in failing to advise the Petitioner of the legal implications that pleading guilty to exploitation of a minor by electronic means would have on his dependency and neglect case. Based on trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review, we affirm.

Daniel Benson Taylor v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00737-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Robert Carter, Jr.

Daniel Benson Taylor, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of his Renewed Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Renewed Petition”). Because the Renewed Petition does not
comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-21-
107(a) and (b)(1), (3), and (4), we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In Re Alyssa A. et al.
M2022-00582-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn W. Olita

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights to his children. The trial court found that the petitioner, the children’s grandmother, established several grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination of his rights was in the best interests of the children. The father appeals, challenging each ground for termination as well as the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

State of Tennessee v. Roderick Turner
W2022-00584-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark L. Hayes

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Roderick Turner, was convicted in the Dyer County
Circuit Court of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of
convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years for each aggravated assault
conviction and four years for the convicted felon in possession of a handgun conviction
and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of
thirty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his aggravated assault convictions and
that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court. We remand for the entry of corrected judgments in counts
one and two to reflect that the Defendant’s convictions for misdemeanor assault were
merged into the aggravated assault convictions involving the same victims.

Jacky Bellar, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dewey King Knight v. Dwight Anthony Eatherly, et al.
M2022-00403-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

This appeal arises from a petition for declaratory judgment to construe a will. At issue is whether the testator intended to bequeath cash, coins, vehicle titles, certificates of deposit, and other financial documents in a lock box located at the testator’s residence pursuant to paragraph FIFTH, which reads: “I devise and bequeath my house and lot . . . where I live . . . to DWIGHT ANTHONY EATHERLY, and I devise and bequeath to him all personal property and household goods and furniture located thereon.” The trial court held that the rule of ejusdem generis limited the testator’s intended meaning of “all personal property” to items of like kind to “household goods and furniture.” The trial court also relied on the principle that “[i]n the absence of a contrary testatorial intent, as a general rule, a bequest of the contents of a house will not include choses in action or money found therein at the testator’s death.” Based on these and other findings, the trial court summarily ruled that the testator did not intend for the contents of the lock box to be part of the bequest in paragraph FIFTH; instead, they were to pass pursuant to the residuary clause in paragraph NINTH. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Kemetria Yarbrough v. Darryl Mitchell
W2021-01174-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Felicia Corbin Johnson

In this contract action, the defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for failure to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court has failed to include in its final order
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52.01. Thus, we
vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a
more detailed order.

State of Tennessee v. Crystal Ann Michael
M2022-00580-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Vanessa Jackson

The defendant, Crystal Ann Michael, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of theft of property under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to sixty days in jail. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jose Lemanuel Hall v. State of Tennessee
M2021-01556-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Angelita Blackshear Dalton

The petitioner, Jose Lemanuel Hall, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Shay Lynn Jeanette Starnes v. Olukayode Akinlaja, M.D., Et Al.
E2021-01308-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

In this health care liability action, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions to
compel the plaintiff to produce expert witness materials despite the plaintiff’s claim of
the work product doctrine. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion for
interlocutory appeal. Upon the plaintiff’s application, this Court granted leave for an
extraordinary appeal. Determining that the plaintiff has waived any privilege or
protection for specific materials requested by the defendants, including expert witnesses’
notes, draft reports, and communications with counsel, we affirm the trial court’s grant of
the defendants’ motions to compel, inclusive of the trial court’s proviso allowing the
plaintiff to present specific materials for review if she believes they contain mental
impressions of her counsel. However, also determining the trial court’s order to be
overly broad, we modify the language of the order to more closely track the language of
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(4)(A)(i) and the defendants’ specific requests.

Shay Lynn Jeanette Starnes v. Olukayode Akinlaja, M.D., Et Al.
E2021-01308-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney and Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. I do
so because Tennessee law requires the result reached in the Court’s opinion. However, I
write separately to state my view that the 2010 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4), which protects draft reports and communications of expert witnesses
from discovery, is a better approach than that set out in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
26.02 as it is currently written. Tennessee does not offer the same sort of protection from
discovery of draft reports and communications of expert witnesses that is provided under
the federal rules. As a result, and certainly after this Court’s opinion, counsel for both
defendants and plaintiffs likely will decline to write down their communications with
experts and instead rely exclusively on oral communication. Even more concerning, the
experts will communicate with counsel only by oral means leaving counsel, likely not a
healthcare provider, not having the benefit of what she is told being in a more detailed
writing. Counsel for Dr. Akinlaja candidly acknowledged as much at oral arguments,
saying “that is the way that it’s done practically.”

Adolphus Lebron Hollingsworth v. State of Tennessee
E2021-01100-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas C. Greenholtz

The petitioner, Adolphus Lebron Hollingsworth, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Justus G. Onyiego v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00629-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Glen Ivy Wright

The Petitioner, Justus G. Onyiego, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
two counts of aggravated rape based on alternative theories. The trial court sentenced the
Petitioner to seventeen years for each conviction and merged the convictions. This court
affirmed the convictions, and the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The
post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, granted relief, and ordered a new trial
for both counts based on trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on any lesserincluded
offenses. The State appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court erred by
granting relief, and the Petitioner cross-appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court
erred by denying relief on his various other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that
the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants relief, and that the post-conviction
court erred by denying his requests for funding for an investigator and a DNA expert.
Based on the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the postconviction
court’s granting relief for the Petitioner’s conviction of aggravated rape causing
bodily injury and reinstate his conviction for that offense. The judgment of the postconviction
court is affirmed in all other respects, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jay R. Wilfong v. Charles R. Kaelin, Jr.
M2021-01007-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

This matter is before this court on a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 9 interlocutory appeal to determine “whether the trial court erred in determining that it cannot order a new trial on the issue of punitive damages only.” Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.07, “[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action . . . .” Accordingly, this court concludes that trial courts may order new trials addressing the limited matter of punitive damages without need of retrying the entirety of the parties’ dispute.

In Re Aniyah W.
W2021-01369-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge Harold W. Horne

After Mother filed a notice of appeal of the termination of her parental rights, her appointed
counsel filed what was characterized as a brief, but which contained no statement of facts,
no statement of the case, and no argument. The Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services argues that Mother’s appeal should be waived under these circumstances. Based
on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn.
2016), we are not at liberty to waive consideration of either the grounds for termination or
the best interests of the child despite the deplorable state of Mother’s “brief.” Following
our review, we reverse the trial court’s finding of the ground of abandonment based on the
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services’ decision not to defend that ground. We
affirm the remaining grounds, as well as the trial court’s finding that termination was in
the child’s best interest.

Korrie Dulaney v. Aimee Chico
E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan

The appellant in this case challenges the trial court’s entry of an order of protection against
her. She argues that an order of protection should not issue when the sole incident for
which the appellee sought the order of protection occurred more than a year and a half
before appellee filed the petition for an order of protection. Under the circumstances of
this case, we agree with the appellant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.