Nancy L. Blue v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Nancy L. Blue, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed her convictions but modified her sentences. See State v. Nancy Blue, No. W2008-00187-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1097450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 23, 2009), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2009). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief; however, the postconviction court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that the petition was not timely filed. The Petitioner alleges that both prison notaries were unavailable for several days preceding the date that her petition was due and, because of their absence, she was not able to get her petition to the appropriate prison authorities for mailing until the day after the one-year statute of limitations ran. After our review, we remand to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant tolling the statute of limitations for due process concerns and whether the Petitioner timely filed her petition for post-conviction relief. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Walls
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Carlos Walls, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s statement to the Department of Children’s Services as evidence, and that the trial court applied improper enhancement factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Deon Hester
The defendant, Derek Deon Hester, stands convicted of felony murder; aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony; and aggravated rape of a child; a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to a life sentence for the felony murder conviction; as a Range I, violent offender to twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence; and as a Range III, violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape of a child conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion to consolidate the cases; that the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of certain evidence; and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lakeya Peoples
In this State appeal, the State challenges the Madison County Circuit Court’s decision dismissing the charges against the defendant and expunging them from her record, claiming that the trial court was without jurisdiction to take the action because the judgment had become final. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Arness Degraffreed
A Tipton County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Tony Arness Degraffreed, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in confinement to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred by refusing to require the jury to determine whether his penetration of the victim was digital or penile, and (3) the State improperly commented on the appellant’s failure to testify during it closing argument. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Lynn Davis v. Jack E. Scariano, Jr., M.D. et al.
The plaintiff, Deborah Lynn Davis, appeals from a grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Dr. Jack E. Scariano, Jr., and his group, West Knoxville Neurological Associates. Except when the context requires otherwise, we will refer to the defendants collectively as “Dr. Scariano.” Davis sued Dr. Scariano alleging medical malpractice and fraud related to the doctor’s treatment of her and to the billing of her account. Dr. Scariano moved for summary judgment. After granting Davis several continuances, the trial court heard the motion and granted it based on Dr. Scariano’s filings and the plaintiff’s failure to present evidence establishing a disputed issue of material fact. Davis appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re T.C.E.
This is a biological father’s appeal from a judgment terminating his parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence (1) that he had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate; (2) that he had not substantially complied with his obligations under a court-approved permanency plan despite reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child; and (3) that termination is in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Keilah Gonzalez-Bonilla v. Eduardo Mendez
Keilah Gonzalez-Bonilla (“Mother”) and Eduardo Mendez (“Father”) are the divorced parents of a minor child (“the Child”). At the time of the divorce, Mother was named the primary residential parent of the Child, and Father was granted visitation. After the divorce, Mother relocated and a revised permanent parenting plan was entered on August 3, 2007. In December of 2007, Father filed a petition seeking a change in custody of the Child alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on August 4, 2009 finding and holding, inter alia, that there had been a material change in circumstances since February 5, 2007, that custody would be changed with Father to be the primary residential parent, and that the joint decision making would be changed and Father shall have the decision-making authority. Mother appeals to this Court. We find that the proper date from which to determine whether there had been a material change in circumstances is the date the previous order was entered, i.e., August 3, 2007, and that a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a change in custody had not been proven. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s order changing custody, and remand this case to the Trial Court for reconsideration of its orders regarding child support in light of this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Senior Housing Alternatives, Inc. v. Bernard Global Loan Investors, LTD.
Senior Housing Alternatives, Inc. (“the Borrower”) filed this action against Bernard Global Loan Investors, Ltd. (“the Secured Party”) asking the trial court to enjoin the Secured Party from foreclosing on a deed of trust that secured several notes on which the Borrower had defaulted. In essence, the Borrower’s complaint alleges that its original lender had defrauded the Borrower and inflated the balance owed on the notes and that the Secured Party had knowledge of the fraud when it took ownership of the notes and deed of trust. The complaint alleges that the merits of the case are at issue in a federal district court in Georgia. Despite expressing reservations about the Borrower’s ability to prevail on the merits, the trial court granted it a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo in an order entered February 15, 2010. The court noted that developments in the federal court action could affect the equities and set a hearing for August 13, 2010, to “review the entire matter.” Two days before the hearing date, the Secured Party filed a brief, with supporting affidavits, asking the court to dissolve the injunction. The court heard proof at a status conference and thereafter issued a memorandum opinion explaining that it was dissolving the injunction because, among other things, the court did not believe the Borrower could prevail on the merits. The Borrower appeals from the order dissolving the injunction and dismissing the complaint. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keanest D. Whitson
In this State appeal, the State contends that the trial court erroneously interfered with its plea negotiations with the defendant. The State has no right to appeal via the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the State’s claim in case number 33292 regarding the trial court’s acceptance of the defendant’s guilty plea to a community corrections violation is not reviewable via the common law writ of certiorari, a majority has concluded, albeit on different grounds, that the State’s claim in that regard should be dismissed. Because the record establishes that the trial court acted outside its authority in case number 35646, a majority has reviewed the State’s claims in that case via the common law writ of certiorari and has concluded that the trial court was without authority to accept the defendant’s plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of unauthorized use of an automobile without the consent of the State. In consequence, the conviction of the unauthorized use of an automobile is vacated and reversed, and that count of the indictment is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the original charge of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000. With regard to the sentences imposed in both cases, a majority of the court that does not include the author of this opinion has concluded, on differing grounds, that a remand for resentencing is appropriate. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keanest D. Whitson - Concurring/Dissenting - Thomas
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was without authority to reduce the charge of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and that the Defendant’s conviction of unauthorized use of an automobile is void. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the common law writ of certiorari does not provide the State with an avenue in which to appeal the entirety of the trial court’s actions. While I agree that the trial court effectively rejected the plea agreement, the trial court merely imposed a sentence of its own choosing without affording the State an opportunity to participate in a sentencing hearing. See State v. Leath, 977 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (concluding that the trial court “exceeded its authority by unilaterally reducing the [defendant’s] sentence”). Moreover, I believe that the trial court violated Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure by advising the Defendant of the sentence he would receive if he decided to plead guilty in the absence of an agreement with the State. Rule 11 provides, “The district attorney general and the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when acting pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court shall not participate in these discussions.” If the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively prohibit the trial court from participating in the plea negotiation process, these rules most certainly must prohibit the trial court from excluding the State from the negotiation process and crafting its own agreement with the Defendant. Accordingly, I believe that the trial court exceeded its authority in this case and that the case should be remanded for a sentencing hearing. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keanest D. Whitson - Concurring/Dissenting - Tipton
I agree with my colleagues that the common law writ of certiorari is the proper means to have this court address the trial court’s actions regarding improperly reducing the felony theft charge to unauthorized use of an automobile. I differ, though, in how the issue is addressed. I also agree with Judge Thomas that a new sentencing hearing is in order. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott D. Julian
The Defendant, Scott D. Julian, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-527, 39-17-1003 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years’ probation for each of the sexual battery convictions and to two years’ confinement for the sexual exploitation conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State’s failure to provide a more specific bill of particulars deprived him of a fair trial and the ability to prepare a defense, (3) the trial court erred by denying his request to question witnesses about the existence of a sexual relationship between the victim and a witness, (4) the trial court erred by admitting a recorded telephone conversation between the Defendant and the victim, and (5) the State’s election of the offenses in counts three and five were not specific enough to ensure jury unanimity. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Venus L. Lowery v. Larry G. Womble, II
In this child-support matter, Father appeals the trial court’s determination of his parenting time and income for the purpose of setting his child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Fuller, by His Next Friend, Theresa-Vay Smith v. Mark Emkes, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration
Petitioner, a teenager enrolled in the TennCare program, was denied coverage for orthodontic braces by the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration (“TDFA”). Petitioner contends he qualifies for orthodontic treatment under Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1200-13-13-.04(1)(b)6 due to a severe misalignment that constitutes a medical necessity. He also contends that Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-13-13.04(1)(b)6, which limits orthodontic treatment to persons with “a handicapping malocclusion or another developmental anomaly or injury resulting in severe misalignment or handicapping malocclusion of teeth,” is in conflict with the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment program in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) and in violation of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5). TDFA contends that TennCare regulations provide orthodontic coverage consistent with federal law, that it correctly interpreted and applied its own regulations regarding Petitioner’s request for orthodontic braces, and that the courts are to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own rules. The Chancery Court for Davidson County affirmed the administrative decision. We also affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
H.J. Heinz Company, L.P. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioiner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Plaintiff/Appellant H.J. Heinz Company, LP, is a Delaware limited partnership that manufactures, sells and distributes food products. Plaintiff operates a facility in Nashville, Tennessee. The issue in this case is whether Plaintiff’s income from its investment in HJH One, LLC, is subject to taxation, on an apportionment basis, in Tennessee. The trial court determined that the earnings constituted business earnings as defined by the relevant statutes, and that the Department of Revenue’s assessment of franchise and excise taxes on the earnings was constitutional. The trial court further determined that the apportionment formula used by the Department was correct. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Commissioner, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Richard A. Demonbreun
Property owner seeks review of the trial court’s decision that two citations were properly issued against him because he did not have a permit for hosting historic home events on his property as required by the Metropolitan Government. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, by and through Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company
This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Appellant State of Tennessee brought suit against Appellee tobacco product manufacturer, under the Tobacco Escrow Fund Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 47-31-101 et seq., alleging that Appellee had failed to make escrow deposits, as required under the Act, for cigarettes sold in Tennessee. Based upon the trial court’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Appellee, it entered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. The State appeals. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the facts of this case show that the manufacturer intentionally used a distribution system with the desired result of selling its product in all fifty states, including Tennessee, so as to support a finding that the manufacturer had minimum contacts with the State necessary to invoke the exercise of personal jurisdiction; (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, is reasonable and fair; (3) the manufacturer is subject to regulation under the Act; and (4) the Act is not unconstitutional. Moreover, we conclude that: (1) Appellee is a tobacco products manufacturer, as defined by the Escrow Fund Act; (2) Appellee’s cigarettes were sold in Tennessee; and (3) Appellee is, therefore, liable for escrow payments under the Escrow Fund Act. Consequently, we grant the State’s motion for summary judgment. The order of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant State and for calculation of the escrow amount owed by Appellee and entry of judgment thereon. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Bohannon
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gary Bohannon, of one count of premeditated first degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), for which he received a life sentence. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the defendant also contends that the trial court erroneously admitted as evidence at trial (1) a witness’s statement to law enforcement, (2) a crime scene photograph of the deceased victim, and (3) a tape recording of the 9-1-1 telephone call reporting the shooting. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Britt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John Britt, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder and is currently serving consecutive eight-year sentences. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use the entrapment defense at trial. Following review of the record, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Undray Luellen
The Defendant-Appellant, Undray Luellen, was indicted by the Shelby County Criminal Court for three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. The aggravated robbery count was dismissed during trial, without opposition from the State, following the defense’s motion for judgment of acquittal. At the conclusion of the jury trial, Luellen was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to two consecutive sentences of twenty-two years for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and a concurrent ten-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. He was also sentenced to a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the aggravated criminal trespass conviction. The trial court merged the aggravated kidnapping conviction involving the child victim with the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction involving the child victim. The trial court then imposed an effective sentence of forty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Luellen argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting three items of testimony; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to consolidate his two indictments for especially aggravated kidnapping; (3) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior conviction for aggravated robbery was admissible for impeachment purposes; (4) the cumulative errors at trial required a reversal; and (5) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to insert a service percentage of seventy-five percent for the aggravated criminal trespass conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamar McField
The Defendant-Appellant, Jamar McField, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He received a life sentence with the possibility of parole for felony murder and a concurrent sentence of twenty years for aggravated child abuse. On appeal, McField claims: (1) the trial court erred 1 in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the insufficiency of the evidence; (3) the trial court improperly ruled that an autopsy photograph was admissible; and (4) the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor during sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Scott C.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of mental incompetence, substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions, as well as a finding that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
John Haynes v. Rutherford County et al.
The issue in this matter is whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (“the Transfer Statute”) tolls the running of the statue of limitations when a claim under the Government Tort Liability Act is filed in a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the court transfers the case to a court with jurisdiction. Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed a GTLA claim in the general sessions court of Rutherford County; the civil warrant was filed prior to the running of the one-year statute of limitations for a GTLA claim. Because subject matter jurisdiction over GTLA claims is limited to the circuit court, the sessions court transferred the case. The circuit court held that, because the sessions court lacked jurisdiction, the transfer itself was invalid; therefore, the action was not effectively filed until it was transferred to the circuit court. However, the date of transfer was beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations for GTLA claims; thus, the circuit court dismissed the case as time barred. We have determined this case is not time barred because, under the Transfer Statute, the statute of limitations was tolled when the civil warrant was timely filed in sessions court and, because it was timely filed, the sessions court was authorized to transfer the case to the circuit court. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the case and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael C. Dressler et al. v. Edward Buford
This is an action to establish the common boundary line between adjacent property owners. ollowing a four-day bench trial, the trial court adopted Plaintiffs’ survey to establish the parties’ common boundary line. Defendant appeals arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Finding the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s numerous findings, we affirm. |
Clay | Court of Appeals |