Richard A. Demonbreun v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals
The Metropolitan Nashville Board of Zoning Appeals refused to grant a special exception permit to allow a Nashville businessman to operate a Historic Home Events business in a residential neighborhood. The Board stated that its decision was based on the businessman’s history of non-compliance with the conditions it had imposed on earlier permit grants and renewals. The businessman filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court of Davidson County. After a hearing, the court found that four of the BZA members had acted out of ulterior motives, i.e.,their displeasure and frustration with the applicant, and it granted the requested permit, subject to a number of restrictions. We hold that the BZA may take into consideration prior activity at the location in the context of the impact of those activities on the public health, safety, and welfare. Because herein the BZA did not relate any specific prior conduct to a public harm and because most of the activities discussed at the hearing had occurred prior to previous permit grants and renewals, we conclude that the denial was arbitrary. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Lake and Linda Ousley v. Louis Haynes, Barbara Haynes and Running Bear Construction
This is a construction case. The plaintiffs hired the defendant construction company to build two residential houses. Disputes arose during construction over completion of the work and the plaintiffs did not make some payments to the construction company. After the plaintiffs terminated the contract, they sued the defendant construction company. The construction company filed a counter-complaint. After a trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and the defendants’ counter-complaint. However, the trial court failed to issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William May v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
This appeal involves a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The plaintiff employee filed this lawsuit against the defendant railroad alleging injuries caused by his employment. The railroad company filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the employee’s claims are time-barred. The railroad argued that, under the discovery rule, the facts showed that the employee knew or should have known that his injuries were work-related more than three years before the lawsuit was filed. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment. The railroad was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of Harriman, Tennessee v. Roane County Election Commission et al.
Two municipalities sought to annex the same territory outside the urban growth boundaries for both municipalities set forth in the county’s growth plan. One municipality attempted to annex territory that was not within its urban growth boundary by proposing an amendment to the county growth plan and enacting an ordinance annexing the territory. A second municipality annexed the same territory by an annexation referendum pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 6-51-104 to -105 and 6-58-111(d)(2). We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the application of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 6-58-101 to -116 to these municipalities’ annexation efforts. After considering the related statutes, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-58-111 requires an amendment to the county growth plan for a municipality to effect an annexation of territory beyond its urban growth boundary by ordinance. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the chancery court’s order dismissing the case. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
Ready Mix, USA, LLC., v. Jefferson County, Tennessee
Defendant issued a stop work order against plaintiff to cease mining activities on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought suit in Chancery Court seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue. A bench trial was held and the Trial Court adopted the doctrine of diminishing assets and that Ready Mix had established a pre-existing and non-conforming use on its property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 (b)(1). Defendant has appealed and we hold on this record that plaintiff was required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing an action in Chancery Court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Ready Mix, USA, LLC., v. Jefferson County, Tennessee - Dissenting
I cannot concur in the majority’s decision – as stated by it – “that Ready Mix was required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by statute and the ordinance by appealing the zoning official’s stop work order to the Board of Zoning Appeals.” The majority relies heavily upon our decision in State ex rel. Moore & Associates v. West, 246 S.W.3d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). In Moore, the plaintiff alleged that the zoning administrator failed or refused to issue a certificate of compliance even though the developer had installed a Category B landscape buffer that complied with the requirements of the Metro ordinance, giving specifics as to the materials installed, their spacing, and the dimensions and nature of the buffer. Id. at 576-77. The Moore plaintiff asked the court to declare that the buffer it had established in connection with its newly-constructed hotel “complied with the [buffer] requirements of the . . . Code [of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County].” Id. at 577. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nile Bradley LaRue
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Nile Bradley LaRue, of voluntary manslaughter. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to six years to be served as one year in jail and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury on the defense of protection of property, and (3) his six-year sentence is excessive and the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Hawk
On February 16, 2010, the defendant, Michael D. Hawk, entered an open plea in case numbers S1000006 and S1000007 to three counts of burglary, Class D felonies; six counts of theft over $1,000, Class D felonies; eight counts of theft under $500, Class A misdemeanors; two counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors; and one count of vandalism under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of six years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and disputes the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William B. Francis v. State of Tennessee
In 2006, a jury convicted the petitioner, William B. Francis, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. A panel of this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See State v. William B. Francis, Jr., No. M2006-02177-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4224629, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2007). In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his counsel were ineffective for failing to present a complete defense and for not preventing the state from referring to the petitioner’s residence as a halfway house. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clint Black et al. v. Charles Sussman et al.
Entertainer filed this suit against his former business manager, who is an accountant, and against several business entities for breach of fiduciary duty, accounting malpractice, breach of contract, misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the business manager and another defendant on the ground that the gravamen of the complaint was accounting malpractice and that all of the claims were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. As to a second group of defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment based upon the absence of an actual partnership and the absence of proof that the entertainer relied on any representations of partnership. We have concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the first group of defendants because the complaint states causes of action for breach of a business manager’s fiduciary duties as well as causes of action for accounting malpractice, and these two types of causes of action are subject to different statutes of limitations. As to the second group of defendants, we have concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate because material issues of fact remain as to the entertainer’s reliance on representations of partnership. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elliot H. Himmelfarb, M.D. et al. v. Tracy R. Allain
Two physicians filed this malicious prosecution action against a former patient after she voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, a medical malpractice action she filed against them. The defendant, the former patient, moved for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiffs could not prove the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim: that the medical malpractice suit was brought without probable cause, that it was brought with malice, and that it was terminated in the physicians’ favor. The trial court denied the motion. We have determined that the issue of favorable termination in this case involves questions of fact and law, and that fact questions concerning the circumstances surrounding the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the medical malpractice action are in dispute. We have also determined that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the other essential elements. Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Lynn Hill v. State of Tennessee
The trial court dismissed this action, inter alia, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We dismiss this appeal for Appellant's failure to timely file the notice of appeal. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Iyana R.W.
The primary residential parent of the parties’ ten-year-old daughter requested permission to relocate to Colorado. The mother’s reason for the relocation was that she had married a man who was a military service member stationed in Colorado. The father opposed the move. The trial court denied the request after finding that the mother’s conduct surrounding the move constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was in the child’s best interest that the father become the primary residential parent. The mother appeals. At the time of the request to relocate, Mother was the primary residential parent and spent substantially more time with the child; thus, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d) applied. Finding that the trial court erred in failing to apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d), we reverse the trial court’s judgment; grant Mother’s request to relocate to Colorado with the parties’ minor child; deny Father’s petition to change custody; and remand for the trial court to set Father’s visitation. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dane Shannon Briest
The appellant, Dane Shannon Briest, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He received concurrent sentences of six years, one month for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Ryan Watson
Appellant, Ryan Watson, was indicted in June of 2009 by the Polk County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”) of an intoxicant, marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system, or in the alternative, driving while the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood or breath was .08% or more. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the following: (1) the search of his person and vehicle; (2) his statement at the time of the arrest; (3) the results of the blood alcohol test; and (4) the results of the field sobriety tests. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Subsequently, Petitioner pled guilty to DUI, first offense and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the county jail. The trial court suspended the sentence, after service of forty-eight hours, and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence on probation. As a condition of the guilty plea, Appellant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure arguing that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the factual findings of the trial court that there was probable cause for the stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Maurice Hickman
The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Maurice Hickman, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Davidson County to possession with intent to sell a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class B felony. Hickman was originally sentenced as a multiple offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, this sentence was suspended to twelve years on community corrections. On appeal, Hickman concedes that he violated the terms of the community corrections sentence. He argues, however, that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing his original sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julio Ramirez
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Julio Ramirez, of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape of a child, and one count of assault, for crimes involving multiple victims, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighteen years of confinement. The trial court subsequently reduced this sentence to fifteen years following a motion for new trial hearing. On direct appeal from his convictions, the Defendant contends: (1) his trial counsel deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel by failing to move to sever the offenses with respect to the multiple victims; (2) he did not knowingly waive his right to be tried separately for the offenses and, as such, his joint trial for these offenses violated his rights to due process, a jury trial, and the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child; (4) the trial court improperly limited the defense’s cross-examination of the victims’ mother; (5) the trial court improperly limited the defense’s presentation of character testimony; (6) the State made improper remarks during closing argument; and (7) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert A. Guerrero
Defendant, Robert A. Guerrero, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and nine counts of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive life sentences and nine fifteen-year sentences, to run consecutive to the life sentences, for a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus 135 years. In this direct appeal, Defendant makes the following assignments of error: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s challenges for cause to three jurors; 2) the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to conduct an individual voir dire of the prospective jurors regarding their media exposure to the case; 3) the trial court erred by not striking three jurors after they saw Defendant being escorted to the restroom by a courtroom deputy; 4) the trial court erred in allowing a witness for the State to remain in the courtroom in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615; 5) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of an emergency room doctor who treated some of the victims; 6) the trial court erred by allowing two exhibits into evidence over Defendant’s objection as to the chain of custody; 7) the indictments charging attempted first degree murder, Counts 5 through 9, should have been dismissed for failing to provide Defendant adequate notice of the charge; 8) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; 9) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing; 10) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Following a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewayne Jones v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dewayne Jones, of two counts of aggravated rape, and the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to twenty-two years as a Range I, violent offender. This Court affirmed the Petitioners convictions on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. As such, we affirm its judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Lynn Hugueley v. State of Tennessee
Following affirmance on direct appeal of his murder conviction and accompanying sentence of death, State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2006), the Petitioner, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent the Petitioner. The Petitioner thereafter wrote the post-conviction court expressing his desire to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief. A competency hearing was held in November 2008. On January 8, 2009, the post-conviction court found the Petitioner competent and entered an order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. A notice of appeal was filed on February 19, 2009. The Petitioner filed a motion to remand the matter to the post-conviction court. The motion was predicated upon the Petitioner’s desire to proceed with any and all available challenges to his conviction and sentence. This court entered an order concluding that the motion to remand shall be heard contemporaneously with arguments on the merits of the Petitioner’s Rule 3 appeal. On appeal to this court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims related to the lower court’s determination that he was competent to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief, including the lower court’s denial of independent experts, medically appropriate experts, and sufficient time to prepare. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, this court declines to expand the precedent established in Pike v. State and concludes that the Petitioner may not belatedly withdraw his decision to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, this court concludes that the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that the Petitioner was competent to withdraw his motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jenny A. Pennington v. Christopher J. Hennessee
Mother filed a petition in 2010 to modify child support set in a 2005 order and parenting plan on the basis of a substantial and material change of circumstances. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that there was not a significant variance in the parties’ presumptive child support obligations in 2005 and 2010. Mother appeals, contending that the 2005 order and parenting plan are void because they relieved Father of his obligation to pay child support. Finding that the 2005 order fails to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-1-1(e)(1)(A) and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. Ch. 1240–2–4–.02(7), we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
McCall Brister v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a hospital’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that plaintiff’s claim sounded in medical malpractice and dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Finding that Plaintiff’s complaint states claim for ordinary negligence and premises liability, we reverse the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mason Fischer v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a Worker’s Compensation action on August 22, 2003 alleging a compensable injury in the course of his employment with his employer in December 1998. The employer filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. The trial court entered an order in September 2008, stating that the employer was withdrawing the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute based upon the employee’s commitment to take a medical deposition within sixty days. A second motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed and heard on March 15, 2010 because the medical deposition had not been taken. The trial court granted the motion with prejudice. The employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Victor Powell et al. v. Brett Marter, Individually and d/b/a Quality Floor Covering
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers’ compensation action contending his injury while cutting trees at his employer’s home was in the usual course of his employment at his employer’s floor covering business. The trial court held that employee’s work was casual employment not in the usual course of his employer’s business as defined by TCA § 50-6-106(2) and not covered by the workers’ compensation statute. We affirm the judgment. |
Marion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., et al.
In this products liability case, a widow sought compensation for the death of her husband from mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. She sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband’s employer. She based her claim on strict liability and alleged that the seller sold defective products and failed to warn her husband of the products’ health risks. The jury found that the seller was at fault, but that her husband’s employer was the sole cause of his injury and awarded her nothing. The widow appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions that more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury. On review, we hold that the seller was subject to suit in strict liability, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) (2000), because none of the products’ manufacturers were subject to service of process. Further, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of any danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings. This jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, it applied the learned intermediary doctrine, which the courts of this state have limited to medical products and pharmaceuticals. Second, the jury instruction misidentified the consumer as the employer, when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court |