Matthew Goforth-Lange, v. Lisa B. Lange
Appellant, pro se, raised as issues the Trial Judge ordering him to deposit half of his income tax refund, and in ordering him not to have his children around fiance. The record contains an Order by the Trial Judge ordering appellant to pay into the Court half of his income tax refund, but the record is devoid of any order pertaining to the latter issue. The Order on the income tax refund recites that evidence was heard on that issue, but appellant has filed no transcript or statement of the evidence. Accordingly, the Trial Judge's ruling is conclusively presumed to be correct, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Gilbert Olerud, et al. v. Dr. Walter M. Morgan, III, et al.
This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment to a hospital and physician in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of their motion that the trial court recuse itself due to the court’s membership on the board of directors of the defendant hospital and the court’s denial of their motion for default judgment based on spoliation of evidence. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Patterson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Patterson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies. The petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty-two years. The convictions and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. See State v. James Patterson, No. W2005-01416-CCA-R3CD, 2007 WL 162175, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2007). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief. On appeal, the petitioner claims he is entitled to a new post-conviction hearing because post-conviction counsel failed to diligently investigate and present reasonable claims for relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian Ann Crain
The defendant, Adrian Ann Crain, appeals the revocation of her probation sentence, claiming that the state denied her right to a speedy trial and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction when it revoked her sentence and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edmond Cato et al. v. D. L. Batts et al.
Purchasers of home filed this action against the sellers for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation for the failure to disclose defects in the home. The trial court found for the purchasers on their claim of negligent misrepresentation but denied their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation and their request for rescission. Purchasers appealed contending the trial court erred by not finding fraudulent misrepresentation and partially denying their motion to alter or amend the judgment in which they sought to introduce new evidence. We affirm the ruling of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Faith F.
Father filed a petition to relocate with minor child, and mother filed a petition for change of custody. After a hearing, the trial court denied father’s petition to relocate and mother’s petition to change custody but increased mother’s parenting time. A week after the court’s order was entered, mother filed a petition to reopen the proof, and the court granted her motion. After another hearing, the trial court granted mother’s petition for a change of custody. On appeal, father argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition to relocate, in reopening the proof, and in granting mother’s petition to change custody. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Aaron Jenkins and Perley Winkler, Jr.
A Monroe County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellants, Michael Aaron Jenkins and Perley Winkler, Jr., of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of attempted aggravated arson. After sentencing hearings, Jenkins received an effective seventeen-year sentence and Winkler received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the appellants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by prohibiting them from questioning one of the victims, David Senn, about a prior felony conviction. In addition, Jenkins contends that the trial court should have allowed him to cross-examine Senn in front of the jury about Senn’s untruthfulness during an offer of proof, that the trial court should have granted his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. Winkler contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to question a second victim about a threatening message Winkler allegedly left on a cellular telephone and that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced Winkler. The appellants’ remaining issues are waived because the appellants failed to provide an adequate record on appeal. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Chloe R.P.
In this action to terminate the parental rights of the mother, the petitioner alleged statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The mother answered, defending her right to remain a parent. At trial, the parties stipulated that there were statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The only issue at trial, was whether or not it was in the best interest of the child for the mother's rights to be terminated. Following the evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court found that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, we concur with the Trial Court that there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kristen Cox Morrison v. Paul Allen, et al. - Dissent
|
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
W.T. Walker et al. v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
The Walkers, the appellants, sued the appellee railroad seeking a declaration that an easement already existed over the railroad tracks so that appellants could have access to a public road without contracting for an easement from the railroad. The jury found that the easement contract was not valid and that the appellants had an easement by necessity and implication. The trial court granted the railroad a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the existence of the easement. The Walkers appealed. We reverse the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
James and Patricia Cullum, et al. v. Baptist Hospital Systems, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, parents of child who suffered severe, permanent brain injuries during the course of his labor and delivery, filed suit against their physician, physician’s employer, and related hospitals. The physician and her employer settled prior to trial, leaving the related hospitals as the only defendants. This case has been tried twice. Following the first trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, which the trial court set aside pursuant to the thirteenth juror rule. The second trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs, with the jury assigning 3.75 percent of fault to the defendants and 96.25 percent of fault to the nonparty physician. Because the evidence shows that the members of the jury agreed to be bound by the result of a predetermined averaging process, we have concluded that the jury reached a quotient verdict, which is impermissible. Consequently, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Boone et al. v. City of Lavergne, Tennessee, et al.
Two former employees of the City of LaVergne claimed that the defendants retaliated against them in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act for complaining of race discrimination in the workplace and for filing claims with the EEOC. One of the plaintiffs asserted an additional claim for hostile work environment discrimination. The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs for retaliation and for hostile work environment for one plaintiff. The defendants appeal the trial court’s admission of certain testimony and evidence about an alleged listening device as well as the jury verdict for hostile work environment and the amount of damages for humiliation and embarrassment. We find that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, but that the error was harmless. The court did not err in admitting evidence about the alleged listening device. We conclude that there is material evidence to support the jury verdict’s for a hostile work environment as well as the amount of the award for damages. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Cook v. General Motors Corporation
The Employee suffered a compensable injury while working on an automobile assembly line. A few months after the Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, his employer, through a highly-publicized bankruptcy, sold a majority of its assets to a newly created entity. The trial court held that because the Employee, who was employed by the new entity, had not returned to work for his pre-injury employer, he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the cap established by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The employer has appealed, contending that the unique circumstances of its bankruptcy sale compel this Panel to rule that the Employee returned to work for his pre-injury employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Valentine Hill
Defendant, Joseph Valentine Hill, was charged with one count of DUI, second offense, a class A misdemeanor, and with seven counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a class C felony. He entered pleas of guilty as charged in each count and submitted to a sentencing hearing with no agreement as to the length or manner of service of the sentences. The trial court sentenced Defendant to four years for each aggravated assault conviction and to 11 months and 29 days for the DUI second offense conviction. The DUI sentence and three of the aggravated assault sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. The remaining four aggravated assault sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the first grouping of sentences, for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered the eight-year sentence to be served in incarceration. Recognizing that the DUI, second offense conviction requires a mandatory minimum period of incarceration, Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by declining to grant him probation after serving the above-noted mandatory minimum confinement. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Diane Carr v. Gregory F. Allen
Elizabeth Diane Carr (“Petitioner”) filed for and obtained an ex parte order of protection against her cousin, Gregory F. Allen (“Respondent”). Pursuant to statute, a hearing was conducted on whether to dissolve or to extend the order of protection. In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-605(b), a trial court has two options at such a hearing: (1) to dissolve the order of protection; or (2) to extend the order of protection for a definite period of time not to exceed one year. With respect to taxing costs, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617(a) expressly prohibits taxing costs against a victim, even if the order of protection is dissolved. If the order of protection is extended, the costs must be taxed against the respondent. In the present case, following the hearing on whether to extend or dissolve the order of protection, the Trial Court instead entered a mutual restraining order and taxed costs equally to both parties. Because neither action was authorized by statute, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Keri Williams v. The City of Milan, Tennessee and Mayor Chris Crider, in his official and individual capacities
This appeal involves the transfer of a case from the chancery court to the circuit court. The plaintiff was terminated from her employment with the defendant municipality. She filed this lawsuit against the municipality for wrongful termination, seeking only unliquidated damages. The municipality filed a motion to transfer the case to circuit court, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act and also based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-11-102, which addresses the chancery court’s jurisdiction over claims for unliquidated damages. The chancery court denied the motion to transfer. The municipality now appeals. We reverse, concluding that once an objection to jurisdiction was made under Section 16-11-102, the chancery court was required to transfer the case to the circuit court. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Wasau Insurance Company v. Archie Richardson
The employee alleged that he injured his back in the course of his employment. His employers denied the claim based upon failure to give timely notice of the injury. The employee saw two medical doctors and a chiropractor shortly after his injury. Their records contained no reference to a work injury; one stated that the injury had happened at home. The trial court found that the employee did not provide timely notice of his alleged injury and, alternatively, that he failed to sustain his burden of proof concerning causation. The employee has appealed from those findings. We affirm the judgment. |
Loudon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carolyn Berry v. Armstrong Wood Products
Employee filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits against her former employer alleging that her work for her former employer advanced pre-existing arthritis in both knees and required her to have joint replacement surgery on her right knee. The employer denied her claim, contending that her condition was unrelated to her employment. The trial court found that she had sustained a compensable aggravation of her arthritis and that she had not had a meaningful return to work. It awarded 78% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. The employer appealed,1 contending that the trial court erred by finding the award was not subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). We agree with employer that employee is entitled to an award of one and one-half times her impairment rating and decrease the award to 39% PPD to the body as a whole. We affirm the judgment as modified. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Kristen Cox Morrison v. Paul Allen, et al.
After the death of her husband, the plaintiff filed suit against their agents/financial planners based upon several theories of recovery in regard to the termination of a life insurance policy from one company and the acquisition of a replacement policy from a second company. After initially contesting the award of benefits, the second company, which was also named as a defendant in the suit, settled with the plaintiff. At the conclusion of the bench trial as to the liability of the agents, the plaintiff was awarded substantial damages as to each policy based upon various theories of recovery: the agents’ failure to procure a life insurance policy as directed, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, but held that the damages in contract relating to the failure to procure should be offset by the amount of the plaintiff’s pre-trial settlement with the second insurance company. Because of the nature of the issues presented, this Court granted permission to appeal. As to the policy for which benefits were denied by the second company, we hold that (1) a cause of action may arise for the failure of the agents to procure a policy not subject to contest; (2) the claim for failure to procure may be actionable, notwithstanding the policy holders’ admission that they did not read the insurance application; and (3) because the settlement by the second life insurance company was not specifically resolved based upon contract, the agents are not entitled to a credit against damages caused by their failure to procure. As to the policy terminated by the plaintiff, we hold that the evidence preponderates against any award of damages based upon negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finally, we hold that the ad damnum clause in the complaint provided the agents with sufficient notice to support a damage award in the amount of $1,000,000 plus pre-judgment interest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for determination of post-judgment interest. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Kristen Cox Morrison v. Paul Allen, et al. - Dissent
|
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Karah and Ryan DePue, et al v. Charles D. Schroeder, et al
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging medical malpractice against numerous healthcare providers on May 26, 2009. They alleged that they had given the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121(a) prior to April 8, 2009 to the defendants. The defendants filed several motions, including motions for summary judgment, stating that plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121. The record establishes that plaintiffs did not give the requisite notice, "at least 60 days before the filing of their Complaint". In response to the motions for summary judgment the Trial Court excused compliance with the code section and defendants appealed. On appeal, we reverse the holding of the Trial Court on the grounds that non-compliance with the code section could only be excused upon the showing of extraordinary cause. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Karah and Ryan DePue, et al v. Charles D. Schroeder, et al - Dissenting
|
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Judy Dotson McConnell, et al v. Pat Fuller, et al
In September of 2009, Judy Dotson McConnell and Jerry Dotson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Pat Fuller, John Fuller, and Lela Dotson Gravett (“Defendants”) alleging, in relevant part, that the Last Will and Testament of Clarence E. Dotson, which was offered for probate in May of 2003, was a fraudulent will. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted alleging that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ claim. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on February 16, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not filed within the statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs failed to “allege facts which would bring into play fraudulent concealment,” which would have tolled the statute of limitations. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deborah N. Cotter
The appellant, Deborah N. Cotter, was convicted by a jury in the Hamblen County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, particularly because no witness identified her in court as the robber. She also contends that the trial court erred in arriving at her sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryant C. Overton
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryant C. Overton, of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, but we reverse them in part based upon a sentencing error. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |