State of Tennessee v. Derrick D. Crutcher
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Derrick D. Crutcher, of simple possession of cocaine, in this case a Class E felony, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (e) (2006), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, see id. § 39-17- 425(a)(1). In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert J. Montville v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert J. Montville, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for simple assault and reckless driving and his resulting effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as twenty-four hours in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Hughlett
The defendant, Bobby Hughlett, appeals from the trial court’s denial of any form of alternative sentencing, including probation. The defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated robbery and robbery, both Class C felonies. The defendant was given an agreed sentence of ten years for each count, to run concurrently, as a persistentoffender, with a 45% release eligibility date. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying him an alternative sentence, including probation, and erred in finding the defendant was on probation at the time of committing these offenses. After review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Suzanne H. McKin v. Charles David McKin
In this divorce case the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce, divided the marital property, and ordered transitional alimony to the wife until the husband pays the wife an amount ordered by the Court to render the property settlement equitable. The parties have appealed, and we modify the Judgment because the Trial Court inadvertently included an amount in the property division which he had found to be the separate property of the husband. We adjust the property division along the lines intended by the Trial Judge and set a definite time for the transitional alimony to comply with the statute. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Ernest Kilburn v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Inmate brought petition for writ of certiorari challenging his conviction of the prison disciplinary offense of conspiracy to violate state law. The trial court granted judgment on the record to the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). We have concluded that TDOC failed to follow the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, but that this departure did not affect the disposition of the case. We therefore affirm the chancellor’s decision. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of James A. Hamilton a/k/a James Robert Hamilton
A woman who failed to have her paternity determined while her putative father was living filed a complaint seeking to establish her right to inherit a part of his estate. Tennessee Code Annotated §31-2-105 requires paternity to be established by clear and convincing evidence if paternity is sought to be established after the putative father’s death. Prior to the trial, the woman moved the chancery court to order the deceased’s family to provide her with DNA samples in an effort to prove the deceased was her father. The trial court denied this motion, finding the rules of civil procedure do not require nonparties to provide DNA samples. Following a bench trial, the court concluded the woman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased was her father. The woman appealed. We affirm the trial court in all respects because, first, nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the deceased’s family members to provide DNA samples to assist the woman in proving she was the deceased’s daughter. Second, the positive and negative evidence rule does not apply to the testimony in this case because there was no conflicting testimony by eyewitnesses to the woman’s conception. Third, the missing evidence and missing witness rule applies to jury trials, whereas this trial was a bench trial, and there was no evidence that the purportedly missing evidence or missing witnesses were under the estate’s control. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Kristene M. Brewer v. Boyd W. Brewer
Former cohabitant brought this partition action with respect to real and personal property. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in dividing the real property and a mobile home, in finding the motor vehicles to be jointly-owned property, and in dividing the proceeds of a savings account equally between the parties. We have concluded that the trial court erred in dividing the savings account, which is titled in the defendant’s name alone. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Zulu Naantaanbuu v. Sheila Naantaanbuu
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of: (1) an oral motion for a continuance supported by her doctor’s affidavit; and (2) a motion to add, as necessary parties, two mortgagees of real estate alleged to be marital property. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brent Blye
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brent Allen Blye, was convicted in Case Number S50,833 of possession with intent to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and two Class A misdemeanors and was sentenced by the trial court pursuant to an agreement by the parties. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant pled guilty to several felony and misdemeanor charges in three unrelated cases and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to an effective term of 30 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) his pro se motions should be considered as a motion for new trial in Case Number S50,833; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions in Case Number S50,833; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in Case Numbers S46,736, S48,639, and S51,239; (4) his right to a speedy trial was violated in Case Number S46,736; (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him; and (6) the trial judge who presided over the sentencing hearing for all four cases should have recused herself. Following our review, we affirm the convictions but remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Wayne Young
A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Douglas Wayne Young, of aggravated rape and sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) admitting the appellant’s nine millimeter handgun into evidence; (2) admitting scientific evidence from a DNA and serology expert; (3) finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; (4) giving the jury an instruction concerning flight; and (5) imposing a sentence of twenty-two years. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v Charles E. Lowe-Kelley
A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for each first degree premeditated murder conviction, merged the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder convictions, and imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years’ incarceration for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently with the life sentences. On appeal, in addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a continuance, (2) allowing a juror to remain on the jury who expressed an opinion about the case, (3) admitting evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (4) admitting a taperecorded conversation between the defendant and a separately-tried co-defendant, and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. Because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial, all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing are waived. Furthermore, the untimely motion for new trial rendered the notice of appeal untimely. In the interest of justice, however, we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal and review the remaining issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alvin T. McGee v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alvin T. McGee, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted burglary and vandalism between $500 and $1000, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitzi Rollins
The appellant, Mitzi Rollins, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to one count of initiating a false report under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502. The plea agreement provided that she would be sentenced to two years and ten months, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for alternative sentencing, citing her lengthy criminal history and the repeated unsuccessful attempts to use less restrictive sentencing. The appellant contends the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rachel Elaine Smith v. James Daniel McGrath
Mother appeals action of the trial court in adding a “paramour provision” to an order approving parenting plan for minor child. We modify the judgment and affirm in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v Patrick Rico Edwards
Defendant, Patrick Rico Edwards, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for murder in the perpetration of a theft and first-degree premeditated murder, both in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. After a jury trial began on August 21, 2008, the trial court granted a mistrial. On March 19, 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing on May 12, 2009, Defendant was sentenced to serve 21 years in confinement at 100 percent. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s sentence is not excessive and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mattie M. Lindsey, et al. v. Mark Lambert, et al.
This appeal involves an award of sanctions. We reverse because the moving party did not comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy K. Hindman vs. Louise Helen Hindman
Louise Helen Hindman (“Wife”) and Tommy K. Hindman (“Husband”) were divorced in August of 1997, at which time the trial court approved a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”) submitted by the parties. Relevant to the instant case, the MDA addressed future medical and educational expenses for the parties’ minor child (“Son”). After Wife refused to reimburse Husband in compliance with the pertinent provisions of the MDA, he filed a petition seeking to have her held in contempt. The trial court ultimately ordered Wife to pay $43,678. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis Robin Russsell, et al. v. Anderson County, et al.
This is the second appeal of this wrongful death action, arising from a pedestrian versus motor vehicle collision that fatally injured a seven-year-old child at a downtown Clinton intersection. The action was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq., against the City of Clinton (“the City”) by plaintiffs Curtis Robin Russell (“Mr. Russell”) and Dorothy Louise Russell (“Mrs. Russell”) (collectively “the Russells”) as next of kin of the decedent, their son Curtis Tyler Russell (“Curtis”). The Russells settled with the driver of the vehicle, Ladislav Misek (“Mr. Misek”), who was subsequently dismissed as a party-defendant from the lawsuit. The trial court in the first trial entered judgment after a nonjury trial, apportioning equivalent liability to Mrs. Russell and the City. On appeal, this court held that: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to rule on the fault to be attributed to Mr. Misek; and (2) material evidence existed for the culpability and fault to be assigned to Mr. Misek. On remand, the trial court altered its judgment, attributing 45% of the fault each to Mrs. Russell and the City and 10% to Mr. Misek. The City appealed. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deadrick Garrett
The defendant, Deadrick Garrett, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the victim’s prior convictions and parole status. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lloyd Andra Webb
The Defendant, Lloyd Andra Webb, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and to possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (2010); 39-17-418 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the possession with intent to sell conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor possession conviction, to be served concurrently. He was order to serve fifteen weekends in the Blount County Jail with the balance of his sentences on community corrections. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Chester McNally
The Defendant, Tony Chester McNally, pled guilty to introducing contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-201 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years’ confinement, to be served consecutively to sentences he was serving at the time of this offense. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the questioning that led to his conviction. Because we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall Phillip Boyce v. Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission
Sheriff filed a petition for judicial review regarding a decision of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (POST) denying the sheriff’s request for certification. The sheriff argued that his basic recruit training in 1976, when he was a sheriff’s deputy, was equivalent to the Tennessee Law Enforcement Training Academy recruit training required by POST. The chancellor ordered POST to issue a certificate of compliance to the sheriff. Finding no error in POST’s decision, we reverse the chancellor’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bennie E. Massey
Following a Montgomery County bench trial, the Defendant, Bennie E. Massey, was convicted of five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and sentenced to six years, to be served on probation. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve forty-eight hours in jail every two weeks for the first year of his sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the evidence presented by the State is based solely upon the victims’ testimony and those victims, he asserts, are accomplices to the sexual battery in that they consented to the unlawful touching. Further, he asserts that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the victims were not accomplices, in that their consent was coerced by the Defendant, and that the evidence, therefore, supports the Defendant’s convictions. We further conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie W. Stanfill
The Defendant, Jamie W. Stanfill, pled guilty to three counts of theft of property between $10,000 and $60,000, Class C felonies; one count of theft of property between $1000 and $10,000, a Class D felony; and five counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class E felonies. The Defendant agreed to a ten-year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court improperly denied his request for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ryne W. Brown v. Catherine L. Brown, Trustee, et al.
Appellant contends that he is a beneficiary of a trust created by his parents and thus entitled to distributions of principal and income. In a declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined that Appellant was not entitled to mandatory distributions of income or principal until both of his parents were deceased. We affirm this portion of the trial court’s judgment. The trial court also determined that no corporate trustee was required. We reverse this portion of the trial court’s judgment and remand for the appointment of a corporate trustee. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |