Luis D. Vidales Romero v. Joe Easterling, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Luis D. Vidales Romero, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory M. Nicholson v. Tonya S. Nicholson
In this divorce case, Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court's division of marital property and denial of her request for alimony. Finding that the trial court correctly valued the dental practice and properly awarded same to Husband/Appellant, we affirm that portion of the trial court's order. However, because the trial court did not specifically determine whether certain debt was separate or marital debt, and, consequently, did not allocate that debt, we vacate the trial court's division of marital property, and remand for a determination of the nature of the marital debt, and division of same. Because the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i), we vacate the trial court's denial of alimony, and remand for further proceedings concerning Wife/Appellant's need for alimony, and Husband/Appellee's ability to pay same. Affirmed in part; vacated in part, and remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angela Milhorn
The defendant, Angela Milhorn, appeals the denial of her request for judicial diversion, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by placing undue emphasis on the circumstances of her offense while ignoring positive factors in favor of diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julius W. Weaver
Appellant, Julius W. Weaver, was indicted by a Rhea County Grand Jury on three counts of aggravated sexual battery. On count one of the indictment, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of Class B misdemeanor assault. The jury found him not guilty on counts two and three. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six months incarceration. He now appeals the length and manner of service of his sentence. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry O'Neil Greene
The Defendant, Terry O'Neil Greene, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the results of his breath-alcohol test. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Wayne Tripp
A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Patrick Wayne Tripp, of rape of a child, a Class A felony; aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony; aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony; sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony; and attempted incest, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises four issues: (a) whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (b) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support his convictions; (c) whether the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the offense of rape of a child; and (d) whether the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the evidence supports the Defendant's convictions, the trial court properly instructed the jury, and the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Rita Day v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Teresa Rita Day, appeals the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition was untimely and the petitioner has not shown any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tamabe Trinise Leke
The Defendant-Appellant, Tamabe Trinise Leke, was convicted by a Madison County jury of disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. She was sentenced to thirty days for disorderly conduct and to six months for resisting arrest. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Leke challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eldridge Hill v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Eldridge Hill, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In his appeal, he claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make a motion for judgment of acquittal regarding the especially aggravated robbery charge and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the conviction on appeal based on his claim that the victim's shooting did not occur prior to or contemporaneously with the robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craig
This is a fraud claim between ex-spouses. While the petitioner mother and the respondent were dating, the mother became pregnant, and she told the respondent that the child was his. Consequently, she and the respondent married, and the child was born during the marriage. Years later, the parties divorced, and the respondent paid child support to the mother. After several years, the respondent obtained a DNA test, which revealed that he is not the child's biological father. After he told the mother of the test results, she filed a petition requesting a court-ordered paternity test and modification of the parenting plan. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation by the mother for falsely representing that he was the child's biological father. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the respondent compensatory damages for past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums paid for the child, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and attorney fees. The mother now appeals. We conclude that under Tennessee statutes, the respondent cannot recover the past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums, as this would be a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. We find that the remaining damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded for the tort of fraud and misrepresentation, because such damages are non-pecuniary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a Regional Medical Center v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
Kevin L. Holt, injured in an automobile accident in Arkansas, was first taken by ambulance to an Arkansas hospital and then transported to the Regional Medical Center in Memphis, where he incurred $33,823.02 in expenses. Shelby County Health Care Corporation, the operator of the Regional Medical Center, filed affidavits for a lien as prescribed by statute. Thereafter, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, which had medical coverage for Holt with limits of $5,000, paid $1,290 for ambulance services and $3,710 to the Arkansas hospital. Shelby County Health Care Corporation sued Nationwide for impairment of its lien, seeking as recovery the entire amount due for its medical services to Holt. The trial court awarded $5,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals revised the amount of the judgment to $33,823.02. Because we have determined that liens under the Hospital Lien Act do not attach to medical payment benefits paid pursuant to an insurance policy, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is dismissed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Bethany (Bumgarner) Schroedel vs. Timothy Adam Bumgarner
Bethany (Bumgarner) Schroedel ("Mother") and Timothy Adam Bumgarner ("Father") are the divorced parents of one minor child ("the Child"). In October of 2007, Mother filed a petition alleging, among other things, that Father was refusing to allow Mother her visitation with the Child. Mother's petition sought, in part, to modify the parenting plan to name Mother as the Child's primary residential parent. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order on June 29, 2009 finding and holding that a change of circumstances existed that affected the Child's well-being in a meaningful way, but not one sufficient to justify a change in primary residential custody. The trial court's June 29, 2009 order did modify the parenting plan to allow Mother greater visitation. Mother appeals to this Court raising an issue regarding the trial court's refusal to change primary residential custody, and an issuec regarding the trial court's finding her in contempt. We affirm the trial court's order as to the parenting plan, vacate the trial court's order finding Mother in contempt, and remand for further proceedings in compliance with this Opinion. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal vs. Veronica Monde Barone, et al
Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal ("Step-Daughter") brought an action to quiet title to a nearly three hundred acre farm in Cumberland County, Tennessee, against Veronica Monde Barone ("Ex-Wife") and Anthony F. Barone ("Father"). She primarily asserts that she has acquired adverse possession rights in the entire farm pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103. The disputed property was also the subject of prior litigation in a circuit court proceeding involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment and fraudulent conveyance claims against Father by Ex-Wife as a judgment creditor. In the present action Ex-Wife moved for summary judgment on several theories including the assertion that filing a lien lis pendens barred Step-Daughter's adverse possession claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on all grounds. Ex-Wife filed a motion asking the trial court for permission to submit an application for interlocutory appeal on one issue raised on summary judgment _ whether the lien lis pendens tolled the seven-year adverse possession statute found in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103 during the circuit court proceeding. The trial court granted that motion and we likewise granted the application for interlocutory appeal on the asserted issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment on the sole issue presented to us. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Wayne Maples v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur in the results, but I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that trial |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Wayne Maples v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Wayne Maples, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping on the basis of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in the investigation and presentation of evidence concerning his mental health. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maxwell Medical, Inc., Successor in Interest to Maxwell Medical, LLC, v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
The trial court determined that glucometers sold by Plaintiff taxpayer during the tax period January 1, 2001, through September 30, 2003, were not exempt from sales and use tax under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 67-6-314(5)(1998). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Revenue. Plaintiff taxpayer appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Patrick Hyde v. Amanda Bradley
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to be named the minor child's primary residential parent or, in the alternative, to increase his parenting time. The trial court denied Father's petition, and also denied Father an award of attorney's fees and costs under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-103(c). Finding that Father failed to meet his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in the child's primary residential parent and/or the child's residential schedule, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Patrick Hyde v. Amanda Bradley
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to be named the minor child's primary residential parent or, in the alternative, to increase his parenting time. The trial court denied Father's petition, and also denied Father an award of attorney's fees and costs under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-103(c). Finding that Father failed to meet his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in the child's primary residential parent and/or the child's residential schedule, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Yuko Garen v. Raymond McClure Bowman, III d/b/a BMR Constructors
This case involves an unusual procedural history and requires us to examine the consequences of an oral motion for voluntary dismissal for which a written order was not entered. We have determined that the trial court did not err in its rulings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
James Fortune v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, et al.
This appeal arises out of an alleged wrongful denial of long term disability benefits. The plaintiff/appellant filed suit asserting multiple causes of action against an insurance company that contracted to provide long term disability insurance to employees of the City of Germantown. The defendants/appellees, the insurance company and its parent corporation, moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the applicable statutory and contractual limitations periods barred each of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Ball v. Theodore Shockley
This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion. The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries arising out of a car accident. Several months later, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was not opposed, and was granted. The plaintiff later retained new counsel and filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for relief, commenting that even if the order were set aside, it would nevertheless grant the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of Logan A.S.; John W.W., Jr., Stephanie L. W., and Lindsey B. W. v. Glenn S.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was born to teenage parents who never married and have long-term, continuing problems with substance abuse. As a result of his substance abuse, the father has been in and out of prison for much of the child's life. The child has lived with the petitioners, the maternal grandfather and maternal step-grandmother, who filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents and adopt the child. The mother subsequently joined in the petition. After a trial, the trial court terminated the father's parental rights, finding abandonment by, inter alia, engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. The father now appeals. We affirm, finding that the undisputed evidence supports the trial court's finding on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, and that termination of the father's parental rights is in the child's best interest. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lynne Pilkerton Hudson v. Foster Eugene Hudson, Sr.
This is an interlocutory appeal involving intercounty transfer of post-divorce matters. The divorce was granted in Carroll County, Tennessee. The mother and the parties' minor child reside in Davidson County, Tennessee. The father once resided in Carroll County, but has since moved to Georgia. The father filed a motion in the Carroll County trial court seeking modification of child support, alimony, and the parenting plan. The mother filed a request to transfer the case to Davidson County. The Carroll County trial court granted the transfer as to the child support and parenting plan issues, but denied transfer as to the alimony issues. Both the trial court and the appellate court granted the mother's request for permission for an interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, finding that the entire case must be transferred to Davidson County. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Roger A. Miller vs.Kimberly Summers Welch
Kimberly Summers Welch ("Mother") gave birth to Aaron A. (the "Child") on July 14, 2004. Prior to the birth, Roger A. Miller ("Father") filed a petition seeking to establish paternity. After the Child was born and a DNA test established that Father was the biological father, Father was ordered to pay $235 per month in child support. This amount was specifically held not to be presumptively correct and Mother was allowed additional time to pursue her claim that Father's income was such that he should pay more child support. The trial court eventually found that Father was capable of earning or presently was earning $40,000 annually. Father also was ordered to pay 10% of Mother's attorney fees. Father appeals both determinations. Mother requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her attorney fees incurred in this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Apac-Atlantic, Inc. et al vs. Samuel Robert Morton d/b/a Morton Construction
The plaintiff, APAC_Atlantic, Inc. ("APAC"), filed this lawsuit against the defendant, Samuel Robert Morton d/b/a Morton Construction, for breach of contract. APAC moved for a default judgment after Mr. Morton failed to answer APAC's complaint within the allowable time limit established by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. The trial court entered a default judgment, awarding APAC $106,776.20 in damages. Thereafter, Mr. Morton filed a motion to have the default judgment set aside under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Mr. Morton was not entitled to relief from the final judgment. Mr. Morton appealed. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals |