The Hartford vs. James R. Wyrick
The defendant, acting pro se, appeals the entry of a default judgment entered against him in a subrogation action. After a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jon Michael Anseman
The defendant, Jon Michael Anseman, appeals the Blount Court Circuit Court's order revoking his probation, and the State has moved this court to summarily affirm the circuit court's order pursuant to Rule 20 of the rules of this court. The motion is well taken, and the order of the circuit court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latoya T. Waller
The Appellant, Latoya T. Waller, was charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Class B felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann.__ 39-17-417(c)(1), -418(c). Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pleaded guilty to simple possession of marijuana, and the State dismissed the felony cocaine charge. She subsequently filed a Motion for Expungement and requested that the trial court expunge the felony cocaine charge from her record. The trial court denied her motion. In this appeal by writ of certiorari, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her Motion for Expungement of count one of the indictment. After reviewing the record, we reverse the denial of the appellant's motion and remand to the trial court for entry of an order requiring expungement of all records relating to the felony cocaine charge, count one of the indictment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Ray Anderson
The Defendant, Tony Ray Anderson, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted rape, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-12-107(a), -13-503(b). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction for each count, with the two sentences running concurrently. Almost three years after he pleaded guilty, the defendant petitioned the trial court and requested to serve the remainder of his sentence on probation. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony A. Phipps v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tony A. Phipps, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence and explore certain theories of defense; (2) that misconduct by the prosecutor denied him the right to a fair trial; and (3) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roosevelt Morris v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner Roosevelt Morris was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, and received an effective sentence of fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed the conviction on appeal but reduced his sentence to forty-seven years. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his counsel was deficient for (1) failing to object to the State's questions and closing arguments concerning petitioner's post-arrest silence; (2) failing to object to other prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument; and (3) failing to have the magazine and the unfired bullet in the firearm used in the crime examined for fingerprint evidence. Petitioner also contends that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clifton Harrison v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Clifton Harrison, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. He pled guilty and was convicted of seven offenses of selling cocaine, and he received an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to amend the petition with the assistance of counsel. We hold that the trial court should have appointed counsel under the circumstances in this case, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lynn Harrison v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David Lynn Harrison, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, and reckless endangerment for which he received an effective sentence of 16 years. The petitioner challenged the voluntariness of his guilty pleas and the performance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We remand the petitioner's case because the trial court failed to enter findings of fact as to the petitioner's contention that he did not voluntarily plead guilty. The trial court is instructed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Elma Ward
This case involves the validity of a holographic will. Appellant, son of the decedent, appeals the trial court's finding that the holographic will was valid, arguing that the document did not comply with the statutory requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. _32-1-105. Finding that the presence of more than one signature, the location of the signatures, and the fact that the document contains both handwritten and typewritten sections does not negate the validity of a holographic will, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Bee Deselm, et al. v. Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission, et al.
This is an appeal of a lawsuit by Knox County citizens to have a former county sheriff decertified as a peace officer. The plaintiffs' first lawsuit was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiffs then pursued administrative remedies but were denied administrative relief based in part on an administrative finding that they did not have standing to seek the relief requested. After that, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, seeking judicial review of the denial of their request for administrative relief. The trial court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue for declaratory relief, but did have standing under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 4-5-322 to obtain judicial review of the administrative decision not to investigate the decertification of the former sheriff. Subsequently, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on this claim, remanding the case to the administrative body with instructions to hold a contested case hearing on the decertification of the former sheriff. The plaintiffs and the administrative body both appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part, concluding that the plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue any of the relief they seek, and dismiss the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Trevor Ford v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Trevor Ford, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2007, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two years. On appeal, he argues that the denial of his petition was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that counsel failed to introduce evidence of specific violent acts by the victim, failed to secure testimony establishing the victim's reputation for violence, and failed to pursue funding for a forensic pathologist. Additionally, he argues that the refusal to grant funds for an expert at the post-conviction level denies him fundamental due process and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Rehagen v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner Richard Rehagen filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of his guilty pleas to one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson. He now appeals the habeas court's decision to summarily dismiss the petition for failing to state a cognizable claim. Upon review, we affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Dale Parris
This Court's opinion, filed on September 23, 2010, is hereby withdrawn and substituted with the corrected opinion and judgment being filed contemporaneously with this order. SO ORDERED. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Dale Parris
In 2006, the defendant, Bobby Dale Parris, pled guilty to the second degree murder of his wife, who died on September 16, 2004. The trial court sentenced him, under the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act, as a violent offender to twenty years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act after concluding that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant under the 2005 amendments because the defendant had not waived his ex post facto rights. Upon remand, the trial court again sentenced him to twenty years, opining that the defendant's sentence was the same under either the pre-2005 or post-2005 sentencing statutes. The defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court did not consider mitigating factors as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record on appeal, and the applicable law, we vacate the trial court's sentencing order and remand for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the 2005 Sentencing Act. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Liberty State Bank v. Charles Wayne Smithson
The defendant has appealed from a default judgment granting the plaintiff possession of his 1995 Lincoln Towncar. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Henry Robinson, Jr. vs. Ann Prevatt Robinson Irons
Robert Henry Robinson, Jr. ("Father") and Ann Prevatt Robinson Irons ("Mother") were divorced in 1998. The parties have two minor children. Although they initially had equal co-parenting time, in March of 1999 Mother was designated as the primary residential parent with Father having weekend co-parenting time. In October of 2007, Father was designated as the primary residential parent due to a threat posed by Mother's husband, John Irons, a suspected arsonist. The trial court held that this threat constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was in the children's best interest for Father to be primary residential parent. In January of 2010, pursuant to a petition to modify filed by Mother, the trial court determined that this threat no longer existed and the absence of the threat constituted a material change in circumstances. The trial court then designated Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appeals claiming there was no material change in circumstances. We affirm the trial court's finding that there was a material change in circumstances. Because the trial court never made a finding as to what was in the children's best interest, we remand this case to the trial court for such a determination. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald A. Henry v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ronald A. Henry, filed a post-conviction petition asking the court to set aside his convictions for burglary, theft, vandalism, and possession of burglary tools or to grant a delayed appeal. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to adequately defend against video evidence that depicts petitioner committing the crime; failed to preserve his right to appeal; and failed to file an Anders brief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence David Schreane v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Clarence David Schreane, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) not seeking dismissal of the petitioner's indictment on due process grounds, (2) not seeking dismissal of the petitioner's indictment under the Interstate Compact on Detainers, and (3) not seeking suppression of the petitioner's statement to police on the basis that he was denied the right to counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Federated Rural Electric Insurance Exchange, et al. v. William R. Hill, et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered work-related injuries to his knees prior to 2003 and underwent numerous surgeries. He entered into two settlements that obligated Employer to pay all future medical expenses arising from those injuries. In 2004, Employee fell at home and reinjured his right knee. He sought workers' compensation benefits, claiming that the 2004 injury was a natural consequence of his prior compensable knee injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to Employer, finding that Employee's injury was not a natural consequence of the prior on-the-job knee injuries. We affirm the judgment as to Employee’s claims for permanent partial disability benefits, and certain temporary total disability benefits. We reverse as to Employee’s claims for medical benefits and certain temporary total disability benefits because there are disputed material facts that could allow Employee to prove his 2004 injury was a natural consequence of his prior compensable knee injuries. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of several collateral issues raised by employee. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Richard A. Willette, Jr. v. Carroll G. Hulse, et al.
This action arises out of a vehicular accident in which the plaintiff sustained serious personal injury. A complaint was filed on behalf of the pro se plaintiff; however, the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or a licensed attorney as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. The plaintiff subsequently retained counsel, but the plaintiff's attorney failed to make a written appearance until months later. Moreover, neither the attorney nor the plaintiff signed the complaint to cure the signature deficiency until after the case was dismissed and the statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff then filed a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order based on Excusable Neglect. That motion was denied and this appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Rule 60.02 motion; therefore, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
David Livingston v. State of Tennessee
Appellant was convicted of "sexual misconduct" in New York in 1988, and was compelled to register as a sex offender in Tennessee in 2008. Upon his registration, the TBI classified appellant as a violent sexual offender, determining that his New York conviction was analogous to rape, a violent sexual offense. appellant contacted the TBI seeking removal from the registry, but his request was denied. He then filed an administrative appeal in the chancery court, but his classification as a violent sexual offender was upheld. We find that the elements of "sexual misconduct" under N.Y. Penal Law _ 130.20 are analogous to the elements of rape as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-503, and therefore, that appellant was properly classified as a violent sexual offender within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-202(28). The judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Turner v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole - Concurring
I fully concur in the decision of the court. I believe it may be useful to further explain my position in this matter. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Turner v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
After being denied parole at her first parole hearing, Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated at the Tennessee Prison for Women, filed this Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari to challenge the decision by the Board of Probation and Parole to defer reconsideration of parol for six years. Finding that the deferral of parol eligibility for six years was not arbitrary and did not violate Tennessee law, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Searle v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.
This action arises from the alleged harassment of plaintiff by defendant, Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., while attempting to collect on a dishonored check. Plaintiff cashed a check for $500 at Harrah's Metropolis Casino in October 2001. The check was dishonored by plaintiff's bank on the first attempt, but cleared on the second attempt on December 8, 2001. Apparently neither party knew the check had cleared in December, and in January 2002, plaintiff claims he received threatening phone calls and letters to collect on the check. After receiving a threat of criminal prosecution, plaintiff and his wife drove to the casino and paid $525.00 to settle the debt; however, the casino could not produce the original check, only a photocopy. Upon further investigation, plaintiff discovered the check had cleared in December. Plaintiff then filed this action against Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County. After a default judgment was entered, Harrah's filed a petition for writ of certoriari in the Circuit Court asserting that it was not the proper defendant and insufficient service of process. The circuit court granted the petition and set aside the default judgment. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint asserting claims for negligence, gross negligence, outrageous conduct, and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Following a bench trial, the court found that Harrah's was the proper defendant and ruled in favor of plaintiff on his claims for negligence, the TCPA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and awarded plaintiff damages of $5,962.95, which was trebled under the TCPA for a total award of $17,888.85. The court also awarded plaintiff his attorney's fees. Harrah's appeals claiming it was not the proper defendant and it was not properly served. It also challenges the findings of negligence, violation of the TCPA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the damages awarded. We have determined that Harrah's waived the issue of insufficient service of process and it is estopped to assert that it is not the proper defendant. We affirm the trial court's findings regarding negligence, violation of the TCPA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We find that the trial court erred by including the $5,962.95 award for emotional distress within the amount trebled under the TCPA. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to recalculate the damages awarded under the TCPA and for a determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney's fees plaintiff incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lester Mitchell Lawson, III v. Anthony Adams
Lester Mitchell Lawson, III ("Plaintiff") filed this wrongful discharge lawsuit against his former employer, Anthony Adams ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claims he was illegally discharged for refusing to remain silent about and refusing to participate in illegal activities. Plaintiff brought both common law and statutory claims. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims after finding that the undisputed material facts established that plaintiff failed to report the alleged illegal activity to an entity other than the person engaging in the claimed illegal activity. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's common law and statutory claims that he was discharged for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's common law and statutory claims that he was discharged for refusing to participate in illegal activities. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |