Benny Taylor, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Benny Taylor, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2008 Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis B. Reece
The petitioner, Dennis B. Reece, pled guilty to second degree murder in October 2005. In September 2008, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the convicting court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) ("Gomez II"), created a new constitutional rule entitled to retrospective application and that this court should deem the one-year statute of limitations period to extend from the publication of Gomez II. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard P. Alexander et al vs. Antonio Zamperela, et al
Richard P. Alexander, Regina Phillips, Gail Young and Judy Sprinkles ("Plaintiffs") filed this products liability suit against Antonio Zamperla, S.p.A. and Zamperla, Inc. ("Defendants"), as a result of June Alexander's death that occurred while riding an amusement park ride manufactured by defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendants summary judgment, finding the act of a third party constituted both a superseding cause of the death and an alteration of the product which relieved defendants of liability. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
E & J Construction Company vs. Liberty Building Systems, Inc.
E & J Construction Company ("Plaintiff") purchased a metal building from Liberty Building Systems, Inc. ("Defendant"). The metal building was purchased by plaintiff for one of its customers, Camel Manufacturing Company ("Camel"). Plaintiff constructed the metal building for Camel and connected it to an existing building. Almost from the outset, there was a problem with leaking. Plaintiff sued defendant raising various claims including, among others, breach of contract. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial on the few remaining claims. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the grant of a directed verdict on plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings. The judgment of the trial court otherwise is affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Don Nichols v. Jack Cooper Transport Company, Inc. et al.
The employee, who suffered two separate injuries during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the employer, settled his first claim for workers' compensation and filed suit on the second. Shortly after being laid off because of an unexpected work shortage, the employee elected to retire in order to maintain medical insurance coverage rather than face an indefinite furlough without pay or benefits coverage. When the trial court reconsidered the settlement and awarded benefits in excess of the lower statutory cap on the second claim, resolving the issues in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, and the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. Because we have concluded that the employment relationship terminated when the employee was laid off, rather than when he subsequently retired, the employee was not meaningfully returned to work, and, therefore, qualifies for reconsideration of his first injury and is not subject to the lower cap on the second. The judgment of the Panel is reversed, and that of the trial court is reinstated. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
John Cartlidge v. State of Tennessee
Employee suffered a compensable back injury in the course of his employment for the State of Tennessee. The Claims Commission found that he was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, the State contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment. |
Jackson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee in hac parte Knox County District Attorney General Randall E. Nichols on Relationship of Bradley J. Mayes, et al vs. John E. Owings, et al
The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation. Therefore, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley J. Elliott vs. Life Of the South Insurance Company, Inc.
The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation of the defendants that the only notice of appeal received by the trial court clerk was a facsimile filed notice of appeal. As such is insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this court, the appeal is dismissed. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Shaw, Jr.
The defendant, Joseph Shaw, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the sexual battery conviction into the rape conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim without issuing a limiting instruction and by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ron "Cotton" Seals
A Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ron "Cotton" Seals, of one count of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine; one count of possession with intent to deliver dihydrocodeinone, a schedule II controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver alprazolam, a schedule IV controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half ounce or more of marijuana; one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, kept, or sold; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 20 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sharon M. Keisling v. Daniel Kerry Keisling, et al.
This matter was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for a frivolous appeal. Appellant challenges only the award itself and not the amount decided by the trial court. The party awarded the fees argued that the trial court erred in the amount awarded. Finding no error, the trial court is affirmed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson, et al. v. CVS Corporation, et al.
Plaintiff, individually and as the guardian of her minor child, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claims that she and her child were harmed by the defendants' disclosure of their private health information. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: April P-C, Jennifer P-C, and Kenneth P-C
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to three children, asserting that the findings of the juvenile court that he had abandoned his children by failure to support and that the conditions which led to the children's removal persisted were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father also asserts that the court erred in finding that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Billie Gail Hall, As Surviving Spouse and Administratrix of The Estate of Billy R. Hall, Deceased v. Douglas B. Haynes, Jr., M.D., et al.
In this medical malpractice case, we are asked to determine whether various employees of a medical corporation were agents properly authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation and/or one of its physician employees. We hold that none of the individuals who accepted service in this case were agents authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of either the corporation or the individual physician. With specific reference to the attempted service of the amended complaint, we hold that the authority to sign for and receive certified mail does not, on its own, confer the authority to accept service of process. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
In Re Bernard T, et al.
This appeal involves a termination of rights proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113 (Supp. 2009) with regard to five children between the ages of twelve and seventeen. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services removed the children from the custody of their biological mother and the person thought to be their biological father and entered into a series of permanency plans with them for the next three and one-half years. Shortly after discovering that the putative father was not the biological father of two of the children, the Department filed a termination petition in the Shelby County Juvenile Court. The juvenile court entered an order on October 31, 2008, terminating both the biological mother's and the putative father's parental rights. The putative father appealed the juvenile court's decision to terminate his parental rights based on both Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi). While the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's finding that grounds for termination of the putative father's rights existed, the court reversed the judgment terminating the putative father's rights based on the majority's conclusion that the Department had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to address the causes for termination under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3). The majority also reversed the termination of the father's rights under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi) because the Department had failed to aid the putative father in establishing paternity. State, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Tina T. (In re B.T.), No. W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3681884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009). We granted the Department's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that the Department used reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to establish his parentage and to regain custody of his biological and legal children and that the juvenile court properly terminated the putative father's rights with regard to all five children. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Lori Turner v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51 for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lori Turner (“Employee”) sought reconsideration of her prior workers’ compensation settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Her claim had been settled for 14% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole, based upon a 7% anatomical impairment. Upon reconsideration, the trial court awarded an additional 21% PPD, for a total of 35% PPD to the body as a whole. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. (“Employer”) has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the amount of the award. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Cumberland | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jose Holmes v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The Petitioner, Jose Holmes, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that the judgment is void because the State failed to file a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment at least ten days before the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Edward Braddam, alias Eddie Braddam
The Defendant, Donnie Edward Braddam, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering him to serve the balance of his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Lynn Craft
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Terry Lynn Craft, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-213(b)(2). In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court violated the hearsay rule in admitting a recording of a 911 call. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jean Hensley v. Robert Cerza, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the result reached by the majority; however, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding the proferred opinion testimony of two lay witnesses, Lisa Poe, a registered nurse, and Jimmy Brock, a surgical technician. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Hensley v. Robert Cerza, et al.
A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in this medical malpractice action. On appeal, the plaintiff assigns error to various decisions made by the trial court concerning the admission of evidence and arguments and to the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of negligent retention. While the trial court erred in several respects, we consider the errors to be harmless and affirm the judgment based on the jury verdict. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Builders Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert W. Daughtrey
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his left arm. His employer denied the claim, contending that the injury was not caused by the employment, and also that the employee had failed to provide notice of his injury as required by the workers’ compensation statute. The trial court found that the injury was work-related, and awarded 60% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the left arm. On appeal, the employer argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on these issues, and that the trial court erred by failing to apply the missing witness rule as to the potential testimony of the treating physicians. We find no error, and affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Joe Lynn Hughes v. Robert Brent D/B/A Apartment Maintenance Specialists, et al.
In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the employee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203, because the employee had not filed a request for benefit review conference within one year of the date of injury. The employee, Joe Lynn Hughes, has appealed, contending that the statute was tolled by his timely filing of a request for assistance. We agree, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the trial court |
Sullivan | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Gail Tuten v. Johnson Controls, Inc., et al.
Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome while employed as a factory worker by Johnson Controls, Inc. (“JCI”). After employee gave notice of her injury and received some treatment, Manufacturers Industrial Group (“MIG”) bought the factory and became her employer. She had surgery on both arms and returned to work, but was then permanently laid off. Employee brought an action against both JCI and MIG for workers’ compensation benefits due to injuries sustained to her right and left hands and wrists. JCI and MIG each argued that the other should be liable for her workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court found that MIG was liable and awarded 48% permanent partial disability to both arms. MIG appealed. It contends that the trial court erred by assigning liability to it and by adopting theimpairment rating of a physician chosen through the Medical Impairment Registry. MIG further argues that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Shari Harp v. Darryelle E. Mills
Petitioner, Shari Harp, filed this action to recover personal property and for an injunction related to her deceased mother's estate. Respondent, Darryelle E. Mills, is surviving spouse of the decedent. The trial court entered a partial default judgment in Ms. Harp's favor after Mr. Mills failed to answer the complaint or otherwise plead _ despite ample notice of the consequences of failing to answer. Upon appeal, this court entered a show cause order directing Mr. Mills, acting pro se, to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, among other things. Mr. Mills has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time allotted. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal because it is premature and because Mr. Mills has neglected to file a cost bond and has not paid the litigation tax associated with the appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals |