Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. R. D. Aldridge, et al.
Bank purchased property at a foreclosure sale, and a tenant of the previous owner continued to occupy the property after the sale. The deed of trust executed by the previous owner provided that if the property was sold, any person holding possession of the property through the borrower would either surrender possession of the property or become a tenant at will of the purchaser. Bank filed a detainer warrant against the tenant and was awarded possession of the property by the general sessions court. On appeal, the circuit court also awarded possession to the Bank. The tenant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Perry Avram March
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Perry Avram March, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony, and destruction of evidence, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-five years for his murder conviction, two years for his abuse of a corpse conviction, and five years for his destruction of evidence conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for his Class C and Class E felonies consecutive to his sentence for his murder conviction, and his murder conviction in this case consecutive to his sentence in case no. 2005-D-2854 of twenty-four years for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for an effective sentence of fifty-six years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence (1) his statements to Detective Postiglione on August 12, 2005; (2) his taped conversations with Nathaniel Farris while Defendant was housed in the Davidson County Jail awaiting trial; (3) Leigh Reames’ testimony concerning Defendant’s prior conduct; and (4) the draft of a novel written by Defendant. Defendant also contends that the State’s prosecution of the offenses of abuse of a corpse and tampering with evidence are time-barred and, alternatively, that the tolling of the statute of limitations in criminal cases violates his constitutional right to travel and denies him equal protection under the law. Defendant submits that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him his constitutional right to due process. After a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Destiny H. A. A. M. M. M., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christina M. (“Mother”) to her daughters Jazsman (d.o.b. 5/28/08) and Destiny (d.o.b. 11/18/09). DCS was excused from being 2 required to make reasonable efforts to assist Mother to accomplish the goal of reunification because she has previously had children removed involuntarily from her custody. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g)(4). The trial court found and held that clear and convincing evidence existed on the ground of mental incompetence to terminate Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals, asserting that DCS should have been required to make reasonable efforts to maintain her daughters in her care. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth C. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kenneth Clay Davis, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of identity theft, a Class D felony, and driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, and was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the denial of the petition was error because: (1) his due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed before the return of the indictment; and (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial and affirm the judgment of the Sevier County Circuit Court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie Bradfield v. Henry Steward, Acting Warden
The pro se petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Perry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Perry, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to properly investigate the case and advise him about testifying at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Leon Moore v. Joe Easterling, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or his sentences illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George T. McClain v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, George T. McClain, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court imposed illegal sentences and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Craig Edwin James
The Defendant, Craig Edwin James, was convicted of speeding in Rutherford County General Sessions Court and appealed his conviction to the Rutherford County Circuit Court. Following a de novo bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, fined five dollars, and ordered to pay $624 in court costs. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) his General Sessions trial was conducted in violation of both Tennessee statute and the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (2) the designation of his speeding violation as criminal rather than civil violated his right to equal protection; and (3) the United States Department of Transportation improperly limits state sentencing discretion in violation of the Supremacy Clause. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shelby County Health Care Corporation, d/b/a Regional Medical Center v. John Baumgartner, Elizabeth Baumgartner, a/k/a Daray Baumgartner, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity
This appeal involves the impairment of a hospital lien. The individual defendant was treated at the plaintiff hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by a thirdparty tortfeasor. The patient incurred substantial medical expenses. The hospital filed a hospital lien for the amount of the patient’s medical expenses. Subsequently, the patient received insurance proceeds from his own insurance company under his uninsured motorist coverage, and another payment from the tortfeasor’s insurance company. Nothing was paid to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital filed this lawsuit against both insurance companies for impairment of its hospital lien. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Against the patient’s own insurance company, the hospital was awarded one-third of the monies the patient received. Against the tortfeasor’s insurance company, the hospital was awarded an amount equal to the policy coverage limit. The hospital now appeals, arguing that it was entitled to recover from both insurance companies jointly the reasonable cost of the hospital services rendered to the patient. The insurance companies also appeal, arguing that there was no impairment of the lien and that, if there was impairment, the hospital’s recovery should have been limited to one-third of the payments made to the patient. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the hospital’s lien was valid and was impaired, but that the hospital can recover only for the damages caused by the impairment of its lien. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Martha S. French v. Stratford House et al.
The administratrix of the estate of the deceased brought this wrongful death suit against the defendant nursing home and its controlling entities, alleging damages as the result of ordinary negligence, negligence per se, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act applied to the ordinary negligence claims, thereby precluding allegations of negligence per se or violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court also dismissed a claim for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but vacated the portion of the order dismissing the punitive damages claim. This Court granted the administratix’s application for permission to appeal in an effort to clarify the standards governing nursing home liability and to resolve a conflict in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals. We hold that, because the administratrix of the estate of the deceased has alleged violations of the standard of care pertaining to both medical treatment and routine care, she has made claims based upon both medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. Further, she may offer proof of negligence per se and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act as support for her ordinary negligence claims. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the punitive damages claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Richard Swecker, et al., v. Steven Michael Swecker, et al., and, Dinah Sluder, et al., In Re: Estate of Joseph James Swecker, Steven Swecker, et al., v. Richard Allen Swecker
Plaintiffs brought this action to establish a partnership with the deceased against the estate's personal representative and others. Defendants answered, denying the allegation that a partnership existed, and filed a counter-complaint, asserting the estate should be reimbursed for plaintiffs' mismanagement of the farm, and for monies the plaintiffs removed from the estate's bank account. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court held that deceased and plaintiff had entered into a partnership and that the partnership would be wound up by the Court and the partnership assets distributed. Also, the Trial Court held that plaintiffs would be required to pay rent on the house they occupied on the farm for several years. On appeal, we affirm the finding that a partnership existed, but reverse the Trial Court's holding that plaintiffs owed the estate rent for occupancy of the house on the farm. We remand, with directions to the Court to wind up the partnership. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Carolyn A. Montgomery v. Daniel Kueter, M.D.
We granted the application of Daniel Kueter, M.D. (“Defendant”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal on the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in reinstating this case to its active docket after it had been dismissed without prejudice over a year earlier. We find and hold that although plaintiff was not entitled to relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the Trial Court did not err when it granted Plaintiff’s motion to enter an agreed order nunc pro tunc reinstating this case. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Martha S. French v. Stratford House et al. - Dissenting
This appeal involves important questions regarding the process for adjudicating the liability of nursing homes for injuries to their residents. In particular, it requires this Court to articulate the principles that should be used to decide whether a claim based in part on the conduct of a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”) should be treated as a medical malpractice claim or as an ordinary negligence claim. The Court has determined that claims involving the adequacy of CNAs’ training, the sufficiency of the staffing at a particular nursing home, and the adherence of CNAs to a patient’s plan of care are ordinary negligence claims that can be substantiated without the introduction of expert proof. The Court has also decided that the negligence per se doctrine permits the use of federal and state regulations regarding the licensing of nursing homes to create and define the scope of the duty of care that nursing homes owe to their patients. I cannot concur with either decision. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather Richardson
In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellant, Heather Richardson, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order denying her relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. The State concedes that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying the application. Upon review, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the trial court to order the prosecutor to grant the Appellant pretrial diversion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert A. Cantrell
The defendant, Robert A. Cantrell, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to sixteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial following a bomb threat and ensuing building evacuation that took place during voir dire; (2) whether his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury was prejudiced by the jurors’ exposure to the bomb threat and publicity surrounding the case; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trestan Lemark Yarbrough
The defendant, Trestan Lemark Yarbrough, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence for his convictions for facilitation of aggravated assault and two counts of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was more severe than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in the sentencing guidelines. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating his original sentence. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerry Tallan
The appellant, Gerry Tallant, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on criminal responsibility, and that the State’s closing argument was improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Genaro Dorantes
The defendant, who was extradited from Mexico to face charges for aggravated child abuse |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Chuncy Lesolue Hollis
The defendant, Chuncy Lesolue Hollis, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a timely appeal to this court, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by issuing an expanded jury instruction on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that the defendant premeditated the killing, the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas Jordan v. State of Tennessee
A Blount County jury convicted the petitioner, Douglas Jordan, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the state suppressed evidence but that the evidence was not material to the defense. On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) the state withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the post-conviction court erred by applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard to the materiality prong of the Brady test; (3) the state’s suppression of evidence violated Article 1, sections 1 and 2, of the Tennessee Constitution; and (4) in the alternative, the petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the case. Following our thorough review, we conclude that the state failed to disclose evidence that was both favorable and material to the defense in violation of the petitioner’s right to due process. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lesa C. Williams, et al. v. Renard A. Hirsch, Sr.
This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client’s standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client’s complaint for lack of standing but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the client’s complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Blue Bell Creameries, LP v. Richard Roberts, Commissioner, Department of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Taxpayer is a Delaware limited partnership that produces, sells, and distributes ice cream in Tennessee and elsewhere. At issue in this appeal is the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s excise tax assessment on capital gains from a one-time stock transaction between Taxpayer and its holding company. Taxpayer sought a refund in chancery court, challenging the validity of the tax assessment on statutory and federal constitutional grounds. Both Taxpayer and the Department moved for summary judgment. The chancery court granted summary judgment to Taxpayer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Based on the uncontested facts in the record, we hold that Taxpayer’s capital gains were business earnings pursuant to the functional test provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-2004(1) (Supp. 2000) and therefore subject to the excise tax. Additionally, we hold that the tax assessment was constitutional pursuant to the unitary business principle. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter summary judgment for the Department. We remand to the trial court to determine the amount of excise tax related to Taxpayer’s capital gains. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Garrett
The defendant was indicted separately for two different criminal episodes, one involving an aggravated robbery and the other involving a homicide and an especially aggravated robbery. On the State’s motion but over the defendant’s objection, and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court consolidated the indictments for a single trial. The jury convicted the defendant of all offenses charged, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in consolidating the offenses. We hold that the trial court erred both as to methodology and as to result in consolidating the indictments. When a defendant objects to the State’s pretrial motion to consolidate offenses, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the motion under the severance provisions of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), not the provisions of Rule 8(b). We also hold that a prosecutor should refrain from seeking the consolidation of offenses over a defendant’s objection unless the prosecutor has a good faith basis for arguing that the requirements of Rule 14(b)(1) will be met. The trial court’s error in ordering consolidation requires that we reverse the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and remand for a new trial on that charge. The trial court’s error was harmless as to the defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and we affirm those convictions. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Milton Carver III
The defendant, Thomas Milton Carver, III, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury with a flight instruction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. Following review of the record, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |