Jimmy Gray v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur in the result, but I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the petitioner is presumed to have the same knowledge as his attorney regarding the photograph and the timing of its discovery. I do not believe that such a presumption applies to all facts that an attorney uncovers during representation. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Gray v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jimmy Gray, stands convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and is serving a sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On September 14, 2009, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner claims that (1) due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations; (2) he filed his petition within one year of discovering new evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record on appeal, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Orlando Knox v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Orlando Knox, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered best interest pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of burglary, a Class B felony; two counts of vandalism, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The agreement prescribed an eight-year sentence, which was to be suspended following service of six months. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the case and prepare for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tarrence Parham
The defendant, Tarrence Parham, stands convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the trial court's admission of his prior conviction of reckless homicide for impeachment purposes and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified to reflect that the defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault is merged into his conviction for attempted second degree murder. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David L. Baker
In April 2004, Appellant, David L. Baker, pled guilty in Jackson County to one count of aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant was ordered to serve four years on probation. Appellant's probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that appellant had violated Rules 1 and 4 of the probation order. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's probation based upon a violation of Rule 10 of the probation order. Appellant appealed to this Court arguing that his right to due process had been violated because he did not receive sufficient notice of the Rule 10 violation to support the revocation of his probation. We have reviewed the record on appeal and must agree with appellant. The trial court based the revocation upon a violation which was not alleged in the probation violation warrant and appellant had neither written nor actual notice of the allegation of this violation. Therefore, we reverse the revocation of appellant's probation and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Nelson McCoy
The defendant, David Nelson McCoy, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and received a negotiated sentence of ten years, as a Range I standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a sentence of continuous confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Edgar Leverette
The defendant, James Edgar Leverette, stands convicted of theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the value of the property was under $500. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Lee Arnold
The defendant, Jeffrey Lee Arnold, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, but reserved a certified question for appeal. The question presented is whether law enforcement officers who entered the defendant's house and discovered the marijuana forming the basis for the charge in this cause, had the right to enter under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the marijuana was lawfully seized from the defendant, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jennifer Leeann Nowlin
The defendant, Jennifer LeeAnn Nowlin, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II multiple offender to eight years for aggravated burglary concurrent with six years for the conspiracy charge, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Norman Eugene Banks
Defendant, Norman Eugene Banks, was indicted for initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, in count one of the indictment, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in count two. Following a bench trial, the trial court as trier of fact found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of attempt to initiate of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to eight years for his Class C felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on his assertion that the language in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the statutory presumption created in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 is unconstitutional; (3) the offense of attempt to initiate a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine is not a recognizable offense in Tennessee; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Robert Wilson
Appellant William Robert Wilson, was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI") after being observed driving erratically by a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office. The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted appellant for one count of DUI; one count of DUI, third offense; one count of driving on a revoked license; and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial and his waiver of proof regarding DUI, third offense, appellant was convicted of DUI and driving on a revoked license and entered a plea to DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months and 1 twenty-nine days for DUI, third offense and five months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with service of 130 days in confinement and the remainder in a community-based alternative program. Appellant appeals arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss his case because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop; (3) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for continuance; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on the State's duty to preserve evidence. We have reviewed the record on appeal and have found no basis for reversal. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Taj O'Chancey Young
As a result of a guilty plea, the Robertson County Circuit Court, sentenced Appellant, Taj O'Chancey Young, to an effective sentence of four years. The sentence was ordered to be served on community corrections. Appellant was placed under the supervision of a case officer on March 20, 2009. On June 29, 2009, the case officer filed a violation warrant. A second amended violation warrant was filed on August 28, 2009, asserting additional grounds. After a hearing on the warrants, the trial court revoked Appellant's community corrections sentence and ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant has appealed the revocation of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tennessee Protection Agency, Inc. vs Jordon D. Mathies
Party A obtained a default judgment in general sessions court against Party B. The general sessions court subsequently granted Party B's motion to set aside the default judgment. Party A appealed to circuit court. The circuit court reversed the general sessions court's decision to set aside the default judgment. Party B appeals to this court. We affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia M-M, Et Al.
Father of child appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to continue hearing to terminate his parental rights and subsequent termination of his rights on the grounds of abandonment and failure to establish/exercise paternity. Finding that the court erred not recessing the hearing to allow Father to be present at the termination hearing, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia M-M, Et Al. - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Father’s request for a continuance and proceeding with the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights. I reach my decision based on two factors: (1) the decision to grant a continuance or to proceed with the trial was within the discretion of the trial court, a decision that will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made; and (2) the fact that Father was arrested three weeks prior to trial and knew he would be unable to attend, yet he did not inform his attorney until the night before trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn Stanfield, et al. v. John Neblett, Jr., M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn Stanfield, et al. v. John Neblett, Jr., M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of David J.B. et al.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights with regard to a child, Nathan T., who came into protective custody of the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") on November 7, 2006. DCS initiated a proceeding to secure temporary custody of Nathan following receipt of a referral that he had been left by his mother, Megan T., ("Mother") with two elderly women in a house with no heat and where the women were using drugs; This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by initializing their last name. could not be found.2 By order entered January 24, 2007, Nathan was adjudicated dependent and neglected and custody awarded to DCS; he was subsequently placed in a foster home, where he has remained throughout these proceedings. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
James Q. Holder, et al vs. Westgate Resorts Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnersyip d/b/a Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort at Gatlinburg - Concurring
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Horner’s attempt to tell the jury what the “personal representatives of the International Code Council” told him is an effort to give the jury hearsay testimony. Finally, I agree that, assuming the trial court was incorrect in sustaining the plaintiff’s objection to the subject testimony, the error was nevertheless harmless. My departure from the majority opinion is with respect to the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred when it sustained the plaintiff’s objection. In my judgment, the proffered testimony was not only hearsay, it was hearsay that does not fit within any exception to the hearsay rule. I believe the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James Q. Holder, et al vs. Westgate Resorts Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnersyip d/b/a Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort at Gatlinburg
Plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from a fall on defendant's premises and brought this action for damages, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages against defendant. Defendant appealed, and asserted that the trial judge erred when he refused to allow defendant's expert to testify to his conversation with a third party. On appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the proffered testimony, but the error was harmless. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Cooper vs. Clinton Utilities Board
Plaintiff brought this action, charging defendant utility breached its contract with plaintiff to construct a line and deliver electricity to his property. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial judge held that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and defendant was not obligated to construct a line to deliver electricity to plaintiff's dwelling. On appeal, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Wester v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Adam Wester, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, for which he received life imprisonment. The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress the petitioner's written statements to law enforcement and in failing to challenge the State's expert regarding the cause of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Duane Michael Coleman v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Duane Michael Coleman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Grady Wayne Mealer v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Grady Wayne Mealer, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was denied the right to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Theresa W. Robinson
The defendant, Theresa W. Robinson, was indicted for soliciting unlawful compensation, misuse of official information, and official misconduct. She applied for pretrial diversion, and the district attorney general denied her request. After granting her petition for a writ of certiorari, the trial court ruled that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction because the State cannot appeal the trial court's decision to grant pretrial diversion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and we decline review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, the State's appeal is dismissed. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals |