Deana Elizabeth Church v. Thomas Neal Church
This appeal involves post-divorce modification of alimony. When the husband and wife were originally divorced, the husband was ordered to pay alimony in futuro. At the time of the divorce, the wife was undergoing treatment for a life-threatening illness. After the divorce, the wife’s treatment resulted in a dramatic improvement in her health. Meanwhile, the husband lost his job and ultimately found employment at a reduced level of compensation. Citing his decreased income and the wife’s improved circumstances, the husband sought modification or termination of his alimony obligation. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, but nevertheless denied the husband’s petition to modify. The husband appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Sepal Flogene Boren Emberton, Deceased
This is an appeal from the probate court’s award of $66,107.14 to Decedent’s Estate for the value of property Decedent’s husband did not return to the Estate following her death. The Administrators of the Estate appeal the court’s failure to award the Estate the value of certain jewelry the husband allegedly converted. The husband appeals the court’s valuation of the property he failed to return to the Estate. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
James William Taylor, A/K/A Lutfi Shafq Talal v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James William Taylor, also known as Lutfi Shafq Talal, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of felony murder, robbery, and second degree burglary. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of life, fifteen years, and fifteen years for the respective convictions. In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for nunc pro tunc to consolidate prior offenses. Because such an order is not subject to an appeal as of right under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the petitioner’s appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Shorty
The Defendant-Appellee, Melvin Shorty was convicted by a Shelby County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. Several months prior to trial the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment listing two of Shorty’s prior Tennessee felony convictions. The day before sentencing, the State amended their notice to seek enhanced punishment by adding two prior Wisconsin felony convictions. The trial court determined that the amended notice failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202, and sentenced Shorty as a Range I, standard offender to four years in a workhouse. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Shorty as a Range I, standard offender, rather than a Range II, multiple offender because the original notice was sufficient to alert Shorty that they intended to seek enhanced punishment, and that Shorty has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the amended notice. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Shermaine Lillard
Defendant, Phillip Shermaine Lillard, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in not charging the jury concerning his prior criminal convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court v. F. Chris Cawood
Disciplinary Counsel of the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against attorney F. Chris Cawood for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct. After Disciplinary Counsel’s presentation of evidence, the Hearing Panel dismissed the petition. The Board of Professional Responsibility appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the Hearing Panel’s dismissal. The Board appealed the decision of the chancery court to this Court. We hold that the Board of Professional Responsibility’s petition for certiorari failed to meet the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 and that the chancery court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Waylon Hanson
Defendant, William Waylon Hanson, was indicted for one count of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, Tenn. Code Ann. section 55-10-616. Defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge and was sentenced by agreement to serve two years to be suspended on probation after 90 days. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether Defendant could have been convicted of driving in violation of the Act more than three years after the order was entered declaring him to be an habitual offender. After reviewing the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Clilon Bates
A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, David Clilon Bates, of aggravated rape and assault, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Bell, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “motion” for post-conviction relief. The State has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record demonstrates that the “motion” was filed outside the statute of limitations applicable to petitions for post-conviction relief, we grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Ann Barnett v. Elite Sports Medicine, et al.
In this case, we are asked to decide whether an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which became effective July 1, 2009, and requires the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to file a certificate of good faith at the time of filing suit, was properly applied to an action initiated prior to the effective date of the amendment, voluntarily dismissed and refiled after the effective date. We also consider whether the requirement that the plaintiff file a certificate of good faith applies to an action for medical battery. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Sue Farley v. Ricky Farley
Wife filed a complaint for divorce. Husband did not file an answer. Wife sought and received a default judgment. Husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment based on excusable neglect as a result of depression. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Soles4Souls, Inc. v. Donelson Cedarstone Associates, LP et al.
In a landlord-tenant dispute, the tenant plaintiff claims that before the parties entered into a lease for commercial property, the landlord defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses that the plaintiff was expected to pay as part of its rent pursuant to the lease terms. The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its claims for fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We find that the defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses after entering into the initial lease with the plaintiff but before entering into an agreement for expansion space. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court on the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and violation of the TCPA and remand for determination of an appropriate remedy for damage the plaintiff suffered after agreeing to lease the expansion space. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Sutherland v. Cherry Lindamood et al.
An inmate filed suit, claiming that he was discriminated against in job assignments and that his First Amendment rights were violated in that he was retaliated against for making complaints. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Sabaski et al. v. Wilson County Board of Education et al.
Parents of disabled child sued county board of education and several employees for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent failure to train employees. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). We conclude that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to the plaintiffs’ state law claims. We further conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a valid claim for negligent failure to train because the IDEA provides the exclusive remedy for such claims, but their claims for assault and battery and false imprisonment are not precluded by the IDEA. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson - Order
The matter before this Court arises from a petition to relocate filed by Elizabeth Leanne Hudson (“Mother”) following her divorce from Larson Douglas Hudson (“Father”) and the appeal from the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008, granting the petition and awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. We granted Father permission to appeal and scheduled the appeal for argument. Mother requests that Father’s appeal be dismissed as moot. For the reasons stated below, we grant Mother’s request. In addition, we vacate the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Michael Sanford v. Waugh & Company, Inc. et al.
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether an individual creditor of an insolvent corporation may bring a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporate directors and officers. We hold that a creditor of an insolvent corporation may not bring a direct claim, only a derivative claim, against officers and directors for breach of the fiduciary duties they owe to the corporation. We adopt the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), observing that corporate creditors are adequately protected by existing law, and that recognizing a new direct cause of action is unnecessary and would impede corporate governance. We further hold that the trial court properly excluded evidence of conspiracy to interfere with contract and dismissed the claim for punitive damages. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Daniel Livingston v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Daniel Livingston, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of facilitation of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class D felony, in exchange for a six-year sentence, to be served as a Range I, standard offender at thirty percent. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to a sentence imposed following a parole violation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is illegal. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latisha Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Latisha Jones, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. She was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, both Class A felonies. She was sentenced to life for the murder conviction and to twenty-three years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences set to run consecutively. On appeal, she argues that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief by the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. David Mills, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Renea Smith
Appellant, Lisa Renea Smith, was engaged in a custody dispute over her daughter but allowed to visit her pursuant to a Knox County Juvenile Court order. After one such visit, she refused to return her child and instead took her to Atlanta. The juvenile court held a hearing and found Appellant in contempt for violating the visitation order. Appellant was later indicted in the instant case for violating the custodial interference statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-306. After an unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy protections, she pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor but preserved the double jeopardy issue for appeal. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Phelps
The defendant, a convicted violent sexual offender, was released on parole in 2006. He registered pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 20041 (“the Registration Act”), listing a primary address in Bedford County and a secondary address in Rutherford County. He was subsequently arrested in Lincoln County and charged with violating the Registration Act. Defendant tendered an “open” guilty plea but moved to withdraw his plea prior to being sentenced. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the defendant had “merely had a change of heart” and denied the motion. The trial court later sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision on his motion to withdraw plea and his sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply the correct analysis in determining whether the defendant had established a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea. We further hold that Defendant established sufficient grounds for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is granted, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Curtis Adkins
The Defendant, Jimmy Curtis Adkins, was found guilty by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a class D felony, and initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-433, -435 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ and fourteen years’ confinement, respectively, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the Defendant’s convictions in Georgia. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred during sentencing by considering prior convictions that were not proven by certified copies of the convictions and by considering enhancement factors that were not submitted to the jury. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Scott Reynolds
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Scott Reynolds, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excluded evidence from Karla Teutsch, whom he alleges was a legitimate suspect in this murder investigation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a statement by the victim as an excited utterance; (4) a question by a juror pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1 violated his right to an impartial jury and that such questioning is unconstitutional; (5) the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with a curative instruction about people crying in the courtroom during the trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeff Carter
The Defendant, Jeff Carter, was charged with one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years old, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(b). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the doctrine of election to offer proof of prior bad acts, after the State had provided a bill of particulars describing one particular incident and repeatedly said that it intended on electing that incident; (2) the trial court did not follow the procedures mandated in Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about prior bad acts that occurred outside the time frame of the indictment; (4) the evidence at trial was insufficient because there was no evidence offered to support the time frame stated in the indictment; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed three witnesses to testify that the Defendant had confessed to them, without finding whether the alleged confessions pertained to the charged crime or prior bad acts; and (6) the trial court’s failure to give a specific unanimity instruction was reversible error. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did commit reversible error when it allowed testimony of other bad acts and three irrelevant admissions of guilt that the Defendant allegedly made. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zula Gray v. Joe Bednarz, Jr.
Plaintiff appeals a jury’s determination that she was 60 percent at fault for the injuries she sustained. We find there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we affirm the judgment entered in accordance with the jury’s findings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |