State of Tennessee v. Karen Koons
The Defendant-Appellant, Karen Koons, was convicted by a Lawrence County jury of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. She received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days probation, following service of forty-five days in jail. On appeal, Koons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda M. Moran
Appellant Linda M. Moran pled guilty to a 207-count indictment after it was revealed that she had stolen approximately $73,000 from her employer over the course of nearly a decade. At sentencing, Appellant argued that she should be given some form of alternative sentencing. The trial court disagreed and imposed an effective sentence of nine years in custody. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Gann, Alias Rickey Lee Gann
The Defendant, Ricky Lee Gann, alias Rickey Lee Gann, pled guilty to seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, two counts of theft of property valued $500 or more, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft of property valued $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to an effective six-year term in the Tennessee Department of Correction, followed by twelve years of probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences and in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Harris v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the result reached in the majority opinion, given existing precedent. I write separately, though, to express my dissatisfaction with the result reached. I believe that once the habeas court concludes that a judgment is void, whether for an illegal conviction or |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Harris v. Jim Worthington, Warden
The Petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Dejuan Webster v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Joseph Dejuan Webster, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder. State v. Joseph Dejuan Webster, No. M2007-00050-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2229208, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 29, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). He received a life sentence for the conviction which was ordered to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. Id. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner filed an amended petition, and the post-conviction court held a hearing. After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Calvin Benn vs. Public Building Authority of Knox County, et al
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Stricklan
This appeal involves contested wills and a settlement agreement involving minors. After the death of Billy Joe Stricklan ("Decedent"), his daughter, Teresa Diane Stricklan Coleman ("Daughter"), filed two wills for Probate. Finding the first will valid would result in the entirety of Decedent's estate being awarded to Daughter, while finding the second will valid would result in the estate, minus $100 to Daughter, being divided among Decedent's greatgrandchildren. After the probate court certified the case to circuit court for a will contest, Daughter and the guardian ad litem for the great-grandchildren negotiated a settlement. These parties obtained the probate court's approval of the settlement over the objection of the proponent of second will, Decedent's brother, Reed Stricklan ("Brother"). The probate court also ordered a partial distribution of the cash assets now held in the estate to Daughter. Brother appeals. We vacate the settlement order. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
James Erwin vs. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America
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Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Robertson, a/k/a Jere Robertson vs. Clara Robertson Hodges, et ux., et al
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Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madison N.J.M.
This is a case involving the custody of a minor child, Madison N.J.M. ("the Child"). The Child lived with her mother, K.S. ("Mother"), until she was four. After 1 the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, she was placed in the temporary custody of her maternal grandmother, L.R. ("Grandmother"). Grandmother later sought permanent custody. A paternity suit was filed and it was ultimately determined that C.A.M. ("Father") is the Child's biological father. Soon after paternity was established, Father entered into a mediated agreement which provided that Grandmother would remain as the Child's primary caregiver with parenting time for Father. A final order adopting the terms of the mediated agreement was entered and Grandmother was granted custody of the Child. Father actively pursued a parental relationship and increased time with the Child; he later sought full custody. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court ordered a change of custody from Grandmother to Father based upon its finding of a material change in circumstances and its determination that custody with Father is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal de novo to the trial court, the judgment was affirmed. Grandmother appeals. We also affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Hall v. Am Comp Assurance Corporation
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Michael Hall (“Employee”) alleged that he sustained compensable injuries as a result of repetitive use of his hands and arms in the course of his employment as a butcher for Latham’s Meat Company (“Employer”). Employer denied that he had sustained a compensable injury. In the alternative, it alleged that Employee’s injuries had been caused by his part-time work for a second employer. The trial court found that Employee had sustained compensable injuries to his arms and that Employer was liable for workers’ compensation benefits arising from those injuries. It awarded 22.5% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to both arms. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that a compensable injury occurred and by finding that Employee sustained permanent disability as a result. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Lara L. Battleson vs. Dean L. Battleson
Approximately 29 months after the parties' divorce became final, Lara L. Battleson ("Wife") filed a motion in the trial court asking that Dean L. Battleson ("Husband") be held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. Wife served a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on Douglas R. Beier ("Counsel"), the attorney who had represented Husband in the divorce action. Counsel filed a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit stating that he no longer represented Husband and that his mail to Husband had been returned undeliverable. The trial court found that service on Counsel was sufficient. As a consequence of this ruling, the court denied Counsel's motion to dismiss; it also granted the motion for contempt. Husband appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment of contempt and remand for further proceedings. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tenithia Malena
The Defendant-Appellant, Tenithia Malena, was convicted by a Hardeman County Circuit Court jury of one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court approved the sentence recommendation by the State and sentenced Malena as a Range I, standard offender to three years of supervised probation for the burglary conviction. The court also ordered her to pay $20,000 in restitution by April 4, 2008 and ordered her to pay the restitution balance of $34,662.44 in monthly payments of $350.00 starting May 1, 2008. In addition, the trial court sentenced her, pursuant to the State's recommendation, as a Range I, standard offender to six years of supervised probation for the theft conviction, which was to be served consecutively to the burglary conviction, for an effective nine-year probationary sentence. In this appeal, Malena challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the admission of her financial records as evidence related to the theft charge, and (3) the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial on the ground that extraneous prejudicial information was considered by the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser vs Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
This appeal concerns post-divorce modification of alimony and child support. The parties had two children; during the marriage, the wife remained at home and cared for the parties' children. The husband was self-employed through his solely owned company. Ultimately, the parties divorced on stipulated grounds, and the husband was ordered to pay child support. The husband was awarded his business. The trial court awarded two commercial buildings to the wife and ordered the husband to pay the associated mortgage. The husband was ordered to pay alimony until the buildings were paid off, after which the wife's income was to be derived from the buildings. After the divorce, the income of the husband's company increased substantially and the husband refinanced the buildings. Two years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for modification of alimony and child support. After a trial, the trial court declined to increase the alimony. It granted an increase in the husband's child support obligation to the maximum under the guidelines, but declined to award more than the guideline amount. The trial court also declined to award the wife attorney fees. The wife now appeals. We find that the increase in the income of the husband's company was a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that the decision not to increase alimony was an abuse of discretion, and therefore modify the alimony award. We affirm the trial court's refusal to grant an upward deviation from the guideline amount of child support. We reverse the trial court's denial of the wife's request for attorney fees with respect to child support and alimony, but affirm the denial of attorney fees for the refinancing of the two buildings awarded to the wife. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Glen Cruzen vs Ayman Awad
This case arises out of the alleged breach of a contractual agreement entered by and between Appellant and Appellee for the repair and renovation of a commercial building. Appellant filed suit, asserting that Appellee had failed to fully compensate Appellant for his work on the building. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant was an unlicensed contractor under Tenn. Code Ann. _62-6-102, and that his recovery was, therefore, limited to actual documented expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. _62- 6-103(b). Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tyler M.
At an earlier time, i.e., November 1, 2004, the trial court, inter alia, ordered Pamela M. ("Mother") to pay Gregory L. E. ("Father"), the then-custodian of their child, Tyler M. ("the Child"), a child support arrearage of $7,920 (through October 31, 2004) and prospective monthly child support of $165 plus $35 to be applied on the arrearage. Over the years that followed, several petitions were filed, the disposition of which are not germane to the issues on this appeal. On November 23, 2005, Mother filed a petition for modification based upon the fact that the Child was then in her custody under an order of the trial court. The trial court entered an order on February 15, 2006, providing that "current support is terminated because [Mother] now has custody of the [C]hild." The record contains a number of subsequent pleadings and orders that also are not relevant to this appeal. Finally, on January 16, 2009, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking "to terminate all arrearage and liquidate arrearage to [F]ather." The trial court entered an order on July 17, 2009, determining that "the arrearage balance was proper based on the fact that child support cannot be modified retroactively." The court did reduce Mother's monthly arrearage payment from $50 to $35. Mother appeals and both sides raise issues. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC vs. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Kay and Kay Contracting, LLC ("Contractor") entered into a contract with the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") to build a bridge in Campbell County, Tennessee. Contractor subsequently entered into a subcontract with Whitley County Stone, LLC ("Subcontractor") to provide the excavation and grading work on the project. Subcontractor does not have a written contract with TDOT. Both Contractor and Subcontractor filed claims with the Claims Commission alleging they were owed money by TDOT. Subcontractor was dismissed as a party because it did not have a written contract with TDOT, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The Commissioner, however, determined that Contractor was allowed to prosecute Subcontractor's claim as a "pass-through" claim. The sole issue on this interlocutory appeal is whether Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) removes the State's sovereign immunity such that Contractor can assert a "pass-through" claim against TDOT on Subcontractor's behalf. We conclude that sovereign immunity from such a claim is not removed, and we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Howell, Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Jesse Franklin Browning, Jr. vs Claiborne and Hughes Health Center
This is a medical malpractice action. Appellant originally filed a claim in 2007 in the name of an estate. The original claim was subsequently non-suited. Less than one year later, the claim was then re-filed, also in the name of an estate. With permission of the court, the Appellant later amended the complaint to name the administrator of the estate as the plaintiff. However, upon the Appellee's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations as there were no allegations in the complaint which would invoke the savings statute; (2) the complaint failed to state with particularity the specific acts of negligence; and (3) that the Appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements for a medical malpractice action found in Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 29-26- 121. Finding that the trial court erred, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Joyce Bell et al. v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a The Regional Medical Center
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to an action for damages filed against a defendant that was not covered by the Act when the injuryproducing events occurred. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking the benefit of the claims and defenses available to government entities under the Act. The plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of legislation extending the coverage of the Act to the defendant on the ground that the legislation had been enacted after the plaintiffs had sustained their injuries. The trial court held that the Act applied to the defendant but granted the plaintiffs permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal after the Court of Appeals declined to consider the case. We have determined that applying the substantive amendment to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act enacted after the injury-producing events occurred to the plaintiffs' damage claims violates the prohibition against retrospective laws in Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralphelle James
The defendant, a Range I offender, was found guilty of public intoxication, theft of property over $1,000, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of thirty days for the misdemeanor and four years for the felony theft; because the six-year sentence for aggravated burglary is to be served consecutively, the effective sentence is ten years. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal to consider the propriety of instructions to the jury permitting inferences of both theft and burglary from the possession of recently stolen property. A second issue is whether the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of aggravated burglary for insufficient evidence. As his final issue, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to further examine a defense witness after jurors had submitted questions pursuant to rule. Because the instructions were proper, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on the burglary charge, and the procedure utilized for juror questions was compliant with the rule, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Charles Parsley vs. Elmer Price
Charles Parsley ("the plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, sued Elmer Price ("the defendant") in the General Sessions Court for Hawkins County. In attempting to allege his cause of action, the plaintiff employed a civil warrant form with the pre-printed designation, "Detainer Summons." The general sessions court transferred the case to the trial court. The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not a detainer action but rather a suit "in the nature of either quiet title or of ejectment." Following a bench trial on September 22, 2009, the court incorporated its written memorandum opinion into an order and granted "judgment in favor of the defendant." Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karen Marable
The Defendant-Appellant, Karen Marable, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Shelby County of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced as a standard offender to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marable claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in responding to a jury question; and (3) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Joseph Cordle
The defendant, Thomas Joseph Cordle, appeals from the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentences in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel C. Wicker, II, et al. vs. Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Revenue
Plaintiffs were assessed, and paid taxes under the Drug Tax, which was later declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sought refunds individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The trial court certified the class, and the Department filed this interlocutory appeal challenging certification. Because the Taxpayer Remedies Statute, which must be strictly construed as a derogation of sovereign immunity, does not contemplate the maintenance of a class action, we reverse the trial court's grant of class certification. |
Maury | Court of Appeals |