State of Tennessee v. Manuel Haynes
A jury convicted the defendant, Manuel Haynes, of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, twenty years for the first count consecutive to fifteen years for the second count. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors when sentencing the defendant on the first count; (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (4) the trial court erred by failing to re-read portions of the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on the intoxication of a juror. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patty Sue Lawrence
Appellant, Patty Sue Lawrence, was convicted of two counts of prostitution, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of submitting a false police report, a Class D felony. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of three years in custody. She appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce Huffines v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The Petitioner, Bruce Huffines, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for forgery, a Class E felony. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dr. William P. Harman vs. The University of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The plaintiff professor was a department head at the defendant university. As the department head, the plaintiff evaluated a subordinate professor. The dean of the university instructed the plaintiff to remove negative information from the evaluation; the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff was then removed from his position as department head. He continued at the university as a tenured professor. The plaintiff sued the university asserting a claim under the Public Protection Act, alleging that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities. The trial court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis, inter alia, that the plaintiff was neither terminated nor discharged. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the removal of the plaintiff from his position as department head, when he remained employed as a professor, is not a termination or discharge under the Public Protection Act. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julie Petty
The Dickson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Julie Petty, for one count of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. These charges came about as a result of Appellant's sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl who was a student at the school where Appellant was a substitute teacher and softball coach. Appellant entered an open plea to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years with one year to be served in confinement and the remaining three years to be served on probation. Appellant appeals from the trial court's imposition of this sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court should have imposed a three-year sentence with the entire sentence to be served on probation. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the trial court's judgment. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry McKay v. State of Tennessee
In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Larry McKay, and his co-defendant, Michael Sample, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that the prosecution violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee
In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Eugene Sample, and his co-defendant, Larry McKay, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay and Sample, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that: (1) the State violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him; (2) the State knowingly presented false testimony; and (3) his sentence of death violates Apprendi because the jury imposed the sentence based upon aggravating circumstances that were not contained in the indictment, presented to the grand jury, or proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernest Hurd
The Defendant, Ernest Hurd, appeals as of right from the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to set aside the judgment declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO). See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 55-10-601, et seq. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the default judgment declaring him to be a MVHO is void because it was not properly certified under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. Therefore, he argues that he cannot be convicted of violating the MVHO statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-10-616. Following our review, we hold that the default judgment met the requirements of Rule 58 and that, even if the judgment had not met these requirements, a delay of over sixteen years in challenging the judgment precludes any relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Israel Dean Bolinger
The appellant, Israel Dean Bolinger, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated robbery. He was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, failing to apply the physical facts rule, denying certain redactions in a statement, and in determining his sentence. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Memphis Area Teachers Credit Union v. David Jones
This appeal involves dismissal for failure to prosecute. After receiving an adverse judgment in general sessions court, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. At the circuit court hearing on his appeal, the defendant failed to appear because he mistakenly went to the wrong court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and remanded the case to general sessions for entry of a final judgment. The defendant now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Barry W. Ritchie v. State of Tennessee
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Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick Carey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Frederick Carey, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of the sale of cocaine, Class B felonies, two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of resisting official detention, a Class B misdemeanor. The petitioner agreed to a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each Class B felony, to be served concurrently, and to time served for the misdemeanor convictions. On appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel presented an unenforceable plea agreement upon which he relied in choosing to plead guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Wilson v. State of Tennessee
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Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter of The Conservatorship of Donald E. Todd vs. Tonya Todd Justice
This is a conservatorship case. Appellee filed a petition to appoint a conservator for her father, the Appellant herein. The trial court granted the petition, appointing co-conservators for Appellant, and charging fees and expenses to the Appellant's funds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 34-1-114. Appellant appeals. Finding that the record is incomplete and, as such, does not support, by clear and convincing evidence, a finding that Appellant was in need of the court's assistance, and that the trial court failed to properly follow the statutory mandates required for appointment of a conservator, we vacate and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Catherin Vaughn A/K/A Katherine Funk
On March 13, 2007, Appellant, Catherin Vaughn, pled guilty in Rutherford County Circuit Court to child abuse of a child under the age of six. The trial court ordered her to serve three years on probation. On December 18, 2008, Appellant made several threatening comments about a juvenile court judge in front of the worker who was teaching Appellant parenting skills and anger management. These threats were reported to the police. As a result, on January 1, 2009, Appellant was arrested for retaliation for past actions against a judge. A probation violation warrant was filed against Appellant. The trial court held a probation violation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated her probation. The trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve twenty-one days in incarceration and serve two more years on probation. Appellant appeals from the revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Webber v. State of Tennessee
In January 2007, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Timothy Webber, for one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the death of a homeless woman and the beating of a man. On October 22, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years to be served at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not explain to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a "knowing killing." In addition, Petitioner alleged that because he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues. In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that trial counsel and the trial court explained to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a knowing killing and that Petitioner understood that fact. Therefore, he was not afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela C. Bess v. Properties, L.P., et al.
Car A was traveling north on a two-lane highway. Car B, a city police vehicle with its lights and siren on, was also traveling north on the same highway to answer a call. Car A could not pull off the road to the right to yield to Car B and instead turned left as Car B was passing. A collision ensued in which the driver of Car A suffered serious injuries. The driver of Car A sued the city. The trial court found the city 75% liable for the accident. The city appealed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding the driver of Car A more than 50% responsible for the accident. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Gerald Riley, and wife, Tanya Riley, Individually and as next of kin for Hunter Riley v. James Orr
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Demario Tabb v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demario Tabb, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective life sentence without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that counsel was ineffective by failing to remain with the petitioner after a failed proffer session to ensure that he was escorted back to his cell in light of the fact that the petitioner gave an incriminating statement to police after counsel left. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Robert Lindsley vs. Lisa Whitman Lindsley
The plaintiff had filed suit for divorce against defendant and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had a prior marriage and theirs was a bigamous relationship. The Trial Judge held that defendant had a prior marriage and voided the parties' marriage ab initio and dismissed the action. Plaintiff has appealed. We hold that under Texas law where they married, and California law where they resided prior to coming to Tennessee, they could, under the statute, enter into a common-law marriage after the spouse was divorced in the prior marriage. The disputed issue of fact in the summary judgment is whether the parties entered into a common-law marriage after the plaintiff's prior marriage ended. We remand for a determination of this factual issue. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Lopez
The defendant, Daniel Lopez, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies. He was sentenced to life for each murder conviction and to twenty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in: denying his request to give a jury instruction for accomplice testimony; sustaining the State's objection to testimony of a co-defendant; granting the State's motion to have an anonymous jury; denying his motion for a mistrial; and instructing the jury to disregard a question from defense counsel during cross-examination. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James David Allen, III
The Defendant, James David Allen, III, pled guilty to vandalism, a Class E felony, and received a sentence of two years of probation under the judicial diversion program. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). Following the filing of a violation of probation warrant and an amended violation of probation warrant, the Defendant was sentenced to serve seven consecutive weekends in the Blount County Jail. Following the service of the seven weekends in jail, the Defendant was directed to return to supervised probation for the balance of his sentence. On April 7, 2009, a second violation of probation warrant was filed. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's sentence of probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of the two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin McDougle
The defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of twelve years for the robbery and six years for each assault, resulting in an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the imposition of consecutive sentences, specifically contending that the court erred in relying upon his juvenile record to establish that he was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda Pinkins
The defendant, Linda Pinkins, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class C felony, on July 22, 2009. The trial court sentenced her to three years in the workhouse and ordered that she serve six months in confinement and five years on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and by sentencing her to a term of confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Newt Carter
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty years at 100% for aggravated rape consecutive to five years at 30% for aggravated burglary, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant by misapplying enhancement factors and ordering the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |