Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Norman Eugene Banks
Defendant, Norman Eugene Banks, was indicted for initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, in count one of the indictment, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in count two. Following a bench trial, the trial court as trier of fact found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of attempt to initiate of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to eight years for his Class C felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on his assertion that the language in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the statutory presumption created in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 is unconstitutional; (3) the offense of attempt to initiate a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine is not a recognizable offense in Tennessee; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Taj O'Chancey Young
As a result of a guilty plea, the Robertson County Circuit Court, sentenced Appellant, Taj O'Chancey Young, to an effective sentence of four years. The sentence was ordered to be served on community corrections. Appellant was placed under the supervision of a case officer on March 20, 2009. On June 29, 2009, the case officer filed a violation warrant. A second amended violation warrant was filed on August 28, 2009, asserting additional grounds. After a hearing on the warrants, the trial court revoked Appellant's community corrections sentence and ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant has appealed the revocation of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Robert Wilson
Appellant William Robert Wilson, was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI") after being observed driving erratically by a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office. The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted appellant for one count of DUI; one count of DUI, third offense; one count of driving on a revoked license; and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial and his waiver of proof regarding DUI, third offense, appellant was convicted of DUI and driving on a revoked license and entered a plea to DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months and 1 twenty-nine days for DUI, third offense and five months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with service of 130 days in confinement and the remainder in a community-based alternative program. Appellant appeals arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss his case because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop; (3) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for continuance; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on the State's duty to preserve evidence. We have reviewed the record on appeal and have found no basis for reversal. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Transport Services, LLC. v. Donald Allen
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged a compensable injury to his right shoulder and a compensable mental injury. His employer denied that the alleged mental injury was compensable. The trial court found both injuries to be compensable and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits for the mental injury and by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The employee contends that the trial court erred by accepting the impairment rating of the Medical Impairment Rating Registry physician and in the trial court’s application of the concurrent injury rule. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a compensable mental injury and modify the judgment accordingly. |
Hawkins | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Barbara Ann Wyatt vs. Delmer Colemen Wyatt
In this divorce case, the trial court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and, pursuant to their agreement, divided the bulk of their property. The parties litigated the issue of how the proceeds from the sale of a piece of improved real estate should be distributed. Following a hearing, at which each of the parties testified, the court awarded Delmer Coleman Wyatt ("Husband") $6,500, the stipulated pre-marital value of the unimproved lot, based upon Husband's ownership of the lot before the parties' marriage. It then divided the remaining net proceeds from the sale of the improved property, i.e., $111,376.37, equally between Husband and his wife, Barbara Ann Wyatt ("Wife"). Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia M-M, Et Al.
Father of child appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to continue hearing to terminate his parental rights and subsequent termination of his rights on the grounds of abandonment and failure to establish/exercise paternity. Finding that the court erred not recessing the hearing to allow Father to be present at the termination hearing, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia M-M, Et Al. - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Father’s request for a continuance and proceeding with the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights. I reach my decision based on two factors: (1) the decision to grant a continuance or to proceed with the trial was within the discretion of the trial court, a decision that will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made; and (2) the fact that Father was arrested three weeks prior to trial and knew he would be unable to attend, yet he did not inform his attorney until the night before trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn Stanfield, et al. v. John Neblett, Jr., M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn Stanfield, et al. v. John Neblett, Jr., M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Cooper vs. Clinton Utilities Board
Plaintiff brought this action, charging defendant utility breached its contract with plaintiff to construct a line and deliver electricity to his property. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial judge held that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and defendant was not obligated to construct a line to deliver electricity to plaintiff's dwelling. On appeal, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Protection Agency, Inc. vs Jordon D. Mathies
Party A obtained a default judgment in general sessions court against Party B. The general sessions court subsequently granted Party B's motion to set aside the default judgment. Party A appealed to circuit court. The circuit court reversed the general sessions court's decision to set aside the default judgment. Party B appeals to this court. We affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Q. Holder, et al vs. Westgate Resorts Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnersyip d/b/a Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort at Gatlinburg - Concurring
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Horner’s attempt to tell the jury what the “personal representatives of the International Code Council” told him is an effort to give the jury hearsay testimony. Finally, I agree that, assuming the trial court was incorrect in sustaining the plaintiff’s objection to the subject testimony, the error was nevertheless harmless. My departure from the majority opinion is with respect to the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred when it sustained the plaintiff’s objection. In my judgment, the proffered testimony was not only hearsay, it was hearsay that does not fit within any exception to the hearsay rule. I believe the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James Q. Holder, et al vs. Westgate Resorts Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnersyip d/b/a Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort at Gatlinburg
Plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from a fall on defendant's premises and brought this action for damages, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages against defendant. Defendant appealed, and asserted that the trial judge erred when he refused to allow defendant's expert to testify to his conversation with a third party. On appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the proffered testimony, but the error was harmless. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Wester v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Adam Wester, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, for which he received life imprisonment. The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress the petitioner's written statements to law enforcement and in failing to challenge the State's expert regarding the cause of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Grady Wayne Mealer v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Grady Wayne Mealer, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was denied the right to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Duane Michael Coleman v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Duane Michael Coleman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Wallace Dinwiddie, Jr.
A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Paul Wallace Dinwiddie, Jr., of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and by allowing a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert witness. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. Upon our review, we find no error in the convictions; however, we remand to the trial court to merge the two aggravated sexual battery jury verdicts into one conviction judgment and the two aggravated rape jury verdicts into one conviction judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sedric Lamont Holt
A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Sedric Holt, for nine counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to five counts of robbery, all Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to five years each in counts two, three, seven, and eight, and four years in count four. Counts two and three were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to count four. Counts seven and eight were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to counts two, three, and four for an effective fourteen year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and that he should have been granted an alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Theresa W. Robinson
The defendant, Theresa W. Robinson, was indicted for soliciting unlawful compensation, misuse of official information, and official misconduct. She applied for pretrial diversion, and the district attorney general denied her request. After granting her petition for a writ of certiorari, the trial court ruled that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction because the State cannot appeal the trial court's decision to grant pretrial diversion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and we decline review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, the State's appeal is dismissed. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cecil Hughes, Jr.
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Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Thomas Hepburn
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, a Class D felony, three counts of attempted burglary, a Class E felony, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, six counts of vandalism, a Class E felony, two counts of vandalism, a Class D felony, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of theft, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft, a Class D felony, in case nos. 02-0844, 02-0875, 02-0876, 02-0888, and 02-0291. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to ten years for each Class D felony conviction, five years for each Class E felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court imposed a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of one hundred years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of David J.B. et al.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights with regard to a child, Nathan T., who came into protective custody of the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") on November 7, 2006. DCS initiated a proceeding to secure temporary custody of Nathan following receipt of a referral that he had been left by his mother, Megan T., ("Mother") with two elderly women in a house with no heat and where the women were using drugs; This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by initializing their last name. could not be found.2 By order entered January 24, 2007, Nathan was adjudicated dependent and neglected and custody awarded to DCS; he was subsequently placed in a foster home, where he has remained throughout these proceedings. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Johnson
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Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Floyd Rodriquez Johnson
In three separate cases, the Defendant, Floyd Rodriquez Johnson, pled guilty to two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and one count of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The defendant agreed to allow the trial court to sentence him and agreed he was a Range II offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Hunt-Guy, A/K/A Courtney Hunt
The Defendant, Courtney Hunt-Guy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and evading arrest and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to an effective term of three years, six months in the county workhouse. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by not applying the mental health mitigating factor to his felony theft conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |