Edd Stepp v. State of Tennessee
E2008-01642-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The Petitioner, Edd Stepp, pled guilty to nine counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a violent offender to twelve years for each count, with four of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-eight years. On appeal, this court modified his sentences to eight years for each count, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which, following an evidentiary hearing, was dismissed by the post-conviction court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the guilty pleas of the Petitioner were knowing and voluntary and in dismissing the petition. Following our review, we agree, reverse the order of the post-conviction court, and remand for the granting of post-conviction relief.

Cocke Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Annette Hamby aka Annette Tran-McNabb
E2008-02030-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The Defendant, Annette Hamby, appeals as of right from her Bradley County jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. She contends that the evidence, which included proof of her intoxication, was insufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that she premeditated the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

Bradley Court of Criminal Appeals

Michael Joseph Grant v. State of Tennessee
E2008-02161-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The Petitioner, Michael Joseph Grant, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated burglary and theft convictions for which he received an effective four-year suspended sentence and from the revocation of his probation. He entered pleas of guilty to aggravated burglary and theft and was sentenced to four years, which was suspended. His petition for post-conviction relief asserted that his pleas of guilty were involuntary and unknowing, that his confession was coerced, that the State failed to provide immunity to him, that law enforcement personnel conspired to violate his right to due process, and that the trial court erred  n revoking his probation. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner filed an untimely appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends, and the State agrees, that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing. Following our review, we agree and remand for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

Bradley Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Martino Kelley
W2008-01851-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

The defendant, Martino Kelley, was convicted of the first degree (premeditated) murder of his wife and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the State’s attorney committed reversible error in referencing the jury’s responsibility to the community; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to continue the trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Philander Butler v. State of Tennessee
W2009-00451-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Lammey

The petitioner, Philander Butler, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Genaro Edgar Espinosa Dorantes - Concurring and Dissenting
M2007-01918-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

I concur with most of the decisions and reasoning in the majority opinion, including the reversal of the aggravated child abuse conviction for insufficient evidence. I respectfully dissent, however, from the opinion’s affirming the felony murder conviction. I would reverse and vacate the felony murder conviction, as well.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Genaro Edgar Espinosa Dorantes
M2007-01918-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

Defendant-Appellant, Genaro Edgar Espinosa Dorantes (“Dorantes”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse by infliction of injury. For the felony murder conviction, Dorantes received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court later sentenced him as Range I, standard offender to a consecutive term of twenty-two years’ incarceration for the aggravated child abuse conviction. Dorantes argues: (1) the record is insufficient to support both his conviction for first degree felony murder based on aggravated child abuse and his conviction for aggravated child abuse; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim’s body; (3) the trial court erred when it refused to provide a special jury instruction that ensured that the verdicts were based on acts of abuse rather than a continuing course of neglect; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to require the State to make an election of offenses; and (5) his sentence of twenty-two years for the aggravated child abuse conviction was excessive. After a careful review of the record and the issues presented, we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated child abuse conviction; therefore, we reverse and vacate the conviction for the aggravated child abuse and modify Dorantes’ sentence to life imprisonment. The judgment of the trial court for the felony murder conviction is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Estate of Mary E. Dillard, Deceased v. Tennessee Bureau of Tenncare
M2008-01002-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jim T. Hamilton

Bureau of TennCare filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1-301 seeking the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased TennCare recipient in order to recover the amount of medical assistance and services provided decedent. Trial court declined to appoint an administrator, finding that the statute of limitations at Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310(b) barred the claim of TennCare. We reverse the trial court decision in light of In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner and remand the case for further proceedings.

Lawrence Court of Appeals

State of Tennesse v. Sonny Dean Farrow
E2008-00961-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

The Defendant, Sonny Dean Farrow, pled guilty in the Jefferson County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary and theft, receiving a sentence of six years on supervised probation. Following the filing of several probation violation warrants and finding that the Defendant violated the terms of his probationary sentence, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jefferson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Merl Wayne Medley
W2008-00831-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

 

In Cause C07-176, the Defendant-Appellant, Merl Wayne Medley, was convicted by an Obion County jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. In the same cause, Medley was also found guilty through a bench trial of one count of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony, and one count of violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. In Cause C07-177, Medley was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor. In Cause CC-07-CR-233, Medley was convicted by a jury of one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. In Cause C07-176, one of the convictions for attempted first degree murder and both of the convictions for aggravated assault were merged into the remaining conviction for attempted first degree murder, for which Medley received a twenty-five-year sentence at 30%. He also received a sentence of two years at 30% for the retaliation for past action conviction and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the violation of an order of protection conviction, which were to be served concurrently with the attempted first degree murder conviction. In Cause C07-177, the assault conviction was merged into the aggravated assault conviction, for which Medley received a six-year sentence at 30%. In Cause CC-07-CR-233, Medley received a twelve-year sentence at 30% for the solicitation to commit first degree murder conviction. The trial court ordered that the twenty-five-year sentence for the attempted first degree murder conviction, the twelve-year sentence for the solicitation to commit first degree murder conviction, and the six-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction be served consecutively for an effective sentence of forty-three years. In this appeal, Medley challenges the trial court’s (1) refusal to suppress his statement, (2) joinder of the offense of solicitation to commit first degree murder to the offenses of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault; and (3) imposition of consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Obion Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Cedric Johnson - Dissenting
W2008-01593-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Cedric Johnson
W2008-01593-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

 

The State appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of an aggravated robbery indictment against the Defendant, Cedric Johnson. The dismissal was pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring mandatory joinder. Upon our review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby

K.A.G. v. B.L.I.
M2008-02484-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen S. Bowden

This appeal stems from a paternity action in which K.A.G (“Mother”) filed a petition against B.L.I. (“Father”) seeking legitimation of Z.R.G. (“the Child”), her then 14-year-old son, and an award of child support. The parties stipulated that Father was the biological father of the Child based on the results of DNA testing. An agreed order was entered setting Father’s current child support obligation under the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). Following a hearing on the remaining issues, Father was ordered to pay child support retroactive to the filing of the petition plus 36 months. Father was also ordered to pay a portion of the Child’s orthodontic and dental expenses. Mother appeals, contending that the trial court erred in declining to award her child support back to the date of the child’s birth. We conclude that the court abused its discretion in deviating from the presumption that child support should be awarded retroactively to the date of the child’s birth. We vacate that portion of the trial court’s judgment pertaining to retroactive child support and remand for a hearing at which the trial court will calculate, in a manner consistent with the Guidelines, the child support due Mother from the date of the Child’s birth to the date of filing of the petition.

Marshall Court of Appeals

Jeremy Hardison v. State of Tennessee
M2009-00938-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

 

Petitioner Jeremy Hardison filed, by and through counsel, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, attacking his conviction in Knox County Criminal Court for possession with intent to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine in a school zone. Upon motion of the Respondent, the Circuit Court of Wayne County summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner has appealed, and following the filing of Petitioner’s brief, the state filed a motion for this Court to affirm by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. Finding merit in the motion, we affirm.

Wayne Court of Criminal Appeals

In the Matter of: B.A.C. (d/o/b 6/16/07), A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
W2009-00910-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Christy R. Little

This appeal arises out of a termination of parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Rebecca Cornelius (“Mother”) on April 7, 2009, after finding grounds of severe child abuse and persistence of conditions.1 We affirm.

Madison Court of Appeals

Elizabeth Burks v. The Kroger Company
M2008-02664-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

This is a negligence action resulting from a slip and fall by a customer at a Kroger grocery store. The plaintiff slipped on a pool of water created by one of several leaks in the roof of the grocery store. The plaintiff filed suit against three defendants, The Kroger Company, Roof Management, Inc., a roofing consultant responsible for facilitating necessary repairs to the roof of the grocery store, and Village Roofing Company, Inc., the roofing contractor which made repairs to the roof when called upon to do so. Village Roofing and Roof Management each filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Village Roofing and Roof Management finding they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff and if they did owe a duty that their acts and omissions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. We have determined there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a determination of whether Village Roofing or Roof Management owed a duty of care to the plaintiff or whether their actions were or were not the legal cause of Ms. Burks’ injuries. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Village Roofing and Roof Management and remand for further proceedings.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Shelby County, Tennesse v. James M. Crews, Jr., et al
W2008-01368-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

This is a condemnation case. The appellee county for many years had possession of a small strip of land owned by the appellant family. The county filed a petition for condemnation of the strip of land. A consent order was entered granting the county ownership and possession of the subject parcel, and a hearing was scheduled to determine the amount of compensation due. A week before the hearing, the county gave notice of voluntary dismissal. The family objected to voluntary dismissal, citing Anderson v. Smith, 521 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court permitted the county to voluntarily dismiss its petition. The family appeals. We reverse, finding that voluntary dismissal is precluded where the trial court grants the condemnor right of possession and only the issue of compensation is left to be resolved.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Patricia Anne Gho Massey v. Gregory Joel Casals
W2008-01807-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge William A. Peeler

This is a child support case. The mother filed a petition to increase the father’s child support obligation, alleging that he had misrepresented his gross income. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court judge entered an order finding that the father’s testimony was not credible and that he earned significantly more income than he previously represented. The order increased the father’s monthly child support obligation, retroactive to the date of the filing of the mother’s petition. It also required the father to pay for the child’s private school tuition, and awarded the mother her attorney’s fees. The father appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in not using evidence such as his tax returns to determine his income, in not finding the mother voluntarily underemployed because she worked part-time, and in requiring him to pay private school tuition. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Sherman Clark v. State of Tennessee
W2008-02557-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

 

The Petitioner, Sherman Clark, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Randy White
W2009-00596-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

 

The pro se defendant, Randy White, appeals the trial court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

In re S.J.M.
M2009-01080-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

Father in Nebraska allowed his child’s caregiver to take the child to Tennessee. A strange series of events led to DCS’s being given custody of the child by the Dickson County Juvenile Court and the placement of the child in a foster home. Meanwhile, Father ran afoul of the law (again) and became an involuntary guest of the federal penal system under a fifteen-year sentence. The foster parents petitioned for termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment and sought adoption of the child. Father’s mother intervened. Mother did not defend and her rights were terminated. Father defended. The trial court found Father had not abandoned the child, but that the parties had tried by consent the issue of Father’s being sentenced to prison for a term of ten years or more when the child is younger than eight years of age, circumstances which present a ground for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant t Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). The trial court then granted the adoption. Father filed a motion to alter or amend, presenting to the trial court a document showing that Father’s sentence had been reduced to seven and one-half years. The motion was denied. Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the issue was tried by consent of the parties. Our decision necessitates that the adoption order be vacated and the child be returned to the legal custody of DCS.

Dickson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. George R. Arnold
M2008-01984-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert G. Crigler

The appellant, George R. Arnold, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to one count of attempting to obtain a controlled substance by forgery, and he received a sentence of three years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Marshall Court of Criminal Appeals

Thomas Frazier, et al v. Walter Jerry Mitchell, et al
M2009-00010-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew, III

One of many heirs to certain property in Rutherford County opposed the partition by sale of the property. The property was sold and the proceeds distributed. The heir appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we affirm the trial court.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Sandra Peterson v. Robert L. Peterson
M2008-00631-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kriby
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

This is a post-divorce petition for contempt. In the divorce decree, the mother was designated the primary residential parent of the three children; the father had standard alternate parenting time and was ordered to pay child support. After the divorce decree was entered, however, the parties and the children continued to cohabit for about five years. During this period of cohabitation, the father did not pay the mother the court-ordered child support, but instead provided necessities for the family. When the father moved out of the home, he began to pay some child support but did not pay the full amount due under the divorce decree...

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Bertha Mai Claiborne v. Abc Group Fuel Systems, Inc.
M2008-02292-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee alleged that she injured her back and neck as a result of an accident at work. Her authorized treating physician released her with no impairment. Employee’s examining physician assigned 10% impairment. The parties invoked the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process. The MIR physician assigned to Employee found 0% impairment. The trial court awarded benefits based upon the rating of Employee’s physician. The trial court did not explain how the opinion of Employee’s physician rebutted the MIR physician’s opinion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not accepting the impairment as determined by the MIR doctor. The judgment for permanent partial disability benefits is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings.

Sumner Workers Compensation Panel