Judy Minutella v. Ford Motor Credit Company
M2008-01920-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: E. Riley Anderson, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought post-judgment medical care for a knee injury after the trial court approved a settlement agreement wherein Employer agreed that it would be responsible for medical expenses related to the injury. Employer declined to authorize the original treating physician to provide additional care and instead offered Employee a choice from a panel of three physicians. The first physician Employee chose declined her as a patient. The second physician she chose opined that her need for treatment was unrelated to her work injury and did not treat her. Employee then sought and received further treatment from her original treating physician. At the same time, Employee petitioned the trial court for an order authorizing Employee's original physician to act as her treating physician, requesting that Employer be held in contempt for failing to comply with the order of settlement, and requiring that Employer pay for all of Employee's past and future medical treatment for her injury, along with all attorney fees and costs. The trial court ordered that Employer pay only a portion of Employee's attorney fees, denied Employee's request that Employer be held in contempt, and otherwise granted Employee's petition in full. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the award of attorney fees and remand for further proceedings in that regard but otherwise affirm the judgment in full. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (28) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded E. RILEY ANDERSON, SP. J., in which SHARON G. LEE, J., and ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR. J., joined. Colin M. McCaffrey, Nashville, Tennessee for the appellant, Ford Motor Credit Company. Robert P. Gritton, Murfreesboro, Tennessee for the appellee, Judy Minutella. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 19, 25, Judy Minutella ("Employee") fell in the parking lot of her employer Ford Motor Credit ("Employer") and injured her right knee. Employer offered her a panel of three physicians for treatment, but she declined medical treatment at that time and, therefore, did not select a physician from the panel. However, the injury apparently worsened, and Employee sought medical treatment from Dr. Roderick Vaughan, who was not on the Employer's panel. On February 23, 26, Dr. Vaughan, an orthopedic surgeon, performed anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction, partial medial and lateral meniscectomies and a chondroplasty on Employee's right knee. Dr. Vaughan's medical records indicate that he administered a steroid injection to Employee's right knee on June 19, 26, and Visco supplement injections on July 24, 26; July 31, 26; and August 11, 26. He informed Employee that this injection series could be repeated at six month intervals, and additional surgery was discussed as a "last resort." In November of 26, while under the care of Dr. Vaughan, Employee pursued a workers' compensation claim with respect to her fall and resulting injuries. The parties eventually settled this claim, as approved by order entered August 2, 27, the pertinent language of which provides as follows: The Defendant employer and the Defendant insurer have agreed to pay any authorized, reasonable and necessary future medical expenses incurred by the employee caused by this injury in accord with the Workers' Compensation Law of the State of Tennessee for a period of life, pursuant to statute, from the date of this settlement, provided that the employer and/or insurer has granted permission for future medical treatment prior to said treatment being rendered, but they will not be liable for any unauthorized, unreasonable or unnecessary past, present, or future medical expenses caused by this injury. The settlement agreement does not specify an authorized treating physician. After the settlement was approved, Employee began experiencing additional problems with her right knee. On September 4, 27, Employee wrote Employer a letter advising that Dr. Vaughan had been administering injections to her right knee "to postpone inevitable knee replacement surgery" and requesting that Employer approve Employee's return to Dr. Vaughan for "another round of injections." Employer refused to authorize Dr. Vaughan as Employee's treating physician and instead, presented Employee with the option of selecting her treating physician from a panel of physicians, consisting of Dr. James Renfro, Dr. Michael LaDouceur, and Drs. David Moore and Burton Elrod, who practice medicine in the same office. When Employee selected Drs. Moore and Elrod, Dr. Elrod declined to accept her as a patient and Employer instructed Employee to select one of the two remaining physicians on the panel. On November 28, 27, Employee selected Dr. James Renfro from the proffered list, and 2 ****** Document Outline ****** * Page_1 * Page_2 * Page_3 * Page_4 * Page_5 * Page_6 * Page_7 * Page_8 * Page_9

Theresa Hayes v. The City of Lexington, Tennessee
W2008-02431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Butler

The defendant-city required applicants for its vacant firefighter position to complete a physical agility exam as part of its hiring process. The plaintiff, a female, applied for the position but was eliminated from consideration based upon her performance on the physical agility exam. She sued the city under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, claiming that the physical agility exam had a disparate impact on females. Following a one-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the city and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Ellis Stapleton
E2008-01776-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

The Defendant, Richard Ellis Stapleton, was convicted on his guilty pleas of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; and two counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I, twelve-year sentences to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences. We modify the sentences for attempted especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated burglary to eleven years each and modify the sentences for facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping to nine years each.

State of Tennessee v. Tarik Robertson
W2008-01592-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Lammey, Jr.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tarik Robertson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of observation without consent, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the maximum sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with four months to be served in a county workhouse. On appeal, he claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court did not properly exercise its role as the thirteenth juror; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing both the length and manner of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Raymond Bailey v. State of Tennessee
W2008-01657-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

The Petitioner, Raymond Bailey, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and carjacking, a Class B felony. For the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, he received a sentence of twenty-eight years at one hundred percent. For the carjacking conviction, he received a sentence of twelve years at thirty-five percent. These two sentences were to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of forty years in confinement. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel failed to challenge his dual convictions as violating due process under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) and State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); and (2) trial counsel failed to investigate and call William Isom to testify at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Lionel E. Sherron
W2008-02666-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

A jury convicted the defendant, Lionel E. Sherron, of attempted voluntary manslaughter,  reckless aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment by use of a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective nine-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find him guilty. After review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. G. Mike Holden
W2009-00456-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The defendant, G. Mike Holden, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of sale of beer to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be suspended following service of one hundred twenty days in the county jail. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. However, the defendant has failed to include in the appellate record a transcript of the evidence from his trial. The defendant has submitted a statement of the evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c)-(d). However, it was not timely filed pursuant to the rules. Because the issue submitted is not meritorious as a matter of law, we conclude that it is not in the interest of justice to waive the timeliness requirement. As such, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Delawrence Williams
W2009-00748-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The defendant, Delawrence Williams, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver or sell, a Class B felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to fourteen years for the drug possession offense and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault offense, with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and concurrently to his sentence in a federal case but consecutively to his sentence in another Dyer County case. The sole issue the defendant raises in this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Loroy Salter
W2009-00981-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Lee Moore, Jr.

The defendant, Loroy Salter, was found to be in violation of his probationary sentence in the Dyersburg City Court and was sentenced to twenty days in jail and ninety days of community service. The defendant subsequently appealed the decision to the Dyer County Circuit Court, which affirmed the violation and the resulting sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering revocation, based upon the defendant’s failure to pay costs and fines, without conducting a hearing on his ability to pay. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Adoption of C.A.M. (d/o/b 11/30/96), James Keith Jones and Cari Lecklitner Jones v. Michael Dale Moore
W2008-02003-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Michael Maloan

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. When the mother and father divorced, the mother was designated as the child’s primary residential parent. In light of the mother’s allegations that he had threatened her, the father was granted only supervised visitation. After the divorce, the father lived in Texas and visited the child in Tennessee. Several years later, the father remarried and was awarded unsupervised visitation with the child. Soon thereafter, the child went to Texas for a visit with the father and his new wife. During this visit, the father and his new wife had a domestic dispute in which the father locked her and the child out of their house. After this incident, the mother refused to allow the child to visit with the father. The father was then charged with assaulting his new wife and was given probation on this charge. Soon after that, the father violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. At the time he was sentenced, the child was seven years old. Several years later, the mother remarried. The mother and her new husband then filed this petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and to allow the mother’s new husband to adopt the child. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights, finding grounds for termination and finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father now appeals, challenging only the trial court’s determination regarding the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Joey Conner v. Carmen Conner
W2008-02254-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge George R. Ellis

After Mother and Father divorced, a parenting plan was entered designating Father as the primary custodian of the parties’ minor child. Mother filed a petition to modify, alleging several grounds, including excessive corporal punishment. The trial court initially found no material change in circumstances, but named Mother primary custodian, based on the minor child’s preference. Father appealed, and this Court remanded, finding that the court’s ruling was premature. On remand, the trial court, again, awarded custody to Mother, finding the following material changes in circumstance: 1) Mother’s remarriage and having had two other children; 2) Mother’s completion of her undergraduate degree, her work towards a Master’s degree, and having a stable job; 3) Mother’s having left the national guard; and 4) the minor child’s preference to live with Mother. We affirm the trial court’s modification of custody.

Iris Teresa Bowling Chambers v. Faye Bowling Devore
W2008-02548-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge William C. Cole

This case involves the interpretation of the term “bodily heirs.” Testator’s will, probated in 1942, left certain lands to his daughter for her life, and then to her “bodily heirs.” The life tenant’s granddaughter concedes that she is not entitled to take through her deceased father, as his interest lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant. However, she contends that she is entitled to take directly as a “bodily heir” of the life tenant. We agree that if granddaughter is her father’s issue, and her father is the life tenant’s issue, she is a “bodily heir” of the life tenant. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Abdirizak Omar Yussuf
M2008-01161-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Appellant, Rader Bonding Company, Inc., appeals the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court ordering complete forfeiture of the bail bond in the case of Defendant, Addirizak Omar Yussuf. Appellant argues that the State’s refusal to seek extradition of Defendant, who had fled to Sweden, constituted an extreme case under State v. Frankgos, 114 Tenn. 76, 85 S.W. 79, 80-81 (Tenn. 1905) which relieved Appellant of its responsibility under the bond agreement. Following a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Vincent Roger Harris v. State of Tennessee
M2008-01422-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

Petitioner, Vincent Roger Harris, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of his pleas of guilty, and that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy Tylus Sorrells
E2008-00791-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don W. Poole

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Timothy Tylus Sorrells, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for his murder conviction and one year as a Range I offender for abuse of a corpse, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

George R. Croft v. State of Tennessee
W2008-00449-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The petitioner, George R. Croft, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery and felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and to twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, he contends that his counsel were ineffective and that he should be granted a new trial because trial counsel did not conduct voir dire pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999), with regard to his desire to testify at trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Darrell Walls v. State of Tennessee
W2008-01947-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The petitioner, Darrell Walls, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case. The petitioner entered a best interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in confinement. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief by the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher R. Rickman
W2008-02012-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The defendant, Christopher R. Rickman, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of theft of property greater than $1000, a Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of three years, to be suspended following service of ninety days, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying a sentence of full probation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the convictions and resulting sentences.

State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens' Services v. Tina Temple, et al.
W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge Herbert J. Lane

This a termination of parental rights case. The children were removed from Father’s custody due to his lack of stable housing as well as his allowing Mother to “be with” the children despite her drug use. Numerous permanency plans were entered, which required Father, among other things, to maintain stable housing and income, legitimate the children, complete parenting classes, identify a support system, and attend family and domestic violence counseling. At various times, Father had employment and housing; however, at other times, he did not. In 2008, DCS petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of failure to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, as well as three additional grounds available under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9) for the termination of a non-legal parent’s rights. Although this Court finds that Father failed to obtain and maintain stable housing and income or to legitimate the children, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights, finding that DCS failed to aid Father in such efforts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the petition for termination is dismissed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. Tina Temple, et al. - Dissenting
W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge Herbert J. Lane

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. Specifically, I disagree
with the majority’s analysis of the grounds for termination of the parental rights of persons who are not legal parents, under T.C.A. section 36-1-113(g)(9), and with the conclusion that DCS was
required to prove that it gave Father sufficient aid as to those grounds.

Steve Stamson, Clerk of Juvenile Court of Shelby County, Tennessee v. David Lillard
W2009-00513-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles M. Cary

This appeal involves the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. to civil service positions in Shelby County. The Juvenile Court entered a consent judgment on a salary petition filed by the Juvenile Court Clerk pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. This judgment allowed the Juvenile Court Clerk to fill certain civil service positions. When the positions were not filled, the Juvenile Court Clerk filed a Petition for Contempt. Subsequently, the Juvenile Court entered judgment on the Petition for Contempt. Finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., we vacate its judgments and dismiss the case.

Gregory Allen Cathey v. State of Tennessee - Order
M2009-01123-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles

Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson - Dissenting
M2008-01143-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol Soloman

Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson
M2008-01143-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol Soloman

This case involves an appeal concerning the relocation of Elizabeth Leanne Hudson (“Mother”) and her two minor children from Nashville, Tennessee, to Hopkinsville, Kentucky. Larson Douglas Hudson (“Father”) opposed the relocation. After a three day bench trial, the trial court granted Mother’s request to relocate after finding, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, that the relocation was reasonable and not vindictive. The trial court also awarded Mother attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the holding of the trial court regarding the relocation but reverse concerning the attorney’s fees.¹

Robbie Edwina Elmore v. Fleetguard, et al.
M2008-02374-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Maddux

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Robbie Edwina Elmore, sustained compensable gradual injuries to her neck, shoulders and arms. The trial court made three separate awards, which totaled 122% to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer, Fleetguard, and the Second Injury Fund contend that the trial court erred by failing to make a single award pursuant to the concurrent injury rule, and by finding that she was not permanently and totally disabled. We conclude that the concurrent injury rule is applicable. We therefore modify the judgment to award 65% permanent partial disability, and find it unnecessary to address the remaining argument.1