Calvin R. Cannon v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Calvin R. Cannon, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his four petitions for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lori Ann Patton v. Hartco Flooring Company, a Division of Armstrong Products, Inc., et al.
This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue raised on appeal is whether the Employee, who suffered a neck, arm and shoulder injury in the course and scope of her employment, made a meaningful return to work after her injury. The trial court ruled that the Employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that, therefore, the cap on benefits of one and one-half times the impairment rating provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply. The trial court applied a multiplier of four times the impairment rating. The Employer appealed. We agree with the trial court that the Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, and thus the benefits cap does not apply. Moreover, the multiplier of four times the impairment rating was not excessive. We affirm the judgment. |
Scott | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee
I acknowledge that the majority opinion does not grant error coram nobis relief to this defendant but merely remands the case to the trial court for the purpose of the trial court applying the proper standard of review. I simply disagree with the majority’s conclusion; therefore, I dissent. The State argues that the one-year statute of limitations bars proceeding with the petitioner’s claims. The majority is unsure as to what date the statute began running under the facts of this case but has concluded, in any event, that due process requires the tolling of the statute. I conclude that the statute began to run thirty days after the judgment of conviction was entered on June 27, 1985. Our supreme court has specifically held that, as to a petition for writ of error coram nobis, “[a] judgment becomes final in the trial court thirty days after its entry if no post-motions are filed” and that “[i]f a post-trial motion is timely filed, the judgment becomes final upon entry of an order disposing of the post-trial motion.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996)). The petitioner did not file his petition for writ of error coram nobis until April 22, 2005. Because I agree with the State that the so-called new information either could or should have been discovered during the first trial, I disagree with the majority that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Thus, I would dismiss the petitioner’s claim as time barred. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Shelby County Criminal Court, claiming that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition on the basis that the petitioner was at fault for timely failing to discover the evidence. The petitioner appeals, maintaining that the newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also argues that the coram nobis court applied the incorrect standard in denying his petition for coram nobis relief, that the court did not address all of the evidence in denying his petition, and that a review of all the evidence shows he should receive a new trial. The State argues that the coram nobis court should have dismissed the petition because it was untimely filed and that, in any event, the court properly denied the petition. Based upon our review, we conclude that due process required tolling the statute of limitations in this case and agree with the petitioner that the coram nobis court denied the petition based upon the incorrect standard. Therefore, the court’s denial of the petition is reversed, and the case is remanded to the coram nobis court for reconsideration of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary E. Aldridge v. James Fortner, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gary E. Aldridge, was convicted in 1997 of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of simple assault, all perpetrated upon his estranged wife. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years, with a sentence of seventeen months and twenty-nine days to be served consecutively. The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. Gary Eugene Aldridge, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00075, 1999 WL 632299, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 1999), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2000). Subsequently, the petitioner began a series of post-conviction filings. This appeal resulted from the dismissal of his fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. We agree and dismiss the appeal. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nancy Randloph Deakins v. Lynn Lampton Deakins - Concurring
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Randloph Deakins vs. Lynn Lampton Deakins
In this divorce case, the trial court granted Nancy Randolph Deakins (“Wife”) a divorce from Lynn Lampton Deakins (“Husband”) thereby ending the parties’ 24-year marriage. Upon dissolving the marriage, the court valued and divided the marital estate, declined Husband’s request for alimony, and awarded Wife discretionary costs, her attorney’s fees and court costs. Husband challenges each of these determinations as well as an evidentiary ruling and the court’s finding that Husband dissipated assets. We reverse the awards to Wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett v. Bradley-Polk, OB/GYN Services, P.C.
This is a medical malpractice action filed by Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett and her husband Robert Plunkett (“the Plaintiffs”) as the natural parents and next of kin of their stillborn child. The complaint alleges that Michelle Perry, M.D., and Bradley-Polk OB/GYN Services, P.C. (collectively “the Bradley-Polk Defendants”), negligently failed to diagnose, manage and treat complications during Sarah’s pregnancy and that those failures resulted in the stillbirth delivery of the Plaintiffs’ infant. The Plaintiffs secured only one medical expert, Michael A. Ross, M.D., to present testimony that the Bradley-Polk Defendants violated the standard of care applicable in Bradley County at the time of treatment in early 2004. Doctor Ross was licensed in Virginia and practiced primarily in Fairfax, Virginia, and the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. To satisfy the “locality rule” followed in Tennessee, Dr. Ross testified that Bradley County was similar to two communities where he practiced in Virginia, both of which are within the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., but both of which are distinct communities situated about 40 to 50 miles from Washington, D.C. The Bradley-Polk Defendants first challenged Dr. Ross’s qualifications to testify with a motion in limine, and the trial court denied the motion approximately one month before trial. The Bradley-Polk Defendants renewed their challenge to Dr. Ross’s qualifications on the first day of trial. The trial court allowed a voir dire of Dr. Ross out of the presence of the jury and held that Dr. Ross was not qualified because the large metropolitan area where he practiced was not similar to Bradley County. Upon a stipulation of the parties that there was no proof available other than through Dr. Ross to establish a violation of the standard of care in Bradley County, the trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ oral motion for continuance and granted the Bradley-Polk Defendants’ motion for directed verdict. The Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lois Brasfield
Appellant, Lois Brasfield, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of felony reckless endangerment and misdemeanor assault. As a result, she was sentenced to eighteen months in incarceration. The trial court ordered her to spend 90 days in jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give the missing witness instruction to the jury at trial. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to show that the instruction was warranted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gerald Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief in which he argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also argues on appeal that the post-conviction court improperly excluded evidence at the post-conviction hearing related to his diminished mental capacity. We determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julia Fisher v. Ashley Revell - Concurring
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Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher v. Ashley Revell - Concurring
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Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher, et al. v. Ashley Revell, et al.
This is a summary judgment case, arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs/Appellants, the two injured parties, filed suit and served a copy of the summons on their insurance provider, the Appellee herein. In interpreting the policy, the trial court concluded that the policy limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence limited Plaintiffs/Appellants’ coverage to $200,000 (or $100,000 per person). Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal, asserting that they are entitled to recover the policy limit of $300,000 per occurrence. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley - Concurring
I agree with the majority that, in spite of numerous misdeeds committed by the State, the defendant is not entitled to relief. However, rules of discovery and rules of disclosure of exculpatory evidence exist for a reason. They are a necessary part of our notion of due process and ensure the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for trial. If the State violates the rules, whether intentionally or negligently, the result, even if correct, is tarnished. As Justice Douglas aptly pointed out over forty years ago, “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Such is the case herein. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley
At the conclusion of his second trial, Defendant-Appellant, William Glenn Wiley (hereinafter “Wiley”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Wiley argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal when the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) he should be granted a new trial because of several violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); (3) he should be granted a new trial because of several Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 violations; (4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his Knights Inn employment application and Arrowhead Motel receipt; (5) the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence in the form of Michelle Scheffel’s testimony and rebuttal evidence of a prior assault;(6) his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is excessive; and (7) the trial court erred in denying his request for co-counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Brett Browder
Appellant, Sean Brett Browder, was indicted for one count of theft over $10,000 and one count of theft over $500 by the Montgomery County Grand Jury. Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property over $1,000 and one count of theft of property over $500. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years for the first count and three years for the second count to be served concurrently to each other in the Department of Correction. Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing the length of sentence and in not ordering alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the length of his sentence and there was adequate support for the denial of alternative sentencing. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Joe Headley
Appellant, Ricky Joe Headley, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury in October of 2007 for four counts of official misconduct in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-402, as a result of actions taken while serving as the Sheriff of Williamson County. Appellant was also indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2007 in a multi-count indictment for thirty-three drug related charges that arose out of his unlawful acquisition of prescription medication from a pharmacy in Davidson County while he was wearing his Williamson County uniform and driving a Williamson County law enforcement vehicle. The cases were consolidated, and Appellant eventually pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit official misconduct and four counts of simple possession, all Class A misdemeanors, in exchange for an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-five days. Appellant was ordered to serve the sentence on probation,three years of which was to be supervised. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion. Appellant appeals this denial. We determine that the trial court considered the factors required for the grant or denial of judicial diversion and did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion to Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Collins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company Consolidated, et al.
Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his lower back as a result of his work as a route salesman for a soft drink company. He was treated by several doctors, to whom he gave differing histories concerning how his injury occurred. The trial court found that he had sustained a compensable injury and awarded 70% permanent partial disability apportioned between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. Employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.1 |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Larry Eugene Douglas v. Dura-Craft Millwork, Inc., et al.
Employee injured his neck in the course of his employment. While he was receiving treatment for that injury, his doctors discovered that he had a serious spinal condition. The treating doctors testified that this condition was unrelated to his work injury. After receiving treatment, Employee returned to work at his previous job. Several months later, his position was eliminated. He declined an offer of alternate employment. The trial court found that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 65% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by adopting the impairment rating of an evaluating physician and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree and modify the judgment accordingly.1 |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Shairiq Seabrooks
The defendant, Shairiq Seabrooks, was indicted on charges of first degree felony murder and first degree murder. After a jury trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the felony murder charge and the charge of first degree murder remained. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and the defendant was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to serve twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant has appealed, raising the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the victim’s prior arrest for the unlawful possession of a weapon; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony as inadmissible hearsay; (4) whether the jury charge concerning reasonable doubt was unconstitutional; and (5) whether the court erred in charging the jury on second degree murder. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monique Y. Croom v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Monique Y. Croom, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) maintain proper records, (2) adequately investigate her case and interview certain witnesses, (3) expedite her mental health evaluation, and (4) explain the types of homicide and the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Anthony Cline
The Defendant-Appellant, John Anthony Cline, was convicted by a Henry County Circuit Court jury of theft of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The State filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment based on several prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Cline as a Range II, multiple offender and imposed an eight-year sentence at thirty-five percent. In this appeal, Cline challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence and (2) the sufficiency of the State’s notice to seek enhanced punishment. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Bass Collins v. Stephen Butler Collins
This case involves a divorce ending a one year marriage. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation of marital property, its decision not to include the increase in wife’s separate property in the distribution of marital property and the award of temporary support to the wife during the pendency of the divorce. Because the trial court failed to properly determine the marital value on some items of property we reverse the trial court’s decision as to those items and remand for further consideration. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to the value of the remaining items of property and its award of temporary support. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis S. Person v. The Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
In 1967, the General Assembly passed a Private act consolidating the juvenile courts of Memphis and Shelby County by establishing a new court. The Act also provided for a second division, with the judgeship of that division to remain vacant until the County Commission determined the need for it. Almost forty years later, the Commission adopted a resolution approving the appointment of a judge to the second division of the court. The current judge of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County challenged the attempted creation of a second judgeship, arguing that the relevant portion of the Private Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of the authority to ordain and establish courts, which power is reserved to the General Assembly by the Tennessee Constitution. Because a judge is a necessary component of a court, in order to “ordain and establish” a court under Art. VI, § 1, the legislation creating or establishing the court must make provision for a judge. The legislature cannot establish a court without also establishing a judgeship. Since Section 20 of the Private Act does not create or establish a judgeship for division 2, it did not effectively create or establish that division or court. Additionally, because in Section 20 of the Private Act the legislature delegated to the Commission the power to decide whether a judge for division 2 was needed, which is the equivalent of delegating to the Commission the authority to establish or create division 2 of the juvenile court, we conclude that Section 20 is an unconstitutional delegation of power reserved to the General Assembly by Art. VI, § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s holding on that issue. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on Open Meeting Act claims based on a prior resolution that was promptly rescinded by the Commission. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Thomas Stagner v. State of Tennessee
On November 3, 2006, the petitioner, Donald Thomas Stagner, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft over $500 and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and one and onehalf years, respectively. The court ordered that the sentences would be served concurrently and suspended after ninety days. On October 18, 2007, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that his pleas of guilty were unknowing and that trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief by order entered on February 4, 2008. The defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 13, 2008, and the State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, thus, this appeal should be dismissed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals |