Gary L. Watts and Janet Watts, Parents And Next Friends of Clinton D. Watts, Deceased v. Earnestine J. Morris, et al.
This case arises from the death of a graduate student near the University of Memphis. While crossing the street, decedent was struck by a vehicle. Decedent’s parents, on his behalf, have sued the City of Memphis, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the City negligently maintained the defective, unsafe, or dangerous street that decedent was crossing. The trial court held that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Governmental Tort Liability Act waived the City of Memphis’ immunity from suit or that the City of Memphis was negligent. In addition, the court found that both decedent and the driver of the automobile that struck decedent were negligent and were each 50% at fault of the accident. We affirm on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the street was a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition for which the City’s immunity was waived. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Andre McElrath
The defendant, Mario Andre McElrath, was convicted of the attempted sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school zone. On direct appeal, this court found plain error in the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year, Range I sentence for a Class B felony and remanded for resentencing for a Class C felony. State v. Mario Andre McElrath, No. W2006-02621-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245723 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2007). On resentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of four years for a Class C felony for a violation of the Drug Free School Zone Act (DFSZA). In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the exemption from increased incarceration provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(b)(3) should apply to the release eligibility provision of section -432(c). Following our review, we conclude that the exemption does not apply to the release eligibility provision and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frank Barrett d/b/a Barrett Construction Company v. Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
This case presents a constitutional question of first impression: whether monetary penalties assessed by an administrative agency are subject to the fifty-dollar limitation of article VI, section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that article VI, section 14 applies only to the judicial branch of government and therefore is inapplicable to monetary penalties assessed by an administrative agency, which is part of the executive branch. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Iris Kay Snodgrass v. Robert H. Snodgrass
We granted permission to appeal in this divorce case to address whether a spouse’s 401(k) account is a “retirement or other fringe benefit right[] relating to employment” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) such that any increase in the account’s value that accrues during the marriage is marital property. We hold as follows: (1) the parties’ 401(k) accounts are “retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment”; (2) the entire net amount by which the parties’ 401(k) accounts increased in value during the period of the parties’ marriage is marital property; (3) the premarital balances in the parties’ 401(k) accounts remain their separate property; (4) Husband did not transmute his entire 401(k) account to marital property when he made a single withdrawal for marital purposes; and (5) the trial court correctly divided the parties’ defined benefit pensions by reference to the monthly income each spouse was receiving rather than by reference to the present cash value of each spouse’s pension. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Earl Williams
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Daniel Earl Williams, of one count of driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of violation of the implied consent law, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of violation of the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor, and one count of violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. Following trial, the defendant submitted to having seven prior driving under the influence offenses and was convicted of driving under the influence, eighth offense, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to serve two years in the custody of the Department of Correction. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his felony conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry Lee Hawkins, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Henry Lee Hawkins, Jr., appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions on four counts of aggravated robbery and effective sentence of 34 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy McDaniel, et al. v. Amal Rustom, M.D., et al.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice against emergency room physicians who treated their daughter. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs’ only expert was not qualified to testify as to the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the defendants’ profession and specialty in their community or in a similar community. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs’ expert did not meet the qualifications of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et al. v. Deliquent Taxpayers, as shown on the 2003 real property Deliquent tax records for Shelby County Trustee, et al. Home Funds Direct, A California Corporation/Delinquent Taxpayers v. William Garrett
This case involves the right to redeem property purchased at a tax sale. The trial court confirmed the petitioner’s right to redeem the property, divested title from the purchaser, and vested title in the original owners. The purchaser appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Arnold v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Antonio Arnold, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition based upon its finding that the petition did not contain sufficient and specific factual bases in support of his claim for relief. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Michael Rodriguez
A Hardeman County grand jury indicted the defendant, Andrew Michael Rodriguez, for one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The defendant entered a best interest plea to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, with an agreed sentence of six years as a Range I, standard offender. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion, probation, or other alternative sentencing and ordered the defendant’s sentence to be served in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nabeeh Jameel Mateen
The defendant, Nabeeh Jameel Mateen, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to forty years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing regarding an enhancement factor and a mitigating factor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., et al. v. Richard Epperson, et al.
We accepted Cracker Barrel’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Audrey Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Associates Limited Partnership
When Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint and discovery requests, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of Defendant’s liability. The trial court set a hearing to determine Plaintiff’s damages, and both Plaintiff and Defendant litigated the issue. After the trial court determined the amount of damages, Defendant asked, for the third time, the trial court to set aside the default judgment and schedule a trial on the merits. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, and Defendant appeals. Because Defendant failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense in its motion to set aside the default judgment, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Holt v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services
Plaintiff mother who had formally surrendered parental rights to her five children on March 21, |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Betsy B. Hull
The Defendant-Appellant, Betsy B. Hull (“Hull”) appeals the revocation of her probation by the Circuit Court for Fayette County. She contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to continue and in its decision to revoke her probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Young
This appeal involves the sentencing of a defendant who shot and seriously wounded a victim during an armed robbery and then two days later led law enforcement authorities on a lengthy and dangerous high-speed chase in an attempt to evade arrest. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of numerous offenses arising out of these incidents, and the trial court imposed an effective sixteen-year sentence. On the defendant’s first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the sentences and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing after concluding that the trial court’s sentencing findings were inadequate. On remand, the trial court imposed the same sixteen-year sentence. On the defendant’s second appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals made its own sentencing findings and imposed an effective seventeen-year sentence on the defendant. We granted the defendant’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We now hold that theCourt of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(c)(2) (2006) by increasing the defendant’s effective sentence from sixteen to seventeen years. We also hold (1) that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require that the facts necessary for the imposition of consecutive sentences be determined by a jury, (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals made adequate findings with regard to its decision to impose consecutive sentences, and (3) that the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain a decision to impose an effective sixteen-year sentence on the defendant. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Drake
Upon his pleas of guilty, the Defendant, Anthony Drew Drake, was convicted of one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation (a Class D felony), eight counts of burglary of an automobile (Class E felonies) and six counts of misdemeanor theft. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to terms of five years for the Class D felony and three years for each Class E felony conviction. Three of the three-year sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another and consecutively to the five-year sentence. Two of the remaining three-year sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another and consecutively to the five-year and three-year consecutive sentences, for an effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to serve his sentences in community corrections. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry Frazier, et al. v. Rickey Helton, et al.
Buyers of a corporation filed suit against sellers for breach of contract. Buyers filed a motion for default judgment for failure to answer written discovery requests, which the trial court granted. Following a hearing on damages, the court entered a final judgment. Two of the sellers filed a motion, seeking to alter or amend the judgment, a new trial or for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Wayne Buckner, et al.
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“the insurance company”) brought an action for declaratory judgment against Wayne Buckner (“the policyholder”) and others1 seeking a determination regarding its liability and duty to defend under a homeowners’ insurance policy (“the policy”) issued to the policyholder. The insurance company’s action was prompted by lawsuits filed following an incident in which the policyholder’s two teenage sons, William Russell Buckner and Joshua Thomas Buckner (who will be collectively referred to as “Will and Josh”2), fired rifles at tractor-trailers on an interstate highway, resulting in the death of Aaron E. Hamel, the driver of a car, and severe injuries to Kimberly Bede, a passenger in another car. The lawsuits included a personal injury suit by Ms. Bede and David Hickman,3 a personal injury suit by Denise Deneau,4 and a wrongful death action by John Hamel and his wife, Rosemary Hamel.5 The plaintiffs and defendants in the underlying lawsuits will be referred to collectively as “Defendants,” their posture in this declaratory judgment action. Defendants filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that the policy provides coverage to the defendants in the underlying actions and that each of the shootings was a separate, covered occurrence. The trial court, in dismissing the insurance company’s complaint and granting judgment on the counterclaims, held, among other things, that an exclusion in the policy against injuries “reasonably expected or intended” by the insured is not implicated by the facts of the underlying suits.6 We hold that the exclusionary provision applies to bar coverage for the suits against Will Buckner and Josh Buckner. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of the insurance company as to the suits against Will Buckner and Josh Buckner. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Singleton
The defendant, Barry Singleton, appeals his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. The defendant was sentenced to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and to twenty-five years as a violent offender for the aggravated rape conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively for an effective sentence of thirtyseven years. On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce photographs into evidence that had not been provided to the defense prior to trial; it was error to allow a witness not provided to the defendant to testify; it was error to allow the victim to testify without providing the tape recording of her initial statement to police; and the court erred in imposing his sentence with regard to both the length and manner. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard L. Hubbell v. Sumner Anesthesia Associates, Inc., et al
Shareholder and employee of a professional corporation filed suit demanding payment of the fair value of his shares in the corporation following termination of his employment. The corporation subsequently tendered $760.48 to the Sumner County Clerk and Master, the amount it believed represented the fair value of the shareholder’s shares as of the date of his termination of employment with the corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the corporation finding the shareholder failed to contradict the corporation’s proposed fair value. Finding error, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Hubbell v. Sumner Anesthesia Associates, Inc., et al - Dissenting
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Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy D. Qualls v. Ricky J. Bell, Warden
In 2003, the Petitioner, Timothy D. Qualls, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve eighteen years. The Petitioner file a petition for habeas corpus relief, and the habeas court denied his petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges the habeas court erred because: (1) the trial court sentenced the Petitioner in contravention of his constitutional rights; and (2) thetrial court sentenced the Petitioner in contravention of state statutes. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tom R. Smith v. Thomas Harding Potter
Appellant and Appellee are both licensed attorneys practicing in the State of Tennessee. This appeal arises from Appellant's efforts to recover money owed by Appellee on two promissory notes. The trial court found that the promissory notes were executed in recognition of Appellee's debt under two lease agreements. The court concluded that the lease agreements called for fee-splitting between attorneys in violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. We do not address the merits of the trial court's conclusion on this question. Instead, we find that no final judgment exists in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Antwone J. Terry v. Tennessee Department Of Correction, et al.
The appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking review of prison disciplinary proceedings. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not notarized or otherwise sworn, as required by statute. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals |