In the Matter of M.L.P.
This appeal involves an action to terminate the father’s parental rights filed jointly by the prospective adoptive parents and the temporary guardians of the child. The Juvenile Court found that the father did not abandon his child because the child’s temporary guardian interfered with the father’s attempts to visit the child. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the father abandoned the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) by willfully failing to visit the child for over four months. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the juvenile court to determine whether termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Edwina Montgomery ex rel. Thomas M. Montgomery v. Kali Orexi, LLC, et al.
In this wrongful death action, Edwina Montgomery (“the Plaintiff”), individually and as the surviving spouse of Thomas M. Montgomery (“the Deceased”), brought suit under the Tennessee Dram Shop Act (“the Dram Shop Act” or “the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002). The Plaintiff also sued for negligence and negligence per se.1 The Plaintiff sued Kali Orexi, LLC, which operates under the trade name of Gondolier Italian Restaurant and Pizza (“Gondolier”). Gondolier moved for summary judgment, which was granted as to all theories of recovery. We affirm the summary judgment on what appears to be an issue of first impression. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002) apply to third parties and do not authorize an action against a seller of an “alcoholic beverage or beer” by or on behalf of the supplied, or “first” party. Since the Dram Shop Act does not address first parties, its enactment leaves the law as to first parties as it existed before the Act’s enactment. In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly held that the injuries to the Deceased were not foreseeable; thus, Gondolier owed the Deceased no duty. Furthermore, even if a duty were owed, it was not breached. The question whether the actions of the Deceased and a taxi driver, who was paid by Gondolier to take the intoxicated Deceased home, were intervening and superseding causes that relieve Gondolier of liability are not addressed since we hold that the Plaintiff had no cause of action under the Dram Shop Act or for common law negligence. Accordingly, we affirm.2 |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory A. Frye
The Defendant-Appellant, Gregory A. Frye (“Frye”), pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twentynine days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court ordering Frye to serve his sentence consecutively to unrelated convictions for which he was currently serving a sentence. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lora Ashley - Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority and agree that the trial court correctly denied alternative sentencing in this case based upon the defendant’s criminal history and past failed efforts at rehabilitation. However, I write separately to note that the trial court revoked the defendant’s bond and denied her bond in a misdemeanor case pending appeal in contravention to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-104 and Rule 32(d)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which grant a defendant in a misdemeanor case “a right to have bail set or to be released on recognizance pending the exhaustion of all direct appellate procedure in the case.” |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Calvert v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jason Calvert, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lora Ashley
Appellant, Lora Ashley, appeals the Moore County Circuit Court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Appellant pled guilty to one count of facilitation of a violation of the sex offender registry and agreed to an open plea, where the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the basis that Appellant’s criminal history supported a denial of alternative sentencing and that measures less restrictive than confinement had been unsuccessfully applied to Appellant. As a result, the trial court ordered her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. Appellant appeals this decision. We determine that the record supports the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gale Marleen Krizka
Appellant, Gale Marleen Krizka, was indicted for first degree murder for the death of her husband. At the conclusion of the proof at trial, the trial court dismissed the first degree murder charge. The case proceeded to the jury on several lesser included offenses. After deliberating, the jury found Appellant guilty of second degree murder. As a result, the trial court sentenced her to twenty-two years in incarceration. Appellant seeks a review of her conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on criminal responsibility for the acts of another. We determine that the evidence presented at trial supports a jury instruction on criminal responsibility for the acts of another and that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Algie Lavell McClure
The defendant, Algie Lavell McClure, appeals as of right his jury convictions in the Hamilton County Criminal Court for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, reckless endangerment, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of two years and three years for the reckless endangerment and aggravated burglary counts, respectively. The two year sentence is to be served consecutively to the life sentence for the merged first degree murder conviction, with all other sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant contends on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of numerous prior bad acts of the defendant through multiple witnesses, that the trial court erred in admission of impeachment evidence, and that the trial court erred by not giving a credibility instruction relative to expectations of favorable treatment certain witnesses may have had in exchange for their testimony.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Richmond and wife, Darlene Richmond v. HSBC Bank, USA, as trustee
Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin enforcement of a detainer judgment and to nullify a foreclosure on their home on the basis that defendant failed to offer the property for sale at the courthouse door, in accordance with the notice of foreclosure. The Trial Court held plaintiffs failed to prove their allegations and found the foreclosure sale was properly held. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Ron Henry, et al. v. Cherokee Construction & Supply Company, Inc.
Ron Henry and Linda Henry (“Plaintiffs”) sued Cherokee Construction and Supply Company, Inc. (“Defendant”) alleging damages sustained when a wall in the home that Defendant constructed for Plaintiffs collapsed. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court entered an order finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the four year statute of repose contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-201, et seq., and granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Tim Burrus v. Jimmy Wiseman
This is a lawsuit filed by eight county officials to resolve a budget dispute. The officials filed an application in Chancery Court seeking judicial authorization to hire additional staff and to increase the salaries and benefits paid to a separate group of county employees. One day after the petition was filed, the officials, along with the defendant County Mayor, entered a consent order approving each petitioner’s requests. One month later, the County Commission attempted to intervene and have the order set aside. The trial court denied the County Commission’s motions, and the County Commission appeals. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene. However, several procedural and substantive defects require this Court to vacate the Consent Order and remand |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Billie Gail Hall, as Surviving Spouse of Billy R. Hall v. Douglas B. Haynes, JR., M.D. and Medsouth Healthcare, P.C.
This appeal involves authority to accept service of process. The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the defendant corporation and its employee, the defendant physician. The plaintiffs attempted to serve process in person on both the corporation and the physician at the corporation’s business address. Service was accepted on behalf of the physician by a co-worker, who was not specifically authorized to accept service for him. Service was accepted on behalf of the corporation by an employee of the corporation who was not an officer, managing agent, or chief agent, and who was not specifically authorized to accept service for the corporation. Both defendants received a copy of the summons and complaint. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint and attempted to serve both defendants via certified mail. The return receipts for both defendants were signed by an employee of the corporation who was not an officer, managing agent, or chief agent of the corporation, and was not specifically authorized to accept service of process on behalf of either the physician or the corporation. The employee who signed the return receipts was, however, authorized to sign for certified mail. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based in part on insufficiency of service of process. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, relying on this Court’s decision in Boles v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., No. M1999-00727-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1030837 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2000). The defendants were granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the defendant physician argues that service on him was not effective because he was not personally served and because the persons who accepted service on his behalf were not authorized to do so. The defendant corporation argues that service on it was not effective because neither the corporation’s registered agent nor its administrator were served and the persons who accepted service on the corporation’s behalf were not authorized to do so. After reconsidering the analysis in Boles, we reverse the trial court’s decision, finding that service was not effective on either defendant and the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Herman Jones
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Herman Jones, pleaded guilty to theft of property over $1,000 and evading arrest, Class D felonies. As a result, he was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years as a Range II offender to be served in community corrections with the first year to be served in the Synergy drug treatment program. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentences and resentenced the defendant to concurrent twelve year sentences as a career offender. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but modify the defendant’s concurrent sentences to eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. The case is remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Noe Gutierrez - Dissenting
My colleagues and the trial court determined that Detective Corcoran was without probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in the murder of Emma Fuller, that taking the defendant into custody violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the defendant’s subsequent confession acknowledging his involvement in the murder should be suppressed. I agree with the relevant law cited by the majority and recognize that probable cause must have been established at the time of the defendant’s arrest. I simply disagree with the majority’s conclusion that probable cause was not established on the facts known to Detective Corcoran. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Noe Gutierrez
The defendant, Jose Noe Gutierrez, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated rape. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement he made to police after his arrest, alleging that “his initial detention at his place of employment was made without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and all his statements were therefore fruit of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed.” The trial court granted the motion and also granted the State’s request for an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State argues that the defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, or, in the alternative, that the defendant’s statement was not tainted by the illegal arrest. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert M. Winters v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden, and the State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Robert M. Winters, was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery. He received a total effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his convictions were void because of faulty indictments and that his counsel was ineffective. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to allege grounds upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the summary dismissal. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Antonio Logan
The defendant, Marcus Antonio Logan, was convicted by jury of one count of delivering less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class C felony. Thereafter, he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court properly overruled the defendant’s objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the jury should have been instructed on the state’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alfred Goodman
The defendant, James Alfred Goodman, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and evading arrest – endangering others, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years and three years, respectively, to be served consecutively in confinement. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in not considering his motion to proceed in propria persona; (2) his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the State’s failure to produce all of his property in its possession; (3) his right to confront witnesses was “abridged and violated”; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Tigner, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either that counsel was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies in representation prejudiced the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rickie Reed v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in the case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Herman Parham v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Herman Parham, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retrieve a bullet from a tree at the crime scene. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul L. McMillin vs. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in 2005 and another action, similar in nature, against the same defendant in 2006. The actions were assigned to two separate Judges and the 2005 action was first dismissed by one Judge and subsequently the 2006 action was dismissed by the other Circuit Judge. The plaintiff has appealed the 2006 action. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David W. Frazier
Following a jury trial, the defendant, David W. Frazier, was convicted by a Weakley County jury of one count of driving under the influence, second offense, (“DUI 2nd”), a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, sixty days of which was to be served in the county jail. The defendant was initially indicted by a Weakley County jury for DUI 2nd and violation of the implied consent law. He subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, as the preliminary hearing tape was inaudible. The State agreed, and the court dismissed the indictment. Subsequently, a second preliminary hearing was held, and the defendant was reindicted by a grand jury. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the second indictment upon grounds that he had previously been charged and indicted for the same offenses. The court denied the motion. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the second indictment because the State failed to timely reindict the defendant and because the second indictment violates double jeopardy principles. After review of the record, we find no merit to the defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard L. Williams v. Roland Colson, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edwin O. Martin, et al v. Carl Nash, et al
Members of family in whose name a cemetery was established brought suit against owners of property surrounding the cemetery seeking removal of a cloud upon their title to the cemetery, injunctive relief and damages. The trial court declared the boundaries of the original cemetery and limited those entitled to be buried therein to the family members; allowed that members of the general public were permitted to be buried in land added to the original cemetery tract; and appointed trustees to manage the cemetery as established under both conveyances. Family members appeal, contending that trial court erred in setting the cemetery boundary; in disregarding proof of cost of repairing fence which had been removed by one defendant; and in refusing to hear testimony as to the trust fund established for the maintenance of the cemetery. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals |