Eisai, Inc. v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
M2021-01408-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russel T. Perkins

The issues on appeal involve the assessment of state business taxes against a pharmaceutical company that stored and sold its products from a warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the taxpayer, Eisai, Inc. (“Eisai”), on the ground that its pharmaceutical sales were not subject to business tax because the pharmaceuticals did not constitute “tangible personal property” as the term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702(a)(23), which exempts products that are “inserted or affixed to the human body” by physicians or “dispensed . . . in the treatment of patients by physicians.” The Department of Revenue (“the Department”) appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but also rule in favor of Eisai on a different ground raised in the trial court and on appeal. In order to prevail in this case, the Department must establish that Eisai made “wholesale sales” to “retailers,” as distinguished from “wholesaler-towholesaler” sales, the latter of which are exempt from business tax. The undisputed facts reveal that Eisai’s sales were “wholesaler-to-wholesaler” sales. Accordingly, Eisai’s sales were not subject to business tax. As such, Eisai need not establish that the exception in § 67-4-702(a)(23) applies. Nevertheless, if Eisai’s sales to its distributors are within the scope of the business tax, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Eisai’s sales are exempt under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702(a)(23). For these reasons, we affirm.

In Re Jeremiah B.
E2022-00833-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dwight E. Stokes

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established
that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother
has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Brad Coen v. Myra (Coen) Horan
W2019-00404-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carma Dennis McGee

The mother of the parties’ only child filed a pro se appeal of the trial court’s order granting
the father’s Petition to Allow Relocation and for Modification of the Parties’ Permanent
Parenting Plan. The final order was entered on January 25, 2019, and the mother filed a
timely Notice of Appeal; however, the technical record was not filed with this court until
three years later, on June 7, 2022. While the mother’s pro se appellate brief was timely
filed, her brief is profoundly deficient for it fails to comply with Rule 27(a) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee in many material respects. Specifically, her Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts are littered with a series of assertions unrelated to the merits of this
appeal, and she fails to provide the requisite citations to the record as required by Rule
27(a)(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further, her brief fails to set forth
relevant arguments with respect to the issues presented as required by Rule 27(a) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the few citations to legal authorities she
provides are not on point. Based on her failure to comply with Rule 27(a)(7) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee, Mother has waived her right to an appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is
dismissed.

Home Service Oil Company v. Thomas Baker
M2021-00586-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Louis W. Oliver

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The judgment debtor opposed the petition claiming that the doctrine of laches prevented the judgment creditor from enforcing its judgment. Alternatively, the judgment debtor claimed that equitable estoppel prevented the judgment creditor from collecting the full amount remaining on the judgment. The trial court enrolled the judgment but agreed that equitable estoppel applied. We conclude that equitable estoppel does not apply. So we affirm the enrollment of the foreign judgment and vacate the trial court’s decision as to enforceability.

City of Covington v. Terrell Tooten
W2021-00946-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Walker, III

Appellant was found guilty of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-199 for
alleged use of a handheld wireless telecommunication device while driving. The trial court
later dismissed the judgment against Appellant. Appellee City of Covington reached a
settlement with Appellant, Appellant’s driver’s license was reinstated, and the violation
was removed from his record. Accordingly, the legal controversy at the center of this case
has been extinguished, and this Court can offer no meaningful relief to the Appellant. As
such, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

In Re Korey L.
M2022-00487-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal; (4) incarceration for a 10-year sentence; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support the grounds of: (1) failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights on those grounds. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Dover Signature Properties, Inc. v. Customer Service Electric Supply, Inc.
E2022-00461-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John F. Weaver

The appellant, the developer of a senior living facility in Knoxville, appeals the trial court’s
determination that it breached a joint check agreement that included itself, an electrical
subcontractor, and an electrical supplier as signatories. Although the appellant had initially
denied executing the joint check agreement and had expressed a lack of awareness of the
electrical supplier’s involvement with the subcontractor and senior living project, it
ultimately acknowledged during litigation that its controller had signed the joint check
agreement and that the supplier’s materials were incorporated into the project. The proof
at trial revealed that, notwithstanding its execution of the joint check agreement, the
appellant never issued a joint check that would assure that the supplier received payment.
Instead, the appellant paid only the subcontractor who failed to pay the supplier. Herein,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding the supplier relief against the appellant.

City of Memphis v. George Edwards by and through Elizabeth W. Edwards
W2022-00087-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

Appellant City of Memphis appeals the dismissal of its petition for judicial review of the
ruling of an administrative law judge. The trial court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the City failed to provide the entire administrative record. Despite profound
deficiencies in the City’s brief, the dispositive issue is one of law and involves only the
question of whether the trial court should have proceeded with its review on the partial
administrative record. Because our review is de novo on questions of law, we exercise our
discretion under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 and 13(b) to proceed with
adjudication of the appeal on the merits. We conclude that the trial court should have
proceeded with its review on the partial administrative record; as such, we reverse the trial
court’s dismissal of the appeal and remand for further hearing.

State of Tennessee v. Tedrick Dawne Hughes
W2022-00571-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Defendant, Tedrick Dawne Hughes, was convicted of possession of more than onehalf
gram of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of more than one-half gram of
marijuana with intent to deliver, tampering with evidence, and simple possession of
methamphetamine, for which he received an effective five-year sentence of confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions for possession of more than one-half gram of marijuana with intent to sell,
possession of more than one-half gram of marijuana with intent to deliver, and tampering
with evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

City of Memphis v. George Edwards by and through Elizabeth W. Edwards -Dissent
W2022-00087-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

There is much in the Majority Opinion with which I agree. But on one significant
question I must respectfully dissent: whether this Court should excuse the City’s failure to
brief a threshold issue.

Kelvin Dewayne Golden v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00388-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On
appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his
claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner
argues that counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to argue to the trial court that the
indictment was inconsistent with the charged jury instructions, (2) failing to utilize
impeachment evidence through the use of expert witnesses, (3) failing to properly
investigate the case, (4) failing to hire a private investigator and medical expert to review
physical or DNA evidence, and (5) failing to utilize the victim’s psychological records to
impeach the victim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Kellye Rhea Crabtree
M2021-01154-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

Defendant, Kellye Rhea Crabtree, appeals from the trial court’s sentencing and restitution orders connected with her guilty-pleaded convictions for theft over $60,000, theft over $1,000, and official misconduct, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing; finding that she was a professional criminal; denying probation or an alternative sentence; ordering the maximum in-range sentence; and imposing restitution in an ex parte order filed after the sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court regarding consecutive sentencing and the manner of service. However, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for a full restitution hearing.

Collin C. ET AL., By Next Friend Holly Craft v. Michael Steven Tutor
W2023-00153-COA-R3-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Felicia Corbin-Johnson

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court
following the denial of a motion that sought the trial court judge’s recusal from the case.
Herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion.

Brandon K. Anderson v. Lauderdale County, Tennessee
W2022-00332-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Blake Neill

Plaintiff filed an action against Lauderdale County under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-301 to -
303, more than one year after his cause of action accrued. The trial court examined the
gravamen of the complaint and determined a one-year statute of limitations applied rather
than the two or six-year limitations periods advocated for by the plaintiff. Discerning no
error in the court’s analysis of the issues, we affirm.

Marcus Thomas v. State of Tennessee
E2022-00160-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

The Petitioner, Marcus Thomas, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of
post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction to attempted first degree murder.
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on
his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his
guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

In Re Dixee D. Et Al.
M2022-00785-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the maternal aunt and uncle proved two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

State of Tennessee v. David Ray Duncan
E2022-00647-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

As relevant to this appeal, the Defendant, David Ray Duncan, was convicted by a jury of
the offense of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance while present in a penal
institution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. He also argues that the trial court should have excluded
evidence produced after the deadline established by the court’s scheduling order, and he
challenges the propriety of his effective twelve-year sentence. We affirm the Defendant’s
conviction, but we respectfully remand the case for resentencing in accordance with Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-11-211.

State of Tennessee v. Katherine E. Pilley
E2022-00348-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

The Defendant, Katherine E. Pilley, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (c)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended)
(simple possession of methamphetamine). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to
eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after thirty days in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s
denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the
Defendant’s car. Because the certified question is overly broad as it fails to identify the
scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction
to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Medley
E2022-00467-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gary McKenzie

The Defendant, Brian Keith Medley, was found guilty of sexual battery and
domestic assault. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum of four years as a Range II,
multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and that the maximum sentence was excessive. We respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Douglas McArthur McGill
M2022-00501-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The Defendant, Douglas McArthur McGill,1 was convicted by a jury of violating the
Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and
Tracking Act of 2004 by failing to register a secondary address. He was sentenced as a
Range II, multiple offender to a term of two years and six months. On appeal, the
Defendant seeks a new trial, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay
evidence. The State concedes that reversible error exists in the record, and we agree. We
respectfully reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and
remand the case for a new trial.

Darcell Dominique Wright v. State of Tennessee
M2022-00416-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert T. Bateman

The Petitioner, Darcell Dominique Wright, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it held that the Petitioner’s claim of limited ability to access the penitentiary law library due to lockdowns did not entitle him to due process tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for filing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee et al.
E2020-01529-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

Governmental entities generally are immune from suit. But the Governmental Tort Liability Act removes immunity for certain injuries caused by the negligent acts of an employee. In this case, we consider whether the term “negligent” in the Act’s removal provision is limited to ordinary negligence or instead also encompasses gross negligence or recklessness. We hold that the Act removes immunity only for ordinary negligence. Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.

Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee et al. (Concur)
E2020-01529-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

I concur in the majority’s analysis and holding that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 29-20-205 removes immunity for Hawkins County only for ordinary negligence,
not gross negligence or recklessness. I write separately to highlight an issue not addressed
in the majority opinion—whether we should continue to apply the common law public duty
doctrine and the related special duty exception in cases where the legislature has addressed
the issue of immunity by statute.

State of Tennessee v. Ricky Hunter
W2022-00763-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.

Ricky Hunter, Defendant, was indicted for one count of first degree murder and one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of
the lesser included offense of second degree murder and being a felon in possession of a
firearm. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 33 years. The trial court denied
a motion for new trial. After this Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal,
this appeal ensued. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
sustaining the second degree murder conviction. We find the evidence sufficient and
affirm the convictions.

Jahue Mumphrey v. State of Tennessee
W2021-01439-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

The Petitioner, Jahue Mumphrey, pled guilty by criminal information to possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to sell and three counts of domestic assault. He was
sentenced to an effective term of ten years. He later filed a petition for post-conviction
relief alleging that his plea was entered involuntarily and that his lawyer rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by, among other things, failing to review pretrial
discovery with him. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the
Petitioner appealed to this Court. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court.