Markist Cole v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Markist Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that due process considerations warranted the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tut M. Tut v. Kevin Genovese, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, Tut Mayal Tut, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laura Cowan Coffey v. David L. Coffey
This appeal involves the calculation of post-judgment interest applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. The trial court calculated |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death lawsuit. James Williams (“Plaintiff”), individually as next of kin and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Granville Earl Williams, Jr., deceased (“Decedent”), sued Smyrna Residential, LLC d/b/a Azalea Court and Americare Systems, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). Decedent was a resident of Azalea Court, an assisted living facility. Plaintiff alleged his father died because of Defendants’ negligence. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into by Decedent’s daughter and durable power of attorney Karen Sams (“Sams”) on behalf of Decedent when the latter was admitted to Azalea Court. Notably, the durable power of attorney (“the POA”) did not cover healthcare decision-making. The Trial Court held that Sams lacked authority to enter into the Agreement and that, in any event, the wrongful death beneficiaries would not be bound by the Agreement even if it were enforceable. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Gene DeBow v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Billy Gene DeBow, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his first-degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without ruling on the merits of his claims and that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his judgment is void and his sentence is illegal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Halliburton v. Tennessee Board of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied the inmate parole in March 2020. The inmate’s administrative appeal was also denied. Thereafter, the inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court. However, the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to outstanding costs in prior civil cases. The inmate then filed a second petition with the chancery court. The chancery court dismissed the second petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not filed within sixty days of the Tennessee Board of Parole’s final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102. The inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Shaw Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Thompson's Station et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff developer objected to the defendant town’s enforcement of a new energy code after the developer received preliminary plat approval. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant town. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Cole v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in its denial of her petition. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Scott Montella
The Defendant, Christopher Scott Montella, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018). He received a sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Defendantcontends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search, (4) the Defendant suffered a violation of Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when the State failed to inform the Defendant the victim’s trial testimony would be different than the victim’s previous testimony, (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct, and (6) the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to eleven years. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever; however, the error was harmless. We reverse the Defendant’s conviction based on juror misconduct and remand the case for a new trial. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald N. Crawford
The Defendant, Gerald N. Crawford, pleaded guilty to delivery of heroin, a Class B felony, and possession with the intent to sell heroin, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(2), (4) (2018) (subsequently amended). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent twelve-year, Range I sentences, and after a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentences in the Department of Correction. The Defendant filed a motion to modify the manner of service of the sentences, which the court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alisa Bibbs v. Durham School Services, L.P., ET AL.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Woodmore’s school secretary sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The school secretary alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the school secretary had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the school secretary sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the secretary is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Franklin, Jr. v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, an educational assistant at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The educational assistant alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused him serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the educational assistant had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that he had met all other pleading requirements to sustain his RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the educational assistant sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the educational assistant is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cherri Schrick v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a fourth grade math and science teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
McKayla Taylor v. Miriam's Promise et al.
This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court. The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Muhammed Et Al. v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a computer teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Cothran Et Al. v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, the school principal at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). With respect to her NIED claim, the principal alleged that by breaching its duty to keep the students safe, the employer foreseeably caused her severe emotional distress. As to her RIED claim, she averred that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving, despite receiving numerous warnings, disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss as to both claims, finding that the principal’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements to sustain the claims. Employer appeals. We conclude that the principal did not allege the type of relationship to the injured or deceased party required for a plaintiff who did not witness the injury-producing event to recover under a NIED claim. The principal’s allegations also failed to show conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to both issues and remand the case for dismissal of the action against the employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Madeline Lee Williams v. Joshua Dwain Williams
This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court determined that both the husband and the wife had proven their grounds for divorce and declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b). The trial court also (1) declined to adopt the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, (2) determined that the separate assets she contributed to the marriage had become marital property through transmutation, and (3) declined to award attorney’s fees to her as alimony in solido. The wife has appealed, and the husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, characterizing the wife’s appeal as frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s final order of divorce but modify the order to prohibit the husband from consuming alcohol during his co-parenting time. We decline to award the husband attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dillon Lambdin
The Petitioner, Michael Dillon Lambdin, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition seeking relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and life sentence.In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because (1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner's police statement due to the Petitioner's intoxication; (2) counsel failed to object to crime scene and autopsy photographs; (3) counsel introduced a prejudicial crime scene photograph of the victim;(4) counsel failed to object to an improper statement made during the State's rebuttal argument; and (5) counsel failed to request an accomplice jury instruction in writing. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial.After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence F. Goodine v. Erica Carol Goodine
Because appellant failed to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B with regard to filing a recusal appeal, and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernest G. McBrien
The defendant, Ernest G. McBrien, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss, revoking his probation, and ordering him to serve his original six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss both the original and amended probation violation warrants against the defendant. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tarrance Jershun Perry
The Appellant, Tarrance Jershun Perry, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of rape, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years to be served at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Appellant contends that a constructive amendment of the indictment and a fatal variance occurred when the indictment charged him with rape by force or coercion but the proof at trial showed rape without consent and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jesse D. Moses
A jury convicted Defendant, Jesse D. Moses, of one count of Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon. See Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17- 1307(b)(1)(A) (2017). The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years’ incarceration with a thirty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his prior conviction for aggravated burglary was a felony involving the use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that a “[p]rior ‘crime of violence’ includes any degree of burglary.” Upon review, we determine that Defendant’s prior aggravated burglary was a felony involving the use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon and that the trial court’s jury instruction was not prejudicially erroneous. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Virginia Crawley v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee et al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a decision by a city’s planning commission. The petitioner contends that the planning commission’s approval of modifications to a site plan for a planned unit development district were not minor, such that the proposed amendments should have been referred to the city’s council for consideration. The trial court ultimately determined that the modifications were minor and did not require referral to the council; accordingly, it dismissed the petition. We concur in the conclusion of the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Anne Steadman v. Charles Daniel Farmer
In this divorce case, Husband contests the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of alimony to Wife. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaidon S. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four children on grounds of abandonment by failure to support, persistence of conditions, and failure to demonstrate a willingness and ability to assume physical custody or financial responsibility. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |